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Abstract 
Travel behaviour - especially car use - is of concern because it contributes to 
environmental problems such as climate change. Focusing on commuting, this thesis 
aimed to explain people's travel mode decisions and what might motivate drivers to 
switch modes. The literature shows that - as in the wider field of environmentally-
significant behaviour - Schwartz's norm-activation theory (NAT) and Ajzen's theory of 
planned behaviour (TPB) are predominant in travel psychology. Research undertaken 
for this thesis was based on these theories. 
Study 1 used logistic regression (n = 312) to test NAT and the TPB's ability to 
explain drivers' intentions to maintain or reduce their car use for commuting to De 
Montfort University (DMU). A model using variables from both theories was also tested, 
as was a model that added contextual variables to these psychological constructs. The 
model including contextual variables had the greatest predictive power (shown by Rl 
values). There were interactions between several predictor variables. Most notably, the 
influence of altruistic (pro-environmental) motives on intentions was moderated by 
perceived control over commuting mode choice and by contextual factors including 
bicycle ownership, carriage of passengers and journey time. 
In study 2,24 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with commuters to DMU. 
Using discourse analytic techniques, the prevalent stances on car use and use of other 
modes for travel to work were identified. Many echoed NAT and TPB constructs (e.g. 
moral motives, perceived control over modal choice), underlining these theories' 
applicability to commuting. However, other stances were also evident, most notably 
affective motives and habits as reasons for commuting mode decisions. People drew 
on various combinations of these discourses to explain their commuting behaviour. 
The thesis proposes a new model of commuting mode choice and suggests guidelines 
for interventions designed to encourage drivers to use alternative modes. However, it is 
stressed that reliance on attitude-behaviour research alone may ignore wider socio-
cultural influences on travel behaviour. Suggestions are made regarding theoretical 
perspectives and methods that may help in understanding these forces and a case is 
made for mixed-method research as the way ahead for travel psychology. 
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Chapter J 
Research context 
1.1 Climate change: 'The most serious global environmental threat' 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) was launched by the United Nations in 
2001 and reported in 2005. Billed as the "most comprehensive survey ever into the 
state of the planet" (Amos, 2005), it argues that overuse of resources is "already 
causing significant harm ... and unless addressed will substantially diminish the long-
term benefits obtained from ecosystems" (MEA, 2005, 5). 
The MEA identifies many anthropogenic environmental problems, including "disease 
emergence, abrupt alterations in water quality, the creation of "dead zones" in coastal 
waters, the collapse of fisheries, and shifts in regional climate" (Ibid., 6). The prognosis 
based on this global study is alarming. 
Recent decades have seen increased awareness of humankind's negative impacts on 
the non-human environment and such concerns have risen up political agendas in the 
UK and elsewhere. Anthropogenic climate change, in particular, has been identified as 
"the most serious global environmental threat" (DEFRA, 2005, 3) and "our most 
pressing global environmental issue" (Dunn and Flavin, 2002, 49). The phenomenon -
manifest in rising average global temperature, but regional warming and cooling - is 
widely accepted by Climatologists and is blamed for drought, flooding, habitat loss and 
consequent socio-economic impacts (IPCC, 2001). Thus, whether one values the non-
human environment for its own sake (e.g. Lee, Holland and McNeill, 2000) or is 
concerned about the consequences of ecosystem degradation for humans, there are 
imperatives for environmental protection. 
Climate change is caused by several factors. According to the Centre for International 
Climate and Environmental Research, these include changes in the reflectivity of 
Earth's surface, in solar radiation, in the planet's orbit and in atmospheric composition 
(Alfsen, Fuglestvedt, Seip and Skodavin, 1999). It is this last variable on which human 
activity has had a profound effect in a short (geological) time. Concentrations of carbon 
dioxide (C02) - "the most important gas for the man-made enhancement" of climate 
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change (Ibid., 15) - rose from 280 parts per million (ppm) in 1750 to 374 ppm in 2000 
(IPCC, 2002). The main reason for this increase was fossil fuel combustion (Ibid.). 
1.2 The problem of personal transport 
Fossil fuels have been the main energy source in Western societies since the industrial 
revolution (Von Weizs~cker, 1994) and their use is increasing rapidly in developing 
countries. For example, between 1993 and 2002 fossil fuel consumption in India and 
China rose by 46.2% and 31.6%, respectively (BP, 2004). Due to concerns over 
climate change, policies are being implemented to shift energy generation to renewable 
sources and to increase the efficiency of energy use (e.g. DTI, 2003). Although 
atmospheric CO2 levels are expected to rise well into the 21 st Century (IPCC, 2002), 
these policies have had some effect. UK CO2 emissions from the industrial, domestic 
and service sectors fell between 1990 and 2000; reducing national CO2 emissions by 
8% (Foley and Fergusson, 2003). However, CO2 emissions from road transport rose by 
3.6% and transport "is the only sector where emissions are expected to be higher in 
2020 than in 1990" (Bristow, Pridmore, Tight, May, Berkhout and Harris, 2004, 3). 
There are several reasons for this trend; not least the increasing number of cars on UK 
roads. Between 1975 and 2001 the number of registered cars doubled to 24 million 
(Exley and Christie, 2002). By 2001 cars accounted for 85% of passenger miles, trains 
for 7%, buses and coaches for 6% and motorbikes, bicycles and walking just 2% 
(Ibid.). This car dependence can be partly attributed to contextual factors such as rising 
incomes (Ibid.), poor public transport (Ibid.), growing numbers of women in work (Root 
and Schintler, 1999) and planning strategies that have increased distances between 
home, work and leisure destinations (Rodriguez and Joo, 2004). Often because of 
such factors, driving is perceived as the most convenient, flexible and reliable way to 
travel (e.g. Anable and Gatersleben, 2005). 
Besides perceptions of utility, other social-psychological forces are at play. As journalist 
and novelist Tom Wolfe said of 1960s car culture, "Cars mean more to these kids than 
architecture did in Europe's great formal century, say, 1750 to 1850. They are freedom, 
style, sex, power, motion" (Wolfe, 1969, quoted by Bayley, 2003, 11). The academic 
literature also suggests that driving confers non-instrumental benefits such as status, 
personal control (e.g. Ellaway, Macintrye, Hiscock and Kearns, 2003) and fun (e.g. 
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Steg and Uneken, 2002). Moreover, car manufacturers exploit and perpetuate these 
perceptions in their advertising (Steg, Vlek and Siotegraaf, 2001). 
For these reasons, "even the most energy efficient cars will not deliver carbon emission 
reductions on the scale likely to be needed to reduce the climate change impacts of 
road transport over the longer term" (Foley, 2003, 1). While European manufacturers 
should meet their voluntary target of reducing average CO2 emissions from new cars to 
140 g/km by 2008 (Foley & Fergusson, 2003), deep cuts in transport emissions will 
require new technologies if car use continues at present levels or rises further. It has 
been suggested that hybrid-electric vehicles (HEVs), which use a battery-powered 
motor and an engine that operates on fossil fuel, are at best an interim step (Reuyl , 
2005). Although HEVs produce less CO2 per mile than fossil fuel-only vehicles, the 
difference is too small (Foley, 2003) to contribute significantly to the emissions 
reductions called for in the long term (e.g. RCEP, 2002). It has, therefore, been said 
that "hydrogen currently holds out the most promise for achieving radical reductions in 
carbon emissions" from transport (Foley, 2003, 11). However, problems with 
infrastructure, funding and public acceptance mean that despite the existence of 
prototypes (Figure 1.1) significant shifts in this direction remain decades away (Ibid. ; 
Foley & Fergusson, 2003). Moreover, although HEVs and hydrogen reduce per car 
emissions, they will not solve problems caused by congestion and the inaccessibility of 
services to people without cars (Nilsson and KOller, 2000). 
Figure 1.1 BMW's 745h hydrogen-powered car, London Clean Energy Expo, May 2005 
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1.3 Psychology's contribution to the solution 
The above account suggests a need for behavioural change (people switching from 
cars to modes that cause less pollution and congestion and/or avoiding some journeys 
altogether) as well as technological change. Thus, the branch of environmenta\ 
psychology "that looks at the roots of environmental degradation and the connections 
between ... attitudes and pro-environmental behaviors" (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002, 
240) has much to offer. We cannot hope to promote actions that benefit the 
environment without understanding what motivates and constrains them. 
Accordingly, there has been much academic interest in 'environmentally-significant 
behaviour' (ESB) in recent years. ESB can be defined by "the extent to which it 
changes the availability of materials or energy from the environment or alters the 
structure and dynamics of ecosystems or the biosphere" (Stern, 2000, 408). Given the 
resource requirements and emissions associated with fossil-fuelled travel modes, travel 
behaviour is clearly environmentally significant. Thus, within the wider sphere of ESB, 
there is a burgeoning stream of travel research. The present thesis contributes to this 
field and particularly to the set of studies examining influences on travel mode choices 
(e.g. Bamberg and Schmidt, 2003; Nordlund and Garvill, 2003). A common premise of 
such studies is that reducing car use can help to mitigate anthropogenic climate 
change. It may also improve local air quality and reduce congestion, noise and 
accidents (Attali and Wilhite, 2001). Moreover, if people switch to modes like walking 
and cycling, there may be improvements in public health and associated benefits of 
reduced healthcare demand and increased economic productivity (OfT, 2004). 
1.4 Commuting 
Many studies of travel mode choice specifically examine commuting (e.g. Bamberg & 
Schmidt, 2003; KIOckner and Matthies, 2004). Commuter trips may offer significant 
scope for emissions reductions. In 2002, 71.2% of UK journeys to work were made by 
car (ONS, 2002) and the average distance was 8.5 miles in 2003 (OfT, 2003). Many 
people faCing shorter commutes might realistically use non-motorised modes. Even 
those commuting further may be able to use public transport, especially in urban areas. 
At average occupation levels, CO2 emissions per passenger mile by train and bus can 
be 50% lower than by car (OfT, 2004), so widespread switching from driving to these 
modes could contribute much to environmental protection. Moreover, commuting trips 
are frequent, regular and often habitual (Klockner & Matthies, 2004). If environmentally-
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benign commuting habits can be formed, they might influence 10 journeys each week 
for a full-time UK worker. As such a person commutes , on average, over 4,000 miles 
per year (Orr, 2003) the potential for reduced emissions is clear. 
Commuting is a special case of travel behaviour because trips are especially 
constrained. They must be made at particular times, lateness may be penalised, the 
destination is fixed , people may have to arrive dressed in certain ways or carry certain 
items (Nankervis, 1999) and the journey is often very routine. In accordance with the 
view that ESB is heterogeneous and that different behaviours have different 
determinants (e.g. Poortinga, Steg and Vlek, 2004; Stern 2000), commuting should be 
studied as distinct from other travel behaviours and this is the focus of the thesis. 
1.5 The research setting 
Participants in the studies presented here were staff and students at De Montfort 
University (OMU). OMU is a former polytechnic and gained university status in 1992. It 
markets itself as "a leading university for professional, creative and vocational 
education, underpinned by research excellence" and claims to widen "participation to 
provide opportunity to all those with the ability to benefit from University education" 
(OMU, 2005a). This is illustrated by provision of foundation degrees (two years as 
opposed to traditional three-year undergraduate courses) and advertising aimed at 
prospective students from local areas who may not wish to relocate (Figure 1.2). 
Figure 1.2 DMU student recruitment advert, Leicester, May 2005 
13 
During study 1 (April 2003) DMU had 18,515 attending students (14,946 
undergraduates and 3,569 postgraduates) and 3,380 academic and non-academic 
staff; a population of 21 ,895. They were spread across seven campuses; three in 
Leicester, three in Bedford and one in Milton Keynes, all in England's midlands region. 
By the time of study 2 (April 2004), DMU had reorganised its campuses and four 
remained; two in Leicester and two in Bedford. Staff and students who had been based 
elsewhere were relocated to campuses still in operation. 
As part of DMU's ongoing regeneration of the Leicester City campus, it is required by 
the City Council to implement a Green Travel Plan that promotes sustainable transport 
in Leicester. To oversee this plan, DMU has formed a Green Travel Group, consisting 
of representatives from each faculty and non-academic department. The Plan came 
into force in 2003 and has subsequently been revised annually, but has retained "the 
principle objective of altering the current modal split of travel to the University in favour 
of more sustainable modes of transport than the private car" (DMU, 2005). 
The survey used in study 1 was undertaken with DMU's Green Travel Group, which 
was at the time developing its first Plan. The survey was Originally intended to gather 
baseline data on staff and student travel, but the opportunity arose to include attitudinal 
items and items tapping perceptions of context relating to commuting (e.g. access to 
public transport) alongside the Green Travel Group's more factual questions. This 
enabled collection of a large amount of data, but imposed some restrictions in terms of 
what could be asked and how. These are detailed in Chapter 5. 
1.6 Research alms 
Broadly, the research presented here aimed to explain why people commute by 
particular travel modes, what may motivate drivers to switch to non-car modes and 
what may prevent them from doing so. More specifically, it aimed to propose particular 
psychological and contextual influences on commuting mode choice by applying 
established psychological theories and by developing theory based on partiCipants' 
accounts of their behaviour. These outputs are of practical policy relevance. 
The thesis also had theoretical and methodological aims. Firstly, it sought to test the 
ability of two common theories in ESB research - Schwartz's (1977) norm-activation 
theory (NAT) and Ajzen's (1991; 1991a) theory of planned behaviour (TPB) - to explain 
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drivers' intentions to reduce or maintain their car use for commuting in a particular 
setting. Secondly, it sought to identify variables that might be added to these theories 
to improve their explanation of travel mode intentions. Thirdly, it sought to place travel 
behaviour in a wider context and to suggest how theories from other areas of 
psychology (e.g. Breakwell, 1993) could contribute to the domain. Finally, it sought to 
approach the question of why people use particular modes for commuting in two 
complementary and, as argued in Chapter 2, consistent ways; an attitude-behaviour 
perspective in study 1 and a discourse-analytic perspective in study 2. 
1.7 Thesis structure 
The thesis has eight chapters. Those that follow this introduction are outlined below. 
• Chapter 2. Epistemology 
Sets out the epistemological position underpinning the research, explaining the 
relationship between findings from the studies presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 
• Chapter 3. Literature review 1: influences on travel mode choice and acceptance 
and effectiveness of car-use reduction measures 
Presents a review of research on travel psychology and behaviour, describing 
traditions and trends in the field, examining empirical work and identifying influences on 
modal choice from p~evious studies. 
• Chapter 4. Literature review 2: norm-activation and theory of planned behaviour 
research on environmentally-significant behaviour 
Focuses on the two theories underpinning the research, explaining the rationale for 
their use, examining their application in ESB studies and drawing conclusions on the 
current state of knowledge. 
• Chapter 5. Study 1: a quantitative study of commuters' car use intentions 
Presents a questionnaire study which used logistic regression (n = 312) to examine 
psychological and contextual influences on drivers' intentions to reduce or maintain 
their car use for commuting. 
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• Chapter 6. Study 2: a qualitative study of travel mode choice for commuting 
Presents a study using semi-structured interviews (n = 24) and discourse analytic 
techniques to identify and critically analyse commuters' positions on travel to work. 
• Chapter 7. General discussion 
Discusses the findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 in light of other travel research, 
other research using NAT and the TPB and theories from other areas of psychology 
and social science. 
• Chapter 8. Conclusions 
Presents a summary of theoretical and policy-relevant conclusions. 
Following these chapters, there is a list of references and a set of appendices 
containing questionnaires, interview schedules and data coding schemes. 
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Chapter 2 
Epistemology 
2.1 Assumptions (not always) made explicit 
epistemology n. The theory of knowledge, especially the enquiry into what is to 
count as knowledge, the validity of knowledge, what distinguishes mere belief 
from knowledge, what kinds of things are knowable, and whether anything can 
be known for certain 
(Oxford Dictionary of Psychology, Colman, 2001, 249). 
At the outset of an investigation, it is useful to state its assumptions. What information 
wHI it provide and what claims are made of this information? Such statements are rare 
in quantitative environmental psychology research. For example, none of the 24 
quantitative studies reviewed in Chapter 4 declares an epistemological position. They 
are all in the attitude-behaviour tradition, which assumes the existence of mental states 
(or 'attitudes') that are "long-lived and ... relate to behaviour in a systematic manner" 
(Breakwell, 1993,209). Perhaps because this tradition stretches back to the early 20th 
Century (Hogg and Vaughan, 2002), the assumption that behaviour is directed by 
relatively stable, discoverable attitudes is rarely stated today. This is taken as read, 
reflecting the popular view that "science is derived from the facts" (Chalmers, 1999, 1). 
'Facts' are assumed to exist 'out there', waiting to be found. This is taken to apply as 
much to human behaviour and its determinants as to, say, planetary motion. 
Possibly because they often reject this popular view, qualitative researchers tend to be 
more explicit about their epistemological positions. Some studies reviewed in Chapter 
3, for example, are outside the attitUde-behaviour tradition. Hagman (2003) describes 
interviews as constructions, assuming that partiCipants' words cannot be "taken as 
standing for states of affairs as they really are" (Burningham, 1995, 106). Like other 
constructivists (e.g. Bickerstaff and Walker, 2002; Potter, 1996; 1998), he argues that 
one person (researcher) cannot access another's (partiCipant) "inner reality" (Haggett 
and Smith, 2004, 3); their attitudes, beliefs and so on. All that researchers can know is 
what participants say and from this information it is possible to identify 'discourses'; 
"different perspectives on the world" (Fairclough, 2003, 124). But to claim that these 
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actually reveal speakers' mental states is regarded as unjustifiable. To the extent that 
perspectives are widely adopted, they are social constructions, articulating shared 
interpretations of the social environment (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). This adds a 
social dimension to the more individualist view of constructivism as "a doctrine 
according to which perceptions, memories, and other complex mental structures are 
actively assembled or built by the mind, rather than being passively acquired" (Colman, 
2001, 162). 
2.2 Attitudes as a social-scientific device 
It has been said that attitude-behaviour researchers and constructivists accept 
opposing "foundational ontologies", so neither group can ever convince the other of its 
case (Gergen, 1998, 150). The former assume stable, discoverable, mental states (e.g. 
Ajzen, 1991) and the latter reject this position (e.g. Potter, 1998). But this debate need 
not be seen as a dichotomy. There is a continuum between the extremes and this 
thesis takes the middle ground in its two empirical studies. Study 1 (Chapter 5) used 
statistics to analyse quantitative data, while study 2 (Chapter 6) took a discursive 
approach to qualitative data. 
How are these perspectives and methods combined coherently? The key is a 
reassessment of attitude-behaviour assumptions. It is important to realise that no 
method of data collection gives direct access to people's mental states. We can only 
ever know what people say, whether in answer to interview questions or survey items. 
The view that data are not necessarily "windows on what people really think" (Haggett 
& Smith, 2004, 3) applies in quantitative as well as qualitative studies (Willig, 2001). 
And, logically, if we cannot reliably detect attitudes, we cannot be sure of their 
existence. The position taken here is that attitudes are a useful device as opposed to a 
certain reality. The notion of an attitude is itself a 'construct' (see Chapter 4, section 
4.2) employed by social scientists because it captures something intangible (some 
aspect of inaccessible 'inner reality') that - as Breakwell (1993) says - seems to 
systematically relate to behaviour. While the relationship is imperfect (e.g. Huguenin, 
2005), there is plentiful evidence of some relationship (see, for example, the studies 
reviewed in Chapter 4). What we term 'attitudes' seem to be associated, to an extent, 
with how people behave. It is, therefore, useful to measure attitudes and their relation 
to behaviour despite the inherent uncertainty. 
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Furthermore, it is accepted that Breakwell's (1993) "long-lived" attitudes are not 
immutable. They may change with new information or to reduce cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1962). They also originate at some point, which may happen in an interview 
when somebody considers something about which they have not previously thought. At 
such times, people actively construct positions using language; selecting words "from 
available cultural themes and concepts, and by their arrangement, making positive 
claims to a certain version of the world" (Antaki, 1994,7). 
2.3 Attitudes and discourses in this thesis 
What does the attitudes-as-a-device position mean for this thesis? Study 1 used 
quantitative methods which were developed on the assumption of persistent, 
discoverable mental states. Data were collected using survey items and analysed using 
statistics. These methods are vulnerable to measurement error. For example, people 
may provide socially-desirable answers and/or interpret the same response options in 
different ways. Nonetheless, study 1 rested on the premise that it is useful to ask 
people about their 'inner realities' and to try to identify influences on some outcome 
variable; in this instance, car use intentions. If we do not try to discover how people's 
psychology influences their behaviour, there seems little to guide efforts at behaviour 
change. It is necessary to study broader social processes as well (see Chapter 7, 
section 7.3), but these two levels of understanding are each necessary and only 
together sufficient to explain - insofar as they can be explained - people's actions. 
Study 2 identified shared perspectives on car use and use of other transport modes 
from interview accounts of commuting. In other words, it took a social-constructivist 
approach. Many users of the discourse-analytic techniques employed in study 2 argue 
that researchers can discern only fleeting articulations of socially-constructed realities 
(e.g. Haggett & Smith, 2004; Potter, 1996; 1998). The present position differs in 
asserting that evidence of people's current (and possibly fleeting) perspectives may 
illuminate more persistent mental features (Fairclough, 2003). 
Fairclough (Ibid., 124) argues that discourses represent "the material world, the 'mental 
world' of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, and the social world". Accepting that 
discourses are perspectives on things and attitudes are "more-or-Iess consistent 
pattern[s] of affective, cognitive, and conative or behavioural responses" towards them 
(Colman, 2001,63), it seems plausible that the discourses people invoke may 
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articulate their attitudes; at least those held at the time of data collection. Contrary to 
the oft-unspoken assumptions of the attitude-behaviour tradition, it is argued here that 
these attitudinal 'snapshots' are really all that we have available to us as social 
scientists. 
Discourses differ in generality: "how much of the world they include" (Fairclough, 2003, 
124). For example, representation of "people as primarily rational, separate and unitary 
individuals" might be called "the individualist discourse of the self' (Ibid.). Less 
generally, we can identify a political discourse of the 'third way' used by the UK's 'New' 
Labour party in the 1990s (Ibid.). Less generally again, Hagman (2003) identifies a 
discourse of the freedom provided by cars. Each discourse is constructed from what 
Bickerstaff & Walker (2002) call 'vocabularies of motive'. These are analogous to Potter 
& Wetherell's (1988) 'interpretive repertoires', which are "constituted out of a restricted 
range of terms" and "can be seen as the building blocks speakers use for constructing 
versions of actions, cognitive processes or other phenomena" (Ibid., 172). Using 
vocabularies, people build discourses; each presenting a particular stance. There may 
be multiple discourses based on one vocabulary. People might speak positively or 
negatively about an issue, but both positions could be expressed using similar words. 
Discourses express positions, while vocabularies do not presuppose any stance. 
In summary, both studies reported in this thesis aimed to propose motives for 
commuting by particular travel modes. 'Propose' rather than 'identify' because it is 
argued that while people may have 'inner realities', we have no way of directly 
accessing them and so cannot be so certain as to claim 'identification'. But we can 
attempt to use reliable methods of data collection and analysis to make an informed, 
logical case for our proposals. The assumption - based on a long tradition of attitude-
behaviour research - underlying both studies 1 and 2 is that intentions and behaviour 
are directed (to some extent) by "intrapsychic structures ... such as attitudes" (Burr, 
1998, 21) that are expressed using language. Although there may be "life beyond the 
account" (Hollway and Jefferson, 2005,151), the account is all that is knowable. On 
this basis, it is argued that the research presented in this thesis develops the attitude-
behaviour approach rather than discarding it. The development comprises a re-
statement of the approach's assumptions in less emphatic terms than is traditional. 
'Attitudes' are seen as a useful notion, but not phenomena of whose existence we can 
be sure. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature review 1: influences on travel mode 
choice and acceptance and effectiveness of 
car-use reduction measures 
3.1 Introduction: scope of the chapter 
This chapter reviews research on factors influencing travel mode choice, as well as 
studies of modal preference, acceptance of car-use reduction measures and such 
measures' effectiveness. Each of these may influence how (and if) people travel. 
Most of the studies reviewed are from the discipline of environmental psychology, one 
branch of which brings "psychological knowledge to bear upon the issue of developing 
an ecologically sustainable society" and "explores environmental attitudes, perceptions 
and values" (De Young, 1999). But research from other disciplines was also included. 
For example, studies from sociology (e.g. Hjorthol, 2001), transport demand 
management (e.g. Kuppam and Pendyala, 2001), transport policy (e.g. Marshall and 
Banister, 2000) and planning (e.g. Rodriguez & Joo, 2004) all provided relevant 
information. In accordance with the scope of the thesis, the review focused on modes 
commonly used for commuting and did not cover air or sea travel. 
The review aimed to identify influences that are conSistently linked with modal choice 
and/or decisions about whether to travel, to examine methods used to obtain these 
findings and to illuminate issues that could be empirically investigated in this thesis. 
Congruent with its environmental-psychological perspective, the review structure 
echoes Stem's (2000) assessment of progress Toward a Coherent Theory of 
Environmentally Significant Behavior (ESB). Stern identifies four types of influence on 
ESB: attitudinal (Le. psychological), contextual, personal capabilities and habits (Figure 
3.1). These are discussed in relation to travel behaviour in section 3.3. There is some 
deviation from Stern's schema because of overlap between his categories. What 
anyone can do with their capabilities depends on their context, so personal capabilities 
are treated alongside contextual factors in section 3.3.2. Before examination of 
influences on modal choice, section 3.2 describes traditions in research on travel 
psychology and behaviour. Later, section 3.4 discusses overarching issues such as 
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attitude-behaviour causation and social desirability as a source of bias in data, section 
3.5 explores the idea of travel as a social dilemma, section 3.6 examines car-use 
reduction policies and section 3.7 presents conclusions. 
Travel behaviour 
(modal choice and/or 
travel or non-travel) 
Figure 3.1 Influences on travel behaviour (cf. Stern, 2000) 
Review material was identified from the British Library database (Zetoc, 2005), the 
Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI, 2005) and the Sciences Citation Index (SCI , 
2005). Each database was searched for "travel/transport AND behaviour/behavior". 
Publications were also sourced through personal communication with researchers (e.g . 
Gatersleben and Uzzell , 2001), UK government web sites (e.g. DfT, 2003a) and on-line 
bibliographies (e.g. SUT, 2005). This provided a list of 39 publications for review. 
3.2 Research traditions 
3.2.1 Beyond rational-choice 
Academic research on travel behaviour began in earnest during the 1960s, in response 
to congestion (Salomon and Mokhtarian, 1997). Research initially sought infrastructural 
solutions; how best to expand road networks to accommodate demand. Through the 
1970s the emphasis changed to managing existing infrastructure, but by the 1980s 
"there was an increasing realization that altering human behaviour was the necessary 
next step" (Ibid., 108). These changes in research focus coincided with 
acknowledgement that travel causes problems beyond congestion . By the 21 st Century 
many negative consequences had been identified. Steg (2003, 27), for example, lists: 
emissions contributing to "global warming, smog and acid precipitation", use of "scarce 
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raw materials", habitat disruption, accidents, noise, social exclusion of non-drivers and 
shifting of costs from motorists to society. 
Thus, researchers have investigated travel behaviour with the aim of understanding 
how to lessen the associated negative impacts. The oldest tradition in this field uses 
rational-choice models, whereby "individuals are assumed to maximise the utility or net 
benefits stemming fram the transportation mode selected" (Rodriguez & Joo, 2004, 
155) and "travel is assumed to be derived from human desires ... to participate in other, 
non-travel activities" (Kuppam & Pendyala, 2001, 35). Travel is seen as a means to an 
end and a cost to be minimised. 
Rational-choice theory is not unique to psychology. According to the Oxford Dictionary 
of the Social Sciences, it "underlies most work in economics and a considerable body 
of research in other social sciences" (Calhoun, 2002). Indeed, early travel behaviour 
research was not psychological at all, but took an economic perspective; explaining 
behaviour in terms of financial and time costs (Salomon & Mokhtarian, 1997). 
Psychology has borrowed from rational-choice theory, however. Ajzen's (1991; 1991a) 
widely-used (Matthies, 2003) theory of planned behaviour (TPB) exemplifies this. Its 
attitude (A TT) construct captures evaluations of whether an action would have good or 
bad outcomes; usually measured in terms of instrumental (dis)benefits (e.g. Boldera, 
1995). Although TPB studies often focus on evaluations of one behaviour rather than a 
choice of options, the TPB - like classical rational-choice theory - treats "individuals as 
rational maximizers of their interests" (Calhoun, 2002; also see Chapter 4). Thus, the 
TPB can be seen as an extension of rational-choice theory. 
The rational-choice approach to travel has been criticised on various grounds. Steg, 
Vlek & Siotegraaf (2001, 151f) suggest that while instrumental considerations such as 
time and cost do influence travel behaviour, "motives having to do with affect and 
symbolic functions" are also important. Similarly, Anable & Gatersleben (2005, 164) 
argue that "travel may have a positive utility of its own which is not necessarily related 
to reaching a destination". Attention has focused on non-instrumental benefits of driving 
in particular, with Steg & Uneken (2002, 466) proposing that "people buy and drive cars 
simply because they like to, and not (only) because they have a real utilitarian need". 
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Besides failure to acknowledge non-instrumental motives, two further criticisms have 
been levelled at rational-choice models. Firstly, the information on which people base 
decisions can be inaccurate (Steg, 2003). For example, the price of driving may be 
underestimated and that of alternatives overestimated. Secondly, travel is often 
habitual and thus removed from rational-choice (e.g. Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2000). 
Although rational-choice modelling persists (e.g. Rodriguez & Joo, 2004), many 
attempts to explain modal choice, preference and/or acceptance of transport policies 
now examine a wider range of motives than instrumental concerns alone (e.g. Handy, 
Weston and Mokhtarian, 2005; Steg, 2005). This thesis adds to this body of work. 
In discussing travel psychology, it should be noted that this th~\~ - ~~~meo W\\'n 
l)'S'"1cno\09'j an~ behaviour in terms of influences on modal choice - sits within the 
wider field of 'traffic and transport psychology'. One eminent researcher defines this 
field as "psychological intervention or psychological support for intervention in the field 
of traffic" (Huguenin, 2005, 4). This includes such diverse issues as driver aggression 
(e.g. Wiesenthal, Hennessy and Totten, 2003), driving style (e.g. Taubman, Mikulincer 
and Gillath, 2005) and driver co-ordination (e.g. Treffner and Barrett, 2004). Although 
concerned with psychological influences on transport-related behaviour, these 
branches of traffic and transport psychology do not relate to modal choice and so are 
excluded from this review. 
3.2.2 Quantitative and qualitative approaches 
Most research reviewed here used quantitative methods; often administering 
questionnaires to large samples and examining determinants of modal choice and/or 
extent of use of particular modes (e.g. Walton, Thomas and Dravitzkl, 2004). 
Questionnaires were sometimes accompanied by travel diaries. Usually data from 
these were also quantitative; for example, numbers of trips by different modes (e.g. 
G~rling, Garling and Johansson, 2000). 
The cumulative findings of quantitative work on travel mode choice have led Hagman 
(2003, 4) to comment that "these arguments should be familiar to us. We have heard 
them all before. Our focus of interest, therefore, should not be on the arguments 
themselves, but on how they are presented so as to make sense." This is offered as 
justification for taking a discourse-analytic approach to qualitative interview data. Few 
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others have adopted this suggested approach, however. Qualitative studies of modal 
choice are relatively rare (e.g. Ibid.; Dowling, 2000) and our understanding might 
benefit from using methods that allow people to discuss travel in their own terms rather 
than in terms of abstract psychological theory that may seem unconnected to their 
everyday experience. 
The strengths of quantitative and qualitative methods (e.g. the capacity to study large 
groups using the former and individual idiosyncrasies using the latter) led to both being 
employed in this thesis (in the studies reported in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively). The 
review presented in this chapter illuminates another important methodological issue. 
Steg, Vlek & Siotegraaf (2001) carried out a study showing that how people evaluate 
different travel modes can depend on the methods used to elicit evaluations. The detail 
of this study is saved until section 3.4, but it bears pointing out at this stage that using 
multiple methods in one study can help to provide more robust results (see also 
Chapter 6, section 6.2), yet this is uncommon in the research reviewed here. 
3.3 Influences on modal choice, modal preference and acceptance of car-use 
reduction measures 
3.3.1 Psychological influences 
Many travel psychology studies ask why people choose particular modes or accept or 
reject measures aimed at reducing car use; often examining the psychological motives 
that Stern (2000, 414) calls "attitudinal factors, including norms, beliefs, and values". 
Such work is reviewed in section 3.3.1. 
3.3.1.1 Instrumental evaluations of travel modes 
As noted in section 3.2, instrumental evaluations of different behaviours (e.g. travelling 
by different modes) are the basis of rational-choice models. Although much recent 
travel psychology research has also examined other motives, instrumental evaluations 
remain a key concern. For example, studies using different methods and populations 
report positive evaluations of cars' instrumental functions. 
Hagman (2003,3), in interviews with Swedish drivers, found that "many talk about 
convenience and flexibility. The car makes life easier." Several quantitative studies 
corroborate this. In England, over 70% of Gatersleben & Uzzell's (2001, 11) sample 
agreed that driving is "easier, quicker and cheaper than using public transport." Anable 
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& Gatersleben (2005, 172) found that on "two important instrumental factors, flexibility 
and especially convenience, car users evaluate their own mode much more positively 
than other modes." Ellaway et. al. (2003) found similar views in Scotland, while Exley & 
Christie (2002, 18) report that across the UK "large majorities among car users claim 
that significant reductions in their driving would be inconvenient." Each of these studies 
elicited comparisons of driving with other modes; echoing the rational-choice approach 
whereby people supposedly maximise utility by choosing from competing options. 
Occasional studies show cars' instrumental functions not being rated particularly highly. 
In Holland, Steg (2005) measured eight such evaluations of driving, including its speed 
and cost (a = .87). (Cronbach's a statistic indicates the internal reliability of a multi-item 
scale; the extent to which it measures one underlying idea. See Chapter 5, section 
5.4.2.1 for a mathematical explanation.) Scores ranged from 1 (negative) to 25 
(positive). Even those who always commuted by car had a mean of only 12.8 (11.0 for 
those who also used other modes). These evaluations of cars' instrumental 
performance were not particularly positive or negative, but this finding is unusual. 
Few studies use specific instrumental evaluations to explain modal choice in multiple 
regression analysis; a technique that measures relationships between predictor (or 
'independent') variables and an outcome (or 'dependent') variable by finding "the linear 
combination of predictors that correlate maximally with the outcome" (Field, 2000, 116). 
Steg (2005) is an exception, reporting that such evaluations had no significant effect (at 
.05 level) on commuting mode, while evaluations of cars' symbolic (e.g. conferring 
status) and affective (e.g. giving pleasure) functions did. This may be because car and 
non-car commuters gave relatively similar evaluations of driving's instrumental 
functions, meaning that these attitudes did not differentiate the groups. 
Some studies,tocus on instrumental evaluations of non-car modes. Fujii, Garling and 
Kitamura (2001) report that Japanese car commuters perceived public transport as 
taking longer than driving to work. However, after using public transport (during a 
freeway closure), their perceptions changed. The larger this change, the more likely 
people were to continue using public transport once the freeway reopened. However, 
enforced reconsideration of travel behaviour may be rare for most drivers, so 
perceptions of public transport could endure for long periods. 
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Anable & Gatersleben (2005) found that drivers evaluated cars as more 
environmentally-damaging than public transport, walking and cycling (F(3,222) = 
131.31, p < .001 for commuting; F(1,584) = 173.68, p < .001 for leisure). However, this 
was the only one of six instrumental evaluations on which cars did not score highest 
and drivers apparently chose this mode because it was seen as superior on more 
important characteristics such as flexibility and convenience. Furthermore, users of 
various modes rated their satisfaction with these modes. Frequent public transport 
users were only satisfied with environmental performance and were dissatisfied with all 
five other instrumental functions. Such findings are echoed by a UK survey in which 
satisfaction with 13 aspects of bus services ranged from a high of 54% for "Number of 
places can get to" to a low of just 22% for "Frequency in evenings" (DfT, 2003a). 
In Holland, Steg (2003) found that drivers rated the car more highly than public 
transport in terms of convenience, flexibility, comfort, speed and reliability. The only 
instrumental evaluation on which public transport scored higher was safety. 
Interestingly, Nilsson & KOller (2000) found that attitudes to public transport were not 
significantly correlated (r = -.03, p > .05) with modal choice among their Swedish 
sample. Their four-item attitude scale referred to cost, comfort, speed and reliability (a 
= .48). They suggest that instrumental evaluations of "public transport seemed to have 
no influence on travel behaviour. It may be that journeys with public transport depend 
more on attitudes toward the car than on attitudes toward public transport" (Ibid., 229). 
However, given that most studies suggest that people see personal benefits from 
driving, perhaps some other aspect of car use is negatively perceived. Possibly public 
transport users see environmental protection as more important than their own utility 
(see Anable & Gatersleben, 2005). This would be congruent with Nilsson & KOller's 
(2000) suggestion that attitudes to car use differentiate drivers from public transport 
users and with the general finding that many people see driving as a way to maximise 
personal utility. Indeed, Hagman (2003) notes that although Swedes generally spoke 
positively about cars' instrumental functions, they did identify environmental damage as 
a problem. Further research could test the idea that the relative weight given to travel 
modes' personal and environmental (dis)benefits may influence modal choice. 
In defining the TPB's ATT construct, Ajzen (1991a) states that any evaluation that is 
measurable on a negative/positive scale indicates ATT in this specific sense, as 
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opposed to Stern's (2000) more general 'attitudinal factors'. Instrumental evaluations of 
travel modes meet this criterion. 
Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) - applying TPB to explain commuting mode in Germany-
took ratings (in TPB terms, 'behavioural beliefs') of driving's flexibility, speed, comfort 
and stress. These were combined and the resulting scale used to predict overall An to 
driving. An itself was measured by items asking whether car commuting was 
good/bad and pleasant/unpleasant. A perfect relationship is reported, with the four 
evaluations accounting for 100% of variance in An. The standardised path coefficient 
from An to behavioural intention (BI) (to drive or not) was f3 = .32 (p < .05). (f3 shows 
"by how many standard deviation units the dependent variable will change for one 
standard deviation unit change in the independent variable"; Bryman and Cramer, 
2001,257). However, given that one behavioural belief (stress) was arguably affective 
(Anable & Gatersleben, 2005), it is hard to know what proportion of An comprised 
instrumental evaluations. Pleasantness is arguably an affective judgement as well 
(Nilsson & KOller, 2000; Steg, 2005), making it unclear how much of the An-BI effect 
was attributable to instrumental and affective evaluations, respectively. 
Bamberg & Schmidt's (2003) approach reflects Ajzen's (1991a) conception of An; 
capturing instrumental and affective evaluations. But some studies treat these as 
distinct aspects of travel. For example, Anable & Gatersleben (2005) found that 
instrumental and affective motives had different influences on modal choice. Steg, Vlek 
& Siotegraaf (2001) and Steg (2005) report similar findings from Holland. These studies 
suggest that while Ajzen's (1991a) overall An construct does capture influences on 
travel mode choice, instrumental and affective evaluations may be best treated 
separately so that their effects can be isolated. 
In conclusion, several travel psychology studies echo rational-choice theory; eliciting 
comparisons of different modes' instrumental functions. Generally, cars are said to 
provide more personal benefits (e.g. convenience) than alternatives. However, 
because this perception is often shared by drivers and non-drivers, it may not explain 
modal choice. The importance placed on environmental rather than personal utility may 
be a more useful distinguishing factor. Various studies report that people see non-car 
modes as less environmentally-damaging than driving and the weight given to this 
outcome may influence whether people drive or use other transport modes. There is 
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also some evidence that drivers' negative perceptions of non-car modes may be 
revised after using those modes, but there is a catch-22, since people are unlikely to try 
a mode that they perceive negatively unless forced to do so. 
3.3.1.2 Affective evaluations 
"Affective factors refer to the feelings evoked by travelling, such as stress, excitement, 
pleasure, boredom and control" (Anable & Gatersleben, 2005, 164). While many 
studies distinguish affective from instrumental aspects of travel (e.g. Ibid.; Nilsson & 
KOller, 2000), common definitions and measures remain elusive. For example, Steg, 
Vlek & Siotegraaf (2001) refer to all non-instrumental aspects as 'symbolic-affective' 
(including self-presentation, social comparison and emotions experienced while 
travelling), while Anable & Gatersleben (2005) distinguish 'affective' (e.g. feelings of 
relaxation) from 'social' (or 'symbolic') aspects (e.g. feelings of superiority). 
Thus, there are questions over what should be characterised as affect. For example, 
Anable & Gatersleben (Ibid.) identify feelings of control as an affective 'experience of 
travel', while Steg (2005) suggests that control relates to the 'independence' of driving 
and is distinct from 'symbolic-affective aspects of car use'. Similarly, evaluations of the 
car's privacy loaded higher on the 'instrumental' factor (.42) than the 'symbolic-
affective' factor (.28) in Steg's (Ibid.) factor analysis, although privacy was identified as 
a 'symbolic-affective' motive by Steg, Vlek & Siotegraaf (2001). (See Chapter 5, section 
5.4.1 for an explanation of factor analysis.) 
Greater clarity might be achieved by distinguishing affect from its causes. Colman 
(2001, 16) defines affect as "emotion or subjectively experienced feeling". Where 
Anable & Gatersleben (2005) identify 'excitement' and 'control' as affective 
experiences. one could argue that the former fits this definition. but the latter may be 
better regarded as causing an emotion. The same might be said of privacy. while 
stress and pleasure seem to be emotions in and of themselves. Untangling these 
relationships in future studies would build on existing findings suggesting that affect 
plays some role in directing travel behaviour. 
Among these findings. Steg (2005). using multi-item measures of pleasure (a = .81) 
and arousal (a = .70). investigated whether these and other variables contributed to 
explanation of self-reported commuter car use. Neither instrumental evaluations nor 
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pleasure were significant, but arousal (whether driving was stressful) was a significant 
predictor (f3 = -.21, P = .024). 
Anable & Gatersleben (2005) report that drivers, cyclists and pedestrians evaluated 
commuting significantly more positively than public transport users in terms of 
excitement and feelings of control (F(3,222) = 8.09 and F(3,222) = 34.37 respectively, 
both p < .001). However, drivers did not rate these experiences as important; 
emphasising instead the car's instrumental functions. Cyclists and pedestrians, 
conversely, said that affective experiences were important to their modal choice. 
Echoing Anable & Gatersleben's findings regarding car use, Bamberg & Schmidt 
(2003) report that measures of whether driving made respondents feel "in high 
spirits/energetic" and "happy/joyful" were not significant predictors (at .05 level) of self-
reported car use for commuting, while instrumental evaluations were. 
Nilsson & KOller (2000) found that a four-item measure (a = .63) of "car affection" (e.g. 
"It's pleasant to drive") correlated positively with self-reported annual car mileage (r = 
.46, p < .01) and negatively with acceptance of car-use reduction policies (r = -.41, P < 
.01). Although they also report a regression assessing the contribution of various 
factors to explaining mileage and policy acceptance, 'car affection' was combined with 
other psychological variables into a single predictor. It is, therefore, impossible to say 
how much variance in either outcome variable can be attributed to affect. 
Overall, there are mixed findings concerning affective influences on travel. This may be 
partly due to methodological differences between studies. Steg, Vlek & Siotegraaf 
(2001) found that the relative importance of affective and instrumental motives 
depended on how they were measured. They propose that when the task's purpose is 
apparent (e.g. semantic-differentials), people tend to "reason about their car use in a 
socially desirable way" (Ibid., 165). People may not express enjoyment of driving if they 
think that others disapprove of it, preferring to emphasise its instrumental functions. 
However, when the task's purpose is less obvious (e.g. similarity sort of car-use 
episodes), people rate driving's affective aspects more positively. This may explain why 
some studies show that people do not have affective motives for driving (e.g. Anable & 
Gatersleben, 2005; Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003), while others do (e.g. Steg, 2005). 
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It may also be that differences in the wording of semantic-differentials - for example, 
between measurement of pleasure from driving by Steg (2005) and Nilsson & KOller 
(2000) -lie behind some seemingly contradictory results. As suggested above, there is 
a need for standardisation in measuring affective motives for travel, preferably in a way 
that avoids encouraging socially-desirable responses. 
Qualitative research often forgoes standardised measures, but still offers some 
consistent findings. Hagman (2003) and Handy et. al. (2005) report that participants 
spoke positively about the privacy afforded by cars and simple enjoyment of driving. 
For example, US interviewees in the latter study remarked that "the only place I 
actually had any real privacy was my car" and "I love driving. I just enjoy it" (Ibid., 192f). 
Of course, positive affective evaluations of travel are not restricted to drivers. From 
interviews with UK bicycle commuters, Gatersleben (2003, 180) concludes that "Those 
who cycle appear to do so simply because they like cycling"; echoing Anable & 
Gatersleben's (2005) quantitative finding that cyclists and pedestrians rated affective 
experiences as important to modal choice. 
To conclude, although generalisation is difficult because of the variety of affect 
measures used by travel psychologists, one can say that affective experiences do 
appear to influence modal choice. Pleasure, stress, control, excitement and privacy 
have all been identified as relevant, supporting the argument that rational-choice 
theory's instrumental focus ignores some motives for travel (Steg & Uneken, 2002). 
Although some studies suggest that affect is relatively unimportant compared to 
instrumental motives (especially for drivers), Steg, Vlek & Siotegraaf (2001) show that 
such findings should be treated cautiously. People may be wary of expressing affective 
motives for driving because of concerns that these will be frowned upon. Users of other 
modes seem less reluctant to express affective motives. There is a need for travel 
psychologists to agree on what constitutes affect, what causes affective responses and 
how these factors should be measured to minimise social-desirability bias. 
3.3.1.3 Social motives 
Travel psychology takes two distinct approaches to social motives. One is fairly narrow; 
echoing Ajzen's (1991a) subjective norm (SN) construct. This captures perceived 
social pressure surrounding an act (e.g. the perception that driving is disapproved of); 
known as an 'injunctive norm' (Steg, 2005). The second conception is broader, 
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accounting for how people present themselves, as well as for external pressure. This is 
a more reflexive view, assuming that people act on the social environment as well as 
reacting to it. This view also sees social motives overlapping with affect. For example, 
Anable & Gatersleben's (2005) 'feelings of superiority' are affective but also imply 
social comparison. 
Based on a literature review, Steg, Geurs & Ras (2001, 791) identify SN as a 
"motivational factor ... related to car use and travel-mode choice", but note that because 
most studies measure attitudinal factors and behaviour simultaneously, we cannot be 
certain about causal direction (see section 3.4). Even setting aside this uncertainty, 
evidence regarding SN is somewhat mixed. 
In Germany, Hunecke, BIObaum, Matthies and HOger (2001) found that SN influenced 
self-reported modal choice (f3 = .19, P < .05), but Klockner & Matthies (2004) found no 
such effect when SN was used as a regression predictor alongside personal norm (PN) 
and driving habit. (PN is a construct from Schwartz's (1977) norm-activation theory 
(NAT) that captures feelings of personal obligation for specific acts. See section 3.3.1.4 
and Chapter 4.) In Holland, Harland, Staats and Wilke (1999) report that SN influenced 
intentions to use non-car modes (f3 = .18, P < .001), but this influence lessened (f3 = 
.15, p < .01) when PN was entered as a regression predictor alongside the TPB 
variables (ATT, SN and perceived behavioural control, or PBC, which is examined in 
section 3.3.1.5). SN had no significant influence when self-reported travel behaviour, 
as opposed to future intentions, was regressed on these predictors. Steg (2005)-
whose study is unusual in measuring descriptive norms (perceptions of others' 
behaviour) alongside injunctive norms - reports that the perceived expectations of 
family influenced self-reported level of car use for commuting (f3 = .23, P = .018), but 
the perceived expectations of colleagues and friends did not. A descriptive norm 
measure asking how family, colleagues and friends commuted (a = .62) actually had a 
stronger influence on behaviour (f3 = .30, P < .001) than the injunctive norm. 
Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) found that SN was especially important to students' self-
reported modal choice for travel to university. In a test of the TPB, SN had a stronger 
influence (f3 = .40, P < .05) on intentions to use car or non-car modes than A TT or PBC. 
When included in a model containing constructs from the TPB, NAT and Triandis' 
(1977) theory of interpersonal behaviour (TIB), SN's influence on intentions remained 
32 
significant (f3 = .23, P < .05) and only role beliefs had a stronger effect. Indeed, 
Bamberg & Schmidt (2003, 280) argue that "SN is probably too narrow to reflect all the 
social factors influencing the intention building process" and that an adequate social-
influence variable should capture perceived pressure and "self-ascribed social role". 
This calls to mind the second, broader approach to social influences on travel 
behaviour, mentioned at the start of this sub-section. 
Steg, Vlek & Siotegraaf (2001) elaborated this broader approach; investigating whether 
symbolic aspects of driving (relating to self-presentation and social role) could be 
differentiated from affective and instrumental ones. Three methods (similarity sort, Q-
sort and semantic-differentials) showed that evaluations of these three aspects were 
distinct. Links between preference for particular aspects and use of particular modes 
were not examined, but this work raises the possibility that symbolic functions (e.g. 
feeling that "driving a car is sporty and adventurous") may satiSfy "the need to express 
yourself and your social position" (Ibid., 164). While Steg, Vlek & Siotegraaf offer no 
evidence for this generic 'need', their statement echoes Csikszentmihalyi and 
Rochberg-Halton's (1981) research on use of everyday symbols (e.g. cars) to express 
meaning. These authors suggest that people use artefacts not only for instrumental 
reasons, but also because artefacts project the user's personality, reinforcing sense of 
self and showing this desired self to others. Indeed, Steg's (2005) later work develops 
Dittmar's (1992) theory of material possessions, which asserts similar ideas to 
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton's. Steg (2005) found that (self-professed) 
frequent drivers had significantly higher scores than infrequent drivers on a five-item 
measure of symbolic-affective evaluations of driving (a = .90), including an item asking 
the extent to which "The car gives me prestige" (F(2, 169) = 3.6, p = .04). Moreover, a 
seven-item social comparison and self-presentation scale (e.g. "Travelling by car suits 
me better than travelling by bike or public transport", a = .64) significantly influenced 
self-reported level of commuter car use (f3 = .19, P = .026). 
Ellaway et. al. (2003) compared car and public transport commuters on several 
variables, including whether they felt that others would like to use their mode and 
whether that mode made them feel that they were "doing well in life". Controlling for 
age and social class, drivers had Significantly (p < .001) higher scores than public 
transport users, suggesting that driving conferred greater status. 
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In conclusion, there is evidence of various social influences on travel. Subjective norms 
(SN) have been shown to influence modal choice in some settings, especially where 
peer pressure may be strong (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). Elsewhere SN has not 
contributed significantly to explained variance in modal choice (e.g. Klockner & 
Matthies, 2004), although there are fewer negative than positive results concerning 
SN's effect. Notably, where SN is non-significant, PN is often a significant regression 
predictor. This supports Schwartz's (1977) argument that PN accounts for SN (because 
people's normative self-expectations depend, partially, on perceived social pressure). 
There has been little work on descriptive norms as determinants of modal choice, 
although Steg's (2005) results suggest that future studies might usefully examine this 
influence. More attention has been paid to travel modes' symbolic functions and, again, 
this seems to be a useful research avenue. Travel behaviour is influenced by 
interacting with - not just reacting to - the social world. Travel psychologists have 
begun to draw on other areas of psychology to explore these issues (e.g. Steg's (2005) 
use of Dittmar's (1992) theory of material possessions) and such work may help to 
explain why rational-choice modelling often does "not seem to give sufficient 
explanations of car use" (Steg, Vlek & Siotegraaf, 2001, 152). Results indicate that cars 
confer greater status than public transport (Ellaway et. al., 2003), that drivers value 
status more than users of other modes, and that modal choice can be influenced by a 
desire to present a particular image (Steg, 2005). 
3.3.1.4 Personal responsibility and obligation 
When choosing travel modes based on instrumental or affective functions, people seek 
personal benefits. Social motives are also self-interested, with people seeking to 
present a desired image to others, to demonstrate their status, or to comply with others' 
expectations in order to gain approval (Schwartz, 1977). 
The literature shows that non-selfish concerns can also direct travel behaviour. Many 
studies examine these concerns using Schwartz's (Ibid.) NAT, which proposes that 
some behaviours (termed 'altruistic') are performed for others' benefit. When an 
individual values another's welfare, believes that their own actions have consequences 
for it (awareness of consequences, or AC) and feels personal responsibility for those 
consequences (ascription of responsibility, or AR), they will feel moral obligation to 
protect that welfare. This normative self-expectation is captured by the PN construct, 
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which is altruistic behaviour's immediate psychological antecedent. (See Chapter 4 for 
more details of NAT.) 
Although Schwartz developed NAT to explain altruism towards people, environmental 
psychologists have adapted it for situations where non-humans are valued (e.g. Stern, 
2000). Several studies have investigated obligation (PN) for pro-environmental 
behaviours, including use of non-car modes which are assumed to be less 
environmentally-damaging than automobiles because of their lower emissions per 
passenger mile, lesser contribution to congestion and so on (see Chapter 1). 
Nordlund & Garvill (2003, 343) operationalised PN by asking Swedish respondents 
whether "they perceived it to be a personal moral obligation to reduce car use." The 
path from PN to the outcome variable - willingness to drive less - was {3 = .44 (p < 
.05). Harland et. al. (1999) found that PN - when entered as a regression predictor 
alongside TPB variables - had significant effects on intentions to use non-car modes ({3 
= .16, P < .05) and on self-reported use of such modes ({3 = .37, p < .001). 
In Germany, KIOckner & Matthies (2004) report that PN was the only significant (p < 
.05) predictor of self-reported commuting mode when entered into a regression with SN 
and driving habit, while Matthies, Kuhn and KIOckner (2002) found significant (p S .01) 
paths from PN to three regression outcome variables: intention to use public transport, 
preference for public transport and self-reported public transport use. Bamberg & 
Schmidt (2003) report that PN had a significant effect on self-reported car use ({3 = -
.38, p < .05). Thus, several studies show PN's influence on modal choice. 
Bamberg & Schmidt's (Ibid.) study is relatively unusual because it measured AR. 
Schwartz (1977) proposed that this construct operates alongside AC to activate PN. 
Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) report this effect, with AR-PN {3 = .55 (p < .05). Tanner 
(1999) also measured AR, using three items asking about respondents' feelings of 
responsibility for addressing driving-related problems (a = .80). AR had a significant 
influence on self-reported driving frequency ({3 = -.29, P < .001), but its relationship with 
PN was not assessed. 
Hunecke et. al. (2001) used items asking about personal responsibility for problems 
caused by driving, but included these in their PN scale (a = .83) rather than 
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constructing an AR scale that could be used to predict PN. The path from this 
combined responsibility/obligation variable to self-reported modal choice was f3 = .22 (p 
< .01). Other studies have asked about responsibility, but outside the context of NAT. 
For example, Gatersleben & Uzzell (2001) report significant (p not specified) Pearson 
correlations of .25 to .30 between AR and two other variables: willingness and 
perceived ability to reduce car use. Although such results suggest that AR influences 
travel behaviour - perhaps indirectly, as Schwartz (1977) proposed, and directly -
more systematic research is needed before its role can be generalised with the same 
confidence as PN's. This variable is a robust predictor of modal choice when measured 
by various methods in different settings. 
3.3.1.5 Awareness of consequences 
AC, the second construct that Schwartz (Ibid.) proposed as a predictor of PN, has 
received more attention from travel psychologists than AR. Travel's perceived 
environmental consequences are often measured and there is evidence from various 
countries that driving is seen as environmentally-damaging and other modes less so 
(e.g. Gatersleben & Uzzell, 2001; Hagman, 2003; Joireman et. al., 2004). There is 
theoretical overlap here with instrumental evaluations of travel. Some researchers treat 
beliefs about behaviours' impacts - including environmental impacts - as referring to 
instrumental outcomes rather than as part of a moral-normative cognitive process that 
activates PN (e.g. Anable & Gatersleben, 2005). 
Travel studies - like other ESB research (see Chapter 4, section 4.5.3.3) - use two 
conceptions of AC. These can be termed 'condition-focused' and 'action-focused'. 
Action-focused conceptions refer to specific behaviours' consequences (e.g. Steg, 
Geurs & Ras, 2001). Condition-focused conceptions refer to the state of the 
environment (e.g. Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). Neither is exactly the same as 
Schwartz's (1977) original AC construct; defined as a tendency to consider the 
consequences of one's actions for others (see Chapter 4, section 4.5.3.3). 
Nonetheless, they are treated as AC here because this is how AC is defined in the 
research reviewed. 
Steg, Geurs and Ras (2001, 795) found that beliefs that "car use in the Netherlands 
contributes to environmental pollution" raised explained variance in self-reported 
annual car mileage from 21 % to 26% when included as a regression predictor after 
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socio-demographic variables (f3 not reported). Steg & Vlek (1997, 473f) used 
correlational rather than regression analysis, but report that Dutch "respondents having 
a higher problem awareness [AC] actually used their cars less" (self-reported 
behaviour). Conversely, Walton et. al. (2004) found no significant difference (at .05 
level) in perceptions of transport-related environmental problems between car and non-
car commuters in New Zealand and Tanner (1999) found that beliefs concerning the 
consequences of driving for Swiss respondents themselves and for "animals and 
plants" did not predict self-reported driving frequency. 
Thus, while some studies show significant AC-modal choice relationships, this effect is 
somewhat unreliable. There may be various reasons for this. Firstly, Schwartz (1977) 
suggested that AC's influence on behaviour is mediated by PN. To clarify, 
a variable may be said to function as a mediator to the extent that it accounts for 
the relation between predictor and criterion ... Whereas moderator variables specify 
when certain effects will hold, mediators speak to how or why such effects occur 
(Baron and Kenny, 1986, 1176). 
Indeed, Nordlund & Garvill (2003, 345) report a significant path (f3 = .46, P < .05) from 
beliefs that driving causes environmental damage (AC) to PN, suggesting that 
"personal norm is central in the causal chain of effects from ... general and specific 
problem awareness" to willingness to avoid car use. Secondly, where direct AC-
behaviour effects are examined, a variety of other variables are included in analyses. 
For example, in Steg, Geurs & Ras' (2001) study, AC was the only psychological 
regressor among several socio-demographic variables, but Tanner (1999) included AC 
as a regressor alongside psychological constructs including perceived efficacy and AR. 
AC's influence may be lessened when other psychological influences are taken into 
account. Thirdly, different studies measure perceived consequences at different levels 
of speCificity (e.g. Steg, Geurs & Ras' (2001) measure of consequences of driving and 
Tanner's (1999) measure of consequences of human behaviour more generally) and 
this may affect how strongly these variables are associated with specific actions. 
Rather than examining determinants of behaviour, some research focuses on travel 
mode preferences or acceptance of car-use reduction measures. For example, 
Joireman et. al. (2004, 195) report that in their US study, "preference for commuting by 
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public transportation was higher ... among commuters who more strongly believed that 
commuting by car harms the environment". Both Steg (2003a) and Steg & Vlek (1997) 
found that the higher Dutch respondents' awareness of environmental problems 
caused by driving, the more likely they were to accept car-use reduction policies. 
Gatersleben & Uzzell (2001) obtained similar results in the UK. 
Related to - but distinct from - awareness of problems is concern over them. Nilsson & 
KOller (2000) found significant (p < .001) relationships between stated concern over 
transport-related environmental damage and both self-reported annual car mileage and 
acceptance of car-use reduction policies. It is important to recognise that people may 
acknowledge some consequence of a behaviour (e.g. pollution arising from driving) 
without being concerned by it (see Chapter 6, section 6.5.1.6). As such, AC and 
environmental concern should be treated as distinct. 
To conclude, there is some evidence of beliefs about travel's environmental 
consequences being related to modal choice, but this relationship is less reliable than 
the PN-behaviour effect. This is unsurprising, as Schwartz (1977) proposed that PN 
should mediate AC's influence on actions. There is also evidence of AC being 
positively related to acceptance of car-use reduction policies (e.g. Gatersleben & 
Uzzell, 2001; Steg & Vlek, 1997). There is a practical application here, as attempts to 
encourage pro-environmental behaviour often rely on pointing out environmental 
impacts, yet these usually have little lasting effect on people's actions (Collins, 
Thomas, Willis and Wilsdon, 2003). Their ineffectiveness may be due to overemphasis 
on information alone (see Chapter 7, section 7.4). Better results might be obtained by 
addressing norms and underlying values as well as AC. This relates to the observation 
that belief in an action's negative consequences does not entail concern over those 
consequences. Concern may only be engendered by addressing values (Ibid.). 
3.3.1.6 Perceived control, self-efficacy and perceived facilitating or inhibiting conditions 
Recognising work from other areas of social psychology (e.g. Ajzen, 2002; Bandura, 
1997; Triandis, 1977), some travel psychology studies examine the perceived difficulty 
and/or possibility of performing particular actions (e.g. using non-car modes) as well as 
instrumental, affective and/or normative motives. According to Ajzen (2002, 667), 
perceived control over performance of a behaviour is "now a central feature of' attitude-
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behaviour theories. Even strong motivations may not influence behaviour if people feel 
that action is - for whatever reason - too difficult. 
Harland et. al. (1999), for example, measured Ajzen's (2002) perceived behavioural 
control (PBC) construct, which taps the "perceived ease or difficulty of performing" an 
act (Ibid., 665). Based on one item asking the extent to which respondents thought it 
likely that they could use non-car modes, PBC had a stronger influence on intentions (f3 
= .42, P < .001) than ATT, PN or SN and was also the most influential predictor of self-
reported travel behaviour (f3 = .28, P < .001). 
Tanner (1999) produced a scale measuring perceived barriers to reducing car use from 
seven yes/no items asking whether certain conditions applied to respondents (e.g. 
"need to transport materials"). This variable had a stronger effect on self-reported 
driving frequency than any other predictor (f3 = .44, P < .001). There are questions over 
the scale's validity, however. No reliability statistics are reported and the items included 
"colleagues' impression of me" and "inconvenience" as potential barriers to using non-
car modes. The first of these seems to be an SN measure and the second an A TT 
measure (Le. an instrumental evaluation of non-car modes). If this interpretation is 
accepted, Tanner's 'perceived barriers' scale actually tapped beliefs underlying all 
three TPB predictors, making it unsurprising that the variable should influence the 
outcome and impossible to pinpoint the exact nature of that influence. 
Garling et. al. (2000) used diaries to assess whether Swedish participants met 
commitments to reduce their car use by up to 50% over a week. The average reported 
reduction was only 10%, implying that people found avoidance of driving difficult. 
(Statistics showing the range of reductions and individual differences are not provided.) 
Steg & Uneken (2002) found that although Dutch respondents did not rate instrumental 
aspects of car use for commuting particularly favourably (M = 12.1 on a 1 to 25 scale), 
59% always commuted by car. This, they suggest, may "be due to the fact that no 
feasible alternatives are available" (Ibid., 473). Steg & Vlek (1997, 473) report 
interviews suggesting that many "people see no opportunities to reduce their car use, 
because, as they say, they already use their car as little as possible", while Klockner & 
Matthies (2004,326) found that respondents "think of work trips as being under low 
personal control". This theme is revisited in the studies reported in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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PSC does not always predict modal choice, however (e.g. Hunecke et. a/., 2001). 
There are several possible reasons for this. Perceived control may depend on journey 
type (e.g. commuting or leisure), perceptions of local public transport, participants' 
personal capabilities and/or different views of what is possible in a given context. 
In conclusion, although some studies have done so, it would be useful for more to use 
PSC as a regression predictor and to establish whether this variable actually influences 
modal choice. Assertions that switching from car to non-car modes is seen as 
impossible often seem to be anecdotal (e.g. KIOckner & Matthies, 2004). It is also 
useful to examine beliefs underlying PSC in order to show why people do or do not feel 
control over their travel behaviour. Furthermore, travel psychologists might follow up 
some of the systematic research on PSC and Sandura's (1997) perceived self-efficacy 
(PSE) concept that has been undertaken outside the ESS domain. For example, Ajzen 
(2002) suggests - based on a review of empirical work concerning several behaviours 
- that PSC should be measured in terms of both perceived controllability (Le. whether 
people could act if they wanted to) and PSE (Le. people's confidence in their abilities 
pertaining to an action). Others argue that PSC should be decomposed into perceived 
ease/difficulty and perceived controllability components (e.g. Sparks, Guthrie and 
Shepherd, 1997; Trimafow, Sheeran, Conner and Finlay, 2002). Although travel 
research has begun to suggest PSC's role in directing modal choice, it may be falling 
behind theoretical developments outside this behavioural domain. 
3.3.2 Contextual influences (and their interpretation) 
Steg (2005, 159f) asserts that "Travel behaviour is to a large extent dependent on 
situational characteristics, which affect the availability and relative attractiveness of 
various travel modes and the necessity to travel." We should also note that views of 
what is possible with any resource (e.g. a bus service, one's physical abilities) arise 
from interactions between person and situation. Context must usually be interpreted. 
This having been said, some contextual conditions probably do influence most people's 
travel behaviour in the same way. They are more-or-Iess non-negotiable. Factors such 
as having a driving licence and access to a car (Nilsson & KOller, 2000) or bicycle 
(Gatersleben, 2003; Nankervis, 1999) have been shown to influence modal choice. 
Without a licence one cannot (legally) drive and without a bicycle one cannot cycle. 
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Often, however, contextual conditions alone "are poor predictors of behavior, as 
individuals in similar objective situations may have different subjective perceptions or 
attitudes towards these factors, and therefore different responses" (Salomon & 
Mokhtarian, 1997, 115). Handy et. al. (2005) found this when investigating whether US 
participants drove out of choice or necessity. They conclude that "What appears to be a 
question of choice to an observer may be perceived as a matter of necessity by the 
individual. Finding an objective way to make such distinctions may simply be 
impossible" (Ibid., 188). This was certainly true in study 2 of this thesis, reported in 
Chapter 6. 
The following sub-sections cover different types of contextual factors, beginning with 
physical and social environments before moving on to socio-demographic variables. 
3.3.2.1 Physical and social environments 
Despite problems of disentangling choice and necessity, several researchers have 
attempted to identify contextual influences on travel behaviour. Using an open-ended 
questionnaire item, Gatersleben (2003) found that people listed many reasons for 
driving rather than cycling to work. She divides these into 'contextual' barriers (e.g. 
weather, hills, darkness) and 'personal' barriers (e.g. needing to dress smartly, needing 
to combine commuting with other trips). This division seems rather misleading, as the 
identified 'personal' barriers are surely contextual. What differentiates them from hills 
and cycle lanes is that they are aspects of social rather than physical context. 
Characteristics such as physical fitness might be more accurately called 'personal'. 
One could argue that social context should be treated under 'social motives' and 
indeed the perception that one cannot cycle because certain clothes are required for 
work can be seen as a subjective norm. However, some influences seem to fit into 
multiple categories. Although this complicates the task of classifying them, it reflects 
the acknowledged interaction between person and environment that stretches back at 
least to Lewin's (1951) field theory. 
Focusing on objective physical environments in the US, Rodriguez & Joo (2004, 169) 
found that "sloping terrain decreases the attractiveness of walking and cycling, while 
higher percentages of sidewalk available in the shortest route to a destination are 
correlated with a higher propensity to select the pedestrian mode." Studies of this type 
differ from those like Gatersleben's (2003). The former actually measure aspects of the 
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physical environment while the latter measure perceptions. This second approach is 
more common in the studies reviewed here. 
Nankervis (1999) - examining influences on cycle or car commuting in Australia-
combined both approaches, reporting many of the same perceived barriers to cycling 
as Gatersleben (2003) and adding the need to carry baggage. Nankervis (1999) also 
assessed the influence of season and weather on cycling. Although there were no 
significant differences across seasons, he found that (objectively-measured) wind and 
temperature correlated significantly with daily bicycle counts (r = -.209, P = .011 and r = 
.363, p < .001, respectively), while rain was marginally significant (r= -.160, p = .052). 
The stronger the wind, the lower the temperature and the greater the chance of rain 
(according to local forecasts), the fewer cycle commuters were observed. 
In opposition to Nankervis' (Ibid.) findings, Bergstrom & Magnusson (2003) report 
significant seasonal variations in Swedish cyclist numbers, probably because Sweden's 
winters are harsher than Australia's. There was also "a clear correlation between 
distance to work and mode choice ... the number of trips by bicycle and on foot 
decreased while trips by car increased with distance" (Ibid., 654). Moreover, ratings of 
the importance of travel time differed between car and cycle commuters. Travel time 
was less important to the latter group than the former, reminding us that people 
interpret contextual conditions in different ways. 
Also investigating travel time, Fujii et. a/. (2001, 796) found that "drivers who more 
frequently commuted by automobile overestimated commuting time by public transport 
to a larger extent than did drivers who commuted less frequently by automobile." They 
report that "if high-frequency drivers use public transport at least once, their 
overestimates of public transport commute time are corrected, leading to an increase in 
the frequency of public transport use" (Ibid., 805). Again, this underlines the importance 
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of perceived context. If perceptions change, behaviour change may follow. 
Rather than time costs, Hunecke et. a/. (2001) examined financial costs. They 
manipulated the price of subway travel by providing free tickets to some participants. A 
significant difference was found in self-reported level of subway use between those 
with and without free tickets (F(1, 156) = 6.00, p < .01). Even after the study, subway 
use was maintained among those who had received free travel. At first glance this 
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seems to mirror Fujii et. al.'s (2001) finding that drivers continued to use public 
transport after experiencing it. However, Hunecke et. al. (2001) note that their control 
participants (who did not receive free travel) also used the subway more after the 
study. They suggest that simply recording one's behaviour in a diary may prompt 
modal switch. Alternatively, external events (e.g. major roadworks) may have led to a 
general increase in subway use at this time. 
Jakobsson, Fujii and Garling (2002) also manipulated travel costs, this time in Sweden. 
Drivers were charged per km of driving during a designated period. Although there is 
some evidence that charging led to reduced car use, effects were only marginally 
significant. Based on interviews with participants, Jakobsson et. al. conclude that 
economic disincentives for car use may be ineffective in promoting modal switch 
because people often feel that they use their cars as little as possible already. This is 
congruent with some of the findings on perceived control reported in section 3.3.1.6. 
Alongside Hunecke et. al.'s findings (2001), it also suggests that lowering the price of 
non-car modes may encourage modal switch more than raising the cost of driving. 
Salomon & Mokhtarian (1997) make a further comment about financial costs when 
discussing factors influencing switching from driving to other modes: "the previously 
sunk cost invested in the automobile often presents a barrier to change" (Ibid., 119). 
Although they cite no empirical evidence for this assertion, it is supported by study 2 of 
this thesis (see Chapter 6, section 6.5.2.2). 
In conclusion, many aspects of physical and social context seem to influence travel 
behaviour. Some, like vehicle ownership, are more-or-Iess non-negotiable, but most 
must be interpreted. For example, as Gatersleben (2003) notes, some people willingly 
cycle in rain or over long distances. The extent to which anyone voluntarily does so 
probably depends on other psychological characteristics. If somebody enjoys cycling or 
values its environmental benefits, they may ride regardless of barriers. This is likely to 
be true of any mode, with more effort being made to overcome barriers where there is 
strong internal motivation. 
Beyond cycling, there is evidence that modal choice is affected by perceived journey 
time and financial costs. The limited findings suggest that drivers may overestimate 
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travel time by non-car modes and that reducing the cost of these modes may be more 
effective in encouraging modal switch than raising the cost of car use. 
Most studies of physical environments' effect on travel measure perceived barriers 
rather than objective contextual features and those that take objective measures rarely 
examine perceptions (although see Nankervis, 1999). Given sufficient resources, 
studies could compare perceived and objective context. Gatersleben, Steg and Vlek 
(2002) took this approach to household energy use, comparing perceived and actual 
energy consumption and reporting that "respondents who indicate they behave more 
proenvironmentally do not necessarily use less energy" (Ibid., 335). It would be 
interesting to see whether there is a similar mismatch between perception of factors 
facilitating or inhibiting use of different travel modes and the actual context in which 
people travel. 
3.3.2.2 Socio-demographics 
A further set of contextual influences on travel comprises people's socio-demographiC 
characteristics. Although not external in the same sense as physical environments, 
such characteristics are clearly distinct from psychological motives. Sometimes socio-
demographics can be seen as proxies for other variables that may directly influence 
modal choice (e.g. physical abilities may be associated with age). This is not always 
the case, however. For example, women in Romany culture do not learn to drive (CoE, 
2005). Their gender can be said to directly affect how they travel. 
Root & Schintler (1999, 354), commenting on Women, motorization and the 
environment, suggest that "mass transit is often not seen as a practical or safe 
alternative for women." No specific evidence is cited, although Ellaway et. al. (2003) 
touch on this issue, reporting that Scottish women felt less protected than men on 
public transport. Exley & Christie (2002, 17) also note that in the UK "More people feel 
unsafe than secure in buses after dark, and women and older people are more likely to 
feel this." Neither study, however, assessed whether such perceptions actually led 
women to use buses less than men. 
In some non-UK studies, women evaluate public transport more favourably than men 
do. Based on structured interviews with Norwegians, Hjorthol (2001, 37) concludes that 
"women have more positive attitudes toward public transport than men." However, 
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when participants had access to both car and public transport for commuting, gender 
did not predict willingness to spend extra time travelling to work by the latter mode ({3 = 
-.037, P = .911). While women may have been more positive than men about some 
aspects of public transport, they apparently thought it too slow and continued to drive. 
Garling et. al. (2000) found that women were more likely than men to report commuting 
by public transport, but because the study focused on determinants of willingness to 
reduce future car use rather than of past behaviour, it is not clear why. Matthies et. al. 
(2002) also found that women were more likely than men to report using public 
transport. In regressions with three different outcomes (intention to use public 
transport, preference for public transport and self-reported public transport use), 
gender's effect was lessened when 'ecological norms' and 'car habit' were entered as 
additional predictors. Gender had a significant (p < .05) influence on each outcome 
before these variables were entered but its {3 value dropped in each model and became 
non-significant in two after 'ecological norm' and 'car habit' were added. This, Matthies 
et. al. suggest, illustrates that women expressed stronger preferences for public 
transport, stronger intentions to use it and reported higher actual use because they had 
stronger norms and weaker car habits than men. 
Rather than examining gender differences in determinants of modal choice, Ellaway et. 
al. (2003) focused on psychological benefits gained by women and men from using 
different modes. (Of course, benefits may feed back, influencing future behaviour.) 
They found that, controlling for age and social class, "Men's self-esteem is more 
strongly related to car access than women's; on the other hand, for women, mastery 
was more closely related to car access, emphasising perhaps the practical rather than 
the symbolic importance of cars in women's lives" (Ibid., 228). Mastery is defined as 
"an individual's self perceived capacity to control events" and was measured by items 
asking, for example, whether people agreed that "I can do just about anything I set my 
mind to" (Ibid., 221). This echoes Bandura's (1997) conception of (general rather than 
behaviour-specific) self-efficacy. The psychological importance of such feelings 
extends far beyond travel. For example, Breakwell's (1993) identity process theory 
proposes that a general sense of "competence and control" is essential for a positive 
self-identity and avoidance of "feelings of futility, alienation and 'helplessness'" (Ibid., 
205). These issues are revisited in Chapter 7. Here, it is simply noted that men and 
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women may perceive different benefits from driving and this could have implications for 
strategies intended to influence modal choice (see also Steg, 2005). 
Leaving gender aside, Kuppam & Pendyala (2001) report that high earners in the US 
tend to combine more non-work activities with commuting and this may explain their 
particular unwillingness to use non-car modes. However, older people (who might be 
expected to earn more) reported combining fewer non-work activities with commuting. 
The reason may be that once children have left home, people perform fewer "out-of-
home maintenance activities", so their commutes are more direct (Ibid., 51). Nilsson & 
KOller (2000) report that young people drove less than the elderly, but middle-aged 
people drove the most. This can be seen as congruent with Kuppam & Pendyala's 
(2001) findings, as the young and old may have fewer 'out-of-home' obligations. 
Exley & Christie (2002) report various UK statistics on car and bus use by different 
groups. Seventy-nine percent of professionals drove a car at least twice a week, but 
only 9% used a bus this frequently. For those in routine/semi-routine jobs, the figures 
were 42% and 26%. Thirty-nine percent of people earning under £10,000 per year 
drove at least twice a week and 29% used a bus, while the figures for those earning 
between £18,000 and £32,000 per year were 75% and 10%. (Mean UK income was 
£25,170 in 200213; ONS, 2003.) These differences suggest that travel mode is related 
to occupation and income and that buses are "mainly used by those who are 
marginalised or 'excluded'" (Exley & Christie, 2002, 11). Such people may not enjoy 
travel mode 'choice' at all. Indeed, Lucas, Grosvenor and Simpson (2001, v) - who 
examined links between travel and social exclusion through desk research and focus 
groups in the UK - argue that "economically- and socially-disadvantaged people do not 
travel less because they do not need to travel, but because they are often constrained 
from travelling in some way." It would be useful to measure PSC alongside socio-
demographics, modal preference and actual modal use. This may indicate whether less 
wealthy individuals want to drive but cannot, or voluntarily use non-car modes. 
In Holland, Steg (2005) found that low earners rated affective aspects of driving more 
positively than high earners (F(2, 177) = 8.8, p < .001). She also reports that younger 
people gave significantly more favourable evaluations of affective aspects of driving 
than older respondents (F(1, 176) = 9.9, P < .001). Echoing this, Handy et. al. (2005) 
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found that some US interviewees said that they enjoyed driving for its own sake when 
they were younger, but enjoyment lessened with age. 
To conclude, several studies have examined links between socio-demographics and 
travel. In the UK, the picture is of a public transport system that is particularly 
unattractive to women because of safety concerns. However, it is unclear whether 
these concerns actually stop women from using public transport. There is some 
evidence from continental Europe that women use public transport more than men 
because of stronger pro-environmental norms and weaker driving habits, but more 
work is required before these findings can be generalised. There are also gender 
differences (at least in one UK study) in terms of psychological benefits provided by 
cars. Driving seems to raise men's self-esteem more than women's, but women's 
sense of control more than men's. 
Studies in various countries suggest that younger people and low earners enjoy driving 
more than older people and high earners, but the former groups still drive less, perhaps 
because of restricted car access. As yet, however, there does not seem to be much 
evidence linking socio-demographic characteristics and the extent of real modal 
'choice'. 
3.3.3 Habits 
Stern (2000) suggests that habit influences many ESBs and travel is apparently among 
them. Bamberg & Schmidt (2003, 281) propose that while travel choices are "rooted in 
once made conscious considerations about pros and cons", behaviour often follows 
automatically from "situational cues". Several others make similar assertions (e.g. Fujii 
et. a/., 2001; Gatersleben & Uzzell, 2001). 
Aarts & Dijksterhuis (2000, 76) - explaining the common conception in travel research 
- propose that habits are 
strong associations between goals (e.g. going to the supermarket) and actions (e.g. 
using a bike). These associations develop as a result of frequent and consistent 
choices made to attain a certain goal (e.g. always use a bike to go to the 
supermarket). Because of these associations, the habitual choice or action is 
automatically activated upon activation of the relevant goal. 
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KI6ckner & Matthies (2004) examined this conception in their study of university travel. 
They measured habit by giving participants five activities (e.g. "shopping expedition") 
and asking for the first travel mode that came to mind for each. These activities were 
assumed to be "so general and so reduced that. .. the decision can only be based on 
existing schema" (Ibid., 324). The strength of participants' driving habit was rated by 
how many times they responded with 'car'. This is called a 'script-based' measure, 
because people are given a behavioural script to respond to. The study also measured 
PN and SN relating to driving and assessed how these variables influenced self-
reported car use for commuting. PN was the only significant predictor of commuting 
mode (f3 = .88, p < .001) and the PN-behaviour correlation was moderate and 
significant for those with weak driving habits (r = .49, p < .001), but weak and non-
significant (r = .21, p > .05) for those with strong driving habits. Thus, KI6ckner & 
Matthies suggest that trips to work are so frequent and routine that "the process of 
norm-activation is totally blocked if habit strength is high" (Ibid., 326). However, it 
seems more accurate to say that norms were activated, but that the PN-behaviour 
effect appeared to be blocked by habits. 
While habit was not a direct predictor of behaviour in Klockner & Matthies' (Ibid.) study, 
it was in Bamberg & Schmidt's (2003). This is surprising because their participants 
were also German students and they investigated trips to university using a script-
based measure. Bamberg & Schmidt tested a model comprising elements of Ajzen's 
(1991) TPB, Schwartz's (1977) NAT and Triandis' (1977) TIB (which includes habit). 
Habit had a stronger influence on self-reported modal choice than any other predictor 
(f3 = .41, p < .05). 
Matthies et. al. (2002) tested a simpler model; consisting of PN, gender and habit 
(using a script-based measure) as predictors of self-reported car or subway use. Again, 
habit was a Significant influence on modal choice (f3 = -.35, P < .001) and had the 
highest f3 value of any predictor. Notably, however, PN had a stronger influence than 
habit when the regression outcome was willingness to reduce car use, rather than self-
reported behaviour. Conscious processes like norm activation and intention formation 
can apparently occur despite habits, but habits can lessen the influence of these 
processes on behaviour (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Staats, 2003). This supports the 
above interpretation of KI6ckner & Matthies' (2004) results. 
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Based on their findings, Matthies et. al. (2002) suggest that improving public transport 
may not break driving habits because habitual drivers do not seek new information 
about alternatives. Given this, "it seems more promising to prevent people from 
becoming habitual car users in the first place" (Ibid., 173). If this can be done, norms, 
intentions and other conscious cognitions may have more influence on travel behaviour 
than if they must compete with opposing habits (Handy et. al., 2005). 
In conclusion, all of the studies reviewed used script-based measures of habit strength. 
This method is said to be better than using past behaviour as a proxy for habit because 
there is no guarantee that past behaviour was automatic (Kleckner & Matthies, 2004). 
Findings generally suggest that habit has a relatively strong influence on modal choice 
and can lessen the effects of conscious psychological motivations. It therefore seems 
useful to try to account for habits when explaining travel behaviour and perhaps 
especially commuting, as this is "an ideal example of a routine behaviour" (Ibid., 319). 
3.4 Cautionary notes: desirability, dissonance and causation 
In many studies reviewed here, people were asked about their attitudes and beliefs and 
these data were used to explain variables such as modal choice or willingness to use 
different modes. Understanding of influences on travel behaviour is based largely on 
such work, but a review of the field must note certain methodological and conceptual 
issues that have a bearing on how we treat this understanding. 
Firstly, in a behavioural domain such as personal transport - which some people see 
as having moral implications (see section 3.3.1.4) - social desirability may influence 
data. Although her study did not address the question directly, Steg (2005, 148f) 
suggests that "people might not be willing to admit that using a car fulfils many 
symbolic and affective functions ... car drivers are inclined to justify and rationalise their 
behaviour." Steg, Vlek & Siotegraaf (2001, 152) ask "Who would easily be aware and 
admit that driving a car contributes to one's feelings of power and territorial instinct? 
People rather keep saying that it's all a matter of time and money." This study 
examined whether people gave different motives for car use under different 
circumstances. As reported in section 3.3.1.2, people stressed instrumental motives in 
a semantic-differential task. However, in a more opaque task where participants 
evaluated fictional car-use episodes, episodes that were deemed most attractive were 
typified by positive affect. People seemed to underplay the value of the car's affective 
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functions and stress its instrumental functions when they were aware of what the 
researchers were trying to discover. They may not have wanted to give the impression 
of driving for 'trivial' affective reasons, but for more 'serious' practical reasons. 
As well as being aware of how participants present themselves, we should recall the 
proposal that people strive for consistent internal self-image (Festinger, 1962). They 
may attempt to avoid cognitive dissonance: "discrepancy between attitudes or between 
attitudes and behavior" which creates "unpleasant psychological tension" (Tertoolen, 
Van Kreveld and Verstraten, 1998, 172). If drivers perceive their behaviour as 
environmentally damaging, they may experience dissonance. To relieve it, they can 
change their behaviour or attitudes. In Tertoolen et. al.'s study, people who scored high 
on AC before an intervention designed to reduce car use, but who did not reduce it, 
scored lower on AC afterwards. This suggests that when discrepancies between 
attitudes and behaviour are "pointed out, people are more likely to alter their attitude 
than their behavior, and tend to excuse themselves for their behavior" (Ibid.). Steg & 
Vlek (1997) report similar findings, with implications for attempts to reduce car use 
through information provision. Despite some (patchy) evidence that AC can motivate 
use of non-car modes, such motives may be vulnerable to change where people seek 
to avoid cognitive dissonance. 
Thirdly, although most studies reviewed here assume that behaviour follows from 
attitudes, "Mode choice may also influence attitudes, through experience and 
psychological phenomena such as cognitive dissonance reduction" (Steg, Geurs & 
Ras, 2001, 791). Because travel psychology studies often measure attitudes and 
behaviour concurrently, we cannot be certain about causal direction (BergstrOm & 
Magnusson, 2003; Steg, 2003a). We must, therefore, acknowledge that the 
psychological motives detailed in section 3.3 may be expressed as post hoc 
justifications for behaviour, rather than prior explanations. 
These observations have implications for travel psychology. Researchers should note 
that: 1) people may express particular attitudes because of social desirability concerns, 
2} attitudes may change to reduce cognitive dissonance and 3) attitudes may follow 
from behaviour. Thus, efforts should be made to use methods that minimise socially 
desirable responses or at least help to identify them and researchers should not 
uncritically assume that data represent people's 'inner realities' (see Chapter 2). It 
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would also be useful to see more longitudinal studies that would enable greater 
certainty over causal direction. 
3.5 Travel as a social dilemma 
The social dilemma concept is common in the literature reviewed here and helps to 
explain how factors discussed in section 3.3 influence travel behaviour. The idea of 
environmental problems as social dilemmas was proposed by Hardin (1968), who 
argued that consumption of a common resource by many individuals with unrestricted 
access to it eventually leads to the resource's exhaustion, with dire consequences for 
all. While it may appear rational to each person that they should consume as much and 
as quickly as possible - because their individual consumption is tiny - their combined 
consumption can rapidly destroy the resource, leaving everybody worse off. The 
dilemma is: consume while you still can, or show restraint and risk seeing the resource 
destroyed anyway. 
In travel terms, the dilemma is usually seen as arising from tension between the 
(perceived) individual benefits of driving and its societal costs: pollution, congestion 
and accidents (e.g. Fujii et. al., 2001; Nilsson & KOller, 2000). If one person tries to 
address these problems by not driving, they may suffer reduced utility while others 
continue to benefit from the car's convenience, flexibility and so on. However, if 
everyone stopped driving, the benefits to society would be large and in the long-term, 
everybody would be better off. As Nordlund & Garvill (2003, 340) note, "there is no 
objectively rational solution" because it can be seen as rational to serve one's 
individual interests or the collective interest. 
Nordlund & Garvill (Ibid., 339) assumed that willingness to reduce car use constitutes 
"intention to cooperate [in the dilemma] since it requires sacrificing immediate personal 
gains in order to reduce long-term collective environmental costs." (This may not 
always be so. Some participants in study 2 of this thesis appeared to derive immediate 
personal benefits from switching to non-car modes (see Chapter 6, section 6.5.1.2). 
But it may generally be perceived as true in car-oriented societies.) Based on a 
regression analysiS, Nordlund & Garvill (Ibid., 345) conclude that "holding a collective 
value orientation, such as self-transcendence [Le. valuing others' welfare as well as 
one's own], and viewing the environment as worth preserving for its intrinsic value, is 
important for feeling morally obligated to cooperate". This echoes a necessary 
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condition for solving social dilemmas identified by Tertoolen et. al. (1998): that people 
must understand the problem "so that moral, normative and altruistic concerns as well 
as external pay-ofts influence behavior" (Ibid., 172). 
But research suggests that this condition may not pertain. Steg & Vlek (1997, 466) 
argue that AC is "an important prerequisite for creating public support for ... measures 
aimed at reducing car use." However, participants "evaluated their car use as 'a 
(SOCietal) problem', but thought their own car use was 'hardly a problem' for society" 
(Ibid., 470). They argue that driving causes cognitive dissonance because individuals 
see car use as problematic, but still want to drive. In tum, dissonance leads people to 
revise their beliefs about how serious the problem is, rather than changing their 
behaviour. Evidence comes from the finding that people who had high AC scores 
before group discussions of transport issues actually had lower scores afterwards. As 
Salomon & Mokhtarian (1997,107) remark, assuming that people will change their 
travel behaviour "so as to improve the environment may prove to be too optimistic. 
Very likely, individuals will respond in a manner which best suits them." This does not 
necessarily mean that individuals act in a consciously selfish manner. There may be 
other processes at work. Breakwell (1986, 81) suggests that denial of a danger "is a 
well-documented response to stress ... First, the facts are denied, then their relevance, 
then their urgency, then the need to act". Perhaps people respond to threats like 
climate change, accidents and local pollution (see Chapter 1) by denying their 
seriousness and hence avoiding the psychological stress of engaging with them. This 
is no solution. Denial "is inevitably disadvantageous in the long run because it isolates 
the person from a reality which is unlikely to go away and may get progressively worse 
if ignored" (Ibid., 82). This could hardly be more apt to the problem of climate change. 
Tertoolen et. al. (1998) also identify a second necessary condition for overcoming 
social dilemmas: people must believe that others will co-operate. If one does not 
believe this, why not exploit common resources since they will be destroyed anyway? 
Discouragingly, Gatersleben & Uzzell (2001) found that only 24% of their sample 
agreed that others would "voluntarily reduce their car use" and 7% agreed that "The 
local authority do everything they can" to tackle traffic-related problems. A later study 
(Gatersleben and Uzzell, 2003) found that only 13% of local policy-makers believed 
that residents would willingly drive less, although 81 % of policy-makers believed that 
residents could do so. This issue is seldom examined in travel behaviour research, but 
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may be important. Perhaps pro-environmental motives (e.g. PN, concern over actions' 
consequences) will have maximum effect on behaviour when people believe that 
others will act pro-environmentally. This would be a useful area for future study. 
Calhoun (2002) notes that sociologists have seen trust as "an essential element of 
stable social life" since Durkheim's (1964) Division of Labor in Society was published in 
the late 19th Century. Giddens (1990) argues that modern society undermines kinship 
and community ties and that trust has been eroded because individuals have little 
contact with many parties on whom their welfare depends. (We should note that 
Giddens is not talking about 'trust' relating to explicit promises, but to general 
confidence in others. In the context of this discussion, the interest is in people's 
confidence that others will reduce their car use.) Travel psychology (and other ESB 
research) may benefit from investigating such ideas. 
Joireman et. al. (2004) have tried to advance the debate on social dilemmas by 
elaborating a temporal dimension. They argue that the conception of social dilemmas 
as conflicts between individual and collective interests is too simplistic, proposing that 
people who score high on consideration of future consequences (CFC) are less likely 
to drive than those who value immediate gains. They measured CFC using a 12-item 
scale asking whether various statements (e.g. "I consider how things might be in the 
future and try to influence those things with my day-to-day behavior") were 
characteristic of respondents (a = .81). The relationship between AC (four items, a = 
.70) and preference for public transport was significant for those with high CFC (f3 = 
.35, t = 3.44, P < .001), but not for those with low CFC. Like Steg & Vlek's (1997) study, 
this shows that environmental awareness alone is often insufficient to motivate 
avoidance of driving, but it also suggests why this may be. AC might only influence 
travel behaviour when allied with a concern for long-term consequences. This is 
another issue deserving of research attention and taken alongside Giddens' (1990) 
ideas, it suggests that NAT and other models of altruistic behaviour (e.g. Stern, Dietz, 
Abel, Guagnano and Kalofs (1999) 'value-belief-norm' model) might be improved by 
addition of trust and CFC. 
3.6 Car-use reduction measures and their acceptance 
Many travel psychology studies state an aim of policy-relevance; to inform strategies 
for addressing the problems described in Chapter 1 (e.g. Bergstrom & Magnusson, 
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2003; Garling et. a/., 2000). Accordingly, several suggest car-use reduction measures 
based on their findings. This section reviews these measures, their rationales and their 
effectiveness. 
Although it is relatively easy to measure behavioural interventions' success with willing 
participants, it is difficult in real-world situations. Marshall & Banister (2000) note that it 
is easier to see travel than 'non-travel'. Traffic volumes show how many journeys are 
made by car, but not how many people are using different modes or not travelling at all 
because some policy is in place. 
Evaluation is not the only policy challenge. Intervention design also poses problems. 
Tertoolen et. al. (1998) argue that people may respond to being told not to drive by 
refusing to change their behaviour; asserting control over their own actions. Again we 
are reminded of the supposed importance of feelings of control to a positive self-
identity (Breakwell, 1986; 1993). Indeed, as reported in section 3.4, Tertoolen et. a/. 
(1998) found that people's stated AC actually lessened after they were given 
information on cars' environmental impacts. This, alongside the finding that there was 
no decrease in car use, suggests that people preferred to change their beliefs than to 
change their behaviour at somebody else's request. Moreover, people who received 
information on the financial costs of driving and who received both cost and 
environmental information did not reduce their car use. Given the failure of this 
"relatively intensive and personalized procedure", Tertoolen et. a/. (Ibid., 178) conclude 
that "even less effect may be expected from more superficial, generalized attempts to 
exert influence by means of mass-media campaigns" (see also Chapter 7, section 7.4). 
Beyond Tertoolen et. al.'s work, the literature provides few examples of controlled tests 
of interventions designed to reduce car use. There are, however, post hoc 
assessments. Marshall & Banister (2000) reviewed eight schemes from three 
European countries, concluding that they "have had qualified success" (Ibid., 321). 
Schemes included a park and ride bus service in Bristol (UK), a parking information 
system in Aalborg (Denmark), restricted car access to the centre of Enschede 
(Holland) and the introduction of teleworking across Holland. In one sense, the most 
successful scheme was the introduction of company bicycles by nine organisations in 
Aalborg. Thirty-five bicycles were ridden 21,700 km in six months. Just over 18,000 km 
replaced·travel by motorised modes. This is a sizable shift, but the impact "on traffic in 
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the city as a whole was relatively small" (Ibid., 328). This illustrates a problem with 
targeted interventions. While they may meet individuals' needs more successfully than 
measures aimed at heterogeneous populations (Gatersleben, 2003), they only affect a 
few people's behaviour. 
Steg (2003a) investigated acceptance of car-use reduction measures rather than their 
effectiveness. Focusing on transport pricing, she examined factors influencing 
acceptance of a policy package including higher fuel prices, tolls, closure of city centres 
to cars and inclusion of road tax in fuel costs. She also examined acceptance of higher 
fuel prices and tolling individually. Acceptance of the policy package, fuel price rises 
and tolling was influenced by awareness of driving-related problems (AC) (f3 = .28, .25 
and .18, respectively, p not reported for any results in this study). Attitudes (A TT) to car 
use were also influential (f3 = -.17, -.17 and -.19, respectively), as were feelings of 
individual responsibility (AR) (f3 = .16, .10 and .10, respectively). Outcome efficacy 
(whether people believed that their actions would make any difference to problems 
caused by travel) influenced acceptance of the policy package and tolling (f3 = .10 and 
.10, respectively), while perceptions of others' travel behaviour only influenced 
acceptance of the policy package (f3 = .08). There is conceptual overlap between 
outcome efficacy and confidence in others (see section 3.5). People may be more likely 
to believe that their actions will make a difference if they also trust others to act for the 
same ends. Confidence in others may even influence the feelings of personal 
responsibility captured by AR. Outcome efficacy should also be distinguished from 
perceived self-efficacy (see sedion 3.3.1.6). PSE refers to people's beliefs about 
whether they can perform an action, rather than about the action's outcomes. 
In another study. Steg & Vlek (1997) found positive relationships between AC, AR, 
outcome efficacy and ~valuations of the effectiveness and acceptability of 'push' 
(coercive) and 'pull' (non-coercive) car-use reduction policies. However, they note that 
when policies were perceived as being effective, they were also often perceived as 
unacceptable because they would impinge on individuals' ability to drive freely. This 
hints at the value placed on personal freedom in modern Western societies and its role 
as a barrier to reduced car use; an issue explored in Chapter 7. 
Although these results suggest attitudes that may be necessary for acceptance of car-
use reduction policies, they do not show how people will behave if those policies are 
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enacted. Indeed, Steg (2003a) notes that transport pricing could have unwanted side-
effects. It may lessen psychological motivations for reducing car use if people believe 
that contextual factors are achieving this goal anyway. Thus, if prices fell , people would 
resume their old behaviours. Furthermore, people may perceive a right to drive 
because they are paying more to do so. 
Despite these dangers, travel psychologists and others continue to suggest 
interventions designed to cut car use either by switching modes or removing the need 
to travel altogether (e.g. Foley & Fergusson, 2003; SISTech, 2004). The problems 
described in Chapter 1 make these efforts necessary, despite the challenges. The 
introduction of congestion charging in London in 2003 (see Figure 3.2) led to 30% 
fewer cars entering the zone in the first six months of operation (TFL, 2003). This 
suggests that large-scale car-use reduction measures can work, but they should, of 
course, take account of relevant psychological research . For example, media coverage 
of UK government plans for 'pay-per-mile' car tax contained many references to the 
need for public acceptance (e.g. Tempest, 2005). It is just this sort of issue to which 
travel psychology could usefully contribute. 
Figure 3.2 Congestion charging in London 
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3.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed research on factors influencing modal choice, whether 
people travel at all, whether they accept car-use reduction policies and what impact 
such policies might have. Taking Stern's (2000) assessment of progress toward a 
coherent theory of ESB as its framework, the review examined psychological factors, 
context/personal capabilities and habits. These categories provided a starting point, but 
it has been argued that they overlap and that Stern's 'attitudinal factors' can be 
differentiated into several separate - although often related - psychological influences. 
Several studies which measure instrumental evaluations show that cars are seen as 
conferring utility (e.g. Hagman, 2003). However. as users of different modes share this 
view. it may not explain modal choice. Perceptions of cars' environmental (dis)utility 
could be more useful. with the likelihood of driving decreasing as the weight given to its 
perceived negative environmental impacts increases (Anable & Gatersleben, 2005). 
This is one area of overlap between Stern's (2000) 'attitudinal factors'. While some 
studies treat environmental impact as an instrumental disbenefit of travel, others use 
Schwartz's (1977) awareness of consequences construct to place beliefs about 
impacts at the start of a causal chain running via personal norms to behaviour. There is 
evidence that PN mediates the AC-behaviour relationship (e.g. Nordlund & Garvill. 
2003) and the PN-modal choice effect is reliable (e.g. Klockner & Matthies. 2004). 
There is less evidence concerning feelings of responsibility (AR). It is important to 
clarify how (and if) these variables interact, as attempts to promote pro-environmental 
behaviour often rely on information provision alone and poor results may stem from 
paying insufficient attention to AR and PN (Collins et. BI .• 2003). 
These are all components of Schwartz's (1977) NAT and work on travel as a social 
dilemma highlights two ways in which this theory of altruistic behaviour might be . 
developed. Consideration of future consequences may be a useful addition (Joireman 
et. BI .• 2004). as might some measure of trust. AR and PN may have most effect on 
behaviour when accompanied by trust in others to co-operate in social dilemmas (e.g. 
by avoiding car use themselves). 
Although NAT apparently captures some important influences on modal choice, it 
ignores others. Instrumental evaluations are one, echoing the attitude (ATT) construct 
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from Ajzen's (1991a) TPB. Subjective norm is another TPB construct that has received 
considerable attention, but its effect is unreliable. This may be because PN partially 
accounts for SN (Harland et. al., 1999; Schwartz, 1977) and/or because peer pressure 
is stronger in some social settings than others (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). Moreover, 
most studies measure injunctive norms but not descriptive norms. Future research 
could usefully investigate whether perceptions of others' behaviour, as well as of their 
expectations, affect travel behaviour. 
Social effects on travel are not restricted to those captured by SN. There is also 
evidence of social-symbolic influences. It has been shown that driving confers greater 
status than public transport (Ellaway et. al., 2003), that drivers value status more than 
non-drivers and that modal choice serves to present an image of the self (Steg, 2005). 
Here we see another overlap between influences, as symbolic factors can be seen as 
affective (e.g. Steg, Vlek & Siotegraaf, 2001). But there are other affective aspects to 
travel. Experiences of pleasure, stress, control, excitement and privacy have all been 
identified as influences. Steg, Vlek & Siotegraaf (Ibid.) suggest that drivers may be 
more reluctant to express affective motives for their modal choice than non-drivers. 
Thus, while affect seemingly does influence travel behaviour, measurement methods 
that minimise social-desirability bias are required. Consistent definitions are also 
needed and it was suggested in section 3.3.1.2 that studies could distinguish affective 
experiences (e.g. pleasure) from their causes (e.g. privacy). 
Another 'attitudinal factor' - perceived behavioural control - may affect the extent to 
which any of the above influences actually directs travel behaviour. Studies often report 
that people feel low control over their modal choice (e.g. OfT, 2003). The distinction 
between PBC and context is blurry, as many contextual conditions must be interpreted 
and the extent to which any is seen as an incentive or a barrier to using a particular 
mode probably depends on the strength of other motives (Salomon & Mokhtarian, 
1997). For example, somebody who enjoys walking may be willing to endure worse 
weather than somebody who does not share this affective motivation. 
Social environments (e.g. job requirements) have also been shown to influence travel 
(e.g. Nankervis, 1999). There is overlap here between context and SN: an 'attitudinal 
factor'. People's socio-demographic characteristics can also be seen as a type of 
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contextual influence. There is evidence (at least from the UK) that use of different travel 
modes is related to socio-economic position. Low earners and non-professionals are 
less likely to drive and more likely to use public transport (e.g. Exley & Christie, 2002). 
As well as income/occupation, studies have examined gender's relationship with travel. 
A number of authors suggest that women in the UK have safety concerns about public 
transport (e.g. Ellaway et. a/., 2003), but there is little evidence of such concerns 
keeping women off buses or trains. Indeed, UK women use buses more than men (DfT, 
2003a). This is also true in other European countries, but here there is evidence of 
women having more pro-public transport attitudes than men (e.g. Hjorthol, 2001). 
Habits were the final influence covered by the review and there is good evidence of 
their effect on travel behaviour (e.g. Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). Klockner & Matthies 
(2004) showed that even when pro-environmental motives for avoiding car use (e.g. 
PN) are present, an opposing habit can block any effect on behaviour. Matthies et. a/. 
(2002) suggest that car-use reduction measures should aim to prevent people from 
becoming habitual drivers in the first place. 
Such measures were examined in section 3.6. There are reports of small-scale 
successes with fairly resource-intensive schemes (Marshall & Banister, 2000), but 
information alone does not seem motivate reduced car use (Tertoolen et. a/., 1998). 
The review suggests several reasons for this. First, awareness of consequences (AC) 
seems to have little effect on behaviour in the absence of feelings of obligation (PN). 
Second, even AC and PN may be insufficient without concern for the future (Joireman 
et. a/., 2004). Third people may need to trust others to act before acting themselves 
(Gatersleben & Uzzell, 2003). Fourth, if people value cars' instrumental or affective 
functions, self-interest may lead them to ignore information about driving's negative 
impacts. Fifth, if people perceive no choice but to drive, information about its 
consequences is unlikely influence their behaviour. Finally, where driving is habitual, 
habits can override even PN, so information alone seems likely to have little effect. 
It is striking that many influences on travel uncovered by this review are captured by 
Ajzen's (1991; 1991a) TPB and Schwartz's (1977) NAT. Even when these models are 
not applied in full, their constructs are often used - with some success - to explain 
modal choice and/or policy acceptance. Of course, these theories do not capture every 
relevant influence, but it seems that as with many other environmentally-significant 
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behaviours, NAT and the TPB can help us to understand why people use particular 
modes and make (or avoid) particular journeys. 
This chapter has also suggested links between theories commonly applied in travel 
psychology and theories from other domains. For example, the importance of feelings 
of control to a positive self-image is highlighted by Breakwell's (1993) identity process 
theory and is echoed by PBC, while Gatersleben & Uzzell's (2001; 2003) work calls to 
mind Giddens' (1990) sociological ideas on trust. Such issues are revisited in the 
general discussion in Chapter 7. The next chapter, however, focuses on two theories 
that are not only common in travel psychology, but have come to dominate ESB 
research more generally; Ajzen's (1991; 1991a) TPB and Schwartz's (1977) NAT. 
Given that travel is a type of ESB, it is useful to examine research on other behaviours 
in this domain and to consider how it might inform the study of travel behaviour. 
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Chapter 4 
Literature review 2: norm-activation and theory 
of planned behaviour research on 
environmentally-significant behaviour 
4.1 Introduction: rationale for the review 
As observed in Chapter 3, travel psychology studies often apply one of two attitude-
behaviour theories: Schwartz's (1977) norm-activation theory (NAT) and Ajzen's (1991; 
1991a) theory of planned behaviour (TPB). Not only are they common in travel 
psychology, they are the "two classic psychological models which have been applied" 
to environmentally-significant behaviour (ESB) more generally (Matthies, 2003, 104). A 
literature search undertaken for this chapter demonstrates this (see section 4.3.1). 
This chapter reviews 24 empirical studies of ESB's determinants that use NAT and/or 
the TPB. The review had two broad aims. One was to establish which (if either) theory 
best explains ESB. To answer this general question, three more specific questions 
were asked. 
• Are there contexts in which one theory is more applicable than the other? 
• Are their behaviours to which one theory is more applicable than the other? 
• What are the reasons for one theory's superior applicability if such a judgement 
can be made? 
These questions suggest a traditional literature review like Chapter 3's; a theory-level 
overview of research in a behavioural domain. However, the review's second aim 
required an additional micro-level approach, focusing on individual constructs. This aim 
was to assess ''the frequency with which studies in the research literature support (or 
refute) a particular finding" (Wood, 2000,417). Many studies may show that X 
influences Y, but it is important to know whether researchers mean the same things by 
X and Yand, therefore, whether studies purportedly "addressing the same relationship" 
(Hines, Hungerford and Tomera, 1987,2) actually do so. Findings from the micro-level 
analysis informed the operational definitions used in the studies presented in Chapters 
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5 and 6 and this chapter as a whole illuminates several methodological issues, 
consideration of which was useful preparation for empirical work. 
4.1.1 Balancing consistency and innovation in research 
Chapter 3 showed that some influences on travel behaviour generalise well (e.g. 
personal norms, habits). Research has brought cumulative understanding, 
strengthening the case for saying that particular factors influence travel behaviour 
through successive additions to the literature. Ziman (1991, 3) describes this process. 
Scientific knowledge is the product of a collective human enterprise to which 
scientists make individual contributions which are purified and extended by 
mutual criticism and intellectual cooperation ... the goal of science is a consensus 
of rational opinion over the widest possible field. 
Ziman's position has two notable implications. First, it assumes that we advance 
towards 'truth' by 'purifying' and 'extending' lines of enquiry. The same assumption is 
made by studies in the attitude-behaviour tradition, within which most work reviewed in 
Chapter 3 and all work reviewed in this chapter is positioned. Second, it suggests that 
some consistency in research is desirable. Unless studies develop previous work, we 
will not reach consensus in fields like travel behaviour, let alone 'the widest possible 
field' (see Oom Do Valle, Rebelo, Reis and Menezes, 2005; Stern, 2000). 
These are complex issues. Philosophers (e.g. Chalmers, 1999) and social scientists 
(e.g. Parker, 1998) have debated epistemology at length, yet arguments between 
relativists and realists (among others) persist. As for research consistency, it is 
arguable that there is a balance to be struck that avoids endlessly re-testing identical 
models and testing models that are incomparable. 
The epistemological position taken in this thesis is explained in Chapter 2, but more 
important for this chapter's purpose is to recognise epistemological assumptions in the 
reviewed work. As noted, attitude-behaviour research is non-relativist, assuming the 
existence of discoverable psychological characteristics that are "long-lived and ... relate 
to behaviour in a systematic manner" (Breakwell, 1993, 209). Every study reviewed 
here makes this assumption. 
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It is necessary to say a little more about research consistency. The proposal is that a 
'coherent theory of environmentally-significant behaviour' (Stern, 2000) can only 
develop if there is reasonable consistency in theories, models and constructs' 
definitions. What is 'reasonable' is debatable. Some variation in operational definitions 
can enhance generalisability, showing whether a construct is robust to different 
measurement methods. But excessive variation - where nominally-identical constructs 
have substantively different content - may cause confusion over which relationships 
hold across situations. We must also acknowledge that theories are not immutable. 
They are subject to change as our understanding develops. But this process should be 
guided by existing findings and/or theory rather than being entirely speculative (Oom 
Do Valle et. al., 2005). 
4.2 Definitions 
Section 4.1 introduced three important terms: theory, model and construct. According 
to the Oxford Dictionary of Psychology, a theory is "a set of propositions offered as a 
conjectured explanation for an observed phenomenon" (Colman, 2001, 739). A model 
is "a deliberately simplified and usually idealized and imaginary representation of a 
phenomenon, with fundamental properties that are explicitly defined ... from which other 
properties can be deduced by logical reasoning" (Ibid., 457). A construct is "a 
conjectured entity, process, or event that is not observed directly but is assumed to 
explain an observable phenomenon" (Ibid., 349). Thus, a model articulates a theory, 
showing how the components of an explanation for some phenomenon (e.g. travel 
behaviour) interact. In psychological theories, these components are often constructs 
such as attitudes and beliefs which are intangible, but assumed to be measurable with 
appropriate instruments such as survey items. 
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Review material 
As this review was concerned with cumulative understanding of ESB, it was decided to 
focus on the theory (or theories) that is (or are) most common in the domain. Matthies' 
(2003) comments (see section 4.1) and Chapter 3's findings suggested that these may 
be NAT and the TPB, but a literature search was needed to establish this. 
The Social Sciences Citation Index (SSel, 2005) and Zetoc (2005) databases were 
searched for "environment AND behaviour/behavior". One-hundred and eighty-one 
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post-1980, English language publications concerning individuals' ESB were identified. 
Inclusion of only English language publications is an acknowledged limitation. 
Abstracts revealed that NAT and the TPB were indeed the two most commonly applied 
theories in Colman's (2001) well-defined sense. 
Although ESB research uses several approaches, including social dilemmas (e.g. Fujii 
et. a/., 2001), the new environmental paradigm (NEP) (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978) and 
Kaiser's (1998) general measure of ecological behaviour, many are not theories. They 
are perspectives or measurement instruments that do not necessarily advance a 
'coherent theory' of ESB. For example, while various studies use the NEP to measure 
"environmental attitudes or concern" (Olli, Grendstad and Wollebaek, 2001, 186), they 
sometimes have contradictory theoretical implications. Stem et. a/. (1999) found that 
acceptance of the NEP explained beliefs about specific behavioural consequences 
captured by NAT's awareness of consequences (AC) construct, while Widegren (1998) 
used NEP items to measure AC. Moreover, Stem et. a/. (1999) placed NEP as 
consequent to values and antecedent to the constructs specified by Schwartz's (1977) 
NAT, while Widegren (1998) placed it as antecedent to guilt over not acting pro-
environmentally and consequent to socio-demographics. Comparing these studies 
arguably serves to confuse more than clarify ESB's determinants. 
There are also well-defined theories - such as Triandis' (1977) theory of interpersonal 
behaviour (TIB) - that are applied infrequently to ESB. Although common in other 
domains (e.g. Kingston, Evans, Smith and Berry, 2004 in the context of medical 
practice), they have not contributed to cumulative understanding of ESB to the same 
extent as NAT or the TPB. 
Using the criterion that a study must measure at least two constructs from one of the 
focal theories for inclusion in the review, SSCI and Zetoc provided eight TPB studies, 
seven NAT studies and seven that used constructs from both theories (including at 
least two TPB or NAT constructs). Searches on the theories' names did not identify 
other relevant literature, nor did Ajzen's website (Aizen, 2005). One known TPB study 
not contained in the databases was added to the review material (Steg & Uneken, 
2002), as was a study using constructs from both theories (Von Borgstede and Biel, 
2002), resulting in a list of 24 publications (Table 4.1). This may seem few, but many 
studies - even some claiming to apply NAT or the TPB - actually only measure a 
64 
Ol 
U1 
Theory Study Publication Behaviour or intention All 
items 
listed 
TPB Bang et. al. (2000) Psychology and Marketing Purchasing renewable energy for the home ,/ 
Boldero (1995) Journal of Applied Social Psychology Household recyding ,/ 
Cheung et. al. (1999) Environment and Behavior Household recyding ,/ 
Oahab et. al. (1995) Advances in Consumer Research Household recyding X 
Ewing (2001) Environment and Behavior Household recyding ,/ 
Kalafatis et. al. (1999) Journal of Consumer marketing Buying 'green' products (e.g. furniture from sustainably- X 
managed wood sources) 
Steg & Uneken (2002) ICTTP conference proceedings Travel mode choice ,/ 
Steg (2005) Transportation Research Part A Travel mode choice ,/ 
Ta~or & Todd {1995l Environment and Behavior Household recvding and composting ,/ 
NAT Black et. al. (1985) Journal of Applied Psychology Improving home energy-efficiency X 
Guagnano et. al. (1995) Environment and Behavior Household recyding ,/ 
Nordlund & Garvill (2002) Environment and Behavior General pro-environmental behaviour X 
Nordlund & Garvill (2003) Journal of Environmental Psychology Reducing car use ,/ 
Stem et. al. (1999) Human Ecology Review General pro-environmental behaviour ,/ 
Stem et. al. {1986l POl2.ulation and Environment Pressuring government and industry for environmental action ,/ 
Both Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) Environment and Behavior Travel mode choice ,/ 
theories Barr et. al. (2005) Energy Policy General pro-environmental behaviour ,/ 
Bratt (1999) Environment and Behavior Household recyding ,/ 
Flannery & May (2000) Academy of Management Journal Pro-environmental decision-making at work ,/ 
Harland et. al. (1999) Journal of Applied Social Psychology Using unbleached paper, reducing meat consumption, using ,/ 
non-car modes, using energy-saving lights, conserving water 
Hunecke et. al. (2001) Environment and Behavior Travel mode choice ,/ 
Oom Do Valle et. al. (2005) Environment and Behavior Household recyding ,/ 
Tanner (1999) Journal of Environmental Psychology Travel mode choice X 
Von Borgstede & Biel (2002) Goteborg Psychological Reports Copying double-sided, recyding paper, tuming off computer ,/ 
screen when not in use, using phone instead of meetings, 
incorporating environmental issues in teaching and research 
Percentage of studies reporting each type of information 79% 
Percentage of studies reporting all three types of information 
Table 4.1 Studies included in the review (plus their reporting of items, scale reliabilities and p values) 
Scale Allp 
reliabilities values 
re~orted re~orted 
,/ ,/ 
,/ ,/ 
,/ ,/ 
,/ ,/ 
,/ ,/ 
,/ ,/ 
,/ X 
,/ ,/ 
,/ ,/ 
,/ X 
,/ ,/ 
,/ ,/ 
,/ ,/ 
,/ X 
,/ ,/ 
,/ ,/ 
,/ ,/ 
,/ ,/ 
X ,/ 
,/ ,/ 
,/ ,/ 
,/ ,/ 
X ,/ 
X ,/ 
88% 88% 
63% 
single construct from one or both theories (e.g. Widegren, 1998). Although interesting 
in terms of operational definitions, such studies were not reviewed because they do not 
systematically test the focal theories' structures. It is also notable that not all studies 
included in the review actually claimed to apply one of the theories, even when they 
measured at least two NAT and/or TPB constructs (e.g. Steg & Uneken, 2002). 
As well as listing each study reviewed, the publication it appeared in and the type of 
ESB it focused on, Table 4.1 shows whether studies reported particular types of 
information. This issue is taken up in section 4.5.4. The table also highlights travel 
studies (shown in bold type). Like this thesis, four of the seven travel studies used both 
NAT and the TPB. However, unlike any of the reviewed research, this thesis used a 
mixed-method approach involving quantitative and qualitative work (Chapters 5 and 6, 
respectively). 
4.3.2 Analytical approach 
NAT and the TPB's applicability to ESB was examined using the theory-level questions 
listed in section 4.1. These are addressed in section 4.6. The micro-level analysis 
focused on individual constructs. The NAT constructs are awareness of consequences 
(AC), responsibility denial (RD) and personal norm (PN) (Schwartz, 1977). The TPB 
constructs are behavioural intention (BI), attitude towards the behaviour (A IT), 
perceived behavioural control (PBC) and subjective norm (SN) (Ajzen, 1991a). 
Concerning each construct in each relevant publication, three questions were asked. 
• Does the theoretical definition differ from the original? 
• Does the operational definition differ from the original? 
• How do definitional variations affect results? 
Three further questions were addressed by taking a view across the literature. 
• How varied are theoretical definitions of each construct? 
• How varied are operational definitions of each construct? 
• How varied is each construct's role in theoretical structure? 
Through these questions, the review assessed how consistently the theories have 
been applied and the extent to which published studies provide a cumulative 
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understanding of NAT and the TPB's ability to explain ESB. A summary of findings is 
presented in section 4.5.1 and full findings in sections 4.5.2 to 4.5.4. 
4.4 NAT and the TPB 
Having explained the review's aims, scope and method, it is necessary to describe in 
detail the theories on which this chapter focuses and which inform much of this thesis. 
Ajzen's (1991; 1991 a) TPB has been applied to many ESBs and other behaviours 
(Armitage and Conner, 2001). It proposes BI as behaviour's immediate psychological 
antecedent. BI is determined by a person's overall evaluation of a behaviour (A TT), 
perceived social pressure surrounding it (SN) and perceived control over influences 
that may facilitate or inhibit performance (PBC). These constructs are based on 
underlying beliefs. For example, SN rests on beliefs about the wishes of others and the 
individual's motivation to comply with them. Arrow '1' in Figure 4.1 indicates that where 
PBC accurately reflects factors affecting control, it may directly influence behaviour 
(Ajzen, 1991a). Arrow '2' indicates that PBC may moderate the BI-behaviour 
relationship (Ibid.; Ajzen, 2002). Moderators were briefly mentioned when defining 
mediators in Chapter 3, section 3.3.1.5. To explain further, a moderator "is a third 
variable that affects the zero-order correlation between two other variables" (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986, 1174) and specifies "when certain effects will hold" (Ibid., 1176). Ajzen's 
proposal is that the BI-behaviour relationship should be stronger for people with high 
PBC than for those with low PBC. PBC differentiates the TPB from its predecessor, the 
theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
An 
SN BI Behaviour 
PBe 
Figure 4.1 Ajzen's (1991a) TPB 
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Schwartz's (1977) NAT was developed to explain altruistic behaviour intended "to 
benefit another as an expression of internal values, without regard for ... social and 
material reinforcements" (Ibid., 222). While Schwartz emphasised the value placed on 
other people, ESB research emphasises "whatever objects are the focus of the values 
that underlie the norm" (Stern et. al., 1999,83), assuming that these can include non-
humans. Normative self-expectations (PN) are the immediate antecedent of altruistic 
acts and are activated by AC and feelings of responsibility. Schwartz (1977) spoke of a 
tendency for responsibility denial (RD), but - as shown in section 4.5.3.2 - subsequent 
researchers have used the behaviour-specific AR construct. Many NAT variants have 
been applied to ESB, but are linked by Schwartz's general propositions. Schwartz 
(1977) also said that PN's influence on behaviour is moderated by AC and 
responsibility, but few ESB studies (e.g. Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003) test these effects. 
AC 
Feelings of 
responsibility 
Behaviour 
Figure 4.2 Schwartz's (1977) NAT 
Differences between NAT and the TPB include, firstly, the former's emphasis on 
altruism. Benefits to others are prioritised over self-interest. The TPB, however, 
stresses personal utility. Although ATT may capture beliefs that a behaviour is positive 
because it benefits others, these are not assumed to be necessary for action. Second, 
NAT focuses on internal normative influences (PN), while the TPB focuses on external 
ones (SN). Third, the TPB captures perceived control over behaviour (and, by 
implication, perceptions of context), but NAT does not. Fourth, the TPB includes the 
behavioural intention (BI) construct, while NAT does not. Due to the theories' different 
explanations of ESB, some researchers have developed models incorporating 
constructs from each. For example, PN has been added to the TPB (e.g. Flannery and 
May, 2000) and SN (e.g. Bratt, 1999) and PBC (e.g. Tanner, 1999) added to NAT. 
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Summary 
Micro-level results are presented construct-by-construct, starting with those from the 
TPB. They are summarised in Table 4.2, which uses five categories: none, low, 
moderate, high and complete. Depending on the column in which they appear, these 
categories indicate: 
• correspondence between definitions of NAT and TPB constructs in ESB studies 
and the constructs' original definitions, 
• correspondence between a construct's theoretical role in ESB studies and its 
original role, 
• consistency in a construct's definitions and roles across ESB studies, 
regardless of how it was first defined or applied. 
The categories are based on the percentage of relevant studies (those providing 
theoretical/operational definitions of a construct) that agree on a construct's definition 
or role. None = 0%, low = 1% to 33%, moderate = 34% to 66%, high = 67% to 99%, 
complete = 100%. Decision rules for entries in Table 4.2 were as follows. 
• For the columns 'Correspondence with SchwartzlAjzen's theoretical definition' 
and 'Correspondence with SchwartzlAjzen's operational definition' 
% correspondence = total theoretical/operational x 
[ 
100 ~ theoretical/operational definitions substantively 
the same as Schwartz 
(1977) or Ajzen (1991; 
1991a) 
definitions 
• For the column 'Correspondence with original role in theory' 
% correspondence = 
100 
instances in which construct 
influences and is influenced 
by variables postulated 
by Schwartz (1977) or 
Ajzen (1991; 1991a) and no 
other variables 
instances in which 
x construct influences or is 
influenced by variables 
not postulated by 
Schwartz (1977) or Ajzen 
(1991; 1991a) or does 
not influence or is not 
influenced by variables 
postulated by Schwartz 
(1977) or Ajzen (1991; 
1991 a) 
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• For the column 'Consistency across ESB studies' 
% consistency = 
[ 
100 ] instances in which x 
construct is theoretically/ 
operationally defined 
maximum number of 
instances using 
substantively the same 
theoretical/operational 
definition 
All percentages in Table 4.2 are rounded to the nearest whole number. To illustrate 
application of the decision rules, take PN's 'Correspondence with Schwartz/Ajzen's 
theoretical definition'. Thirteen theoretical definitions of PN were reviewed. Eleven were 
substantively the same as Schwartz's (1977); feelings of personal moral obligation for a 
specific act (see section 4.5.3.1). (100/13) x 11 = 85%. Eighty-five percent is in the high 
category, hence the cell entry. Similarly, take AC's 'Consistency across ESB studies'. 
The moderate entry for consistency of operational definitions is based on there being 
10 such definitions; six action-focused and four condition-focused (see section 4.5.3.3). 
Therefore, the maximum number of instances where substantively the same 
operational definition appeared was six. (100/10) x 6 = 60%. 
Following the sub-sections covering each construct, there are some comments on how 
results are reported in the reviewed studies (section 4.5.4). Table 4.1 shows whether 
studies provide all scale reliabilities, questionnaire items and p values. These are 
basics of quantitative research reporting (Wright, 2003), providing information that is 
essential in interpreting results. 
4.5.2 Results for TPB constructs 
4.5.2.1 Behavioural intention (BI) 
• Theoretical definitions 
BI, as theoretically defined by Ajzen (1991a, 181), captures "the motivational factors 
that influence a behavior". Although no reviewed study uses the term 'motivational 
factors', all seven definitions reflect this conception by stating that BI derives from the 
motives captured by ATT, PBC and SN (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Bang, Ellinger, 
Hadjimarcou and Traichal, 2000; Boldero, 1995; Cheung, Chan and Wong, 1999; 
Dahab, Gentry and Su, 1995; Harland et. al., 1999; Steg, 2005). 
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~ 
Construct 
(and 
theory) 
BI (TPB) 
n theoretical 
definitions 
reviewed 
7 
ATI(TPB) 12 
PBC (TPB) 7 
SN (TPB) 16 
PN (NAT) 13 
AR (NAT) 8 
AC (NAT) 11 
n operational Correspondence with 
definitions Schwartz/Ajzen's theoretical 
reviewed definition 
8 Complete. All 7 definitions define 
BI as resulting from ATT, PBC and 
SN, echoing Ajzen's (1991a, 181) 
"motivational factors". 
13 Moderate. 5 echo Ajzen (1991a), 
referring to overall evaluations of 
behaviour. 9 define A TT as 
product of behavioural and 
outcome beliefs. 
11 Low. 2 of 7 studies refer to "ease 
or difficulty" of behaviour (Ajzen, 
1991a, 183). 
16 Complete. All definitions cite 
perceived social pressure 
surrounding specific acts, despite 
variations in phrasing (Ajzen, 
1991a). 
13 High. 11 of 13 echo Schwartz 
(1977), referring to behaviour-
specific personal obligation. 
6 None. No studies define AR as a 
trait (Schwartz, 1977). 
10 None. No studies define AC as a 
trait (Schwartz, 1977). 
Correspondence with 
Schwartz/Ajzen's operational 
definition 
Moderate. 4 of 8 studies tap only 
strength of intentions for specified 
acts (Ajzen, 1991). 
Moderate. 8 of 13 studies use 
semantic-differentials to assess 
overall evaluation of individual's 
behaviour. 
N.A. Ajzen (2002) suggests that 
PBC can be appropriately 
operationalised in various ways. 
High. 12 of 16 studies specify 
"importanr others (Ajzen, 1991a) 
or other potentially salient 
referents. 
Moderate. 5 of 13 studies follow 
Schwartz (1977), tapping only 
behaviour-specific personal 
obligation. 
None. No studies measure AR as 
a trait (Schwartz, 1977). 
None. No studies measure AC as 
a trait (Schwartz, 1977). 
Correspondence with original Consistency across ESe 
role in theory studies 
Complete. BI is always Theoretical- complete (100%) 
behaviour'S immediate antecedent. Operational- moderate (50%) 
Role - complete (100%) 
High. 11 studies treat ATT as Theoretical- high (75%) 
predictor of BI. 1 as direct predictor Operational- high (67%) 
of behaviour. Role - high (92%) 
Low. 9 of 11 studies treat PBC as 
predictor of BI and 6 as predictor 
of behaviour, but only 3 test 
moderating effect on BI-behaviour. 
Moderate. 10 of 16 studies treat 
SN as predictor of BI. 5 as 
predictor of behaviour and 2 as 
predictor of PN. 
Theoretical- high (83%) 
Operational-low (27%) 
Role -low(27%) 
Theoretical- complete (100%) 
Operational- high (75%) 
Role - moderate (63%) 
Moderate. 8 of 13 studies treat PN Theoretical- high (85%) 
as predictor of behaviour. 5 treat it Operational- moderate (38%) 
as predictor of BI. Role - moderate (62%) 
Low. 4 of 6 studies treat AR as Theoretical- high (88%) 
predictor of PN, following Schwartz Operational-low (33%) 
(1977), but only 1 tests AR as Role - high (67%) 
moderator of PN-behaviour. 
Low. 9 studies test AC-PN effects, 
1 tests AC-behaviour effect and 1 
tests AC-BI effect. 2 test AC as 
moderator of PN-behaviour. 
Theoretical- moderate (60%) 
Operational- moderate (40%) 
Role - high (90%) 
Table 4.2 Micro-level (construct) results summary 
• Operational definitions 
Ajzen & Fishbein (1980) originally operationalised BI using items rating strength of 
intentions for specific acts. Four of eight studies that measure intention tap solely this 
conception (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Boldero, 1995; Dahab et. al., 1995; Harland et. 
al., 1999). Others tap three further dimensions (substantively different psychological 
factors). These are desires (what people 'want to' do) (Cheung et. a/., 1999), self-
predictions (what people 'will' do) (Ibid.; Flannery & May, 2000; Taylor and Todd, 
1995) and "willingness to" perform a behaviour (Bang et. al., 2000). Overall, there is 
moderate correspondence between operational definitions of intention in ESB studies 
and Ajzen & Fishbein's (1980) original operational definition and there is moderate 
consistency across ESB studies. 
• Results 
TPB research often does not measure behaviour, instead using BI as the outcome 
variable. However, two recycling studies show BI explaining 80.1 % of variance in self-
reported behaviour when measured only with reference to intentions (Boldero, 1995) 
and 20.1% when measured using a desire/self-prediction scale (a = .89) (Cheung et. 
al., 1999). Another study using only intention items to tap BI reports {3 = .60 (p < .05) 
for the path between BI and self-reported car use (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). To 
summarise, half the operational definitions reviewed (four of eight) accord with the 
original approach and the (very) limited evidence suggests that these may be better 
predictors of behaviour than desires and self-predictions. 
4.5.2.2 Attitude (A IT) 
• Theoretical definitions 
Reviewed studies theoretically define ATT in two different ways. One echoes Ajzen's 
(1991a) definition: ATT as an overall evaluation of performing an act. Five studies offer 
such definitions (Flannery & May, 2000; Harland et. al., 1999; Oom Do Valle et. al., 
2005; Steg, 2005; Taylor & Todd, 1995). Two of these (Steg, 2005; Taylor & Todd, 
1995), plus seven others, provide the second type of definition: A TT as the product of 
beliefs about behavioural outcomes and their likelihood (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; 
Bang et. al., 2000; Boldero, 1995; Cheung et. al., 1999; Dahab et. a/., 1995; Kalafatis, 
Pollard, East and Tsogas, 1999; Steg & Uneken, 2002). 
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• Operational definitions 
Ajzen & Fishbein (1980) operationalised ATT using direct measures; semantic-
differentials such as very negative/very positive by which respondents evaluate a 
behaviour. Five of 13 relevant ESB studies use only direct ATT measures (Bang et. a/., 
2000; Dahab et. al., 1995; Flannery & May, 2000; Harland et. a/., 1999; Steg, 2005). 
Four of these reflect Ajzen's (1991 a) advice, referring specifically to respondents' 
evaluations of performing the target behaviour. However, Steg (2005, 151) asked 
people "to what extent their family, friends or colleagues consider them as a car lover". 
The rationale was that this would "reduce the chance of social desirable responses" 
(Ibid.), but respondents' perceptions of others' perceptions seem quite different from 
Ajzen's (1991a) conception of ATT. 
Direct ATT measures range from one item (Harland et. a/., 1999; Steg, 2005) to nine 
(Dahab et. a/., 1995). Only two of three studies using multi-item scales provide 
reliability statistics. Flannery & May (2000) report a = .73, while Bang et. a/. (2000) 
report a = .80 (both three-item scales). 
Six further ESB studies combined direct and indirect measures (Bamberg & Schmidt, 
2003; Boldero, 1995; Cheung et. al., 1999; Ewing, 2001; Kalafatis et. al., 1999; Taylor 
& Todd, 1995). Indirect measures use pairs of items tapping beliefs about behavioural 
outcomes and their importance to respondents. Overall scores are produced by 
summing the products of each pair. This is termed the 'expectancy-value' approach 
(Ajzen, 1991). A final study (Oom Do Valle et. a/., 2005) used only an indirect measure 
consisting of four item pairs (a = .9067). For example, one pair comprised "Household 
recycling is an important way to conserve energy" (not importantlvery important) and "It 
is important to save natural resources and the environment" (totally false/totally true). 
To summarise, the review found three ways of tapping ATT; direct semantic-
differentials, indirect expectancy-value measures and combinations of both. One direct 
measure did not refer to respondents' evaluations of the target behaviour, contrary to 
Ajzen's (1991a) advice. 
• Results 
Eight studies used direct ATT measures to explain BI in regressions, examining 15 
relationships in total. Comparing regression coefficients and p values across studies is 
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somewhat problematic, as sample size influences these statistics. Nonetheless, 
comparison can offer insights. For example, are there behaviours for which A TI -BI 
paths are always or never significant? It should also be noted that some studies report 
unstandardised regression coefficients and others provide standardised coefficients 
(f3). While comparing f3 values for different paths in one study accounts for any 
differences in measurement scales, this does not apply between studies. The type of 
coefficient is noted when regression results are cited in this chapter. 
Accepting these caveats, direct ATT measures significantly influenced BI (p < .05) in 11 
of 15 tests. Significant f3 values range from .14 to .62 (average = .37). All five single-
item A TT measures had significant effects, as did six of 10 multi-item A TI scales. 
Behaviours with non-significant ATT-BI associations were green purchasing (Kalafatis 
et. sl., 1999), pro-environmental decision-making at work (Flannery & May, 2000) and 
recycling (Oahab at. sl., 1995). No other studies examined the first two behaviours, so 
it is impossible to specify reasons for the non-significant relationships (e.g. some 
property of the research setting, the behaviour itself, or the ATT items). Regarding 
recycling, Taylor & Todd (1995) and Cheung at. sl. (1999) report significant ATI-BI 
relationships, showing that recycling intentions can be related to ATI. 
The reviewed studies report only one test of an indirect A TI measure's influence on BI 
(Boldero, 1995). This measure - using five item pairs (a = .78) - did not significantly 
influence recycling BI (p > .05). Nor did it influence self-reported recycling behaviour. 
Three further studies tested ATT-behaviour relationships. Ewing (2001) used three 
indirect A TT measures as separate predictors of self-reported recycling. Only one -
tapping beliefs about recycling's environmental impacts - was significant 
(unstandardised regression coefficient = .86, P = .017). Steg & Uneken's (2002) eight-
item (a = .87) indirect A TI measure was non-significant for self-reported car use (Steg, 
2005 reports the same study), while Oom Do Valle et. a/.'s (2005) four-item measure 
was non-significant for self-reported recycling. 
Four studies examined associations between indirect and direct A TT measures in order 
to "better understand the relationships between belief structures and determinants of 
intention" (Taylor & Todd, 1995, 610). In the first, two indirect measures of beliefs about 
recycling and composting were used (Ibid.). These tapped the 'relative advantage' (Le. 
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environmental benefit and its importance) and 'complexity' (i.e. difficulty of performing 
and its importance) of each behaviour. 'Relative advantage' significantly influenced 
ATT towards both recycling and composting (unstandardised regression coefficients of 
.38 and .35, respectively, both p < .001). 'Complexity' had a significant effect on 
composting A TT only (unstandardised regression coefficient = -.05, P < .001). In the 
second study (Kalafatis et. al., 1999), a scale based on five unspecified behavioural 
beliefs had significant effects on A TT towards green purchasing in two separate 
samples (unstandardised regression coefficients of .032 and .031, both P < .001). The 
third study (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003) reports a perfect relationship between a four-
item behavioural belief scale and a two-item A TT towards car use scale (f3 = 1.00, P < 
.001). The final study did not regress ATT on behavioural beliefs, but reports a 
correlation of r = .66 (p < .001) (Cheung et. al., 1999). 
In summary, ESB studies measure ATT in several ways. Broadly, these are direct, 
indirect and direct/indirect combinations. All single-item, direct measures significantly 
influenced BI in regressions, while more specific semantic-differentials (e.g. whether a 
behaviour is co"ectlinco"ect, beneficial/harmful) (Cheung et. al., 1999) show less 
consistent effects in this regard. Indirect measures derived from behavioural beliefs 
and their importance are generally poor predictors of behaviour and BI, although only 
one test of the latter effect was reviewed. However, indirect measures often contribute 
significantly to explained variance in ATT as measured directly. Recycling is the only 
behaviour for which a large number of ATT-BI tests were reviewed, with mixed results. 
4.5.2.3 Perceived behavioural control (PSC) 
• Theoretical definitions 
According to Ajzen (1991a, 183; 2002, 665), PBe rests on beliefs about factors that 
may facilitate or hinder speCific actions; capturing "perceived ease or difficulty". Only 
two of seven studies offering theoretical definitions refer to ease or difficulty (Oom Do 
Valle et. al., 2005; Tanner, 1999). Others all refer to underlying beliefs (Bamberg & 
Schmidt, 2003; Cheung et. al., 1999; Flannery & May, 2000; Harland et. al., 1999; 
Taylor & Todd, 1995). Two of these provide further detail, suggesting that PBC 
captures internal factors (e.g. skills) and external factors (e.g. resources) (Flannery & 
May, 2000; Harland et. al., 1999). 
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• Operational definitions 
In discussing the "vexing problems" surrounding PBC's "nature and measurement", 
Ajzen (2002,666) suggests operationalising the construct with reference to both 
perceived self-efficacy (PSE) (people's beliefs about their capacity to perform a 
behaviour) and volitional control (VC) (beliefs about whether the behaviour is under the 
individual's control). He also argues that direct and indirect PBC measures (the latter 
eliciting perceptions of facilitating or inhibiting conditions and weighting these by 
people's expectations that they will pertain) are equally appropriate. 
The 11 relevant studies reviewed used various ease/difficulty, PSE and VC items to 
operationalise PBC. Three employed single-item direct measures. Harland et. a/. 
(1999) elicited ratings of VC. Von Borgstede & Biel (2002) asked about ease/difficulty. 
Barr, Gilg and Ford (2005, 1440) labelled their item 'self-efficacy', obtaining strongly 
agree/strongly disagree responses to the statement "It's too complicated and 
inconvenient to act in ways which help the environment." Whether this is PSE in the 
sense implied by Ajzen (2002) and derived from Bandura (1991, 257) - "the conviction 
that one can successfully execute the behaviour" - is debatable. How complicated a 
behaviour is may be a question of ease/difficulty and inconvenience seems to be an 
instrumental evaluation of the type underlying ATT. 
Four studies employed multi-item direct PBC measures. Oom Do Valle et. a/. (2005) 
used one ease/difficulty and one VC item to measure PBC for recycling. Tanner's 
(1999) seven items asked about potential external barriers to using non-car modes 
(e.g. baggage). Flannery & May's (2000) 11 items included two tapping PSE (a = .89), 
seven tapping aspects of organisational culture that might inhibit ethical decision-
making (a = .89) and two tapping behaviour's financial cost (a = .64). These latter two 
measures appear to tap perceived external constraints. Boldero (1995) reports using 
one VC item to measure PBC, but her study also included three measures of 
'contextual' influences on recycling (e.g. storage space). Although treated separately 
from PBC, these could be interpreted as tapping external factors that might facilitate or 
inhibit behaviour. Items of this type were included in PBC scales by Tanner (1999) and 
Flannery & May (2000). 
The remaining four studies combined direct and indirect PBC measures. Cheung et. 
a/.'s (1999) five direct items comprised one measuring PSE, two measuring 
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ease/difficulty and two measuring VC. This study's indirect measure comprised item 
pairs asking how frequently respondents encountered eight situations and how likely 
these were to influence recycling. Taylor & Todd (1995) employed three direct VC 
measures for composting and recycling and three indirect PSE measures and one 
indirect measure assessing availability of resources for each behaviour. They also 
used five indirect measures of 'compatibility'; a construct from Rogers' (1983) diffusion 
theory that captures the extent to which a behaviour fits with people's lifestyles. The 
relationship between compatibility and PBC is questionable, however. Although some 
of Taylor & Todd's (1995) items refer to difficulty, others refer to convenience. As 
suggested above, this may be best conceptualised as influencing ATT, rather than 
PBC. Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) used two direct measures of PBC for using non-car 
modes; one ease/difficulty and one VC. Their two indirect measures assessed the 
extent to which car ownership and car availability were perceived to influence modal 
choice. Finally, Kalafatis at. al. (1999) report using a two-item direct measure and a 
three-item indirect measure, but do not quote items. 
In summary, operational definitions of PBC in ESB studies are inconsistent. Many 
reflect Ajzen's (2002) argument that PBC is multi-dimensional by assessing 
combinations of ease/difficulty, VC and PSE, but no two scales are identical. Some 
PBC measures include perceptions of specific external conditions (e.g. Tanner, 1999), 
while others treat such perceptions as separate variables (e.g. Boldero, 1995). 
• Results 
Ajzen (1991a; 2002) suggests that PBC influences BI. Eight reviewed studies report 16 
tests of this effect (Le. BI regressed on a variable labelled PBC). Eleven tests show 
significant (p < .05) effects. These arose from various measures, including a multi-item 
direct ease/difficulty, PSE and VC scale (Cheung at. al., 1999) (PBC-BI (3 = .21), 
single-item direct VC scales (Harland et. al., 1999) (PBC-BI (3 = .43, .49, .32 and .44), 
a single-item direct external barriers scale (Flannery & May, 2000) (PBC-BI (3 = .20) 
and multi-item indirect PSE and external barriers scales (Taylor & Todd, 1995) (PBC-
BI unstandardised regression coefficients = .64 and .15, respectively). The five non-
significant PBC-BI paths also arose from different scales, suggesting no systematic 
relationship between the type of measure and the significance of the PBC-BI 
association. Furthermore, as with ATT, too few tests concerning each behaviour were 
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carried out to show whether some behaviours are more consistently linked with PBC 
than others. 
As well as variables labelled PBC, other measures capturing beliefs about faCilitating 
and inhibiting factors have been used to predict BI. On Ajzen's (1991a; 2002) 
conception, these are indicators of PBC despite not being termed as such. For 
example, Taylor & Todd (1995) report an unstandardised regression coefficient of .29 
(p < .001) for the path between perceived recycling service availability and recycling 
BI. Cheung et. al. (1999) - as well as combining ease/difficulty, PSE and VC items-
used these in two separate scales: 'perceived difficulty' (one PSE and two 
ease/difficulty items) and 'perceived controllability' (two VC items). These variables' 
influence on BI was compared to PSC's. 'Perceived difficulty' significantly influenced BI 
(f3 = -.25, P < .001), but 'perceived controllability' did not. Such findings add to the 
evidence that PSC is multi-faceted and that different factors are likely to influence 
different behaviours in different situations. 
Ajzen (1991a; 2002) also suggests that PSC should directly influence behaviour. Six 
reviewed studies test this effect (all self-reported behaviour except Boldero, 1995). In 
nine tests, three paths were non-significant at .05 level (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; 
Boldero, 1995; Cheung et. a/., 1999). Those that were significant used single-item 
direct VC scales (Harland at. al., 1999) (PBC-behaviour f3 = .22, .44, .16 and .39), a 
multi-item direct ease/difficulty and VC scale (Oom Do Valle at. al., 2005) (f3 = .772) 
and a multi-item direct external conditions scale (Tanner, 1999) (f3 = .42). 
Three studies assessed relationships between indirect and direct PSC measures. 
Cheung et. al. (Ibid.) report correlations rather than f3 values. Their eight-item indirect 
measure correlated at r = .35 with PBC, .37 with 'perceived difficulty' and .18 with 
'perceived controllability' (all p < .01). Samberg & Schmidt's (2003) two-item indirect 
measure had a strong effect on PSC (f3 = .91, P < .05), while Kalafatis et. al. (1999) 
report unstandardised regression coefficients of .069 and .088 (both p < .001) for paths 
between indirect and direct PSC measures in two separate samples. 
In summary, the reviewed ESB studies are reasonably consistent in their theoretical 
definitions of PSC, but less consistent in their operational definitions. Single- and multi-
item direct and indirect measures have been used, tapping ease/difficulty, PSE and VC 
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(all identified as components of PBC by Ajzen, 2002), as well as specific internal and 
external factors that may influence behaviour. Each type of measure is used in too few 
studies to allow many generalisations, so it is difficult to say whether it is the particular 
population and behaviour that determines PBC's influence, or how PBC is measured. 
The construct appears robust enough to exert the expected effects when measured in 
various ways, assuming that it is operationalised with the same specificity as the 
outcome variable. 
4.5.2.4 Subjective norm (SN) 
• Theoretical definitions 
Ajzen's (1991a, 188) SN construct captures "perceived social pressure to perform or 
not to perform" an act. Four of 16 reviewed definitions quote "perceived social 
pressure" (Bang et. al., 2000; Barr et. al., 2005; Harland et. al., 1999; Steg, 2005). 
Others paraphrase, but none contradicts Ajzen's conception (e.g. Bratt, 1999; 
Hunecke et. al., 2001). Nine publications also echo Ajzen (1991a) by defining SN as 
resulting from the individual's beliefs about the wishes of salient others and motivation 
to comply (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Boldero, 1995; Cheung et. al., 1999; Dahab et. 
al., 1995; Ewing, 2001; Kalafatis et. al., 1999; Oom Do Valle et. al., 2005; Steg, 2005; 
Taylor & Todd, 1995). Steg & Uneken (2002) differentiate injunctive norms from 
descriptive norms. This is the only reviewed definition of SN that develops Ajzen's 
(1991a) conception. 
• Operational definitions 
Measurement of SN often approximates to Ajzen's (1991a, 195) method, directly 
asking the extent to which "important others" would dis/approve of respondents' 
actions. Of 16 reviewed measures, four used only items of this type (Bamberg & 
Schmidt, 2003; Cheung et. al., 1999; Flannery & May, 2000; Harland et. al., 1999), 
while a fifth also used items specifying "people who influence my decisions" (Taylor & 
Todd, 1995). Two publications report the same direct items specifying potentially 
salient groups (family, friends, colleagues) (Steg, 2005; Steg & Uneken, 2002). Two 
items refer to each group; measuring injunctive and descriptive norms. Another study 
elicited salient referents from respondents themselves (Hunecke et. al., 2001). A ninth 
study used "People in this community expect others to recycle" (strongly agree/strongly 
disagree), stating "it was assumed that. .. 'community' would be interpreted as 'persons 
who are important'" (Dahab et. al., 1995, 253). Where reported, scale reliabilities are 
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generally high (range a = .60 to .88, average = .75). Only Steg (2005) and Steg & 
Uneken's (2002) three injunctive norm items were not considered sufficiently correlated 
to be combined in a scale. 
Of seven further relevant studies, one gives no scale details (Kalafatis et. al., 1999) 
and four report indirect SN measures specifying particular groups (again, including 
friends and family) and weighting perceptions of what each group wanted respondents 
to do by respondents' motivation to comply (Boldero, 1995; Bratt, 1999; Ewing, 2001; 
Oom Do Valle et. al., 2005). Finally, Barr et. al. (2005) used a single-item direct 
measure of descriptive norm only, while Von Borgstede & Biel's (2002) single direct 
item elicited absolutely not/absolutely responses to "Do you think that others in your 
workplace think they ought to [behaviour]?". Rather than SN as commonly 
conceptualised, this appears to measure respondents' perceptions of other people's 
personal norms. 
• Results 
In the four studies using only 'important others' items, SN predicted BI in seven of eight 
tests. Significant (p < .05) f3 values ranged from .12 to .40 (average = .22) (Bamberg & 
Schmidt, 2003; Cheung et. al., 1999; Flannery & May, 2000; Harland et. al., 1999). 
Taylor & Todd (1995) report two SN-BI tests with unstandardised regression 
coefficients of .20 and -.08 (both p < .001). It seems, therefore, that while perceptions 
concerning 'important others' usually influence BI in ESB studies, they are generally 
not as influential as A TT or PBC. This echoes findings across behavioural domains 
(Armitage & Conner, 2001). 
Three further studies tested SN as a predictor of BI. Kalafatis et. al. (1999) report f3 = 
.42 (p < .001) but provide no scale details. Oahab et. a/.'s (1995) item assuming that 
"community" equals 'important others' was non-significant for BI, as was Boldero's 
(1995) indirect SN measure. 
Six studies used SN to predict variables other than BI. Boldero (1995) found that SN 
had no significant effect on (observed) recycling, while Ewing (2001) found that 
perceptions of households', friends' and neighbours' wishes predicted recycling, but 
perceptions concerning councils, businesses and environmental groups did not. Oom 
Do Valle et. 8/.'s (2005) indirect SN measure - citing friends, family and neighbours -
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also influenced recycling (f3 = .186, P = .005). Steg (2005) and Steg & Uneken (2002) 
report {3 = .23 (p = .018) for the influence of families' wishes on respondents' car use. 
Friends' and colleagues' wishes had no effect. Descriptive norms had a stronger effect 
on behaviour ({3 = .30, P < .001) than injunctive norms in this study. Hunecke et. a/. 
(2001) report SN-travel behaviour {3 = .19 (p < .05), using a scale in which respondents 
identified three people who they "regard[ed] as being particularly close to" them. (Self-
reported behaviour unless stated in the above studies.) Hunecke et. a/. (Ibid.) also 
report SN-PN {3 = .28 (p < .01) and Bratt (1999) - tapping perceptions of partners', 
children's and neighbours' wishes regarding recycling - found SN-PN {3 = .28 (p < .05). 
As with A TT and PBC, some researchers have examined associations between SN 
and underlying beliefs. Cheung et. a/. (1999) report r = .59 (p < .001) between their 
four-item SN measure and an indirect scale comprising six item pairs asking whether 
specified referents (e.g. "best friends") thought that the individual should recycle and 
the individual's motivation to comply. Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) and Kalafatis et. a/. 
(1999) also report the expected significant relationships, although these studies 
regressed SN on underlying beliefs rather than stating correlations. 
Harland et. a/. (1999) provide a final notable set of results regarding SN. They added 
PN to the TPB in regressions predicting BI and (self-reported) ESBs. In five 
regressions with BI as the outcome variable, SN was a significant (p < .05) predictor in 
four instances when entered alongside ATT and PBC. However, when PN was added, 
SN-BI {3 values dropped in each case and three of the four previously significant paths 
rose above the .05 threshold. Very similar results were obtained with behaviours as 
outcome variables. 
In sum, SN often influences BI for ESBs, but generally has weaker effects than ATT or 
PBC. Single items referring to 'important others' seem to be as effective as multiple 
items citing specific groups. SN has also been shown to predict PN and behaviour; 
effects not postulated by Ajzen (1991a). Moreover, Harland st. al. (1999) suggest some 
overlap between the normative motivations captured by SN and PN. Finally, the 
reported tests show the expected associations between SN and underlying beliefs. 
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4.5.3 Results for NA T constructs 
4.5.3.1 Personal norm (PN) 
• Theoretical definitions 
Schwartz (1977,227) conceptualised PN as "self-expectations for specific action in 
particular situations ... experienced as feelings of moral obligation". Of 13 reviewed 
studies that theoretically define PN, 11 refer to "obligation" (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; 
Black, Stern and Elworth, 1985; Flannery & May, 2000; Guagnano, Stem and Dietz, 
1995; Harland et. al., 1999; Hunecke et. al., 2001; Nordlund & Garvill, 2002; 2003; 
Oom Do Valle et. al., 2005; Tanner, 1999; Stern et. al., 1999) and one refers to 
"expectations held by the individual about how he or she ought to behave" (Von 
Borgstede & Biel, 2002, 2). There are, however differences in specificity. While 
Schwartz stressed "specific action", six ESB studies either do not specify what 
obligations are for (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Hunecke et. al., 2001; Nordlund & 
Garvill, 2002; Tanner, 1999), or refer to ESB generally (Nordlund & Garvill, 2003; Stern 
et. al., 1999). The thirteenth definition is quite distinct. Stem, Dietz and Black (1986) 
conceptualise PN as "beliefs about what ought to be done" (emphasis in original), but 
not by the individual. These beliefs refer to others' obligations and are not 'personal' in 
Schwartz's (1977) sense. 
• Operational definitions 
Operational definitions of PN vary considerably. Schwartz (1977,234) suggested items 
referring to personal obligation for specified actions. Only three of 13 relevant studies 
used this method (Black et. al., 1985; Flannery & May, 2000; Nordlund & Garvill, 2003), 
although Bratt (1999) asked whether people felt that they "should" recycle and Von 
Borgstede & Biel (2002, 2) asked respondents "Do you think that you ought to 
[behaviour)", which also seem to be questions of personal obligation. Other stUdies 
tapped behaviour-specific personal obligation, but alongside guilt over not acting 
(Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Barr et. al., 2005; Harland et. al., 1999; Oom Do Valle et. 
al., 2005) or feelings of responsibility (Hunecke at. al., 2001). Nordlund & Garvill (2002) 
and Stern et. al. (1999) measured beliefs about personal obligation for general 
environmental protection, but the latter also included items about the obligations of 
government and industry to take speCific pro-environmental actions. Stem at. al. (1986) 
only measured beliefs about institutional obligations for specific actions. The 13 studies 
thus illustrate six different ways of operationalising PN. 
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• Results 
Schwartz's (1977, 231) proposition that PN is "the motivational construct energizing 
altruistic behavior" is supported by the review. Studies tested 17 PN-behaviour 
relationships (all self-reported) and significant (p < .05) {3 coefficients are reported in 15 
instances (range (3 = .11 to .59, average = .32). Behaviours on which PN exerted 
significant effects include using non-car modes (e.g. Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003), 
recycling (e.g. Bratt, 1999) and using unbleached paper (Harland et. al., 1999), as well 
as an index of several ESBs (Nordlund & Garvill, 2002). There is no obvious link 
between type of operational definition and strength of PN-behaviour influence. The 
strongest ({3 = .59, P < .05) rested on a scale comprising two items worded "I should 
[behaviour] because [consequence)" (agree completely/disagree completely) (Bratt, 
1999). "I feel moral obligation to [behaviour)" (agree not at all/agree totally) also 
produced a relatively strong influence ({3 = .46, P < .05) (Nordlund & Garvill, 2002). 
These measures reflect Schwartz's (1977) method, tapping behaviour-specific personal 
obligation. The two ESBs for which PN was non-significant were major energy-
efficiency investments (Black et. al., 1985) and environmental activism (Stern et. al., 
1999). While Black et. al.'s (1985) four PN items tapped only behaviour-specific 
personal obligation (a = .58), Stern et. al. (1999) used three items of this type plus five 
referring to business and government obligations and one to "people like me" (a = .88). 
As well as behaviour, studies test PN's effect on BI (Flannery & May, 2000; Harland et. 
al., 1999; Stern et. al., 1986), or willingness to undertake speCified actions (Nordlund & 
Garvill, 2003; Von Borgstede & Biel, 2002). PN also performs well here, being 
significant (p < .05) for eight of 10 Bl/willingness measures. Significant {3 values range 
from .16 to .44 (average = .35). Again, there is no obvious link between measurement 
instrument and strength of PN's effect. The strongest influence rested on a single item 
asking whether "respondents perceived it to be a personal moral obligation to reduce 
car use" (Nordlund & Garvill, 2003, 343). However, one non-significant effect also 
derived from items based on Schwartz's suggested operationalisation (Flannery & May, 
2000). The second rested on beliefs about the obligations of others (Stern et. al., 
1986). Despite these few negative findings, PN is generally robust to differences in 
measurement and exerts the expected effects. 
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4.5.3.2 Ascription of responsibility (AR) 
• Theoretical definitions 
NAT's original responsibility construct was defined as a general tendency towards 
responsibility denial (RO) (Schwartz, 1977). The studies reviewed here, however, 
uniformly adopt a situation-specific approach, using AR. Seven of eight theoretical 
definitions reviewed cast AR in terms of personal responsibility for particular actions, or 
for bringing about particular consequences (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Black et. a/., 
1985; Hunecke et. a/., 2001; Oom Do Valle et. al., 2005; Stem et al., 1986; Stem et. a/., 
1999; Tanner, 1999). For example, Tanner (Ibid., 146) defines AR as referring to 
instances "when people judge themselves to be responsible for outcomes" of a 
particular behaviour. Only one definition is not person-specific, referring to the 
responsibilities of "individuals like" the respondent (Guagnano et. al., 1995,707). 
• Operational definitions 
None of the reviewed studies employed RO as a responsibility measure, so none used 
Schwartz's (1977) scale assessing tendency to deny responsibility across situations. 
Approaches vary, however, even among six studies measuring responsibility. Just two 
tap the most common theoretical definition of AR; behaviour-specific personal 
responsibility. Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) used two such items, for example "With my 
travel mode choice ... I am responsible for traffic pollution" (agree/disagree), while 
Guagnano et. a/. (1995) tap responsibility ''to oneself for recycling". A third study 
measured group responsibility, ascribed "for energy saving to households" (Black et. 
a/., 1985). The fourth reports one item of this type, "Everybody has a duty to contribute 
to a reduction of smog by reducing automobile use" (not truelvery true) (Tanner, 1999, 
150), but the other items in the three-item scale are not reported. The fifth study moves 
beyond groups to which the respondent belongs, eliciting ratings of government and 
industry responsibility for environmental problems (Stem et. a/., 1986). These are 
beliefs about others' responsibilities, rather than personal responsibility. The sixth 
study states that liAR was not regarded as an autonomous construct because the 
causal effects of individual behavior on the environment are already contained in the 
AC" (Hunecke et. a/., 2001, 833). One might, therefore, not expect to find items 
specifically referring to responsibility. However, three of six items in the PN scale tap 
AR. For example, "I feel responsible for preserving the environment in my choice of 
daily means of transport" (do not agree at all/agree extremely) (Ibid.). 
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• Results 
Schwartz (1977) found that responsibility moderated the PN-behaviour relationship. 
Only one reviewed study tested this effect (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). With AR 
operationally defined as personal responsibility for specific acts, no moderating effect 
was found. Schwartz's assertion that AR influences PN was supported, however ({3 = 
.55, P < .05). AR as group responsibility for specific acts also influenced PN for three of 
four energy saving behaviours ({3 = .10, .23 and .23, all p < .05) (Black et. al., 1985). 
Stern et. al.'s (1986) AR measure referred to others' responsibilities for environmental 
problems, while the PN measure referred to their obligations to solve the problems. 
Thus, both scales had the same referents, even though they differed from the common 
conceptions of AR and PN. In two tests of AR-PN effects, one relationship was non-
significant and the other significant ({3 = .46, P < .01). 
Guagnano et. al. (1995) did not measure PN, but report a direct AR-self-reported 
recycling behaviour effect ({3 = .36, P < .01). Similarly, Tanner (1999) reports a direct 
AR-self-reported car use influence ({3 = -.29, p < .001). 
Hunecke et. al. (2001), whose PN scale contained AR items, report PN-behaviour {3 = 
.22 (p < .01). One cannot know, however, whether the influence on behaviour was due 
to PN, AR, or both. Guagnano et. al. (1995) and Tanner's (1999) results show that 
direct AR-behaviour effects are possible. 
In sum, the studies reviewed generally support the AR-PN influence. They provide no 
evidence that AR moderates PN-behaviour, but do report direct AR-behaviour effects 
not postulated by Schwartz (1977). Thus, even among the few studies that 
operationalise AR, both measures and findings are rather inconsistent. 
4.5.3.3 Awareness of consequences (AC) 
• Theoretical definitions 
Schwartz (1977, 229) defined AC as a "tendency to become aware of the 
consequences of one's behavior for others". However, AC is not defined as a tendency 
in any of the 11 reviewed studies providing theoretical definitions. These definitions are 
less general, focusing on consequences of specific conditions or actions. Condition-
focused definitions refer to beliefs about the consequences of environmental problems 
(e.g. Guagnano et. a/., 1995; Stern et a/., 1999). Nordlund & Garvill (2002; 2003) even 
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re-name AC as 'problem awareness'. An example condition-focused definition is AC as 
"awareness of negative consequences for others of a state of affairs" (Guagnano et. 
al., 1995,707). Seven action-focused definitions refer to consequences of behaviours 
(Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Black et. al., 1985;-Bratt, 1999; Hunecke et. al., 2001; 
Oom Do Valle et. al., 2005; Stern et. al., 1986; Tanner, 1999). An example action-
focused definition is AC as capturing "the causal relation between behaviour and 
environmental consequences" (Hunecke et. al., 2001,833). This conception of AC, 
focusing on specific behavioural outcomes, is akin to beliefs underlying the An 
construct. Indeed, Oom Do Valle et. al. (2005) - in a model combining NAT and TPB 
constructs - measure An but not AC on the assumption that they are analogous. 
• Operational definitions 
Schwartz (1977) measured AC as a tendency, using narratives in which a character's 
choices affect others. Respondents described the character's thoughts, with AC 
scored by references to others' needs. Just as no study reviewed here theoretically 
defined AC as a tendency, none measured it as such. EchOing their theoretical 
definitions of the construct, ESB studies use items referring either to consequences of 
specified environmental conditions or consequences of actions. 
Two studies used condition-focused AC scales referring to consequences for multiple 
entities. Stern et. al. (1999) differentiated consequences for self and family, 
respondents' country and plants and animals. Nordlund & Garvill (2002) differentiated 
general consequences from those for self and for the biosphere. 
Nordlund & Garvill (2003) differentiated consequences of environmental conditions for 
the biosphere and humankind and also measured beliefs about the consequences of 
respondents' own actions, although the condition- and action-focused items were not 
combined into one scale. Three further studies used condition-focused measures, but 
did not distinguish between consequences for different entities (Bamberg & Schmidt, 
2003; Stern et. al., 1986; Tanner, 1999). 
Four studies used only action-focused AC measures. These can be subdivided into 
those concerning consequences of respondents' own behaviour and those concerning 
wider performance of a behaviour. Bratt (1999), for example, used two items; one 
concerning consequences of the individual's recycling behaviour, the other concerning 
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consequences of recycling more generally. Black et. a/. (1985) and Guagnano et. a/. 
(1995) asked only about general behavioural consequences, while Hunecke et. a/. 
(2001) asked only about the consequences of respondents' actions. 
• Results 
AC has been operationalised in many ways and with various purposes. Only two 
studies test Schwartz's (1977) hypothesis that AC moderates PN's influence on 
behaviour. One used an action-focused AC scale (Bratt, 1999), the other a condition-
focused scale (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). Neither shows any moderating effect. 
Nine studies investigate Schwartz's (1977) proposed AC-PN influence, reporting 14 
tests (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Black at. a/., 1985; Bratt, 1999; Hunacka et. a/., 
2001; Nordlund & Garvill, 2002; 2003; Starn et. al., 1986; Stern at. a/., 1999; Tanner, 
1999). Ten tests show significant (p < .05) effects. Significant f3 values range from .14 
to .42 (average = .22). The strongest influence rests on a 12-item, condition-focused 
AC scale (a = .82) referring to consequences for self and biosphere (Nordlund & 
Garvill, 2002), but action-focused measures also predict PN (Black at. a/., 1985; Bratt, 
1999; Hunecke at. al., 2001). The non-significant AC-PN relationships derive from one 
action-focused scale (Black at. a/., 1985) and two condition-focused scales (Bamberg 
& Schmidt, 2003; Tanner, 1999). Thus, there appears to be no systematic difference 
between action- and condition-focused AC scales as predictors of PN. 
ESB research often tests effects not postulated by Schwartz (1977). One reviewed 
study tested AC's direct influence on behaviour (Guagnano et. al., 1995). The action-
focused scale had no significant effect on self-reported recycling. Another study - this 
time using a condition-focused AC scale - tested two AC-BI effects (Stern et. a/., 
1986). AC had a significant effect on intentions to influence government action on 
pollutants (f3 = .37, P < .01), but not on intentions to influence industry action. 
As well as PN, behaviour and BI, AC has been used to predict AR (Black at. a/., 1985; 
Guagnano at. al., 1995; Stem at. al., 1986). AC was a significant (p < .05) predictor of 
AR in four of seven tests of this relationship (average f3 for significant paths = .36). 
Both action- and condition-based AC measures had significant effects on AR in some 
tests, but not in others. 
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4.5.4 Reporting 
Table 4.1 shows where reviewed studies appeared, the behaviour and/or intention 
investigated and whether they report all items, scale reliabilities and p values. There 
are few patterns to the publications in which information was not provided. Omissions 
occur in journals devoted to environmental psychology, social psychology, consumer 
issues, human ecology and management. It is notable, however, that neither report in a 
consumer journal (Dahab et. al., 1995; Kalafatis et. al., 1999) provides full item details, 
making it impossible to know exactly what was measured. Of 17 studies in 
environmental or social psychology publications, 13 (76%) provide all three types of 
information. 
4.6 Discussion 
This chapter reviews ESB studies using Schwartz's (1977) NAT and/or Ajzen's (1991; 
1991 a) TPB; the two most common theories in the domain. The first aim was to 
establish which (if either) theory best explains ESB. The second aim was to assess 
how far research using these theories contributes to a cumUlative understanding. To 
this end, a micro-level analysis focusing on individual constructs was undertaken. This 
analysis had two premises. Firstly, the extent to which research provides a cumUlative 
understanding depends on how far studies share construct definitions. The more widely 
shared, the greater findings' comparability and the confidence that can be placed in 
their generalisability. However, it was acknowledged that some variation in operational 
definitions can increase generalisability; demonstrating constructs' robustness to 
differences in measurement. Secondly, cumulative understanding is aided by 
consistency in theoretical structures across studies. While no theory is immutable (as 
illustrated by Ajzen's (2002) re-conceptualisation of PBe), changes should build on 
theoretical and/or empirical foundations (Oom Do Valle et. al., 2005; Stem, 2000). This 
is not to say that new research directions are never fruitful, but it seems sensible to 
develop existing findings via small steps if "the goal of science is a consensus of 
rational opinion" (Ziman, 1991, 3). The review also uncovered a third issue affecting 
incremental accumulation of knowledge: research reporting. The discussion is 
organised into sections reflecting these issues. 
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4.6.1 NA T and the TPB as explanations of ESB 
4.6.1.1 Overview across behaviours 
Overall, one can say that the reviewed studies demonstrate NAT and the TPB's 
applicability to ESB. Although section 4.5 showed that expected relationships between 
constructs are not always observed, this does not invalidate the theories' use. Even 
when one construct is non-significant, a set of constructs forming a well-defined model 
may still explain a behaviour. For example, Harland et. al. (1999) report that PBC was 
non-significant for intentions to reduce red meat consumption. However, the coefficient 
of determination (RZ, which expresses the proportion of variance in the outcome 
explained by a regression model) between this intention and the TPB was .47. The 
TPB explained 47% of variance in BI, despite PBC's non-significance. Although 
reducing red meat consumption was generally said to be controllable - meaning that 
intentions to perform or not to perform the behaviour could not easily be explained by 
levels of PBC - the other TPB variables were more useful in this regard. 
In a meta-analYSiS of ESB studies, Hines et. al. (1987) report a corrected correlation 
coefficient of r = .347 between attitudinal (Le. psychological) factors and behaviour. 
Although they were not solely concerned with NAT and the TPB, this indicates the 
approximate level of explained variance in ESB that can be expected from 
psychological models in general. A recent meta-analysis of TPB studies across 
behavioural domains showed this theory accounting for 27% and 39% of variance in 
behaviour and BI, respectively (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Although no NAT meta-
analyses could be found, this evidence suggests that one might reasonably expect RZ 
values in the .25 to .40 range for models applied to ESB and ESB intentions. 
Models in the reviewed studies generally meet and sometimes exceed this expectation. 
Taylor & Todd (1995), for example, report TPB RZ = .88 for intentions to compost 
household waste. Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) report a more modest, but respectable, 
TPB RZ of .45 for self-reported car use. The lowest TPB RZ in any reviewed study was 
.277, for self-reported recycling (Cheung et. al., 1999). (As expected, TPB RZ was 
usually higher for BI than behaviour. Many factors can prevent intentions from 
translating into actions, so associations between ATT, PBC, SN and behaviour are 
generally weaker than their associations with BI.) 
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R'l values for NAT models are similar. They range from .90 for self-reported energy-
efficiency investments (Black et. al., 1985) to .14 for self-reported car use (Bamberg & 
Schmidt, 2003), but most are between .20 and .45. However, a striking observation 
concerning R'l values is that those for models combining NAT and TPB variables tend 
to be higher than those for the individual theories. This is, at best, a rough comparison. 
As noted in section 4.5.2.2, many statistics are affected by sample size and R'l is 
among them. It is also affected by the number of regressors. Nonetheless, average R'l 
for the 10 models comprising both NAT and TPB variables is .49 (Bamberg & Schmidt, 
2003; Bratt, 1999; Harland et. al., 1999; Hunecke et. al., 2001; Oom Do Valle et. al., 
2005; Tanner, 1999); higher than the averages for NAT or TPB models (.40 and .42, 
respectively). 
The effect of combining TPB and NAT variables is demonstrated by Harland et. al. 
(1999), who performed regressions adding PN to the TPB when explaining five 
intentions (using unbleached paper, reducing red meat consumption, using non-car 
travel modes, using energy-saving lights and conserving water). ATT, SN and PBe 
were entered as predictors of BI in one block, followed separately by PN. In all five 
regressions, there were significant (p < .01) increases in R'l after PN's addition and {3 
weights for each TPB variable fell. Moreover, in several instances, p values associated 
with TPB variables' {3 weights rose above .05. This suggests that PN accounted for 
some of the variance captured by ATT, PBe and SN and that adding PN to the TPB 
improved the models' ability to explain BI. This empirically supports the suggestion 
made in section 4.4 that the two theories together capture a wider range of motives for 
ESB than either on its own. As Bamberg & Schmidt (2003, 280) point out, these 
"models were developed in different research contexts and focus on different aspects 
of social behaviour." As such, they should be viewed as complementary rather than 
competing and the best approach may be to integrate them. This suggestion is taken 
up in the study presented in Chapter 5. 
4.6.1.2 Theories' applicability to particular behaviours 
Table 4.1 shows the behaviours and/or intentions investigated in each reviewed study. 
Some were only examined once (e.g. purchasing renewable energy for the home; 
Bang et. al., 2000) and only recycling and travel mode choice have received enough 
attention to allow the possibility of saying which theory might be most applicable. 
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Six studies give Ff values for recycling models (four TPB, one NAT, one combined). 
The TPB studies provide impressive figures for explanation of recycling BI: Ff = .358 
(Boldero, 1995), .544 (Cheung et. al., 1999), .57 (Oahab et. al., 1995) and .99 (Taylor & 
Todd, 1995). Two of these studies also predicted behaviour. As expected, Cheung et. 
al.'s (1999) Ff of .277 (based on BI and PBC as predictors of self-reported behaviour) 
was lower than that for BI (predicted by ATT, PBC and SN). Boldero's (1995) Ff of .801 
for observed behaviour, however, was far higher than that for BI. This is because the 
predictors of observed behaviour were BI and past behaviour, but past behaviour was 
not used to predict BI and this variable exerted a very strong influence on observed 
behaviour. These findings illustrate the difficulty of comparing models between studies 
even when they apply the same theory. 
Guagnano et. al. (1995) report Ff = .25 for self-reported recycling, based on the NAT 
variables AR and AC and the contextual variable 'possession of recycling bin'. Bratt 
(1999) reports Ff = .348 for self-reported recycling with PN as the only direct predictor 
and AC and SN as predictors of PN. Again, model differences complicate matters and 
since no two of the six recycling studies reviewed here used exactly the same model, it 
is hard to meaningfully compare them. The only sure way to compare different models' 
ability to explain a behaviour is to test them using the same sample with exactly the 
same behaviour/intention as the regression outcome. Of the reviewed studies, only 
Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) took this approach; comparing NAT and the TPB's ability to 
explain travel mode choice. One can say that in their research setting (a German 
university), the TPB was better able to explain modal choice than NAT (Ff = .45 and 
.14, respectively). Trying to compare this study with other studies of travel mode, one 
encounters the same problems as with the recycling studies; different model structures, 
operational definitions, outcome variables and sample sizes. 
Given these difficulties, one might ask why this review was not conducted as a meta-
analysis. According to Hines et. al. (1987,2), these "precise statistical methods ... 
permit the determination of the relative strengths of associations between each variable 
and responsible environmental behavior", whilst correcting for differences in scale 
reliabilities, sample sizes and so on. However, for the present purpose, it is not clear 
that meta-analysis would have been "far superior to more subjective narrative 
discursive reviews" (Ibid.). Meta-analysis would not show how operational definitions of 
nominally-identical constructs differ; an observation that is central to this chapter. Nor is 
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meta-analysis free from narrative reviews' 'subjectivity'. Meta-analysts must still identify 
"key characteristics and findings from each study" and "suspected moderator" variables 
(Ibid.). These tasks require interpretation and assumptions. 
In summary, while NAT and the TPB explain several ESBs, this review does not permit 
judgements about which is best suited to the domain. However, as Bamberg & Schmidt 
(2003) suggest, hoping for such judgements may be misguided. It may be better to see 
NAT, the TPB and their constructs as complementary. Studies that do so provide 
encouraging results (e.g. Harland et. a/., 1999; Oom Do Valle et. a/., 2005) and seem 
to justify Stern's (2000, 420) argument that ESB research "needs synthetic theories" . 
incorporating variables from the many models that have been applied in the domain. 
4.6.2 Construct definitions 
Having discussed theory-level findings, we turn to the construct-by-construct analysis. 
As Table 4.2 shows, each construct has been theoretically and operationally defined in 
various ways, some quite different from their original conceptions. Some changes have 
been widely adopted, such as theoretical and operational definition of AC and AR as 
situation-specific (e.g. Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). Here, although ESB research 
abandons constructs' original definitions, cumulative knowledge has developed 
because re-definition is relatively consistent. However, the review reveals two ways in 
which variation in constructs' definitions may hinder development of a cumulative 
understanding. 
4.6.2.1 Nominally-identical constructs are operationalised very differently 
An example of problems arising when very different measures are used for nominally-
identical constructs comes from two studies using SN to predict BI (Bamberg & 
Schmidt, 2003; Dahab et. a/., 1995). The first reports a strong, significant effect, while 
the second reports no significant relationship. Of course, this mav be due to different 
influences acting in different research settings (Ajzen, 1991), or to parameters such as 
sample size. But because Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) asked respondents what "people 
who are important" to them wanted, while Dahab et. a/. (1995) asked what "people in 
this community expect", we cannot discount definitional differences as the reason for 
differences in findings. No justification is offered for Dahab et. a/.'s (Ibid., 253) 
assumption that "community" would be interpreted as "persons who are important". 
This appears to be an arbitrary development of SN, leading to uncertainty over whether 
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its influence really fails to generalise to a particular setting and whether Ajzen's (1991 a) 
suggested means of measuring SN - which is common among ESB studies - would 
have produced a different result. 
Definitions of PN highlight a different problem. While Dahab et. al. (1995) assume that 
their SN measure is analogous with the common operational definition, Stern et. al. 
(1986) make no such claim of their lPN' measure, which is entirely different from 
Schwartz's (1977, 227) normative "self-expectations", referring instead to individuals' 
beliefs about what others ought to do. (Barr et. al. 's (2005) SN item also taps such 
perceptions.) This means that taking Stern et. a/.'s (1986) findings at face value and 
interpreting them after inspecting the lPN' item~ may lead to different conclusions. It is 
not lPN' in the usual sense that influences BI, but a substantively different construct. 
Such variation in operational definitions of constructs with the same name complicates 
comparison of studies' results. New constructs should have new labels. 
Different operational definitions of nominally-identical constructs are not necessarily 
problematic, however. They can enable comparison of alternative measures when 
consensus is yet to emerge about which is most appropriate. PBC, for example, has 
been operationalised in many ways in ESB research, using VC, PSE, ease/difficulty 
and perceived context items. The construct is sufficiently robust that it usually exerts 
the expected effects despite definitional differences. However, since there is good 
evidence of PSC's multi-dimensionality (e.g. Cheung et. a/., 1999), it would seem wise 
to combine different control measures even though single items often significantly 
influence BI and/or behaviour (e.g. Harland et. al., 1999). This would also reflect the 
wider social-psychological literature (Ajzen, 2002; Leach, Hennessey and Fishbein, 
2001; Sparks et. al., 1997; Terry and O'Leary, 1995; Trimafow at. a/., 2002). Indeed, 
based on a review of TPB studies across behavioural domains, Ajzen (2002, 679) has 
suggested treating PBC as a "hierarchical construct" capturing various control factors. 
Without systematic comparison of alternative measures, we could not draw such 
conclusions. 
4.6.2.2 Constructs are conflated 
Conflation is problematic because when constructs are combined, we cannot know 
which component of the combined variable is having an influence or being influenced. 
Again, empirical justification is important. Where constructs cannot be empirically 
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distinguished, it may be reasonable to treat them as one. But where they have been 
shown to be empirically distinct, this is doubtful. 
For example, Cheung et. sl. (1999) used a 'BI' scale combining desire and self-
prediction items not actually referring to 'intentions', making it impossible to say 
whether desires, self-predictions, or both influenced self-reported recycling. 
Furthermore, questions over whether desire's influence on behaviour is mediated by 
intentions and/or self-predictions, or whether desire moderates the PBC-behaviour 
relationship (Armitage & Conner, 2001) require that intentions, desires and self-
predictions are operationalised as distinct variables. 
Hunecke et. sl. (2001) measured 'PN' using personal responsibility as well as 
obligation items. They report a factor analysis where responsibility and obligation items 
loaded high on the same factor. Loadings for the five items ranged from .60 to .73, 
none of the items loaded on any other factor higher than .40 and no other items loaded 
on the 'PN' factor higher than .35. Thus, although the combination of obligation and 
responsibility items in one 'PN' scale is counter to studies that empirically distinguish 
AR from PN (e.g. Black et. sl., 1985) and to Schwartz's (1977) distinction between RD 
and PN, Hunecke at. sl. (2001) provide empirical justification for the combined 
measure in their research setting. Their respondents seemed not to differentiate 
between feelings of obligation and responsibility. It remains somewhat confusing that 
responsibility items were included in the 'PN' measure when responsibility was 
assumed to be captured by AC (see section 4.5.3.2), but there was at least empirical 
justification for the decision. 
Despite such difficulties, confusion does not reign in ESB research. The reviewed 
studies contribute much to a cumulative understanding. By comparing them, one can 
draw conclusions about alternative measures. For example, it seems that BI (as 
operationally defined by Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) predicts ESB more successfully than 
desires or self-predictions. This observation rests on just three studies (Bamberg & 
Schmidt, 2003; Boldero, 1995; Cheung et. sl., 1999), so one cannot yet claim that it 
applies across ESBs. But it does suggest that future research could try to establish 
consensus on the predictive power of alternative direct antecedents of behaviour. One 
can also say that single-item direct ATT measures are reliable predictors of BI, while 
multi-item indirect A TT measures perform less well. However, indirect measures of 
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An, PBC and SN tend to predict these constructs as measured directly (e.g. Ibid.; 
Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). As Taylor & Todd (1995) suggest, indirect measures can 
clarify the belief structures underlying overall evaluations. These findings illustrate the 
incremental accumulation of knowledge resulting from the reviewed studies. 
4.6.3 Theory structure 
It has been argued that some variations in constructs' operational definitions help to 
develop cumulative understanding while others are a hindrance, depending on whether 
the variation is theoretically and/or empirically justified. The same can be said of 
variations in theories' structures. 
Schwartz (1977) and Ajzen (1991; 1991a) provide detailed accounts of their theories, 
to which ESB research exhibits varying degrees of faithfulness. At one extreme, 
Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) compare the two theories' ability to explain travel mode 
choice, using both models' original formulations. As well as assessing NA Ts mediating 
effects, analyses tested whether AC and AR moderated PN's influence on behaviour. 
In the TPB analysis, PBC's direct effect on behaviour was tested, as well as its indirect 
effect via BI. Testing all of a theory's propositions enables comparison of a full range of 
findings, but this is rare in the research reviewed. Only Bamberg & Schmidt (Ibid.) 
tested both NAT moderating effects, while Bratt (1999) tested for AC moderating PN-
behaviour. No other study tested either effect. 
In contrast to Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) are Bang et. al. (2000), who despite 
publishing nine years after Ajzen (1991 a) added PBC to the TRA to develop the TPB, 
applied the TRA in their research. Moreover, they did not measure SN, meaning that 
An was the only predictor of BI. This seems to be a missed opportunity to increase 
our understanding of effects that - as this review shows - often influence ESB. 
In TPB research it is common for the regression outcome variable to be BI rather than 
behaviour (e.g. Taylor & Todd, 1995). This may not be ideal (see section 4.6.1.1), but 
is understandable because of the difficulty of collecting prospective behavioural data. It 
is harder to see why NAT studies cannot test moderating effects using data on AR, AC, 
PN and past behaviour. In fact, few studies measure AR, despite apparently 
widespread theoretical acceptance that it activates PN (e.g. Bratt, 1999). More tests of 
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AR's role as a predictor of PN are required for theory verification and, again, not 
measuring a construct that seems to be theoretically accepted is a missed opportunity. 
Just as common as omission of variables from models is addition of variables or 
relationships between existing constructs. It is easier to see how these changes 
develop understanding. For example, as well as predicting PN, AR has been shown to 
directly influence behaviour (Guagnano at. al., 1995; Tanner, 1999). ESB research has 
begun to provide evidence for this effect, suggesting that Schwartz's (1977) theoretical 
structure could perhaps be modified, although more studies could still test AR's indirect 
effect. 
One notable development of Schwartz's theory is Stem at. al.'s (1999) value-belief-
norm (VBN) model, in which AC is antecedent to AR (Figure 4.3). This causal order 
was tested in three reviewed studies (Black at. al., 1985; Guagnano et. al., 1995; Stern 
et. al., 1986) and supported in each. Moreover, variables "in this model may also have 
direct effects ... on variables more than one level downstream" (Stem et. al., 1999,84). 
Indeed, AC has been shown to influence PN (Black et. al., 1985; Bratt, 1999; Hunecke 
et. al., 2001; Nordlund & Garvill, 2002; Stem et. al., 1986; Stern et. al., 1999) and AR to 
influence behaviour (Guagnano et. al., 1995; Tanner, 1999). The VBN model also 
extends its causal chain back as far as values: "the regard that something is held to 
deserve; [its] importance or worth" (Soanes and Stevenson, 2004). Altruistic values are 
assumed to underpin PN (Schwartz, 1977) because people only feel moral obligation to 
perform particular actions when those actions are perceived as means of safeguarding 
something of 'importance or worth' (e.g. the non-human environment). Acceptance of 
the NEP (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978) - which "measures awareness of very general 
adverse consequences of environmental conditions" (Stern at. al., 1999) - links these 
general values to the more specific beliefs captured by AC. These features of the VBN 
model, alongside the lack of evidence for AC and AR's proposed moderating functions 
where tested, mark out Stem et. al.'s (1999) work as the type of empirically-justified 
theory development that arises from and contributes to cumulative understanding. 
Values NEP 
--+ 
AC AR PN Pro-environmental 
--+ f---+ f---+ f---+ behaviour 
Figure 4.3 Causal order in Stern et. al.'s (1999) VBN model 
96 
• 
The same might be said of Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) and Oom Do Valle et. al.'s 
(2005) combined NATITPB models. Indeed, there is empirical support for SN's addition 
to NAT (Bratt, 1999; Hunecke et. al., 2001), PBC's (or at least some measure of 
perceived constraints on behaviour) addition to NAT (Tanner, 1999) and PN's addition 
to the TPB (Flannery & May, 2000; Harland et. al., 1999). Harland et. al. (Ibid.) note 
that the TRA's predecessors included PN, but it was removed after correlating so 
strongly with BI that it did not add to explanation of behaviour. Schwartz (1977,227), 
however, states that "personal norms are experienced as feelings of moral obligation, 
not intention". The difference between the two is empirically demonstrated by PN-BI 
effects reviewed here (e.g. Harland et. al., 1999; Nordlund & Garvill, 2003). Moreover, 
from a theoretical viewpoint, adding PN to the TPB should increase normative 
coverage (Ajzen 1991a; 2001); accounting for internal and external norms. Although 
Schwartz (1977) argued that SN's effect on behaviour should be entirely mediated by 
PN, Oom Do Valle et. al. (2005) and Harland et. al. (1999) show that this is not the 
case and that PN's addition to the TPB raises explained variance in BI and behaviour. 
4.6.4 Reporting 
Three reporting issues were highlighted in section 4.5.4; failure to provide reliability 
statistics for multi-item scales (e.g. Flannery & May, 2000), failure to provide item 
details (e.g. Kalafatis et. al., 1999) and failure to provide p values (e.g. Stern et. al., 
1999). 
The exact wording of items is essential in order to assess whether operational 
definitions match theoretical definitions and are comparable across studies, while scale 
reliabilities and p values allow for judgements on the coherence of measures and the 
statistical significance of findings. Wright (2003, 133) remarks that data should "tell a 
story". Without such basic details as these, stories are incomplete. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This review permits conclusions concerning knowledge of NAT the TPB as applied to 
ESB and general issues of research design and reporting. Although in some ways the 
variety of theoretical and operational definitions and proposed effects for each 
construct suggests confusion, there are several issues on which micro-level analysis 
reveals incremental advances in understanding. Many have implications for future 
research, as noted in the following points. 
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• Intentions seem to be better predictors of behaviour than desires or self-
predictions. Desire measures should probably be avoided in BI scales, as what 
people want to do'may be unrelated to what they can do. 
• Single-item AIT measures reliably predict BI, but multi-item measures provide 
information on why people see a behaviour as positive or negative. 
• AIT measures do not perform well as direct predictors of behaviour, supporting 
Ajzen's (1991a) assertion that BI mediates this relationship. 
• PBC is a reliable predictor of BI and behaviour, as Ajzen (Ibid.) proposed. 
• PBC seems to be multi-dimensional, accounting for perceived ease/difficulty, 
volitional control, self-efficacy and context. Measures could usefully tap each of 
these perceptions. 
• SN items referencing 'important others' reliably predict BI, although with 
generally weaker effects than A IT or PBC. This reflects Armitage & Conner's 
(2001) findings across behavioural domains. 
• Few studies measure descriptive norms but the evidence suggests that more 
should do so as they appear to influence ESB. 
• SN and PN overlap to an extent, but PN does not completely mediate SN-BI or 
SN-behaviour effects. 
• PN reliably predicts behaviour, suggesting that people often see ESB as having 
a moral aspect. 
• PN also performs well as a predictor of BI. 
• More studies could measure AR to reach consensus on how this should be 
done. The accepted theoretical definition as personal responsibility for specific 
acts seems to suggest an appropriate operational definition. 
• There is some evidence of the AR-PN effect postulated by Schwartz (Ibid.), but 
more studies should test this relationship. 
• The same applies to AR's proposed moderating effect on the PN-behaviour 
relationship, which is as yet unconfirmed in ESB research. 
• There is, however, evidence of direct AR-behaviour effects not proposed by 
Schwartz (Ibid.). This supports Stern et. al.'s (1999) VBN model causal order. 
• AC's direct effect on AR also supports this theoretical development. 
• Both action- and condition-focused AC measures reliably predict PN. 
• There have been few tests of AC's proposed moderating effect on the PN-
behaviour relationship. What evidence there is does not support this effect, but 
more is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn. 
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Moving away from the construct level, the review aimed to ascertain which of the 
theories examined is most applicable to ESB. Judgements on this were difficult. The 
level of explained variance in ESB provided by each theory is similar, averaging 
around 40%. This is an approximate comparison, since the reviewed studies had 
different sample sizes, used models with different numbers of regressors and rarely 
tested NAT or the TPB's original formulations. Nonetheless, 'back-of-the-envelope' 
comparison of Ff values suggests that there is little to choose between them in terms 
of ability to explain ESB and ESB intentions. Both theories perform well compared to 
models included in Hines et. al.'s (1987) meta-analysis of ESB studies, which found an 
average explained variance level nearer to 35%. Thus, overall one can say that both 
NAT and the TPB seem to capture some motives for ESB and should be viewed as 
complementary. 
The review also aimed to discover whether there are specific ESBs or research 
settings to which one theory is most applicable. However, because most behaviours 
were examined by few studies, this question was also unanswerable on the basis of 
research assessed here. Even recycling and travel behaviour, which were investigated 
by several studies, could not be more closely associated with the motives captured by 
one of the two theories. This was largely because of variation in research designs. 
NAT and the TPB have been expanded to include a variety of additional variables, 
making true comparison impossible. As argued in section 4.6.1.2, this can only be 
achieved by testing different models as explanations of the same outcome using the 
same sample; an approach that is rare. 
From the point of view of cumulative understanding, perhaps the most important 
conclusion echoes Stern's (2000) suggestion that ESB research should integrate some 
of the many theories that have been applied to such behaviour. There is empirical 
support for PN's addition to the TPB as a predictor of BI; a development on which 
Ajzen (1991a; 2001) himself has speculated. Similarly, adding SN and PBe to NAT 
models increases explained variance. Some researchers have begun to develop 
theory-based integrated models (e.g. Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Oom Do Valle et. al., 
2005; Stern at. al., 1999) and have applied them to particular behaviours. These 
models could now be tested for various ESBs in various settings so that their 
generalisability can be assessed. 
99 
Comparing research reviewed here with that reviewed in Chapter 3, it is notable that 
the only studies included in this chapter that examined affect are travel studies which 
were also discussed in the previous chapter (e.g. Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Steg, 
2005). Affect may be particularly pertinent to travel and other ESBs might be less 
associated with 'subjectively experienced feeling' (Colman, 2001), but empirical work is 
needed to test this. The same could be said of social-symbolic motives. Do people 
perform 'public sphere' pro-environmental behaviours (Stem et. al., 1999) to 
demonstrate environmentalist credentials? Neither NAT nor the TPB explicitly 
addresses such questions. They both imply an individualist attitude-behaviour 
approach and while this clearly goes some way towards explaining ESB, Ff values in 
the .40 range illustrate that much explanation remains to be done. Habit is another 
influence beyond the purview of NAT and the TPB and while a few researchers have 
included this variable in expanded versions of these models (e.g. Bamberg & Schmidt, 
2003), it warrants further attention. 
Such is the state of knowledge on NAT and the TPB's ability to explain ESB, but what 
can be done to ensure that future research actively contributes to a cumulative 
understanding? This review suggests various steps. 
Research reports should provide all information that is necessary for interpretation of 
results. Attention should also be paid to research designs. The literature provides 
examples of constructs being conflated so that it is impossible to isolate the influence 
of one variable on another. It is easier to interpret results when one scale measures 
one construct. In addition, operational definitions should be consistent with theoretical 
definitions. It is confusing to find a construct being conceptualised in one way and 
measured in another. It is equally confusing to find a construct being given a label that 
is commonly applied to some quite different variable, as with Stem et. al.'s (1986) non-
personal 'PN'. It is helpful to readers if authors demonstrate awareness of terms' 
common uses and avoid applying them in unusual ways. 
Some degree of consistency is also desirable in the roles specified for constructs and 
when an established behavioural theory is developed by some change to its structure, 
a rationale should be provided. Of course, the advancement of understanding does 
require the development of new theories and models, but this should not be arbitrary. If 
studies are to be comparable, which they must be if we are to accumulate, a coherent 
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body of knowledge, they cannot be based on speculatively-chosen constructs. Finally, 
there is a need for methodologically-oriented studies that test alternative operational 
definitions of the same constructs. It is appropriate to end this chapter with Stern et. 
al.'s (1999, 85) comment that "most work on public environmental attitudes and 
behavior does not build into a cumulative understanding because too little attention has 
been given to systematic theory and the comparative testing of alternative theoretical 
models". Comparative testing of NAT and the TPB was precisely the aim of the first 
empirical study undertaken for this thesis, which is reported in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Study 1: a quantitative study of commuters' car 
use intentions 
5.1 Abstract 
This chapter reports a quantitative study of influences on drivers' intentions to reduce or 
maintain their car use for commuting to De Montfort University (DMU). Schwartz's (1977) 
norm-activation theory (NAT) and Ajzen's (1991; 1991 a) theory of planned behaviour 
(TPB) were its theoretical bases. Various analyses were conducted using the same 
sample. First, the theories' ability to explain car use intentions was compared using 
logistic regression (n = 312). NAT explained more variance. Second, a model using 
constructs from both theories was tested. This explained more variance than either 
individual model. A combined ascription of responsibility/personal norm variable (ARlPN) 
from NAT and perceived behavioural control (PBC) from the TPB were the only two 
statistically significant regressors. Third, contextual variables were added to NAT and 
TPB constructs, raising explained variance again (and raising adjusted f?2, which applies 
a penalty to compensate for additional predictors). ARIPN and PBC remained significant 
and several physical-contextual and socio-demographic variables also had significant 
effects on intentions. Finally, interactions between predictors were examined. ARlPN's 
influence on intentions was partially moderated by PBC, bicycle ownership, carriage of 
passengers when commuting, perceived cost of commuting by car and journey time from 
home to DMU. Findings are discussed in light of previous travel research and 
conclusions drawn about theoretical implications and implications for DMU transport 
policy, which aims to alter "the current modal split of travel to the University in favour of 
more sustainable modes of transport than the private car" (DMU, 2005). 
5.2 Theoretical background and study aims 
5.2.1 Models tested in the study 
Chapter 3 showed that travel mode choice is influenced by many factors. Several are 
captured by the theories examined in Chapter 4; Schwartz's (1977) norm-activation 
theory (NAT) and Ajzen's (1991; 1991a) theory of planned behaviour (TPB). Due to 
their prevalence in environmentally-significant behaviour (ESB) research (Matthies, 
2003) and successful application to travel behaviour (e.g. Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003), 
these theories were applied in the study reported here. 
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Although NAT and the TPB may partially explain modal choice, Chapter 3 also 
highlighted influences that are beyond these theories' purview. The importance of 
context (e.g. Gatersleben, 2003) and affect (e.g. Steg, 2005) was especially apparent. 
The present study examined contextual factors, but not affect. This could be seen as a 
limitation, but the principal objective was to obtain a clear picture of NAT and the TPB's 
comparative explanatory power, in their original formulations. Affective motives were, 
however, examined in study 2 (see Chapter 6). 
This study compared NAT and the TPB's ability to explain drivers' intentions to maintain 
or reduce their car use for commuting to De Montfort University (DMU). It also tested a 
model using constructs from both theories. This approach has been shown to increase 
explanatory power in travel studies (e.g. Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Harland et. al., 
1999), reflecting the assumption that a person may have altruistic and non-altruistic 
motives for one behaviour. Neither NAT nor the TPB explicitly accounts for this. 
A fourth model comprised constructs from NAT and the TPB plus measures of actual 
and perceived context that were assumed - based on the literature review presented in 
Chapter 3 - to be potential influences on commuting behaviour. The TPB's perceived 
behavioural control (PBC) construct "denotes subjective degree of control over 
performance of' a behaviour (Ajzen, 2002, 668) and is, therefore, likely to capture 
perceptions of at least some relevant contextual conditions. However, as Ajzen (Ibid.) 
notes, PBC may not reflect actual control. Contextual conditions (and perceptions 
thereof) were included in the fourth model to test the idea that direct effects of context 
on behavioural intention (BI) may be distinguishable from PBC's influence. 
5.2.2 Intention as an outcome variable 
Two points must be made about the regression outcome variable for this study, 
intentions to reduce or maintain car use for commuting among people who usually 
drove to DMU. Firstly, 'car use intentions' is used as shorthand for this dichotomous 
variable. Secondly, investigating BI is arguably less useful than investigating behaviour. 
Actions, not intentions, have environmental impacts. Furthermore, numerous factors 
may mediate BI-behaviour relationships, meaning that intentions do not always lead to 
actions. Nonetheless, BI often does explain ESB (e.g. Boldero, 1995) and other 
behaviours (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Accordingly, it is common for TPB stUdies to 
employ BI as an outcome variable (e.g. Flannery & May, 2000). 
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Use of BI as an outcome variable in NAT models raises different issues because 
Schwartz's (1977) theory does not include the construct. Research shows, however, 
that personal norms (PN) explain BI (see Chapter 4, section 4.5.3.1). This accords with 
Schwartz's (Ibid.) differentiation of PN from BI, in that PN can be neutralised before 
intentions form. In this study - comparing NAT and the TPB - comparisons had to be 
made on the basis of explaining the same outcome. Due to the difficulty of gathering 
prospective behavioural data, car use intention was chosen. This is a limitation, but the 
study does add to previous work that has examined influences on drivers' intentions to 
maintain or reduce their car use (e.g. Harland et. a/., 1999; Matthies et. a/., 2002). 
To summarise, the study had the following aims: 
• to compare the explanatory power of NAT and the TPB for car use intentions, 
• to compare the explanatory power of each model with a model comprising 
constructs from NAT and the TPB, 
• to assess whether adding contextual variables to a model comprising constructs 
from NAT and the TPB improved explanation of car use intentions. 
5.2.3 Hypotheses 
Based on previous research, four hypotheses were developed. 
1. Congruent with NAT, variance in drivers' car use intentions will be explained by 
awareness of consequences (AC), ascription of responsibility (AR) and PN. 
2. Congruent with the TPB, variance in drivers' car use intentions will be explained 
by attitudes toward commuting by car (A TI), PBC and subjective norms (SN). 
3. A model comprising constructs from NAT and the TPB will explain more variance 
in drivers' car use intentions than either individual model. 
4. Addition of contextual variables (see Table 5.3) to a model comprising constructs 
from NAT and the TPB will explain more variance in drivers' car use intentions 
than psychological variables alone. 
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Participants 
Participants were staff and students at DMU's three campuses in Leicester, three in 
Bedford and one in Milton Keynes, all of which were open when data were collected 
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(see Chapter 1, section 1.5). This population was divided into academics, 
administrative support staff, non-administrative support staff, undergraduates and 
postgraduates, although quotas were not set for groups or locations. During the study 
DMU had 18,515 attending students (14,946 undergraduate and 3,569 postgraduate) 
and 3,380 staff; a total population of 21 ,895. Staff with DMU email accounts (3,180) 
were sent a message by DMU's Green Travel Group (GTG), with which the study was 
undertaken, stating that a travel questionnaire was online and requesting its 
completion. A reminder was sent six weeks later. Staff without email accounts (200 
people in cleaning and maintenance posts) received paper questionnaires and covering 
letters. Eight hundred students were approached on a convenience basis across 
campuses. Participants were offered the opportunity to enter a £100 prize draw on 
return of a completed questionnaire and were assured of confidentiality. Staff data were 
collected between April 1 st and May 20th 2003 and student data between April 1 st and 
April3rd 2003. One thousand and fourteen completed questionnaires were returned, 
representing 4.6% of DMU's population and 24.3% of those approached to participate. 
Socio-demographic details of the sample are shown in Table 5.1 (the colurTm headed 
'Drivers' provides additional information explained in section 5.4.1.1). The majority of 
respondents were female. Twenty to 29 was the most represented age group. 
Administrative support staff was the most represented job type. There were more full-
than part-time respondents and incomes were generally at the lower end of the range. 
5.3.2 Questionnaire pre-testing 
The questionnaire was developed using Robson's (2002) pre-testing process. Drafts 
were provided to members of each participant group (six academics, four admin 
support staff, four non-admin support staff, three undergraduates and four 
postgraduates), drawn from all campuses. They were selected by 'snowball sampling', 
whereby the researcher chooses the first person, who suggests another, and so on 
(Ibid.). The number of people is unspecified at the outset and sampling continues until 
volunteers provide no new information. Here, the first person was an academic known 
to the researcher through DMU's gym, who worked in a different faculty. 
Each volunteer completed the questionnaire in the researcher's presence, verbalising 
their reactions to all items. The researcher then identified items regarded as 
ambiguous, intrusive, repetitive, or otherwise difficult. Consistently-problematic items 
were revised. For example, some were altered to reflect the fact that respondents could 
106 
spend equal amounts of time at more than one DMU campus and the question "What 
form of transport do you usually use for the main part of your journeys to and from 
university?" was amended to "What form of transport do you usually use for the main 
part of your journeys - in terms of distance - to and from university?" because six 
people requested clarification of "main part". 
Full sample (n = 1,014) Drivers (n = 539) 
n % n % 
Gender female 616 60.7 344 63.8 
male 343 33.8 170 31.5 
missing 55 5.4 25 4.6 
Age under 20 47 4.6 6 1.1 
20-29 258 25.4 68 12.6 
30-39 199 19.6 119 22.1 
40-49 231 22.8 158 29.3 
50-59 193 19.0 139 25.8 
60 or over 36 3.6 27 5.0 
missing 50 4.9 22 4.1 
Job type academic staff 265 26.1 166 30.8 
admin support staff 325 32.1 207 38.4 
non-admin support staff 148 14.6 97 18.0 
undergraduate 199 19.6 43 8.0 
postgraduate 32 3.2 8 1.5 
missing 45 4.4 18 3.3 
Full- or full-time 805 79.4 404 75.0 
part-time part-time 156 15.4 110 20.4 
missing 53 5.2 25 4.6 
Income under £10,000 270 26.6 94 17.4 
£10,000-£19,999 291 28.7 165 30.6 
£20,000-£29,999 163 16.1 98 18.2 
£30,000-£39,999 133 13.1 90 16.7 
£40,000 or over 62 6.1 44 8.2 
missing 95 9.4 48 8.9 
Table 5.1 Socio-demographic comparison of full sample and drivers 
5.3.3 Measures 
Items tapping psychological variables are shown in Table 5.2. These were developed 
based on the literature reviews presented in Chapters 3 and 4. All items except the 91 
measure - which had response options Increase/Stay the same/Reduce - used scales 
with response options Disagree strongly/Disagree/Neither agree nor disagree/Agree/ 
Agree strongly. Disagree strongly was coded as 1 and Agree strongly as 5. An Unsure 
option was also provided, which was coded as missing. Items marked * were reverse 
coded for analysis. The questionnaire is provided in Appendix 1. 
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Construct 
Awareness of 
consequences(AC) 
Ascription of 
responsibility (AR) 
Theory Item 
NAT My family and I are affected by pollution from cars 
*1 don't believe that environmental problems like global warming are caused by 
car use 
Avoiding car use will help to solve wider environmental problems like global 
warming 
My transport choices can have an impact on the environment 
I can help to solve my town/city's transport problems by avoiding car use 
I contribute to pollution [when travelling by car to DMUI 
NAT I feel personal responsibility for helping to solve my town/city's transport 
problems 
*1 don't feel any personal responsibility for causing my town/city's transport 
problems 
Personal norm (PN) NAT I feel morally obliged to avoid using the car to get to university 
Attitude towards TPB My usual form of transport [car) is ... 
own car use for 
commuting (ATT) 
Perceived 
behavioural control 
(PBC) 
Subjective norm 
(SN) 
Behavioural 
intention (BI) 
TPB 
TPB 
TPB 
pleasanU*uncomfortable/convenientlflexible/safe 
*It would be difficult for me to reduce my car use when getting to university 
Other means of travelling to the university are available to me 
I am able to use forms of transport other than the car to get to university 
My friends at DMU think that I shouldn't drive to get to university 
*Most people I know at university don't care how I travel to DMU 
Do you plan to change the amount that you use the car to travel to DMU during 
the next 12 months? 
Table 5.2 Items tapping psychological variables 
Table 5.2 shows different numbers of items tapping different constructs. This was 
because items had to be approved by DMU's Transport Co-ordinator on the GTG's 
behalf and some proposed items were discarded during discussions. The Co-ordinator 
was wary of including too many psychological items because they would have 
lengthened the questionnaire, possibly discouraging potential respondents. Those that 
were retained were thought by the Co-ordinator to be useful to the GTG as well as for 
the present research, hence, for example, the comparatively large number of AC items. 
Table 5.3 shows two types of contextual items; physical and socio-demographic. They 
were developed by the GTG to gather data on staff and student travel and were 
considered appropriate as contextual measures for this study's purposes. It is 
acknowledged that many actually measured perceived context. Nonetheless, these 
were useful because, as argued in Chapter 3, section 3.3.2, many aspects of context 
must be interpreted and it is individuals' interpretations that dictate how context 
influences behaviour (and/or intentions). Unsure was again coded as missing. To 
obtain a measure of actual contextual conditions, participants' journey distances were 
calculated using home and campus postcodes, where provided. Distances were 
calculated using an Internet direction finder (Multimap, 2003). 
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Item 
Are you ... ? 
How old are you? 
Are you ... ? 
Are you ... ? 
What is you income (gross per year)? 
Do you own a bicycle? 
Is the area that you live in served by buses? 
Does the area that you live in have a train service? 
Travelling to DMU [by car] is expensive 
How long does it usually take you to get from home 
to your campus? 
How long does it usually take you to get home from 
your campus? 
How far is your home from your campus? 
How many other people normally travel in your car 
with you on the way to DMU? 
Do you combine your journey with other trips, such 
as shopping, or dropping off children? 
Response options 
MaleiFemale 
Under 20120-29130-39/40-49/50-59/60 or over 
Academic staff/Admin support stafflNon-admin support 
staff/Undergraduate/Postgraduate 
Full-time/Part-time 
Under £10,000/£10,000-19,999/£20,000-29,999/£30,000-
39,999/£40,000 or over 
YesINo 
YeS/NO/Unsure 
Yes/NO/Unsure 
Disagree strongly/Disagree/Neither agree nor disagree/ 
Agree/Agree stronglylUnsure 
0-10 minuteS/11-20 minutes/21-40 minuteS/41-60 minutes/ 
Over 1 hour 
0-10 minuteS/11-20 minutes/21-40 minutes/41-60 minutes/ 
Over 1 hour 
0-2 milesl2.1-5 miles/5.1-10 mileS/10.1-20 miles/Over 20 
miles/Unsure 
Nonel1 otherl2 othersIMore than 2 others 
YesINo 
Table 5.3 Items measuring contextual variables 
5.4 Data analysis 
The procedures reported in this section are largely based on those suggested by Field 
(2000) and Bryman & Cramer (2001), although with some additions from other sources 
as cited. 
5.4.1 Principal components analysis (peA) 
Using SPSS, a PCA of psychological variables was carried out to check that items 
. designed for use in multi-item scales were sufficiently correlated. PCA examines 
correlations between variables, grouping those that are highly correlated into factors 
that are uncorrelated or weakly correlated with one another. It "achieves parsimony by 
explaining the maximum amount of common variance in a correlation matrix using the 
smallest number of explanatory concepts" (Field, 2000,423). 
Factors are "independent linear combinations" of the original variables (Brooks, 2002, 
220). If the variables entered into the PCA are denoted by X1, X2, .•• , Xk and the factors 
denoted by f1. f2, ••• , fk' then factors are described by the equations 
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where Gab are the coefficients (or 'factor loadings') representing the loading of the blh 
variable on the ath factor. Although PCA produces as many factors as variables are 
entered, the factors are in descending order of importance. Assuming some correlation 
between the variables entered (see Table 5.10), later factors account for so little 
variance that they can be discarded. Thus, PCA achieves parsimony by identifying 
factors that contribute little to explained variance in the items entered . 
. 
5.4.1.1 Variables included in the peA 
As well as items listed in Table 5.2, five items measuring acceptance of the new 
ecological paradigm (NEP) (Dunlap et. al., 2000) were included, which were not used in 
analyses reported here. Beliefs captured by an earlier version of the NEP (Dunlap & 
Van Liere, 1978) have been likened to NAT constructs; particularly AC. Stern, Dietz 
and Guagnano (1995,739) found NEP beliefs and AC to be "indistinguishable 
psychometrically and in terms of their relationship to behavioural intention", but later 
work by the same team (Stern at. al., 1999) empirically differentiates the two, showing 
NEP to be AC's antecedent. The present analYSis, in which NEP and AC were 
differentiated by the PCA, supports this latter interpretation (Le. NEP and AC items 
loaded highly on different factors). This was expected, as the AC items tapped more 
specific beliefs than the NEP's "measure of endorsement of a fundamental paradigm or 
worldview" (Dunlap at. al., 2000, 427). NEP items are shown in Table 5.4. 
As the study examined drivers' intentions, analysis was restricted to participants who 
stated that they drove to DMU at least four days per week and expressed intentions to 
maintain or reduce their car use for commuting during the year following the survey (n = 
539). (Only 13 drivers expressed intentions to increase car use; too few for this to be 
used as a regression outcome variable. These people were excluded from further 
analyses.) This meant that data from 475 respondents went unused in analyses 
reported here, but DMU's interest was in changing drivers' behaviour and this aim 
underpinned the present research. Eighty-two per cent of the drivers included (n = 441 ) 
intended to maintain car use, while 18% (n = 98) intended to reduce it. For comparison, 
in a recent UK survey (DEFRA, 2002), 39% of respondents claimed to have "cut down 
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the use of a car for short journeys (e.g. school, work, local shops, etc.}" during the last 
year. It is notable that the DEFRA survey suggests that twice the percentage of drivers 
had reduced their car use as intended to do so among the present sample, although 
answers applied to a wider range of journeys and did not indicate by how much people 
had cut down. Socio-demographic details of the drivers group are shown in Table 5.1. 
Of 462 respondents who were not classified as drivers, 189 reported commuting mainly 
on foot, 121 by bus, 53 by bicycle, 44 by train, 38 as car passengers, 10 by motorcycle 
and there were seven missing responses. As proportions of the full sample (n = 1,014), 
these figures equate to 18.6% pedestrian, 11.9% bus, 5.2% bicycle, 4.4% train, 3.7% 
car passenger, 1.0% motorcycle and 0.7% missing. 
In light of potential implications for DMU transport policy, tests were performed to 
assess the significance of socio-demographic differences between drivers and the full 
sample. (Interventions aimed at socio-demographic groups containing significantly 
more drivers may be most effective. See also Chapter 7, section 7.4.) This meant using 
two-unrelated-samples tests. For the ordinal variables age and income, Mann-Whitney 
U tests were used to test the null hypothesis that means for drivers and the full 
sample were equal. If the z statistic produced by the test is significant (p < .05) this 
hypothesis can be rejected (Bryman & Cramer, 2001). For age z = -6.546 (p < .001) 
and for income z = -4.084 (p < .001), indicating that drivers were significantly older and 
higher earning than the full sample. 
For the nominal variables full- or part-time status, gender and job type, 1 tests were 
used to test the null hypothesis that comparison groups contained the same number of 
cases in each category of the test variable. If 1 is non-significant (p > .05), there is no 
significant difference between groups. There was no significant gender difference (I = 
1.069, df = 1, p = .301), but drivers were significantly more likely to be staff than 
students (I = 43.745, df = 4, P < .001) and part-time than full-time (I = 6.050, df = 1, P 
= .014). 
5.4.1.2 Data screening 
Before examining the PCA solution, data were screened to assess their suitability for 
peA. Bryman & Cramer (Ibid.) propose that there should be at least five participants 
per variable in order to produce a result replicable with another sample from the 
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population. After listwise deletion of missing responses (n = 82) n = 457. With 24 items 
(nine NAT, 10 TPB, five NEP), there were 19 participants per variable. 
The determinant of the correlation (r) matrix was examined to check for multicollinearity 
of items. The determinant is obtained by subtracting the product of the off-diagonal 
elements from that of the diagonal elements (Sydsaeter and Hammond, 1995). 
Assuming no random sampling error, if the determinant = 0, changes in the value of 
one variable are identical to changes in the value of another and those variables are, 
therefore, not independent of one another. If the determinant ¢ 0, changes in the value 
of one variable are not mirrored exactly by changes in another, so those variables are 
at least partially independent. In the present context, some random sampling error must 
be assumed, so a determinant ¢ 0 may be insufficient to indicate variables' 
independence. The determinant = 0.0001203. Although close to 0, this exceeded 
Field's (2000) recommended minimum of 0.00001. MultiCOllinearity was not, therefore, 
assumed to be a problem. This was supported by inter-item correlations in the r matrix. 
Field (Ibid.) suggests that only values ~ .80 are problematic, but the strongest was r = 
.733 (p < .001), between two A IT items tapping perceived convenience and flexibility of 
car use. Most were much weaker and many were non-significant (at 0.5 level). 
SPSS produces an anti-image matrix, which includes measures of sampling adequacy 
for each variable. In an image matrix, the elements are regression coefficients for each 
variable regressed on all the others. The anti-image matrix contains residuals from 
these regressions. Its elements indicate the proportion of variance in each variable that 
is unrelated to other variables in the analysiS (Rummel, 1977). The central diagonal of 
the anti-image matrix shows the measures of sampling adequacy. Kaiser (1974), who 
developed this test, suggests that values of these elements should be > .50 if sample 
size is adequate, indicating that more than half of the variance in each variable is 
unrelated to other variables. This was the case for the present data (range = .59 to .94). 
Finally, the reproduced r matrix was examined for non-redundant residuals, defined in 
SPSS as > .05. This matrix is based on the PCA model, rather than actual data. 
Differences between elements in the r and reproduced r matrices indicate the residuals 
from the model and, therefore, its accuracy. Less than 50% of residuals should be non-
redundant if the model is a reasonable approximation to the data (Field, 2000). Here, 
26% were non-redundant. Data therefore met each criterion for PCA's suitability. 
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5.4.1 .3 Factor extraction 
An initial PCA was performed and factors with eigenvalues> 1 (Kaiser's criterion) were 
extracted. A scree plot was also produced (Figure 5.1). Oblique rotation was used 
because factors were expected to correlate. For example, one might expect correlation 
between SN and PN (see Chapter 4, section 4.5.2.4). Oblique rotation allows for this , 
while the alternative orthogonal rotation enforces independence of factors . While this 
has the advantage of giving factors that provide no redundant information, it may not 
reflect conceptual links between variables (Bryman & Cramer, 2001). 
Oblimin was selected as the method of oblique rotation. Kline (1994) identifies th is as 
the most reliable method since it is best able to provide the expected solution when 
factors are already known . 
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Figure 5.1 Scree plot from peA of NAT, TPB and NEP items 
Based on Kaiser's criterion, the PCA yielded a five-factor solution explaining 57.6% of 
variance in the items entered. The scree plot, however, suggested a six-factor solution 
(levelling off after this point). 
Another PCA was run, specifying a six-factor solution. Both solutions were examined to 
assess how well they reflected the NAT and TPB structures (Hammond, 2000; Dancey 
and Reidy, 2002). The six-factor solution was more theoretically coherent, more clearly 
differentiating NAT and TPB constructs from each other and from NEP beliefs. Most 
113 
notably, the five-factor solution had all NAT items loading highly on one factor, while the 
six-factor solution separated AC from AR and PN. This solution was accepted. To 
check the solution, another PCA was run using Promax oblique rotation (Kline, 1994); 
an alternative method provided in SPSS. Results were very similar to the Oblimin 
rotation. The same factors emerged, with only minor differences in factor loadings. 
Table 5.4 shows the rotated structure matrix for the six-factor Oblimin solution and 
includes all loadings > .300 (or < -.300). Loadings of items used to identify each factor 
are in normal type. Loadings of items not used in factor identification are feint. Factors 
Item Construct 
Avoiding car use will help to solve wider environmental problems like AC 
global warming 
My transport choices can have an impact on the environment AC 
I contribute to pollution AC 
I don't believe that environmental problems like global warming are AC 
caused by car use 
I can help to solve my town/city's traffic problems by avoiding car use AC 
My family and I are affected by pollution from cars AC 
Driving to DMU is convenient A TT 
Driving to DMU is flexible A TT 
Driving to DMU is pleasant A TT 
Driving to DMU is safe A TT 
Driving to DMU is uncomfortable A TT 
I am able to use forms of transport other than the car to get to university PSC 
Other means of travelling to the university are available to me PSC 
It would be difficult for me to reduce my car use when getting to the PSC 
university 
The so called 'ecological crisis' facing humankind has been greatly NEP 
exaggerated 
If things continue as they are, we will soon experience a major ecological NEP 
catastrophe 
Nature is robust enough to cope with the impacts of modem industrialised NEP 
nations 
The Earth is like a spaceship with limited room and resources NEP 
Humans are severely abusing the environment NEP 
Most people I know at university don't care how I travel to DMU SN 
My friends at DMU think that I shouldn't drive to get to university SN 
I feel personal responsibility for helping to solve my town/city's traffic AR 
problems 
I feel morally obliged to avoid using the car to get to university PN 
I don't feel any personal responsibility for causing my town/city's traffic AR 
problems 
Factor loadings> .300 
1 234 5 6 
.779 -.467 -.342 
.777 
.710 
.707 
.673 
.564 
.826 
.801 
.753 
.724 
.577 
-.341 
-525 
.301-.360 -.626 
.899 
.894 
.784 
-.340 .363-.356 
.422 -.761 
-.760 -.334 
.305 -.752 
-.725 
.331 -.701 
.800 
.662-.425 
.475 -.319 -.773 
.302-.744 
.488 -.420 -.689 
Tab/e 5.4 Rotated structure matrix from six-factor peA solution 
were identified as representing AC, ATT, PBe, NEP, SN and ARIPN. It is notable that 
not all items loaded on just one factor. While there was clear differentiation between 
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ATT, PBC and all other factors, other distinctions were less sharp. For example, 
the first, third and fifth NEP items loaded (albeit with values S .422) on factor 1 (AC) as 
well as factor 4. Nonetheless, it was possible to identify conceptually-coherent factors 
from the highest-loading items on each. Again taking NEP as an example, all five items 
loaded on factor 4 with values s -.701, showing strong inter-correlation. The fact that 
AR and PN items loaded highly on the same factor (all loadings s -.689) shows that 
drivers' feelings of responsibility and obligation regarding car use were strongly 
correlated. Drivers apparently did not differentiate between these constructs, so ARIPN 
was treated as a single latent variable in the following analyses. 
5.4.2 NAT and TPB construct scales 
5.4.2.1 Scale reliabilities 
Internal reliability refers to whether a multi-item scale measures one underlying idea. To 
check the internal reliability of scales for each factor, Cronbach's a was computed for 
each set of items used in identifying a factor. This test calculates the mean of all split-
half reliabilities (rsh). In a split-half test, items are divided into two groups and the 
correlation between participants' scores on the two groups (r12) is computed and 
expressed as a coefficient with a value between 0 and 1. The equation for rsh is 
where S1 and S2 are the standard deviations of the two halves of the test (the two sets 
of items) and Sr2 is the variance of the total test (Cortina, 1993). Cronbach's test 
examines all possible item groupings and a shows the mean strength of all their 
relationships (Le. the mean of all values of rSh) (Bryman & Cramer, 2001). Results for 
factors used in this study are in Table 5.5. 
Scale nitems neases average item a 
Inter-correlatlon 
AC 6 417 .430 .83 
ATT 5 457 .438 .78 
PSC 3 446 .612 .82 
SN 2 433 .252 .42 
ARlPN 3 446 .459 .70 
Table 5.5 Scale reliabilities 
ESB studies differ on the a value above which internal reliability is acceptable. Some 
take a ~ .40 (e.g. Stem et. al., 1986), others require a ~ .70 (e.g. Hunecke et. al., 
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2001). Cortina (1993, 100) notes that "most recent studies that have used alpha imply 
that a given level, perhaps greater than .70, is adequate or inadequate without 
comparing it to the number of items in the scale." This is certainly true in ESB research. 
The point is that a is partly a function of number of items, as well as their inter-
correlations. Cortina concedes, however, that "there seems to be no real metric for 
judging the adequacy of the statistic" (Ibid., 101). There is no rule based on number of 
items and their average inter-correlation that tells us when an a value above a certain 
leve'l really indicates 'acceptable' internal reliability. Cortina (Ibid.) does offer guidance 
though, suggesting that a is less prone to artificial inflation with fewer items. He 
discusses problems with scales containing ~ 14 items, so it was assumed that a values 
for scales used here, which comprised six items or fewer, were suitable indictors of 
internal reliability. 
Acceptability at a ~ .70 appears to be the most stringent criterion applied in ESB 
studies. This is also the level specified by Cortina (Ibid.), assuming few items. Hence 
.70 was used as the acceptability threshold in the present analysis. Reliabilities for all 
scales except SN met this criterion. Although beliefs about "friends at DMU" and 
"people I know at university" were not sufficiently correlated to form a reliable scale, this 
did not rule out the possibility of one or both variables predicting BI individually. The two 
SN items were, therefore, used as separate predictors in the analyses reported below. 
5.4.2.2 Scale scores 
Participants' scores on reliable scales were computed by taking their mean score on 
items comprising each scale, so that all scores ranged from 1 to 5. For example, if 
somebody had scores of 2, 2 and 4 on the PBC items, their overall PBC score was 2.67 
(the sum of item scores divided by number of items). Scores were computed for 
partiCipants answering all items in a scale. Higher scores on AC, PBC and ARIPN 
indicated beliefs that, according to theory, should lead to increased odds of intending to 
reduce car use. For example, a high AC score indicated that a person identified 
negative consequences of car use. The same convention was used for the SN items. 
Conversely, low A IT scores were theoretically congruent with intending to drive less, 
representing negative evaluations of one's own car use. Table 5.6 shows descriptive 
statistics for each variable. 
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Variable 
AC 
An 
PBC 
ARIPN 
My friends at DMU think that I shouldn't drive to get to university (SN 1) 
Most people I know at university don't care how I travel to DMU (SN2) 
n Min Max Mean SO Variance 
417 1.33 5.00 3.490 .727 .529 
457 1.80 5.00 4.257 .565 .319 
446 1.00 5.00 2.420 1.061 1.126 
446 1.00 5.00 2.685 .743 .552 
433 1.00 5.00 1.864 .783 .613 
439 1.00 5.00 2.041 .787 .619 
Table 5.6 Descriptive statistics for NAT and TPB variables 
PSC exhibited most variance (1.126), while ATT exhibited least variance (.319). 
Drivers' stated attitudes toward commuting by car were generally very positive (M = 
4.257). Mean PSC score (2.420) was low-to-moderate, indicating that drivers generally 
expressed low control over commuting mode choice, although the large variance 
(1.126) shows that some expressed much greater control. Mean AC score (3.490) was 
above the scale mid-point, indicating general awareness of driving's consequences. 
Mean ARIPN score (2.685) was below the mid-point. On the whole, drivers stated that 
they felt neither very responsible for, nor obliged to reduce, their car use. Nor, however, 
did they state absolutely no responsibility or obligation. The two SN items had the 
lowest means (1.864 and 2.041), indicating that drivers generally expressed little 
pressure from the specified referents to reduce their commuter car use. 
5.4.2.3 Comparing reducers' and maintainers' scale scores 
Table 5.7 and Figure 5.2 show separate descriptive statistics for people who stated 
intentions to maintain and reduce their car use (hereafter 'maintainers' and 'reducers', 
respectively). The vertical bars in Figure 5.2 show the variance for each variable, while 
the point in the middle of each bar shows the mean. 
Intention (BI} Variable n Min Max Mean SO Variance 
Maintain car use AC 338 1.33 5.00 3.415 .714 .509 
An 370 1.80 5.00 4.292 .574 .329 
PBC 360 1.00 5.00 2.305 1.020 1.040 
ARlPN 360 1.00 5.00 2.575 .696 .485 
SN1 353 1.00 4.00 1.813 .746 .556 
SN2 356 1.00 5.00 2.034 .779 .607 
Reduce car use AC 79 1.83 5.00 3.812 .701 .492 
An 87 3.00 5.00 4.108 .502 .252 
PBC 86 1.00 5.00 2.899 1.101 1.213 
ARlPN 86 1.33 5.00 3.147 .759 .577 
SN1 80 1.00 5.00 2.088 .903 .815 
SN2 83 1.00 5.00 2.072 .823 .678 
Table 5.7 Descriptive statistics for NAT and TPB variables for different intentions 
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Reducers' mean AC, PSC, ARJPN, SN1 and SN2 scores were higher, while their mean 
ATT score was lower than maintainers'. These findings are congruent with NAT and the 
TPS. Nonetheless, even reducers expressed very positive attitudes towards their own 
car use (M = 4.108). It is also notable that stated anti-driving social pressure was 
uniformly low. The most marked differences were in mean AC, ARJPN and PSC scores. 
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Figure 5.2 Maintainers' and reducers' means and variances on NAT and TPB variables 
Mann-Whitney U tests were used to test the null hypothesis that reducers and 
maintainers had equal means for each variable (Table 5.8). Although scale data of this 
sort are routinely treated as continuous in psychological research (Sryman & Cramer, 
2001), they are actually discrete, hence the use of this test. 
Mann-Whitney U 
z 
p (2-tailed) 
AC 
9373.500 
-4.136 
.000 
ATT 
12672.000 
-3.114 
.002 
PBC 
10731 .500 
-4.457 
.000 
ARIPN 
9172.500 
-5.936 
.000 
SN1 
11803.500 
-2.472 
.013 
SN2 
14545.500 
-.244 
.807 
Table 5.8 Differences between maintainers and reducers on NAT and TPB variables 
There was no significant difference (at 0.5 level) for SN2, but there were significant 
differences for all other variables. Reducers had significantly higher scores on AC, PSC 
and AR/PN, expressed significantly greater (although still low) pressure against driving 
from friends at DMU and stated significantly less positive (although still very favourable) 
attitudes towards their own driving. 
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5.4.2.4 Scores' distributions 
Because the choice of later statistical tests needed to take account of data distributions. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests were conducted to test the null hypothesis that each 
NAT and TPB variable had a normal distribution (Table 5.9). This test was used 
because data were ordinal (Bryman & Cramer, 2001 ). 
The KS test compares observed frequencies of values of a variable against a specified 
theoretical distribution; in this instance, a normal distribution. The z statistic is 
computed from the largest difference between the observed and theoretical distribution 
functions and the associated p value indicates whether observations could reasonably 
have come from the specified distribution. If p < .05, the difference between the 
observed and theoretical distributions is significant and the null hypothesis is rejected 
(Kinnear and Gray, 2000). Significant (p < .05) statistics for all variables indicated that 
no NAT or TPB data were normally distributed. 
Variable 
AC 
ATT 
PBC 
ARIPN 
SN1 
SN2 
*allp < .001 
.081 
.116 
.121 
.116 
.235 
.304 
df 
417 
457 
446 
446 
433 
439 
Table 5.9 Kolmogorov-Smimov tests for normality of NAT and TPB variable distributions 
To further illuminate variables' distributions, histograms with normal curves were 
produced (Figures 5.3a to 5.3f). These reflect the descriptive statistics in Table 5.6. 
Drivers generally expressed little anti-car social pressure, illustrated by pronounced 
positive skewness (Le. means higher than medians) in Figures 5.3e and 5.3'. They 
expressed low-to-moderate PBC (although Figure 5. 3d shows spikes in the distribution 
at 1 and just above the scale mid-point of 3). They also expressed moderate AC and 
ARIPN (Figures 5.3a and 5.3c, respectively) and very favourable attitudes towards their 
own car use (illustrated by very negative skewness in Figure 5.3b). 
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The non-normal distributions had implications for the methods used to measure inter-
variable correlations and to test the study's hypotheses. In the latter regard, since the 
outcome variable was dichotomous (intend to reduce/maintain car use), logistic 
regression was appropriate. In logistic regression, Y is the probability of a case having 
one of the two outcomes "based on a non-linear function of the best linear combination 
of predictors" (Zaman Bin Ahmad, 2003, 153). This is represented by 
where Yi is the estimated probability that the lh case is in one of the outcome categories 
and u is the linear regression represented by 
with constant a, coefficients bj and predictors Xj for k predictors U = 1, 2, ... , k). The main 
difference between linear and logistic regression is that in the former, the linear part of 
the equation is an end in itself, while in the latter it is a means of calculating the odds of 
a case being in one of the outcome categories (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). 
Although it has been stated that "in logistic regression, the predictors do not have to be 
normally distributed" (Ibid., 517), this fails to account for the fact that some software 
packages, including SPSS, use the maximum likelihood (ML) method in logistic 
regression. ML fits a multivariate normal distribution to estimate parameter values 
resulting in the highest likelihood of observing the actual data. If applied when 
predictors are non-normal (as here), it can lead to inflated standard errors (SE). It may 
also bias regression coefficients so that they would differ if the model was applied to 
another sample from the population (Gujarati, 1995). Although SPSS offers no way 
around this, EViews - an econometrics package - provides two solutions (QMS, 1999); 
the Quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) and generalised linear model (GLM) regression 
techniques. GLM was chosen because as well as being robust to non-normal data, it is 
robust to heteroscedasticity in regressions (whereby residuals are not randomly 
dispersed across all values of predictors). Diagnostic testing revealed some 
heteroscedasticity, supporting the choice of GLM (see section 5.6). 
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5.4.2.5 Scale correlations 
Although inter-item correlations were calculated as part of the PCA (see section 
5.4.1.2), relationships between scales constructed from items were also assessed to 
check for multicollinearity of variables to be used as regression predictors. As noted in 
section 5.4.2.3, scale data were discrete. Therefore, Spearman's rho (P) correlation 
coefficients were calculated for each pair of predictors. 
For the Spearman test, data are converted to rank order so that the smallest value of 
each of the two variables whose association is being examined is ranked 1, the next 
smallest 2, and so on. This gives a series of pairs. To test the null hypothesis that p = 0, 
the following equation is used 
rs = 1 - 6loe! I n(n2 - 1) 
where rs is the test statistic, n is the number of pairs and d is the difference in rank 
between each pair (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). If rs is significant (p < .05) the variables 
are correlated and the null hypothesis can be rejected. Correlations between scales are 
shown in Table 5.10. The highest was p = .690 (p < .001), between ARIPN and AC. 
This suggested that multicollinearity would not be a problem, as only significant values ~ 
.80 are said to be cause for concern over non-independence of variables (Field, 2000). 
AC ATT PBC NEP ARIPN SN1 
ATT P -.239 
P (2-tailed) < .001 
n 417 
PBC P .267 -.168 
p (2-tailed) < .001 <.001 
n 409 446 
NEP P .659 -.196 .254 
P (2-tailed) <.001 <.001 <.001 
n 382 402 394 
ARIPN P .690 -.249 .242 .466 
P (2-tailed) <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
n 408 446 436 399 
SN1 p .381 -.256 .246 .259 .502 
P (2-tailed) < .001 <.001 <.001 < .001 < .001 
n 399 433 422 386 424 
SN2 P -.009 -.123 .041 -.078 .148 .256 
P (2-tailed) .851 .010 .398 .125 .002 <.001 
n 402 439 429 387 428 425 
Table 5.10 Inter-correlations among NAT and TPB variables 
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It is especially notable that ARiPN was only moderately correlated with SN1 (p = .502, 
P < .001) and weakly correlated with SN2 (p = .148, P = .002). It has been suggested 
that using PN and SN as separate predictors in regressions might assume that they 
are independent when they are not (Steg, 2004). Certainly Schwartz (1977) argues 
that PN may incorporate SN and there is evidence from ES6 studies that these 
constructs overlap (e.g. Harland et. al., 1999). The picture in this study was confused 
slightly by treatment of ARiPN as a single variable. The fact that feelings of 
responsibility (AR) were tied up with normative self-expectations (PN) may have 
weakened the combined variable's association with SN. Nonetheless, the relatively 
modest correlations showed sufficient independence for the variables to be used as 
separate regression predictors. 
5.5 Results 
Results for each hypothesis listed in section 5.2.3 are presented in sections 5.5.1 to 
5.5.4. A comparison of results for each regression model is provided in section 5.5.5. 
5.5.1 Hypothesis 1: Congruent with NAT, variance in drivers' car use intentions will 
be explained by AC, AR and PN 
As AR and PN were not differentiated by the PCA, this hypotheSiS could not be tested 
exactly as formulated. Using EViews, a logistic regression was performed with car use 
intention (61) as the outcome variable and AC and ARiPN as predictors. Although 408 
drivers had scores on both predictors, only 312 were included. Direct comparison of 
regression models testing each hypothesis required that the same participants were 
used in each analysis. Only 312 drivers provided sufficient data to be included in tests 
of all hypotheses (due to lower response rates for some contextual variables). The 
forced entry regression method was used, as the analysis tested an established 
theory (6ryman & Cramer, 2001; Field, 2000). That is, predictors were entered based 
on theoretical grounds, not statistical significance. Table 5.11 shows EViews' output 
for the regression testing hypothesis 1. 
McFadden R2 is analogous with Ff in linear regression, taking a value between 0 and 
1 and, when multiplied by 100, indicating the percentage of variance in the outcome 
variable attributable to the predictors. Adjusted RZ applies a penalty to RZ, reducing it 
as the number of predictors rises (since adding another predictor would otherwise 
always increase RZ). EViews does not produce adjusted RZ for logistic regression. 
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Predictor 
ARlPN 
AC 
constant 
Mean dependent var 
SE of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Restr. log likelihood 
LR statistic (2 dij 
Probability(LR stat) 
Oep=O (maintainers) 
Oep=1 (reducers) 
coefficient 
2.275 
0.687 
-10.456 
0.127 
0.265 
28.194 
-78.339 
-141.912 
96.273 
< 0.001 
270 
42 
SE z 
0.296 
0.342 
1.291 
8.944 
4.562 
-7.945 
SO dependent var 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz info criterion 
Hannan-Quinn criterion 
Avg. log likelihood 
McFadden f?l 
Adjusted f?l 
Total n 
Table 5.11 Regression of BI on NAT variables 
p 
< 0.001 
0.034 
< 0.001 
0.333 
0.521 
0.526 
0.509 
-0.214 
0.341 
0.327 
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Field (2000, citing Stevens, 1992), however, provides Stein's formula for adjusted ~. 
adjusted ~ = 1 - (n - 1 1 n - k - 1 )(n - 2 1 n - k - 2)(n + 1 1 n)(1 -~) 
where n is number of cases and k is number of predictors in the model. 
This formula was used here because the number of predictors (including constants) in 
regressions used to test the four hypotheses ranged from three (hypothesis 1) to 10 
(hypothesis 4), so ~ may have been artificially inflated in the larger models. Adjusted 
~, on the other hand, provides a consistent basis for model comparison. Applying the 
equation to this regression gave 
adjusted ~ = 1 - (311/308)(310 1307)(313/312)(1 - .341) 
= 1 - (1.009)(1.009)(1.003)(.659) 
= 1 - .673 
=.327 
Adjusted ~ was calculated in this way for each regression reported below. 
Table 5.11 shows that both ARIPN and AC were significantly, positively associated with 
intention to reduce car use. ARlPN's higher regreSSion coefficient indicates that its 
influence was stronger than AC's. It was also more statistically significant (p < .001, as 
opposed to AC's p = .034). (Although unstandardised regression coefficients are 
reported, the effects of different psychological variables are directly comparable 
because each was measured on the same 1 to 5 scale.) The SEs of regreSSion 
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coefficients indicate the likelihood of the null hypothesis (that the coefficient = 0; i.e. no 
relationship between predictor and outcome) being true for the population. Since the 
regression fits a normal distribution to the data to estimate model parameters, the 
properties of this distribution can be used to infer the probability of the regression 
coefficient for the population falling within the bounds set by the SE values. Take, for 
example, AC's coefficient of .687 (p = .034) and SE of .342. One can interpret the 
range within one SE of the coefficient (.345 to 1.029) as an approximate 68% 
confidence interval for the population coefficient. That is, one would expect the 
coefficients of 68% of samples from the population to fall within this range. Similarly, 
the range within two SEs (.003 to 1.371) represents a 95% confidence interval. Given 
that 95% confidence is often applied as the criterion for statistical significance in social 
science research (e.g. Bryman & Cramer, 2001), the question was whether 0 lay within 
the 95% confidence interval. In this instance, it did not (although it was only just 
outside), so the coefficient is statistically significant at .05 level. The smaller the SE, the 
further outside the 95% confidence interval 0 will fall and the less likely it is that that the 
population coefficient is actually O. 
Measures of overall model fit are provided by the information criteria statistics. These 
are useful for selecting the best model - in terms of balance between parsimony and 
goodness-of-fit - from a range of alternatives (Enders, 2004). Of the three information 
criteria provided by EViews, the Schwarz criterion (SIC) and the Akaike criterion (AIC) 
are the most commonly used. The smaller their values, the better the model. The 
equations are 
AIC = itn (sum of squared residuals) + 2n 
SIC = itn (sum of squared residuals) + n In(t) 
where n is the number of predictors (including the constant), t is the number of cases 
and itn is its natural logarithm. The SIC is more reliable for large samples and the AIC 
for small samples, but since 'large' and 'small' are undefined, "You can be quite 
confident of your results if both the AIC and the SIC select the same model" (Ibid., 70). 
It is useful to compare the four models used to test the four hypotheses in this study 
and the SIC and AIC (alongside adjusted Rl) facilitate this. The SIC for the NAT 
regression model = .526 and the AIC = .521. 
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The model correctly identified the intentions of 84.5% of participants, but only 38.9% of 
reducers (and 91.1% of maintainers). This, however, improved on the model including 
only the constant, which correctly classified just 12.7% of reducers, so hypothesis 1 
was not rejected. 
5.5.2 Hypothesis 2: Congruent with the TPB, variance in drivers' car use intentions 
will be explained by A IT, PBC and SN 
A logistic regression with forced entry was performed with BI as the outcome variable 
and ATI, PBC, SN1 and SN2 as predictors (n = 312). Results are in Table 5.12. 
ATI, PBC and SN1 ("friends") significantly (p < .05) predicted BI, but SN2 ("people I 
know") was non-significant. A TI's negative coefficient shows that positive evaluations 
of one's own car use were associated with lower odds of expressing intentions to 
reduce it. Of the three significant predictors, PBC had the strongest influence on BI 
(coefficient = 1.518, p < .001). McFadden R2 for the TPB model (.259) was lower than 
for the model based on NAT constructs, so the TPB explained less variance in BI than 
the NAT constructs. Adjusted R2 (.233) was lower still. 
Predictor 
An 
PBC 
SN1 
SN2 
constant 
Mean dependent var 
SE of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Restr. log likelihood 
LR statistic (4 dQ 
Probability(LR stat) 
Oep=O (maintainers) 
Oep=1 (reducers) 
coefficient 
-0.620 
1.518 
0.689 
0.158 
-6.738 
0.127 
0.256 
28.498 
-80.898 
-131.982 
68.193 
< 0.001 
270 
42 
SE z 
0.229 
0.213 
0.190 
0.329 
1.302 
-4.546 
7.295 
3.020 
1.822 
-4.914 
SO dependent var 
Akaike Info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
Hannan-Quinn criterion 
Avg. log likelihood 
McFadden R2 
Adjusted R2 
Total n 
Table 5.12 Regression of BI on TPS variables 
p 
0.017 
< 0.001 
< 0.001 
0.185 
< 0.001 
0.334 
0.551 
0.559 
0.531 
-0.299 
0.259 
0.233 
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AIC for this model = .551, while SIC = .559. The TPB model achieved a poorer balance 
between parsimony and goodness-of-fit than the NAT model on both measures. In the 
TPB regression 30.2% of reducers were classified correctly, along with 91.1 % of 
maintainers, giving 84.3% accuracy overall. These figures are to be contrasted with 
11.3%,88.7% and 79.8% respectively for the model including only the constant. 
Prediction of BI by the TPB was, therefore, less accurate than by the NAT constructs, 
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although the TPB offered more accurate prediction than the constant-only model in this 
regression. 
5.5.3 Hypothesis 3: A model comprising constructs from NAT and the TPB will 
explain more variance in drivers' car use intentions than either individual model 
A stepwise logistic regression was performed with BI as the outcome (n = 312). All 
NAT and TPB variables were entered. On each step the predictor with the highest p 
value was removed until all predictors had p < .05. Results are in Table 5.13. Only 
ARIPN and PBC remained in the model at the fifth and final step. ARIPN had the 
higher regression coefficient (2.320, p < .001). 
Ste~ Predictor coefficient SE z P. 
1 Ae 0.236 0.416 5.768 < 0.001 
ARIPN 2.401 0.398 0.590 0.555 
An -0.134 0.300 -0.446 0.655 
PBC 0.828 0.198 4.171 < 0.001 
SN1 -.236 0.255 -0.924 0.355 
SN2 -.114 0.229 -0.496 0.619 
constant -11.393 2.087 -5.458 < 0.001 
2 AC 0.211 0.397 0.529 0.596 
ARIPN 2.432 0.415 5.855 < 0.001 
PBe 0.843 0.198 4.257 < 0.001 
SN1 -0.218 0.254 -0.860 0.389 
SN2 -0.122 0.231 -0.530 0.595 
constant -12.007 1.605 -7.477 < 0.001 
3 ARIPN 2.408 0.322 7.477 < 0.001 
PBe 0.845 0.180 4.681 < 0.001 
SN1 -0.185 0.236 -0.782 0.433 
SN2 -0.070 0.213 -0.330 0.741 
constant -11.299 1.236 -9.139 < 0.001 
4 ARIPN 2.428 0.319 7.591 < 0.001 
PBC 0.864 0.180 4.782 < 0.001 
SN1 -0.217 0.225 -0.963 0.336 
constant -11.466 1.196 -9.583 < 0.001 
5 ARIPN 2.316 0.270 9.588 < 0.001 
PBe 0.896 0.174 5.168 < 0.001 
constant -11.963 1.1401 -11.085 < 0.001 
Mean dependent var 0.127 SO dependent var 0.334 
SE of regression 0.262 Akaike info criterion 0.498 
Sum squared resid 30.125 Schwarz criterion 0.503 
Log likelihood -74.738 Hannan-Quinn criterion 0.487 
Restr.log likelihood -151.636 Avg.log likelihood -0.224 
LR statistic (4 df) 111.851 McFadden R2 0.377 
Probability(LR stat) < 0.001 Adjusted R2 0.366 
Oep=O (maintainers) 270 Total n 312 
Oep=1 (reducers) 42 
Table 5.13 Regression of BI on NAT and TPB variables 
127 
For the final model, AIC = .498 and SIC = .503. Adjusted Ff (.366) was higher than for 
either previous model. Ff (.377) was also higher, indicating that this model explained 
more variance in BI than either theory's constructs alone. ARlPN's regression 
coefficient (2.136, p < .001) was higher than in the NAT regression and PBC's 
coefficient (.896, p < .001) was lower than in the TPB regression. This shows that when 
these two predictors were included in the same model rather than in their original 
theories, ARlPN's influence on BI increased whilst PBC's influence decreased. 
In this regression, 42.1 % of reducers were classified correctly, along with 91.4% of 
maintainers, providing 85.1 % correct overall. The constant-only model correctly 
classified 12.9%,87.1% and 77.5%, respectively. The model including variables from 
both NAT and the TPB gave more accurate classification of participants and explained 
more variance in BI than either individual model. Alongside its lower SIC and AIC 
values and its higher Ff, this shows that the model using constructs from both theories 
was the best of the three psychological models, so hypothesis 3 was not rejected. 
5.5.3.1 An additional question: does PBC moderate the ARlPN-BI relationship? 
The finding that ARIPN and PBC were significant predictors of BI after the final step 
suggested another hypothesis. Might PSC moderate the ARlPN-BI relationship, as well 
as exerting a main effect on BI? As noted in Chapter 4, section 4.4, a moderator 
"affects the zero-order correlation between two other variables" (Baron & Kenny, 1986, 
1174). Thus, even somebody who feels responsible for problems caused by their 
driving and obliged to reduce it may not intend to do so if they feel that reduction is 
beyond their control. PBC may "specify the appropriate conditions" (Ibid.) for ARlPN's 
influence on BI. The hypothesis was that the ARlPN-BI relationship will be stronger for 
drivers expressing high PBC than for those expressing low PBC. 
Testing this required examination of the ARlPN-BI association. As BI was a 
dichotomous, categorical variable, this required contingency tables in which each cell 
must meet an expected count in order for tests to be reliable. No count should be < 1 
and no more than 20% should be < 5 (Kinnear & Gray, 2000). When a table was 
produced with two rows representing the categories of BI (maintain or reduce car use) 
and multiple columns representing ARIPN scores, many cells did not meet expected 
counts. ARIPN was, therefore, collapsed into two categories, so that a 2x2 table could 
be produced with high counts in all cells. 
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The 312 drivers were divided into two groups around the median score on ARIPN 
(2.67). Those with scores S 2.67 were assigned to the low ARiPN group (n = 192) and 
those with scores> 2.67 to the high ARiPN group (n = 120). Group sizes were unequal 
because many participants had scores of exactly 2.67. (Including these people in the 
low ARIPN group meant that group sizes were closer to being equal than if they had 
been put in the high ARiPN group.) Next, the contingency table was constructed, with 
ARiPN group in the columns and BI in the rows (Table 5.14). Of those in the low 
ARIPN group, 92.2% expressed intentions to maintain car use, while 7.8% expressed 
intentions to reduce it. In the high ARIPN group, 77.5% expressed intentions to 
maintain car use and 22.5% expressed intentions to reduce it. Thus, there was a 
difference of 14.7% between those with high ARIPN and those with low ARIPN in terms 
of which intention they stated (22.5 - 7.8 = 14.7). 
ARIPN group 
Low High 
Intention (BI) Maintain car use n 177 93 
% 92.2 77.5 
Reduce car use n 15 27 
% 7.8 22.5 
Total n 192 120 
Difference in % across ARlPN levels 14.7 
Table 5.14 Contingency table showing BI by ARIPN group 
To calculate the strength of the ARlPN-BI relationship, the phi (<I» coefficient was 
computed. Like Pearson's and Spearman's coefficients, <I> takes a value between -1 
and 1, with 0 indicating no relationship and -1 or 1 indicating a perfect (negative or 
positive) relationship. <I> is a derivative of i and is expressed by 
where n is the total number of cases in the analysis. <l> was used because both 
variables were dichotomous (Bryman & Cramer, 2001; Kinnear & Gray, 2000). For the 
ARlPN-BI association across all 312 drivers, <l> = .22 (p < .001). 
The next step was to divide drivers around the median PBC score (2.33). Those with 
scores S 2.33 were assigned to the low PBC group (n = 144) and everyone else to the 
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high PBC group (n = 168). Contingency tables of BI by ARIPN group were then 
constructed for each PBC level (Table 5. 15). 
LowPBC High PBC 
ARIPN group ARIPN group 
Low High Low High 
Intention (81) Maintain car use n 93 37 84 56 
% 93.0 84.1 91.3 73.7 
Reduce car use n 7 7 8 20 
% 7.0 15.9 8.7 26.3 
Total n 100 44 92 76 
Difference in % across ARIPN levels 8.9 17.6 
Table 5.15 Contingency tables showing BI by ARIPN group for low and high PBC groups 
At low PBC levels, 93.0% of those with low ARIPN expressed intentions to maintain car 
use, while 7.0% expressed intentions to reduce it. Of those with high ARlPN, 84.1 % 
expressed intentions to maintain car use and 15.9% expressed intentions to reduce it. 
The difference in BI between low and high ARIPN groups was, therefore, 8.9%; smaller 
than in Table 5.14. At high PBC levels, 91.3% of those with low ARIPN expressed 
intentions to maintain car use, while 8.7% expressed intentions to reduce it. In the high 
ARIPN group, 73.7% expressed intentions to maintain car use and 26.3% expressed 
intentions to reduce it. Here, there was a 17.6% difference in BI between the low and 
high ARIPN groups; greater than in Table 5.14. ARlPN-BI correlation for the low PBC 
group was <I> = .16 (p = .020), while for those with high PSC it was <I> = .24 (p < .001). 
Thus, as hypothesised, ARlPN-BI relationship was stronger for drivers expressing high 
PBC than for those expressing low PBC; a partial moderating effect. 
Baron & Kenny (1986, 1175) note that their suggested correlational method of testing 
for moderation "presumes that the independent variable has equal variance at each 
level of the moderator". This meant that variance in ARIPN should be equal in the low 
and high PBC groups. Variance was .55 in the low PBC group and .52 in the high PBC 
group. These values were assumed to be close enough to avoid the problem that if 
130 
variances differ across levels of the moderator, then for levels of the moderator with 
less variance, the correlation of the independent variable with the dependent 
variable tends to be less than for levels of the moderator with more variance 
(Ibid.). 
In fact, there was less variance in ARIPN among the high PBC group, yet ARlPN-BI 
correlation was stronger for this group. Given that lower variance tends to bias the 
correlation coefficient down rather than up, we can be confident that ARlPN-BI 
association was stronger for drivers with high PBC. 
5.5.4 Hypothesis 4: Addition of contextual variables to a model comprising constructs 
from NA T and the TPB will explain more variance in drivers' car use intentions 
than psychological variables alone 
When assessing the influence of contextual and psychological variables, environmental 
psychology studies sometimes enter regression predictors in two blocks; contextual 
variables first and psychological variables second (e.g. Olli et. al., 2001). The rationale 
is that this clearly shows each type of variable's contribution to explained variance in 
the outcome. This method is not always used, however (e.g. Gatersleben et. al., 2002). 
Stem, Dietz and Kalof (1993) suggest that all predictors should be entered 
simultaneously in exploratory models. This was done in the present analysis (as the 
model combined variables from two theories as well as adding contextual predictors). 
A stepwise regression was performed, using the same removal criterion as in analysis 
for hypothesis 3 (n = 312). ARlPN, AC, ATT, PBC, SN1 and SN2 were entered as 
psychological predictors, with BI as the outcome variable. 
Eight physical-contextual and five socio-demographic predictors were also entered. 
Spearman's p correlations between all variables are shown in Table 5.16. These are 
based on the 312 drivers included in regressions, all of whom provided data on all 
variables. Correlations significant at .05 are marked * and coefficients ~ .80 are bold, 
as associations of this strength may indicate collinearity (Field, 2000). All correlations 
are shown for completeness, but two - between journey time from home to DMU and 
journey time from DMU to home (p = .810, P < .001) and between perceived and actual 
journey distance (p = .922, P < .001) - were ~ .80. On this basis, journey time from 
DMU to home and perceived journey distance were discarded. Perceived distance was 
not used as a regressor because it was considered better to have measures of actual 
context where possible. Journey time from DMU to home rather than from home to 
DMU was excluded simply because it came later in the questionnaire. There was no 
other basis on which to choose between them. Table 5.17 shows regression results. 
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~ ARlPN AC NEP An PBC SN1 SN2 biqde perceived perceived perceived joumey joumey perceived carriage combining actual gender age job full- or w 
N ownership access to access to cost of car time from time from joumey of others DMU with joumey type part-
bus train travel home to DMU to distance in car to other trips distance time 
service service DMU home DMU 
AC P .690 
e .000* 
NEP P .466 .659 
e .000* .000* 
An p -.249 -.239 -.196 
e .000* .000* .000* 
PBC P .242 .267 254 -.168 
e .000* .000* .000* .000* 
SN1 P .502 .381 259 -256 .246 
e .000* .000* .000* .000* .000* 
SN2 P .148 -.009 -.078 -.123 .041 .256 
e. .002* .851 .125 .010* .398 .000* 
bicycle ownership p .126 .114 .080 -.038 -.071 -.053 .015 
e. .008* .021' .111 .417 .134 .271 .753 
perceived access p .123 .173 .151 -.031 .425 .132 .020 -.100 
to bus service e. .010* .000* .002* .517 .000' .006* .675 .034* 
perceived access p .122 .152 .021 -.067 .167 .016 .015 .034 .189 
to train service e. .010' .002' .676 .152 .000* .747 .751 .478 .000' 
perceived cost of P -.048 -.087 -.081 .191 .174 -.060 -.on -.007 .134 -.057 
car travel e .315 .079 .105 .000* .000* .213 .111 .884 .005' .232 joumey time from p -.075 -.011 -.084 -.140 -262 -.091 -.078 .050 -.246 .145 -.294 
home to DMU e. .129 .831 .108 .004* .000" .070 .116 .309 .000" .003" .000' joumey time from p -.141 -.037 -.038 -.177 -.260 -.126 -.060 .087 -.189 .217 -.306 .810 
DMU to home e. .019* .550 .553 .003" .000" .039" .324 .146 .001" .000* .000" .000* 
perceived joumey p -.063 -.019 -.065 -.104 -.374 -.120 -.067 .114 -.345 .249 -.302 .727 .754 
distance e .188 .697 .197 .027* .000* .013* .164 .016" .000" .000* .000· .000* .000· 
carriage of others p .080 .131 .163 -.006 .133 -.016 -.013 -.056 .167 .016 .054 -.126 -.056 -.173 
in car to DMU e. .091 .008· .001" .907 .005· .736 .788 .234 .000' .734 .249 .010· .347 .000· 
combining DMU p .059 .023 .094 .052 -.011 .037 -.002 -.047 .103 .049 .080 -.012 .004 -.074 .199 
with other trips e. .221 .648 .063 .269 .818 .449 .967 .324 .029· .302 .091 .813 .952 .119 .000' 
actual joumey p -.075 -.022 -.060 -.140 -.386 -.123 -.033 .105 -.332 .220 -.281 .695 .718 .922 -.203 -.078 
distance e. .150 .680 .281 .006" .000" .020* .528 .044' .000' .000" .000* .000" .000* .000* .000* .135 
Table 5.16 Correlations between psychological and contextual variables for drivers included in regressions (continues) 
~ .. 
~'.:' 
::;:," , 
w 
w 
gender 
age 
job type 
full- or part-time 
income 
p 
e 
p 
e 
P 
e 
p 
e 
p 
e 
ARIPN AC NEP An PBC SN1 SN2 bicycle perceived perceived perceived joumey joumey perceived carriage combining actual gender age job full- or 
ownership access to access to cost of car time from time from journey of others DMU with journey type part-
bus train travel home to DMU to distance in car to other trips distance time 
service service DMU home DMU 
.029 -.067 -.029 -.011 .035 .045 -.020 .029 -.082 -.035 -.101 .028 -.017 .095 -.081 -.159 .091 
.547 .181 .576 .826 .473 .359 .679 .544 .087 .470 .036* .579 .785 .048* .091 .001* .OBO 
.011 -.015 -.007 .101 -.096 .031 .008 .006 -.058 -.097 -.001 -.068 -.043 -.010 -.108 -.054 -.019 .252 
.825 .760 .893 .034* .047* .533 .867 .894 .223 .042* .978 .170 .476 .829 .023* .258 .711 .000* 
-.151 -.074 -.002 -.057 .020 -.033 -.047 -.017 .084 -.046 -.001 -.093 -.097 -.103 .044 -.030 -.094 -.204 -.320 
.002* .135 .976 .228 .674 .499 .334 .72B .077 .336 .982 .060 .105 .031* .353 .532 .069 .000* .000* 
.079 .126 .080 -.069 -.029 .060 .054 .108 -.025 -.061 -.046 -.051 -.068 -.033 -.015 .136 -.010 -.162 .128 .020 
.102 .011* .118 .151 .554 .223 .266 .024* .607 .204 .336 .306 .264 .493 .758 .005* .841 .001* .008* .670 
.060 .009 -.051 .076 .020 .025 -.029 -.033 -.059 .025 .078 .056 .018 .090 -.085 -.092 .OBO .372 .355 -.636 -.410 
.225 .864 .333 .123 .693 .621 .564 .501 .230 .617 .113 .278 .769 .067 .083 .061 .126 .000' .000' .000' .000' 
Table 5.16 (continued) Correlations between psychological and contextual variables for drivers included in regressions 
Ste~ Predictor coefficient SE z e 
1 AC 0.535 0.678 0.789 0.430 
ARIPN 4.079 0.878 4.645 < 0.001 
ATT -0.353 0.530 -0.667 0.505 
PBC 1.008 0.316 3.190 0.001 
SN1 0.454 0.444 1.021 0.308 
SN2 0.582 0.362 1.608 0.108 
actual journey distance 0.032 0.414 0.079 0.037 
bicycle ownership 1.295 0.640 2.021 0.043 
carriage of others in car to DMU -1.046 0.542 -1.927 0.054 
combining DMU with other trips -0.956 0.653 -1.464 0.143 
joumey time from home to DMU -0.782 0.489 -1.596 0.110 
perceived access to bus service 1.025 0.873 1.174 0.240 
perceived access to train service 0.926 0.629 1.472 0.141 
perceived cost of car travel 0.944 0.313 3.015 0.003 
age -0.908 0.330 -2.746 0.006 
full- or part-time 1.235 0.747 1.652 0.098 
gender -0.402 0.769 -0.524 0.601 
income -1.034 0.555 -1.862 0.063 
job -0.824 0.474 -1.740 0.082 
constant -5.409 4.394 -1.231 0.218 
2 AC 0.481 0.432 1.114 0.265 
ARIPN 4.033 0.561 7.180 0.000 
ATT -0.342 0.340 -1.005 0.315 
PBC 0.978 0.198 4.930 < 0.001 
SN1 0.469 0.285 1.642 0.101 
SN2 0.598 0.233 2.558 0.011 
actual joumey distance 0.085 0.258 0.331 0.140 
bicycle ownership 1.299 0.411 3.158 0.002 
carriage of others in car to DMU -1.072 0.351 -3.048 0.002 
combining DMU with other trips -0.954 0.421 -2.264 0.024 
joumey time from home to DMU -0.722 0.305 -2.360 0.018 
perceived access to bus service 0.978 0.553 1.767 0.077 
perceived access to train service 0.918 0.404 2.272 0.023 
perceived cost of car travel 0.961 0.200 4.804 < 0.001 
age -0.941 0.210 -4.476 < 0.001 
full- or part-time 1.228 0.478 2.565 0.010 
income -1.100 0.343 -3.208 0.001 
job -0.845 0.299 -2.824 0.005 
constant -5.637 2.800 -2.013 0.044 
3 AC 0.474 0.434 1.093 0.275 
ARIPN 4.020 0.560 7.168 < 0.001 
PBC 0.986 0.196 5.011 < 0.001 
SN1 0.461 0.286 1.610 0.107 
SN2 0.591 0.233 2.536 0.011 
actual joumey distance 0.074 0.231 0.402 0.009 
bicycle ownership 1.283 0.408 3.142 0.002 
carriage of others in car to DMU -1.061 0.354 -2.999 0.003 
combining DMU with other trips -0.943 0.420 -2.244 0.025 
joumey time from home to DMU -0.799 0.200 -3.992 < 0.001 
perceived access to bus service 0.971 0.198 4.896 0.351 
perceived access to train service 0.874 0.381 2.291 0.022 
perceived cost of car travel 0.934 0.536 1.741 0.082 
age -0.940 0.210 -4.476 < 0.001 
full- or part-time 1.235 0.478 2.583 0.010 
income -1.089 0.340 -3.202 0.001 
Table 5.17 Regression of BI on psychological and contextual variables (continues) 
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Ste~ Predictor coefficient SE z e 
3 (cont.) job -0.834 0.297 -2.809 0.005 
constant -5.844 2.727 -2.142 0.032 
4 Ae 0.487 0.434 1.123 0.262 
ARIPN 3.994 0.553 7.212 < 0.001 
PBe 1.008 0.193 5.203 < 0.001 
SN1 0.398 0.274 1.450 0.147 
SN2 0.610 0.232 2.631 0.009 
actual journey distance 0.916 0.530 1.728 0.084 
bicycle ownership 1.332 0.401 3.320 0.001 
carriage of others in car to DMU -1.033 0.336 -3.071 0.002 
combining DMU with other trips -0.927 0.416 -2.227 0.026 
journey time from home to DMU -0.759 0.192 -3.942 < 0.001 
perceived access to train service 0.891 0.375 2.375 0.018 
perceived cost of car travel 0.950 0.194 4.887 < 0.001 
age -0.965 0.206 -4.668 < 0.001 
full- or part-time 1.245 0.472 2.638 0.008 
income -1.065 0.334 -3.185 0.001 
job -0.800 0.291 -2.743 0.006 
constant -7.442 2.208 -3.369 0.001 
5 ARIPN 3.103 0.450 6.890 < 0.001 
PBe 0.866 0.200 4.329 < 0.001 
SN1 0.176 0.281 0.627 0.530 
SN2 0.483 0.252 1.912 0.056 
actual journey distance 0.995 0.589 1.689 0.091 
bicycle ownership 1.668 0.439 3.793 < 0.001 
carriage of others in car to DMU -0.872 0.344 -2.537 0.011 
combining DMU with other trips -0.575 0.450 -1.277 0.202 
journey time from home to DMU -0.764 0.218 -3.502 0.001 
perceived access to train service 0.855 0.410 2.085 0.037 
perceived cost of car travel 0.786 0.202 3.885 < 0.001 
age -0.822 0.217 -3.772 < 0.001 
full- or part-time 0.871 0.518 1.681 0.093 
income -0.942 0.340 -2.767 0.006 
job -0.737 0.306 -2.404 0.016 
constant 
-7.095 2.349 -3.020 0.003 
6 ARIPN 3.057 0.571 5.355 < 0.001 
PBe 0.866 0.265 3.260 0.001 
SN2 0.510 0.324 1.572 0.116 
actual journey distance 1.003 0.787 1.274 0.103 
bicycle ownership 1.754 0.585 2.995 0.003 
carriage of others in car to DMU -0.865 0.448 -1.930 0.054 
combining DMU with other trips 
-0.542 0.594 -0.913 0.361 
journey time from home to DMU -0.751 0.292 -2.566 0.010 
perceived access to train service 0.800 0.546 1.463 0.143 
perceived cost of car travel 0.795 0.269 2.949 0.003 
age -0.826 0.289 -2.857 0.004 
full- or part-time 0.885 0.689 1.285 0.199 
income -0.920 0.442 -2.078 0.038 
job -0.682 0.395 -1.724 0.085 
constant -7.589 3.103 -2.445 0.015 
7 ARIPN 2.928 0.401 7.294 < 0.001 
PBe 0.890 0.198 4.479 < 0.001 
SN2 0.503 0.241 2.089 0.037 
actual journey distance 1.054 0.586 1.797 0.022 
Table 5.17 (continued) Regression of BI on psychological and contextual variables (continues) 
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Ste~ Predictor coefficient SE z e 
7 (cont.) bicycle ownership 1.765 0.440 4.004 < 0.001 
carriage of others in car to DMU -0.889 0.336 -2.643 0.008 
journey time from home to OMU -0.734 0.215 -3.403 0.001 
perceived access to train service 0.714 0.402 1.777 0.076 
perceived cost of car travel 0.748 0.197 3.783 < 0.001 
age -0.759 0.208 -3.643 < 0.001 
full- or part-time 0.833 0.516 1.614 0.007 
income -0.852 0.324 -2.625 0.009 
job -0.634 0.293 -2.166 0.030 
constant -7.862 2.325 -3.381 0.001 
8 ARIPN 2.815 0.378 7.442 < 0.001 
PBe 0.876 0.191 4.574 < 0.001 
SN2 -0.474 0.232 -2.044 0.066 
actual joumey distance 1.109 0.564 1.965 0.049 
bicycle ownership 1.815 0.433 4.190 < 0.001 
carriage of others in car to OMU -0.923 0.337 -2.739 0.006 
joumey time from home to OMU -0.695 0.208 -3.330 0.001 
perceived cost of car travel 0.742 0.192 3.850 < 0.001 
age -0.641 0.188 -3.396 0.001 
full- or part-time 0.747 0.390 1.914 0.041 
income -1.098 0.299 -3.667 < 0.001 
job -0.820 0.270 -3.028 0.003 
constant -5.996 1.965 -3.051 0.002 
9 ARIPN 2.764 0.369 7.480 < 0.001 
PBe 0.874 0.186 4.690 < 0.001 
actual joumey distance 0.881 0.538 1.638 0.002 
bicycle ownership 1.758 0.423 4.150 < 0.001 
carriage of others in car to OMU -0.954 0.340 -2.799 0.005 
joumey time from home to OMU -0.608 0.203 -2.991 0.003 
perceived cost of car travel 0.734 0.189 3.870 < 0.001 
age -0.662 0.186 -3.551 < 0.001 
full- or part-time 1.267 0.412 2.998 0.002 
income -1.101 0.295 -3.727 < 0.001 
job -0.900 0.266 -3.377 0.131 
constant -5.667 1.940 -2.920 0.004 
10 ARIPN 2.816 0.363 7.763 < 0.001 
PBe 0.881 0.183 4.816 < 0.001 
actual joumey distance 0.540 0.251 2.155 0.031 
bicycle ownership 1.289 0.388 3.321 0.001 
carriage of others in car to OMU -0.904 0.328 -2.756 0.006 
joumey time from home to DMU -1.056 0.328 -3.220 0.001 
perceived cost of car travel 0.879 0.193 4.560 < 0.001 
age -0.637 0.181 -3.511 < 0.001 
full- or part-time 1.327 0.439 3.018 0.003 
income -0.469 0.197 -2.383 0.017 
constant -5.939 1.899 -3.127 0.002 
Mean dependent var 0.127 SO dependent var 0.334 
SE of regression 0.258 Akaike info criterion 0.461 
Sum squared resid 20.128 Schwarz criterion 0.478 
Log likelihood -60.923 Hannan-Quinn criterion 0.419 
Restr. log likelihood -123.260 Avg. log likelihood 
-0.205 
LR statistic (4 dij 118.674 McFadden R2 0.481 
Probability(LR stat) < 0.001 Adjusted R2 0.441 
Oep=O (maintainers) 270 Total n 312 
Oep=1 (reducers) 42 
Table 5.17 (continued) Regression of 61 on psychological and contextual variables 
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ARIPN and PBC were again the only significant psychological predictors after the final 
(10th) step. ARIPN had a stronger influence. Positive regression coefficients indicate 
that the odds of expressing intentions to reduce car use were higher for part-time than 
full-time members of DMU and for bicycle owners than non-owners. Negative 
coefficients indicate that the odds of expressing intentions to reduce car use 
decreased with increases in journey time, number of passengers, age, or income. 
McFadden Ff = .481 and adjusted Ff = .441, the highest of any model tested. The nine 
predictors that were removed (AC, ATT, SN1, SN2, perceived access to bus service, 
perceived access to train service, combining commuting with other trips, gender and 
job type) raised McFadden Ff by just .016 (Le. McFadden Ff = .497 for step 1). SIC for 
this model = .478 and AIC = .461; both lower than for any previous model. This shows 
a superior balance between goodness-of-fit and parsimony when contextual variables 
were included, despite there being more predictors. This model correctly classified 
59.6% of reducers and 96.3% of maintainers, giving 91.4% correct overall. The model 
including only the constant correctly classified 13.5%,86.5% and 76.7%, respectively. 
Inclusion of contextual variables as predictors improved explained variance in BI, as 
well as accuracy of classification and model fit. Thus, hypothesis 4 was not rejected. 
5.5.4.1 Further additional questions: psychological-contextual interactions 
As with hypothesis 3, results for hypothesis 4 suggested further analyses. Given that 
PBC partially moderated ARlPN's effect on BI, it was decided that interactions between 
physical-contextual variables and ARIPN should also be examined. 
First, contingency tables suggested that bicycle ownership had a clearer moderating 
effect than PBC on ARlPN-BI association (Table 5.18). 
No bicycle Bicycle 
ARIPN group ARIPN group 
Low High Low High 
Intention (BI) Maintain car use n 94 38 75 46 
% 86.2 80.9 90.4 63.0 
Reduce car use n 15 9 8 27 
% 13.8 19.1 9.6 37.0 
Total n 109 47 83 73 
Difference in % across ARIPN levels 5.3 27.4 
Table 5.18 Contingency tables showing BI by ARIPN group for bicycle owners and non-owners 
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For those without a bicycle (n = 156), ARlPN-BI correlation was non-significant at <l> = 
.073 (p = .281). For those with a bicycle (n = 156) it was <l> = .324 (p < .001). Nineteen 
point one percent of those with high ARIPN but no bicycle expressed intentions to 
reduce their car use, while 37.0% of those with high ARIPN who owned a bicycle 
expressed this intention. There was greater variance in ARIPN among those who 
owned bicycles than those who did not (.67 as opposed to .42), but since ARlPN-BI 
correlation was stronger and more significant among those owning a bicycle, this would 
not have led to a spurious association. If anything, it would have reduced the strength 
of the ARlPN-BI relationship among bicycle owners. 
Another contingency table analysis suggested a partial moderating effect of carriage of 
passengers to DMU on ARlPN-BI association (Table 5.19). 
No passengers Passengers 
ARiPN group ARiPN group 
Low High Low High 
Intention (BI) Maintain car use n 131 61 37 23 
% 86.8 67.0 91.2 79.3 
Reduce car use n 20 30 4 6 
% 13.2 33.0 8.8 20.7 
Total n 151 91 41 29 
Difference in % across ARiPN levels 19.8 11.9 
Table 5.19 Contingency tables showing BI by ARIPN group for lone drivers and those with 
passengers 
For lone drivers (n = 242), ARlPN-BI correlation was <l> = .240 (p < .001). For those 
with passengers (n = 70) it was non-significant at <l> = .180 (p = .074). Twenty point 
seven percent of those with high ARIPN and who carried passengers expressed 
intentions to reduce their car use, while 33.0% of those with high ARIPN who travelled 
alone expressed this intention. There was greater variance in ARIPN levels among 
those carrying no passengers than those carrying passengers (.57 and .47, 
respectively). Thus, the weaker ARlPN-BI correlation for the passengers group should 
be treated cautiously as it may rest, in part, on 'restriction in range' of ARIPN (Ibid.). 
Thirdly, there was an interaction between perceived cost of driving to DMU and ARIPN. 
Perceived cost was an ordinal variable with three categories (Inexpensive/Neither 
expensive nor inexpensive/Expensive). Crosstabulation therefore used a 3x2 
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contingency table (Table 5.20), meaning that CI> was an inappropriate measure of 
ARlPN-BI association. Kendall's tau-b (T) statistic was used instead (Bryman & Cramer, 
2001; Kinnear & Gray, 2000). Like CI> and p, T takes a value between -1 and 1, 
indicating both the strength and direction of a relationship. It is also similar to CI> and p 
in that it measures agreement between membership of ordered categories, or ranks 
(e.g. different perceptions of the expense of driving and different levels of ARlPN). The 
basis of T is that "one set of ranks can be converted into another by a succession of 
reversals of pairs of ranks in one set: the fewer reversals are needed (in relation to the 
total number of possible reversals), the larger the value of tau" and thus the stronger 
the association between the variables in question (Ibid., 288). 
Inexpensive Neither Expensive 
ARIPN group ARIPN group ARIPN group 
Low High Low High Low High 
Intention (BI) Maintain car use n 64 36 59 27 45 21 
% 91.4 80.0 83.1 64.3 88.2 63.6 
Reduce car use n 6 9 12 15 6 12 
% 8.6 20.0 16.9 35.7 11.8 36.4 
Total n 70 45 71 42 51 33 
Difference in % across ARIPN levels 11.4 18.8 24.6 
Table 5.20 Contingency tables showing BI by ARIPN group for drivers stating different 
perceptions of the expense of commuting by car 
For those who said driving was inexpensive (n = 115), ARlPN-BI correlation was 
significant at T = .177 (p = .035). For those saying driving was neither expensive nor 
inexpensive (n = 113), the correlation was T = .217 (p = .008). For those saying driving 
was expensive (n = 84), the correlation was T = .308 (p = .001). ARIPN was, therefore, 
most strongly and significantly correlated with BI when driving was perceived as 
expensive; when (perceived) context should favour reduced car use. Variance in 
ARIPN was similar across the groups (.59, .58 and .57, respectively), suggesting that 
correlations were reliable. The largest difference in intentions between drivers with low 
and high ARIPN was observed among those who said that driving was expensive. 
The effect of journey time from home to DMU on the ARlPN-BI relationship was also 
examined using 3x2 contingency tables, as journey time was collapsed into three 
ordinal categories (0-20 minutes, 21-40 minutes and> 40 minutes) (Table 5.21). For 
those taking 0-20 minutes (n = 75), ARlPN-BI correlation was non-significant at T = 
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.130 (p = .203). For those taking 21-40 minutes (n = 153), the correlation was 
significant at T = .297 (p < .001). For those taking over 40 minutes (n = 84), the 
correlation was marginally non-significant at T = .205 (p = .054). Variance in ARiPN 
was similar across the groups (.57, .56 and .60, respectively). Of those with high 
AR/PN who took 0-20 minutes, 34.5% expressed intentions to reduce their car use. Of 
those with high ARiPN who took 21-40 minutes, 30.2% expressed this intention. Of 
those taking over 40 minutes, 21.4% expressed it. ARlPN-BI association was strongest 
and most significant for the 21-40 minutes group and the difference between the stated 
intentions of those with low and high ARiPN was also largest for this group (21.3%). 
0-20 minutes 21-40 minutes >41 minutes 
ARIPN group ARIPN group ARIPN group 
Low High Low High Low High 
Intention (BI) Maintain car use n 35 19 82 44 52 22 
% 76.1 65.5 91.1 69.8 92.9 78.6 
Reduce car use n 11 10 8 19 4 6 
% 23.9 34.5 8.9 30.2 7.1 21.4 
Total n 46 29 90 63 56 28 
Difference in % across ARIPN levels 10.6 21.3 14.3 
Table 5.21 Contingency tables showing BI by ARIPN group for drivers stating different journey 
times for commuting 
Finally, the interaction of actual journey distance and ARiPN was examined, using 4x2 
contingency tables and the T statistic (Table 5.22). Distance was collapsed into four 
categories, 0-5 miles, 5.1-10 miles, 10.1-20 miles and> 20 miles. 
0-5 miles 5.1·10 miles 10.1·20 miles >20 miles 
ARIPN group ARIPN group ARIPN group ARIPN group 
Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Intention Maintain car n 44 27 50 25 43 15 31 16 
(BI) use % 78.6 67.5 94.3 69.4 89.6 75.0 88.6 66.7 
Reduce car n 12 13 3 11 5 5 4 8 
use % 21.4 32.5 5.7 30.6 10.4 25.0 11.4 33.3 
Total n 56 40 53 36 48 20 35 24 
Difference in % across 11.1 24.9 14.6 21.9 
ARIPN levels 
Table 5.22 Contingency tables showing BI by ARIPN group for drivers commuting different 
distances 
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There was no clear pattern to results. ARlPN-BI correlation was significant for the 5.1-
10 and> 20 mile groups (n = 89, T = .324, P < .001 and n = 59, T = .297, P = .016, 
respectively), but not for the 0-5 or 10.1-20 mile groups (n = 96, T = .123, P = .160 and 
n = 68, T = .169, P = .136, respectively). Of participants with high ARlPN, those in the 0-
5 and> 20 mile groups were most likely to express intentions to reduce their car use 
(32.5% and 33.3%, respectively), while 30.6% of the 5.1-10 mile group and 25.0% of 
the 10.1-20 mile group expressed this intention. 
To summarise these interactions, the ARlPN-BI relationship was partially moderated by 
bicycle ownership, carriage of passengers when commuting, perceived cost of driving 
to DMU and journey time from home to DMU. ARIPN had a greater influence on BI for 
participants who owned a bicycle, commuted alone, perceived driving to be expensive 
and whose joumeys took a medium time (21-40 minutes) as opposed to a short (1-20 
minutes) or long (> 40 minutes) time. However, there was no discernible effect of 
actual journey distance on ARlPN-BI association. 
5.5.5 Results summary 
To aid comparison of the regression models, results are summarised in Table 5.23. For 
each model, McFadden Ff, adjusted Ff, AIC and SIC are shown, along with 
percentages of those expressing intentions to reduce and maintain their car use 
correctly classified and the overall percentage correct. 
Regression model McFadden Adjusted AlC SIC % reducers % maintalners % COlTtct 
R2 R2 correct correct overall 
NAT constructs .341 .327 .521 .526 38.9 91.1 84.5 
TPB .259 .233 .551 .559 30.2 91.1 84.3 
Constructs from NAT and .377 .366 .498 .503 42.1 91.4 85.1 
the TPB 
Constructs from NAT and .481 .441 .461 .478 59.6 96.3 91.4 
the TPB plus context 
Table 5.23 Comparison of regression models 
These figures show that the model including contextual variables was superior to the 
psychological-only models. It classified participants more accurately (overall and for 
each intention) and had a higher Ff (.481) and adjusted Ff (.441). Importantly, its SIC 
(.478) and AIC (.461) were considerably lower than any other model's. This shows that 
the high Ff was not simply due to having more predictors, as the information criteria 
141 
compensate for this. Comparison of the other regressions shows that the NAT-based 
model was superior to the TPB. 
5.6 Regression diagnostics 
Variable inter-correlations were examined before regressions (Tab/es 5.10 and 5.16) 
and two variables were excluded from analysis for hypothesis 4, as they were deemed 
too closely related (see section 5.5.4). 
Heteroscedasticity in residuals was confirmed by plotting predictors against squared 
residuals. Plots for the NAT regression are shown in Figure 5.4. Residuals cluster at 
high values of AC and intermediate values of ARiPN. All four regression models 
produced some heteroscedasticity, although it was not as pronounced in any of the 
other three as in the NAT analysis. However, the GLM regression method was chosen 
because it is robust to heteroscedasticity, producing reliable parameter estimates even 
where this phenomenon occurs. 
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Figure 5.4 AC and AR/PN plotted against squared residuals 
Examination of standardised residuals also showed that all four regressions produced 
non-normal residual distributions. To illustrate, Figure 5.5 shows a histogram of the 
distribution from the NAT regression , with accompanying statistics. This example is 
provided because, of the four models tested, the NAT regression had the standardised 
residual distribution furthest from normality. The Jarque-Bera statistic refers to a test for 
normality of distribution. Significant p values indicate non-normal distributions. Jarque-
Bera statistics for all regressions were significant (p < .05). Although the ML regression 
method assumes normally distributed residuals (Field , 2000), GLM was chosen 
specifically because of its robustness to this property, so parameter estimates were 
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reliable despite the residual distributions. (The Jarque-Bera test was used, as opposed 
to the KS test described in section 5.4.2.4, because standardised residuals were 
continuous rather than discrete; Bryman & Cramer, 2001). 
250~----------------------------__ ~ 
200 
150 
100 
50 
1.1 
- ---- --I 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 4 
Standardised Residuals 
Observations 312 
Mean -0.044 
Median -0.156 
Maximum 4.171 
Minimum -4.221 
SD 0.781 
Skewness 1.362 
Kurtosis 12.048 
Jarque-Bera 1402.761 
p < 0.001 
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Figure 5.5 Distribution of NAT standardised regression residuals 
5.7 Discussion 
5.7.1 Four regression models to predict car use intentions 
Using logistic regression, this study tested four models' ability to predict drivers' 
intentions to reduce or maintain their car use for commuting to DMU. Investigation of 
NAT was hampered by failure to derive separate AR and PN measures from survey 
items. Since items designed to tap these theoretically separate constructs (Schwartz, 
1977) loaded highly on one factor, ARIPN was treated as a single latent variable. This 
is not unheard of in NAT research. Travel behaviour studies by Hunecke et. al. (2001) 
and Matthies et. al. (2002) both used combined responsibility/obligation variables (to 
explain self-reported subway use and willingness to reduce car use, respectively). 
Matthies et. al. (2002) report no PCA or scale reliability statistics for their 'ecological 
norm' variable. Hunecke et. al. (2001) called their variable PN, although the scale 
included AR items alongside obligation items. All items loaded on the same factor and 
the scale had a = .83, suggesting that people may not easily distinguish between 
feelings of responsibility and obligation. This is not to say, however, that people never 
make this distinction. Other NAT studies empirically support AR and PN's separation 
(e.g. Stern et. al., 1999). It could also be that the close association between AR and PN 
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in the present study was due to PN being measured by a single item. With hindsight, it 
may have been better to tap this construct with multiple items. 
Treatment of ARIPN as one variable made it impossible to test hypothesis 1 exactly as 
worded. Although ARIPN had a significant influence on BI, it is unclear whether this 
was due to responsibility, obligation, or both. AC's influence was also significant, 
although less so than ARlPN's and with a lower regression coefficient. Thus, one can 
say that constructs based on NAT partially explained BI, but, strictly, this claim cannot 
be made of NAT as formulated by Schwartz (1977). 
ARlPN's treatment as a single variable complicates comparisons with other NAT travel 
studies. Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) tested Schwartz's (1977) original formulation of 
NAT, whereby PN is assumed to mediate AC and AR's effects on behaviour. In other 
words, activation of personal norms is the mechanism by which awareness of 
consequences and feelings of responsibility influence behaviour. Bamberg & Schmidt 
(2003) found evidence of this with regard to AR, but not AC. The AR-PN path was 
significant (fi = .55, P < .05), but the AC-PN path was not. Unfortunately, because AR 
and PN were combined in the present study, these separate effects could not be 
tested. 
As noted above, Hunecke et. al. (2001) combined AR and PN. This variable had a 
direct effect on self-reported travel mode choice and was itself influenced by AC. Given 
the similarity in model structure to that reported here, some comparison is possible. In 
the present research, ARIPN had a significant effect on BI, which can be seen as akin 
to Hunecke et. al. 's ARlPN-behaviour effect. However, because AC and ARIPN were 
entered into the regression simultaneously in the analysis for hypothesis 1, no results 
concerning the former's influence on the latter were obtained. These two variables 
were quite closely correlated at p = .690, p < .001, however (see Table 5.10). 
Looking at ESBs beyond travel, Guagnano et. al. (1995) found that AR's influence on 
recycling was stronger and more statistically significant than AC's, while Black at. al. 
(1985) found that AR's influence on PN was slightly stronger than AC's for reducing 
home thermostat settings and making minor energy curtailments (all self-reported 
behaviours). The present results echo these findings insofar as AR appears to have a 
stronger influence than AC in determining various ESBs. Comparison must be 
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cautious, however, since the outcome variable in the present study was BI, rather than 
behaviour or PN. Furthermore, ARlPN's effect may have been inflated compared to 
other studies using AR measures because, although feelings of responsibility and 
obligation could not be differentiated here, this variable may have captured a wider 
range of motivations. Nonetheless, with the caveat that this study was unable to test 
Schwartz's (1977) exact formulation of NAT, data accord with the hypothesis that 
drivers' car use intentions are explained by AC, AR and PN. Although the accuracy 
with which respondents were classified by the regression model was far from perfect, 
addition of NAT variables as predictors considerably improved upon the constant-only 
model and explained nearly 33% of variance in BI (based on ~). 
In accordance with hypothesis 2, the TPB also explained some variance in BI. ~ = 
.259 and ATT, PBC and SN1 were all significant predictors. As with the NAT 
constructs, the TPB's classification of reducers was less satisfactory than of 
maintainers. There was, however, a marked improvement on the constant-only model 
when TPB variables were included. 
The fact that the TPB explained intentions to reduce car use less well than the NAT 
constructs could be interpreted as showing that reducers were predominantly 
motivated by altruism. This contrasts with Bamberg & Schmidt (2003), for whom NAT 
explained only 14% of variance in self-reported car use for university travel, while the 
TPB explained 45%. Their sample comprised only students, however, who were very 
sensitive to SN. This may account for some of the difference between their findings and 
those reported here. SN exerted a stronger influence on BI than any other variable in 
Bamberg & Schmidt's study, providing much of the TPB's explanatory power, but this is 
atypical. ATT and PSC generally have stronger influences on BI than SN does 
(Armitage & Conner, 2001); a situation reflected by the present findings. 
In considering NAT's superior explanation of BI in the present study, we should note 
the precise nature of the intention. Rather than predicting which transport mode would 
be chosen from several altematives, the study investigated intentions to change 
behaviour by reducing car use in favour of other modes. This may be seen as a 
sacrifice. Steg (2003, 31) found that drivers saw car travel as 
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more attractive than public transport because of its convenience, independence, 
flexibility, comfort, speed, reliability and because driving is perceived to be more 
pleasurable. The car also offers more status than public transport. 
Such perceptions are common across travel research (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1 .1) 
and are echoed by drivers' attitudes towards their car use in this study. Mean An 
score was 4.257 (SO = .565), with 1 being very negative and 5 very positive in terms of 
convenience, flexibility, pleasantness, safety and comfort (Figure 5.6). The SO was the 
lowest of any psychological variable, suggesting that the high mean ATT score was 
due to generally positive attitudes rather than a few extremely high scores. 
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Figure 5.6 ATT scores for all drivers and drivers split by ARiPN level 
It is also notable that those with high ARIPN scores (n = 120, as in moderation 
analyses) had a mean ATT score of 4.136 (SO = .568), which is close to the mean An 
score of 4 .339 (SO = .552) for those with low ARIPN scores (n = 192). It seems that 
drivers' attitudes towards their own car use were very positive regardless of whether 
they felt responsible for traffic problems, or obliged to cut their car use. 
Although drivers were not asked to compare car use with alternatives, it seems unlikely 
that other modes could compete with such positive evaluations. Since the TPB 
assumes that people act to maximise personal utility, it is unsurprising that compared 
to the NAT constructs, the TPB performed poorly in explaining intentions that may be 
perceived as reducing utility. NAT explains behaviour with no material benefit to the 
actor. It may be reasonable to characterise reducing one's car use in this way. If so, it 
is logical that NAT constructs should be more closely associated with intentions to 
reduce car use than TPB constructs. 
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It is acknowledged, however, that operational definition of A TT may have affected the 
TPB's ability to explain variance in BI. A TT items referred to driving but not reducing 
driving, while the outcome variable referred to both possibilities. To an extent, this 
conflicts with Ajzen's (1991a) assertion that TPB items should specify the target 
behaviour. In designing items, it was assumed that positive attitudes towards driving 
would be held alongside negative attitudes to reducing car use (Steg and Gifford, 
2003). However, this denied people the chance to express the subjective expected 
utility (SEU), or disutility, of reducing their car use. ATT items such as 'Reducing my 
car use would save me time/money/effort' (Disagree strongly/Agree strongly) may have 
been useful. Although A TT was statistically Significant the TPB regression, A TT items 
tapping the SEU of reducing car use might have uncovered more salient concerns. 
This may have strengthened ATT's influence on BI, increased its significance and 
perhaps even brought it to significance alongside non-TPB predictors. 
Measurement of SN also posed some problems. SN items were entered separately in 
regressions because they did not form a reliable scale, but it was assumed that they 
could have individual effects. Steg (2005) also reports that SN items citing different 
referents failed to form a reliable scale and this may explain the finding here. Given the 
items' wording, it is perhaps unsurprising that perceptions of friends' beliefs influenced 
intentions, while perceptions concerning "people I know at DMU" were non-significant. 
Ajzen (1991a, 195) suggests that SN items should refer to "people who are important" 
to participants (see Chapter 4, section 4.5.2.4). Friends are more likely to be among 
these people than the more general "people I know". That the study did not use Ajzen's 
suggested measure is acknowledged as a possible shortcoming. It was thought useful 
to assess the influence of perceived social pressure from different groups, although 
recent research suggests that it may have been better to use multiple items tapping 
injunctive and descriptive norms relating to the same referents (e.g. Steg. 2005). 
5.7.2 Interactions between psychological variables 
Entry of NAT and TPB constructs into one regression saw ARIPN and PBC emerge as 
significant predictors of BI, begging the question of whether PBC moderated the 
ARlPN-BI relationship. Madden, Ellen and Ajzen (1992, 4) note that when people 
believe that they have 
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little control over performing a behavior because of lack of requisite resources, then 
their intentions to perform the behavior may be low even if they have favourable 
attitudes and/or subjective norms concerning performance of the behavior. 
This observation concerns interactions between TPS constructs, but the present study 
examined PSC's interaction with the NAT variable ARiPN. Was somebody who 
expressed responsibility and obligation for reducing their car use, but little control over 
it, as likely to state an intention to drive less as somebody expressing the same 
feelings of responsibility and obligation, but greater control? Contingency tables were 
used in the analysis (Sryman & Cramer, 2001), with ARiPN and PBC split around their 
medians to create 'high' and 'low' groups. Although median splits have been criticised 
for assuming that all values on one side of a split are identical (Wright, 2003), the 
technique was used because it was impossible to create contingency tables with cells 
for all values of ARiPN and PBC. 
As hypothesised, PSC partially moderated the ARlPN-BI relationship. While ARlPN-BI 
association was significant at both levels of PSC, it was stronger and more Significant 
at high than at low levels. PBC's possible role as a moderator of other psychological 
variables' (TPB or otherwise) effects on BI has received little research attention 
(Armitage, 2003). Even interactions among TPB constructs are rarely investigated 
(although see Conner & McMillan, 1999; Madden et. al., 1992), so research on PBC's 
interaction with non-TPS variables is especially novel. 
SN's non-significance in the model using both NAT and TPB constructs may be 
explained by ARiPN accounting for the perceived wishes of others (Steg, 2004). 
Indeed, Schwartz (1977,271) proposed that SN is "built into" PN and Harland et. a/. 
(1999) provide evidence of this in relation to five ESBs including travel mode choice 
(see Chapter 4, section 4.5.2.4). 
AR's relationship with SN may be similar. Perceived social pressure might engender 
feelings of personal responsibility. If so, we would expect SN's influence to be lessened 
by AR's inclusion. Unfortunately, due to treatment of AR and PN as a single variable, 
their individual effects on SN could not be quantified. 
Harland at. a/. (Ibid.) also found that addition of PN to the TPB reduced An's influence 
on BI in all five of their tests and lessened significance in two, including intentions to 
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reduce car use. Like the present study's findings, this indicates that personal-normative 
considerations can override non-moral attitudes in the ESB domain. There is clearer 
support for this in Harland et. al.'s study, where PN was not linked to AR. In the present 
study, it is impossible to say whether the effect on An's contribution to BI was due to 
PN, AR, or both. Nonetheless, it seemed that drivers saw decisions to reduce car use 
as predominantly moral, but moral beliefs' influence on BI was partially determined by 
feelings of control. When feelings of responsibility and obligation were taken into 
account alongside self-interested attitudes, the latter proved non-significant. 
AC was also non-significant when entered into a regression with TPB variables. 
Although salient when only NAT variables were considered, it seemed to be less 
important to people's car use intentions (and statistically insignificant) once PBe was 
added, as perceived control was apparently a crucial determinant of BI. 
The model comprising ARIPN and PBe classified participants more accurately than 
NAT constructs or the TPB alone. It also explained more variance in BI and achieved a 
better balance between fit and parsimony; illustrated by its Ale and SIC values. This 
accords with hypothesis 3. Apparently, as Harland et. al. (Ibid., 2523) suggest, "none of 
the TPB constructs entirely captures the influence of moral considerations on intentions 
to perform environmentally relevant behaviours". Ensuring that models include a moral 
(personal normative and personal responsibility) element may be especially important 
where behaviours might result in reduced personal utility. It is not certain that drivers in 
this study believed that reducing their car use would involve sacrifice, but it is feasible, 
given their very favourable evaluations of driving. 
5.7.3 The importance of context to intention formation 
5.7.3.1 Physical context 
Explanation of variance, accuracy of predicted intentions and fit-parsimony balance 
were further improved by including measures of actual and perceived context in the 
model. ARIPN and PBe were again the only significant psychological predictors and 
eight contextual variables were also significant at .05 level. 
Most of their effects match a priori expectations, although a quantitative study cannot 
show definitively why a variable has a particular influence. Without qualitative 
explanations, we must speculate in a manner congruent with psychological theory and 
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common sense. For example, bicycle owners may have been more likely to express 
intentions to reduce their car use than non-owners because they had access to this 
alternative transport mode. Among people expressing high levels of ARlPN, the 
ARlPN-BI correlation was very weak and non-significant for those not owning a bicycle, 
but moderate and highly significant for those owning a bicycle. This suggests that 
whether drivers owned a bicycle had an important influence on whether feelings of 
responsibility and obligation led to intentions to reduce car use. 
The more people a driver takes to DMU, the more difficult they may find reduCing their 
car use because of responsibilities to others. Again, there was a partial moderating 
effect on ARlPN-BI association, which was stronger and more significant for lone 
drivers than for those taking passengers. 
The more expensive driving is perceived to be, the more inclined drivers may be to 
seek a cheaper alternative. As with bicycle ownership and passenger carriage, 
perception of driving as expensive had an additive effect on BI with ARIPN. Such 
effects are described by Corraliza and Berenguer (2000, 832). 
When high conflict level is generated between personal dispositions and situational 
conditions, the predictive power of attitudes tends to be minimal, whereas in the 
case of consistency between them it tends to be maximal. 
We should note that despite their assertions to the contrary, Corraliza & Berenguer 
(Ibid.) only measured perceived context. Nonetheless, their proposal is interesting. It is 
supported by Hunecke et. a/.'s (2001) reported interactions between psychological and 
contextual variables in determining subway use and by the interactions found in the 
present study and described above. But the additive model contrasts with Guagnano 
et. a/.'s (1995) attitude-behaviour-context (A-B-C) model. This postulates that 
psychological variables are most strongly associated with pro-environmental BI and/or 
behaviour when the strength of contextual influences is moderate. At high or low 
strength, psychological variables should have little effect because the behaviour is 
either so easy that even people without strong pro-environmental motivation will 
perform it, or so hard that even the strongest pro-environmental motivations are 
insufficient to overcome the barriers. The A-B-C model is illustrated in Figure 5.7a and 
the additive model in Figure 5.7b. 
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Figure 5.7a A-B-C model of psychological-contextual interactions 
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Figure 5.7b Additive model of psychological-contextual interactions 
Journey time's interaction with ARIPN indicates that the A-B-C model can apply to 
influences on car use intentions. The longer drivers said commuting took, the less likely 
they were to express intentions to reduce car use. This could be because temporally-
longer journeys seem more onerous by bicycle, on foot, or by public transport. Of 
participants with high ARlPN, those with journeys taking the least time were most likely 
to intend to reduce their car use and those whose journeys took the longest were least 
likely to express this intention. Looking at ARlPN-BI correlations for the three groups, 
however, only those in the middle time bracket (21-40 minutes) showed a significant (p 
< .05) association, which was also the strongest (r = .297) of any group. Perhaps 
temporally-short journeys pose few obstacles to reducing car use, so strong 
motivations for doing so are not required to overcome contextual barriers to forming 
intentions. This highlights the fact that not all contextual influences interact with 
psychological variables in the same way; something that should be remembered when 
the effects of context on 91 and/or behaviour are investigated. 
The effect of journey distance on 91 is less easily explained. Commuting over greater 
distances was associated with higher odds of expressing intentions to reduce car use. 
It is not clear why this should be when longer journey times were associated with 
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reduced odds of expressing this intention. Contingency tables revealed no pattern to 
the interaction of distance and ARJPN. One important point is that there probably is not 
a simple linear relationship between journey time and distance. A journey through 
heavy traffic may cover a short distance in a long time, while clear roads may allow 
coverage of a greater distance more quickly. This, in itself, does not explain the results 
obtained here. It does suggest, however, that the relationship between journey 
distance and time may not be straightforward and that the nature of the journey (busy 
or clear roads, urban or rural, what the speed limit is, etc.) may influence decisions 
about whether it would be best to use a non-car mode. 
5.7.3.2 Socio-demographics 
Turning to socio-demographic variables, age was inversely related to intentions to 
reduce car use. Older participants may have been less willing to change modes due to 
the extra physical effort of walking, cycling or taking public transport. Such extra effort, 
if undesired, would mean reduced personal utility. Unfortunately, as the An scale did 
not tap the SEU of reducing car use, it is impossible to say whether older and younger 
respondents differed in perceptions of the utility or disutility of the target behaviour. It 
may also be that older drivers have more entrenched travel habits, making them less 
likely to consider changing modes than younger drivers. This issue deserves attention, 
since habit has been shown to influence travel behaviour (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.3 
and Chapter 6, section 6.5.1.8). 
Higher income was also associated with lower odds of expressing intentions to reduce 
car use. Perhaps higher earners do not consider any financial savings arising from 
modal switch to be important. Alternatively, they may value the status conferred by 
driving. Or, as Kuppam & Pendyala (2001) found, higher earners may combine more 
non-work activities with commuting, making car use especially attractive. 
Part-time members of DMU were more likely than full-timers to express intentions to 
reduce their car use. This may be because part-timers have more varied routines and 
less entrenched travel habits, because not travelling daily during peak periods allows 
greater flexibility over modal choice, or because they are generally lower earners. 
Again, while these explanations seem plausible, they cannot be definitively accepted or 
rejected on the basis of a quantitative analysis. 
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5.7.4 Summary of main discussion points 
What the analysis does show is that the model comprising psychological and 
contextual variables explained more variance in BI, correctly classified more 
participants and struck a better balance between fit and parsimony than any of the 
models comprising only psychological constructs. While moral concerns influenced BI, 
PBC - and contextual factors independent of PBC - partially determined whether 
drivers' stated intentions reflected these concerns. Data support the hypothesis that 
addition of contextual variables to psychological variables increases explained variance 
in car use intentions. The generalisability of this finding to other ESBs is limited, as 
different behaviours are likely to be facilitated or constrained by quite different 
contextual influences. But the present results do accord with other studies showing that 
contextual as well as psychological factors determine ESB and ESB intentions (e.g. 
Black et. a/., 1985; Hunecke et. a/., 2001). 
5.8 Limitations 
Use of BI as an outcome variable is common in ESB research, but use of behaviour is 
preferable. Although BI is a proven predictor of behaviour, intervening factors can 
break this relationship and the present study did not examine these. In a study of car 
use, however, people may be aware of many relevant contextual factors before forming 
intentions. For example, drivers seem unlikely to form definite intentions to switch to 
public transport without first establishing that appropriate services exist. Insofar as 
perceptions of context are accurate they should be captured by PBC, but the extent of 
partiCipants' knowledge of issues such as public transport availability is uncertain. 
Use of BI as an outcome variable in NAT research is particularly open to criticism, as 
Schwartz's (1977) model does not include this construct. In the absence of a behaviour 
measure, however, this approach was necessary to enable comparison of NAT and 
TPB models as explanations of the same outcome. While not theoretically ideal, NAT 
constructs explained more variance in BI than the TPB, empirically justifying the 
approach. 
A further limitation was that the study tested a model based on NAT, rather than 
Schwartz's (Ibid.) exact formulation. Due to the failure to distinguish AR from PN, they 
were treated together. Although this is not a unique approach, it does contrast with 
research treating AR and PN as distinct; the former often influencing the latter (e.g. 
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Stern et. a/., 1999). In the present study, however, data dictated that a combined 
variable should be used. As this reflected respondents' apparent inability to 
differentiate between the constructs, this can be considered a useful finding in itself. 
Some shortcomings of the A TT and SN items have been identified. Possible effects on 
ATT's contribution to explanation of intentions were discussed in section 5.7.1. Finally, 
as suggested in section 5.2.1, it may have been useful to examine affective aspects of 
car use, alongside the (largely) instrumental evaluations captured by the ATT scale. 
5.9 Conclusions 
This study indicates that drivers who stated intentions (BI) to reduce their car use for 
travel to DMU were motivated more by moral concerns than self-interest. Personal 
responsibility and obligation (ARlPN) exerted a significant influence on BI when 
entered into a regression with TPB variables, while self-interested beliefs (A TT) did not. 
Non-moral concerns did influence intentions, however, as evidenced by the effect of 
PBC alongside ARIPN. Even when someone feels moral motivation for reducing their 
car use, its effect may be constrained by a perceived lack of control. 
It is logical that NAT constructs should be more salient than TPB constructs in 
influencing intentions to reduce car use. For many drivers, switching modes may 
decrease convenience, comfort and flexibility, requiring increased effort. The view of 
car use as a social dilemma illustrates this (see Chapter 3, section 3.5). Individuals 
often make few short-term gains from changing a behaviour with numerous personal 
advantages. In this socio-cultural context, heavily weighted in favour of driving, 
decisions to use alternative modes are likely to rest on something other than personal 
utility; a willingness to make personal sacrifices for a wider goal. It is, therefore, 
unsurprising that the altruism-based NAT constructs captured motivations for redUCing 
car use more effectively than an SEU theory like the TPB. 
Car use intentions were also influenced by perceived and actual physical context and 
by socio-demographics. Inclusion of these variables alongside ARIPN and PBC 
improved the accuracy with which drivers were classified, raised level of explained 
variance in BI and improved the model specification. As such, it is concluded that 
psychological factors alone were insufficient (insofar as any combination of variables 
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can be considered sufficient) to predict drivers' car use intentions and that contextual 
variables should be included in models with this aim. 
There are at least two possible reasons for the fact that even a model comprising 
psychological, physical-contextual and socio-demographic variables was unable to 
explain over half the variance in BI. Both may apply. Firstly, some unexplained 
variance is probably random and cannot be explained deterministically. Secondly, 
factors not measured in this study may be important in motivating reduced car use. 
These might include role beliefs (e.g. Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003), habit (e.g. Ibid.; 
Matthies et. al., 2002) affect (e.g. Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003) and social-symbolic 
motives (e.g. Steg, 2005). Indeed, Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) compared Triandis' 
(1977) theory of interpersonal behaviour (TIB) with NAT and the TPB in terms of ability 
to explain travel mode choice. The TIB contains role beliefs, habit and affect, alongside 
PN, behavioural beliefs (of the sort underlying An), control beliefs (of the sort 
underlying PBC) and normative beliefs (of the sort underlying SN). In Bamberg and 
Schmidt's (2003) study, this model explained 68% of variance in BI and 51 % of 
variance in self-reported modal choice; more than either NAT or the TPB. Given the 
TIB's ability to explain modal choice from several options, it would be useful to see 
whether it could also explain drivers' decisions to switch modes. In light of the present 
results, it seems possible that the TIB, with the addition of AR and contextual variables 
such as bicycle ownership, could be successful in this regard. 
The present findings could be useful in developing DMU travel policy. Since ARIPN 
and PBC were the most influential psychological variables, interventions aimed at 
reducing car use for university travel could target these motivations. Encouraging 
acceptance of responsibility for travel-related problems and feelings of obligation for 
addressing them could help to raise levels of AR and PN, but there is a danger of 
causing reactance, leading drivers to deliberately avoid switching modes (see Chapter 
3, section 3.4). It may be easier to influence PBC by highlighting available opportunities 
for reducing car use and/or demonstrating how others have done so. Similarly, 
measures to increase ownership of (or access to) bicycles may be effective and DMU 
has already introduced car park charges, raising the cost of car travel. 
This study also suggests ways of targeting interventions. Those most likely to express 
intentions to reduce their car use were generally young, part-time and lower earners. 
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Such people may be more easily persuaded to switch modes than other members of 
DMU. It may also be fruitful to target bicycle owners and lone drivers, as these 
variables partially moderated moral motives' influence on 81. DMU initiatives to reduce 
car use may be best directed at these groups in the first instance. Interventions aimed 
at those who may prove harder to persuade should only be pursued once the 'easy 
pickings' have been harvested. 
This study highlights several avenues that could be explored by qualitative work, 
enabling explanations in participants' own terms. For example, it would be interesting 
to explore how people manage any dissonance caused by holding very positive 
attitudes to driving at the same time as anti-driving moral beliefs, or why people 
generally seem to express low control over how they commute. In the words of Fodor 
and Pylyshyn (1981, 154), "the goal of psychological theory construction is not to 
predict most (or even all) of the variance; it is to explicate the underlying mechanisms 
upon whose operation the variance depends". Identifying statistically significant 
influences is the first step. Asking why they are significant - what they mean to people 
and how they are presented in people's own accounts of their behaviour - enables 
deeper understanding. This was the broad aim of study 2, reported in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 
Study 2: a qualitative study of travel mode 
choice for commuting 
6.1 Abstract 
Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with 24 commuters to DMU (13 female, 11 
male). Study 1, which involved these participants, applied Schwartz's (1977) norm-
activation theory (NAT) and Ajzen's (1991; 1991a) theory of planned behaviour (TPB) 
to explain intentions to reduce or maintain car use for commuting. Study 2 interviews 
were analysed to see whether people used vocabularies and discourses (see Chapter 
2, section 2.3) reflecting these theories when explaining their commuting behaviour and 
to identify any other shared stances on travel to work. Several discourses echoing NAT 
and TPB constructs were identified; driving as necessary (echoing perceived 
behavioural control from the TPB), the car as practical and the car as impractical (both 
echoing attitude towards the behaviour from the TPB), driving as morally problematic 
(echoing NAT's ascription of responsibility and personal norm constructs), anti- and 
pro-driving social norms (echoing subjective norms from the TPB) and car use 
consequences (echoing NAT's awareness of consequences construct). Discourses 
referring to affective motives and driving through habit and laziness were also evident. 
The most striking findings concern the importance placed on perceived behavioural 
control and the extent to which people characterised driving as necessary because of 
their context. Some said that they had only been able to act on motives for using non-
car modes (e.g. personal norms and affect) after contextual changes that had widened 
their perceived choice of commuting modes. Prochaska's (Prochaska & Norcross, 
2001) transtheoretical model was applied as a means of illuminating the process of 
switching modes. Although some doubts are raised about its applicability in this 
behavioural domain, people expressing both moral and self-interested motives for 
avoiding driving were more likely to report having moved towards behaviour change 
than those expressing only one of these types of motive. 
6.2 Approach and aims 
Study 1 examined influences on commuting intentions across a large sample, but did 
not focus on individuals. Moreover, people chose from set response options, many 
relating to Schwartz's (1977) norm-activation theory (NAT) and Ajzen's (1991; 1991a) 
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theory of planned behaviour (TPB). In study 2, however, participants answered open-
ended interview questions and could raise their own concerns. This echoes Glaser and 
Strauss' (1967) grounded theory methodology, whereby researchers develop theories 
to explain "action from the perspective of the human agent" (Haig, 1995, 1). 
The grounded theory literature differs on whether analysis can and should be free of 
assumptions from beyond the data. Glaser & Strauss (1967) asserted that researchers 
should not bring 8 priori ideas to analyses, while others argue that everyone has an 
"orienting theory" (Kinach, 1995, 2). This latter view appears dominant among 
contemporary grounded theorists (Layder, 1993), with Strauss himself recently 
adopting a softer position (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In the present study, which built 
directly on study 1, some 8 priori ideas were inevitable. Although analysis was open to 
any explanations of commuting behaviour, it was decided in advance that questions 
relating to NAT and the TPB would be asked (see section 6.4.2) in order to assess the 
extent to which people's talk echoed these theories. 
Robson (2002) notes that an approach like this - using multiple methods to address 
one issue - can combat 'inappropriate certainty'; the idea that a clear-cut result 
obtained by one method is 'right'. However, where conflicting results are found, one 
must try to explain the inconsistency and decide which, if any, findings are valid. 
Nonetheless, opening up the possibility of such conflicts seems preferable to relying on 
a single method when more can be used. We cannot "avoid the confounding effects of 
methods on our measurements ... Using a logic equivalent to that of classical test 
theory, the error due to methods is regarded as tending to average out when multiple 
methods are used" (Ibid., 371). To some extent, this logic drove the mixed-method 
approach of this thesis, although the studies reported in Chapter 5 and here were 
suffiCiently different (e.g. in sample size and hypotheses/research questions) that this 
was not 'triangulation' in the strict sense of ·checking the results" (Ibid., 373) of one 
method by using another. Rather, studies 1 and 2 were complementary. Interpretation 
of quantitative results was enhanced by analysis of qualitative data. 
Study 2 aimed to identify positions on car use and other modes for commuting. There 
was a focus on shared vocabularies and discourses - those used by more than one 
person - for two reasons. Firstly, it was thought most useful to identify common 
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stances. Seeing whether multiple participants raised the same issues was a means of 
establishing how prevalent different positions were among the sample. Secondly - and 
more pragmatically - a strict focus was necessary due to time constraints. 
Concentrating on ideas invoked in multiple accounts ensured a manageable analysis 
within the time available. 
6.3 Research question 
Study 2 addressed a single, broad question: what shared discourses do participants 
use to explain their commuting behaviour? However, as well as information relating to 
this question, the study provided other data, especially regarding behaviour change. 
Neither NAT nor the TPB was developed to explain such change, so Prochaska'S 
(Prochaska & Norcross, 2001) transtheoretical model (TIM) was applied as a possible 
means of understanding the process of switching travel modes (see also Huguenin, 
2005). Thus, as well as answering the above question, the study included some 
additional analysis. 
6.4 Method 
6.4.1 Participants 
The study 1 questionnaire asked whether people would "like to participate in further 
research". Of 312 drivers included in study 1 regressions, 79 answered "yes". Study 2 
participants were drawn from this pool. 
To try to ensure various motives for commuting mode choices among study 2 
participants, study 1 standardised residuals were used. A residual is the difference 
between the observed dependent variable value and that predicted by a regression 
model, indicating how much information in a case's data is unexplained. The closer the 
value is to 0, the better the model's fit. Using standardised residuals from the NAT and 
TPB regressions (study 1 hypotheses 1 and 2), the aim was to identify four groups; 
individuals for whom only NAT was a 'good fit', for whom only the TPB was a 'good fit', 
for whom both were a 'good fit' and for whom neither was a 'good fit'. 
Participants who had expressed intentions to reduce car use ('reducers') were selected 
separately from those who had expressed intentions to maintain car use 
('maintainers'). The procedure was as follows. 
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1. Drivers included in study 1 analyses who agreed to participate in further 
research and expressed intentions to reduce car use were identified (n = 21). 
2. The median of their NAT regression standardised residuals was calculated. 
3. The median of their TPB regression standardised residuals was calculated. 
4. Anyone whose NAT standardised residual was below the median and whose 
TPB residual was above the median was classed as 'NAT only good fit'. 
5. Anyone whose TPB standardised residual was below the median and whose 
NAT residual was above the median was classed as 'TPB only good fit'. 
6. Anyone whose standardised residuals from both regressions were below the 
medians was classed as 'both models good fit'. 
7. Anyone whose standardised residuals from both regressions were above the 
medians was classed as 'neither model good fit'. 
This gave groups with the following membership. 
• 'NAT only good fit' n = 4 
• 'TPB only good fit' n = 3 
• 'both good fit' n = 9 
• 'neither good fit' n = 5 
The term 'good fit' is relative. The small pool of potential participants meant that people 
could be assigned to a 'good fit' group when their standardised residual was only just 
below the median. Nonetheless, these people had data for which the relevant model 
was a better fit than those excluded from the group. 
The procedure was repeated for maintainers, with the initial pool comprising 58 people. 
The groups had the following membership. 
• 'NAT only good fit' n = 10 
• 'TPB only good fit' n = 13 
• 'both good fit' n = 21 
• 'neither good fit' n = 14 
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The smallest group was reducers with 'TPB only good fit' (n = 3). It was decided that 
data should be gathered from three members of each group, to achieve the largest 
possible equal group size. The target number of participants was, therefore, 24. 
The standardised residuals of members of each group were examined and the three for 
whom the group name was most appropriate were chosen. For example, of the 13 
'TPB only good fit' maintainers, the three with the smallest TPB standardised residuals 
were chosen. In the 'both good fit' groups, each person's standardised residuals from 
the two regressions were summed and the three with the smallest combined values 
were chosen. In the 'neither good fit' groups, each person's standardised residuals 
were summed and the three with the largest combined values were chosen. 
Twenty-three of the 24 selected people agreed to participate. One, a 'both good fit' 
maintainer, was non-contactable. The member of this group with the next-lowest 
combined standardised residual value participated instead. Participants' details are 
summarised in Table 6.1. Names are pseudonyms, protecting privacy whilst conveying 
that participants are real people (Manzo, 2004). 
Intention Grou~ Name Gender Age Job~1!! Full· or ~art·tlme Income band 
Reduce 'NAT Les m 60+ academic ft £40,000 or over 
car use good fit' A1un m 20-29 postgraduate ft £10,000-£19,999 
Patricia f 20-29 postgraduate ft under £10,000 
'TPB Frances f 30-39 academic ft £20,000-£29,999 
good fit' Emie m 40-49 non-admin support ft £20,000-£29,999 
Rick m 4Q..49 admin su~~rt ft £20,000-£29,999 
'Both Owen m 60+ academic pt £20,000-£29,999 
good fit' Sue f 30-39 admin support pt under £10,000 
Denise f 40-49 academic ft £20,000-£291999 
'Neither Monica f 30-39 admin support ft £20,000-£29,999 
good fit' Wendy f 30-39 academic pt £10,000-£19,999 
Nigel m 20-29 admin su~~rt ft £10,000-£19,999 
Maintain 'NAT Vic m 30-39 academic ft £20,000-£29,999 
car use good fit' Beryl f 40-49 admin support ft £10,000-£19,999 
Ha~ m 50-59 admin su~~rt ft £301000-£391999 
'TPB Zoe f 4Q..49 postgraduate ft under £10,000 
good fit' Georgina f SO-59 non-admin support pt £10,000-£19,999 
Jacky f 30-39 admin su~port ft £10,000-£19,999 
'Both Ursula f 40-49 academic ft £30,000-£39,999 
good fit' Ian m 50-59 academic ft £30,000-£39,999 
Kath f 50-59 academic ft £40,000 or over 
'Neither Tina f 60+ non-admin support pt under £10,000 
good fit' Bryan m 50-59 academic ft £30,000-£39,999 
Carl m 30-39 admin su~port ft £101000-£191999 
Table 6.1 Study 2 participants 
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Table 6.2 compares study 1 and study 2 participants' socio-ciemographic 
characteristics. The latter were reasonably representative of the former, although 
generally slightly older and higher-earning. This may be because study 2 contained a 
higher proportion of academic staff. It also had a more equal gender balance. 
Characteristic Study 1 (%). Study 2 (%)b 
Gender female 63.8 54.2 
male 31.5 45.8 
Age band under 20 1.1 0.0 
20-29 12.6 12.5 
30-39 29.3 29.2 
40-49 25.8 25.0 
50-59 5.0 20.8 
60+ 4.1 12.5 
Job type undergraduate 8.0 0.0 
postgraduate 1.5 12.5 
non-admin support 18.0 12.5 
admin support 38.4 33.3 
academic 30.8 41.7 
Full- or part-time full-time 75.0 79.2 
part-time 20.4 20.8 
Income band under £10,000 17.4 16.7 
£10,000-£19,999 30.6 29.2 
£20,000-£29,999 18.2 29.2 
£30,000-£39,999 16.7 16.7 
£40,000 or over 8.2 8.3 
8 percentages do not always total 100 due to missing data 
b percentages do not always total 100 due to rounding 
Table 6.2 Socio-demographic comparison of study 1 and study 2 participants 
One reason for using interviews in study 2 was to understand and convey people's 
individuality. This is difficult without repeating socio-demographic details with every 
quotation. Although excerpts are attributed to the appropriate participant, readers are 
encouraged to refer to Table 6.1 for a reminder of who provided data. 
6.4.2 Data collection 
Twenty-four semi-structured interviews were conducted in various locations during April 
2004 (Table 6.3). It has been argued that varying locations introduces inconsistency 
because "in one location a participant may assert one identity ... and in another answer 
questions from a different perspective" (Elwood and Martin, 2000, 652). However, each 
participant chose their interview location to ensure comfort and convenience for them. 
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Location 
Meeting room in researcher's department at DMU 
Meeting room in participant's department at DMU 
Participant's office at DMU 
Participant's home 
Cafe on campus 
Table 6.3 Interview locations 
n Interviews 
11 
7 
4 
1 
1 
All interviews were conducted by the author, to minimise researcher effects that may 
bias data (Breakwell, 2000). The interview schedule is provided in Appendix 2 and was 
developed through five pilots with people who agreed to participate in further research 
during study 1 but were not selected for study 2. They were informed of the pilots' 
purpose when contacted and were told that data would not be analysed. 
Interview questions were open-ended and allowed participants to discuss commuting in 
their terms. Questions tapping motives for commuting behaviour were drawn from 
various sources, including NAT and the TPB. NAT constructs were operationally 
defined as awareness of commuting behaviour's consequences (AC), acceptance of 
responsibility for these (AR) and obligation for avoiding or minimising car use and/or 
guilt over driving (PN). TPB constructs were operationally defined as attitudes towards 
using various modes for commuting (A TT), perceived control over commuting mode 
choice (PBC) and subjective norms surrounding commuting mode choice (SN). 
Study 1 suggested that commuting intentions were influenced by various contextual 
factors; bicycle ownership, perceived cost of driving, journey time, journey distance and 
carriage of passengers when commuting. Questions tapping each of these issues were 
included in the interviews. 
Questions were also based on findings from other travel research (see Chapter 3). 
These covered privacy and independence (e.g. Hagman, 2003), affect and self-image 
(e.g. Steg, 2005), status (e.g. Hjorthol, 2001), habit and role beliefs (e.g. Bamberg & 
Schmidt, 2003), financial and time costs (e.g. BergstrOm & Magnusson, 2003), 
combining commuting with other trips, needing to travel during the working day (e.g. 
Gatersleben, 2003) and the social dilemma of driving (e.g. Fujii et. a/., 2001). 
These issues were tapped by twelve questions. Some asked directly about an issue 
(e.g. SN was tapped by asking "Can you tell me about any ways in which other people 
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influence how you travel?"), while broader questions were posed to capture various 
motives without being leading (e.g. "Do your feel that your decisions about how to 
travel say anything about you as a person?"). Before posing the questions, the 
researcher asked each participant for permission to record their interview. Once 
granted (it was in all cases), the tape was started. 
After answering the questions, participants undertook a simplified multiple sorting 
procedure (Canter, Brown and Groat, 1985). The full procedure was piloted, but 
interviewees had difficulty understanding it and generally seemed unable to group 
influences on their commuting mode choice. Therefore, the task was changed so that 
participants ranked influences in order of importance. They were given post-it notes 
and asked to write one influence on how they commuted per note, using as many as 
necessary. They were also asked to say when they had finished. At this point, if a 
participant had omitted any previously discussed influence, the researcher asked 
whether this should be included. Decisions about whether to include suggestions were 
left to the participant. Once the participant stated that all influences had been listed, 
s/he was asked to arrange them in descending order of importance. The researcher 
checked that the task was finished and collected the notes in order. 
At the end of each interview, participants were asked if they would like to add anything, 
thanked and asked if they would like to see the finished research report. Finally, they 
were asked to complete a post-interview questionnaire (Clarke and Robertson, 2001) 
and given a pre-paid envelope in which to return it. The questionnaire (Appendix 3) 
was designed to check for sources of bias. The tape was then stopped and the 
interview closed. 
6.4.3 Transcription 
Interviews were transcribed using a simplified Jefferson system (Psathas, 1995). In the 
examples below, 'R' indicates researcher and 'I' indicates interviewee. 
1. Overlapping speech turns: enclosed in [ ] 
R: Would you think about coming by another means [or would you still-) 
I: [I'd probably come) by bus. 
2. Contiguous utterances (i.e. no interval): indicated by = 
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I: 1 have to, you know, get my kids to childcare and pick them up before five o'clock, so I am 
dictated to by time.= 
R: =Sure. 
3. Cut off speech turns (Le. one speaker interrupted by another): indicated by -
R: In a sense, is it your kids that are dictating-
I: Yeah, I suppose 
4. Emphasis: indicated by italics 
I: So, er, «laughs» the A6 is an absolute nightmare 
5. Pauses: indicated by ((pause» 
I: Um, «pause» right, um, 
On average, interviews lasted 54 minutes. Wendy's interview did not record due to 
equipment failure, but still yielded useful data as field notes and ranking task post-it 
notes were used to reconstruct her account. 
6.4.4 Template analysis 
Data were analysed using King's (1998) template analysis method. This is compatible 
with any epistemological position, allows for a priori themes and provides an 'audit trail' 
of successive template iterations. Analysis involved nine steps. 
1. Transcription and case summaries. Interviews were transcribed and a one-page 
summary of each participant's account was written. 
2. Define a priori themes. These included NAT and TPB constructs and the other 
potential influences on commuting mode listed in section 6.4.2 (Table 6.4). 
3. Initial coding. Using eight transcripts (one reducer and one maintainer from each 
'good fit' group) themes were identified in the data and text was labelled with the 
relevant codes. For example, where som~body expressed guilt over driving, text was 
coded as referring to the guilt component of PN (GUilt(PN». Where an influence on 
commuting behaviour was not captured by an 8 priori theme, a new theme was 
devised. For example, when somebody spoke of their car's reliability, a new second-
order theme was added under the top-level A TT theme (Reliability(ATI». 
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Theme type 
NAT 
TPB 
Other 
psychological 
Contextual 
Top-level theme 
Anti-driving personal norm (PN) 
Personal responsibility for commuting consequences (AR) 
Awareness of consequences of own commuting (AC) 
Awareness of consequences of travel generally (AC) 
Attitude towards use of different modes for commuting (A TT) 
Perceived control over commuting mode choice (PBC) 
Subjective norm (SN) 
Affect 
Habit 
Self-image 
Status 
Bicycle ownership 
Carriage of passengers on commute 
Cost 
Journey distance 
Journey time 
Table 6.4 A priori themes 
Second-order theme 
Moral obligation not to drive 
Guilt over driving 
Comfort 
Convenience 
Flexibility 
Safety 
Speed 
Ease/difficulty 
Volitional control 
Descriptive 
Injunctive 
Cost of driving 
Cost of non-car modes 
4. Develop initial template. Themes identified in step 3 were grouped hierarchically. For 
example, participants' attitudes towards different modes for commuting included 
evaluations of reliability and speed. Each of these was a second-order theme under the 
top-level ATT theme. Themes were tabulated in the initial template (Appendix 4). 
5. Inter-coder reliability. One transcript coded for step 3 (Denise) was re-coded using 
the initial template. It was also coded by another researcher, to whom the initial 
template was provided and explained. The following formula was used to establish the 
level of agreement between researchers (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
% reliability = agreements I (agreements + disagreements) x 100 
Initially there was 69% agreement, rising to 98% after discussion. The major cause of 
disagreement was that the author only coded data referring to influences on 
commuting. The second researcher, however, coded any mention of a theme. It was 
agreed that when coding a second transcript, both researchers would only code clear 
references to commuting. 
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There was initial agreement on 88% of codes in the second transcript (Harry), rising to 
100% after discussion. The only repeated disagreement concerned the Flexibility(ATI) 
and Freedom codes (see Appendix 4). On three occasions the author applied the 
former code where the second researcher applied the latter, because the second 
researcher did not appreciate the difference in specificity. Flexibility(ATI) referred to 
ability to make a specific journey at a specific time, while Freedom was defined as 
general ability to travel at will. 
Miles & Huberman (Ibid., 64) suggest that "intercoder agreement should be in the 90% 
range". It was therefore decided that agreement was acceptable. The themes seemed 
to be adequately defined and the author's decisions about where to apply codes 
appeared to be justifiable (Robson, 2002). 
6. Develop template. The initial template was applied to all transcripts. Where data 
relevant to the research question did not fit the template, a code was added or modified 
to capture those data. This required re-coding of previously coded transcripts to reflect 
changes to the template. Each transcript was coded four times before no further 
changes were required. Appendix 5 shows the final template. 
7. Interpretation. This involved various operations. 
• A cognitive map (Miles & Huberman, 1994) was produced for each participant, 
showing commuting mode(s), themes raised in the interview and how they 
seemed to be related. 
• Decision trees (Ibid.) were produced for all partiCipants who commuted by 
different modes on different days. These illustrated the decision processes used 
to chose a mode. 
• Prochaska's (Prochaska & Norcross, 2001) TIM was applied to each transcript. 
The TIM pOSits five stages of behaviour change. Each participant was 
categorised as being at one stage (see section 6.5.3). Themes used by each 
participant to explain their modal choice were listed alongside their TIM stage, 
showing whether people at the same stage raised similar issues. 
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8. Validation. Abstracted representations (e.g. cognitive maps) were compared to raw 
data to assess whether they reflected participants' accounts. Alterations were made 
where claims could not be justified by the data. 
9. Member-checking. Although King (1998) specifies only eight steps, a ninth was 
added as an extra validity check. Miles & Huberman (1994, 275) comment that "one of 
the most logical sources of corroboration is the people you have talked with". This is 
the 'member-checking' recommended by Guba (1981) and Robson (2002), which can 
guard "against researcher bias" (Ibid., 175). 
Robson (Ibid.) suggests contacting a sub-sample of participants as this should indicate 
any wider problems with the analysis. Accordingly, four randomly-selected participants 
were provided with their own one-page case summaries and cognitive maps (by email). 
These were non-technical, using terms such as 'feels obliged' rather than 'personal 
norm' (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Participants were asked to comment (by email) on 
the accuracy of the researcher's account of their commuting behaviour. There were no 
major criticisms, although two participants said that the researcher had mistakenly 
identified one influence on their commuting mode choice. The relevant themes had 
been mentioned at interview, but during member-checking the participants claimed not 
to have cited them as influences on commuting specifically. For example, one had said 
that he often drove because he owned a car and paying for trains seemed wasteful. 
However, during member-checking he argued that he had meant this with reference to 
leisure trips and that he had different reasons for commuting by car. Reviewing the 
transcript, the researcher found that the link to commuting was questionable. This 
prompted re-coding of all 24 transcripts with stricter application of decision rules (see 
section 6.4.5) and subsequent revision of cognitive maps, decision trees and so on. 
The rationale for member-checking can be questioned. Efforts to eliminate bias in steps 
1 to 8 could be undone by changing interpretations at participants' request. But "a 
supine giving in to any criticism is not called for" (Robson, 2002, 175). If decision rules 
are adhered to, the process is a useful validity check. Indeed, all transcripts had 
already been re-coded four times before member-checking (step 6), so it was seen as 
simply another stage in refining the analysis through close attention to data. 
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6.4.5 Decision rules 
Decision rules govern coding, helping to ensure that codes are applied to all instances 
of a theme, but only those instances (internal reliability) and that applications are 
justified (validity). Three rules were developed to guide identification of reasons given 
by participants for using particular commuting modes. 
1. A code should be applied when data refer specifically to commuting. For 
example, Beryl mentioned the convenience of driving to DMU. She referred 
specifically to commuting, so the Convenience(ATT) code was applied. 
I: I cut through the back way ... that's very convenient. It cuts out a lot of the queuing. 
2. Even if a participant does not use the word by which a theme is identified in the 
template. the code should be applied if the theme captures the comment. 
Ursula provides an example. 
I: If my car was off the road, I don't know what I'd do now. 
She stated that she had to drive to DMU. She did not use terms like 'perceived 
behavioural control', but this theme was relevant. The Volitional control(PBc) 
code was applied. 
3. A code should be applied when a participant is not referring specifically to 
commuting if comments also apply to commuting. Again, Ursula provides an 
example. 
R: What are the opportunities not to drive? 
I: None. 
R: Really? Because of where you are? 
I: Yeah. I have to drive. If I want to go anywhere, I have to drive. 
Although there was no speCific reference to commuting, the Volitional 
control(pBC) code was applied. Firstly, this exchange followed Ursula's assertion 
that she had no choice over how she commuted. Secondly, "anywhere" 
logically includes DMU. 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Shared discourses used to explain commuting behaviour 
As Fairclough (2003, 14f) notes, textual analysis is 
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inevitably selective ... we choose to ask certain questions about social events and 
texts, and not other possible questions ... the questions we ask necessarily arise 
from particular motivations which go beyond what is 'there' in the data. 
In this study it would have been possible, for example, to focus on how people develop 
positions through talk, rather than reporting already-held views (Antaki, 1988). Although 
this issue is addressed, its explication was not the study's main aim. Rather, this was to 
explore how people explained their behaviour and to assess how far qualitative data 
would complement study 1's quantitative results. 
The first stage of this process involved examining people's stated reasons for 
commuting (or not commuting) by p~rticular modes and identifying shared positions, or 
discourses. Results of this exercise are reported thematically in section 6.5.1, with sub-
sections detailing different discourses. Vocabularies and discourses evident in 
participants' accounts are summarised in Table 6.6. 
Section 6.5.2 takes a more person-oriented perspective. Rather than treating 
discourses as units of analysis, it treats participants as such, examining how people 
constructed pOSitions on commuting by invoking multiple discourses. In a sense, this is 
comparable to examining interactions between variables in a quantitative analysis. 
6.5.1.1 The car as practical: 'To have my own wheels makes perfect sense' 
Colman (2001) defines attitudes as cognitive and/or affective responses to phenomena 
and Ajzen's (1991a, 200) TPB draws no distinction "between affective and evaluative 
responses to a behavior". Recent travel research, however, differentiates between 
affective and instrumental evaluations (see Chapter 3). Congruently, this study 
revealed separate vocabularies and discourses relating to these issues. 
Every participant expressed some instrumental evaluations of travel modes, referring to 
(dis)benefits such as (in)convenience, (in)flexibility, (un)reliability and speed. Such 
evaluations are based on objects' functional properties and have been called 'cold', in 
contrast to 'hot' (or affective) evaluations of how objects make people feel rather than 
how they serve practical ends (Pham, 1996; 1998). 
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Echoing the positive instrumental evaluations of driving evident in many travel studies 
(see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1.1), several participants represented the car as the most 
practical means of commuting; the best tool - in functional terms - for the job. 
Les (full-time academic in his 50s) provides an example. He said that his main 
concerns were convenience and flexibility and that his car got him from door to door 
quickly and allowed him to come and go from DMU as he pleased. He described his 
approach to commuting as "a very practical, efficiency-oriented way of doing things." 
Like Les, several others reported that driving minimised journey time. When asked why 
she had driven to DMU on the day of her interview, Monica (full-time administrator in 
her 30s) said that she lived 25 miles from Leicester and then continued as follows. 
I: Um, obviously that makes taking the car a lot, er, more easy decision. Catching the train, I've 
actually got to drive to Northampton or Market Harborough and each of those is still half an hour 
journey. Well my full journey to work is only forty-five minutes on a good day. 
R: Oh right. 
I: So obviously the car is the most sensible option for me.= 
R: =OK. 
I: I also, I have to drive from the University ... I often have to go and visit companies. 
R:Ah. 
I: And they're not necessarily, urn, ((pause» based in Leicester. So again, you know, without 
sort of going through the hassle of trying to hire a car, once I'm here to then go out and see 
[these] companies or whatever. To have my own wheels makes perfect sense. 
Monica also discussed the possibility of commuting by bus, saying that "we're out of 
town, so it is difficult to rely on public transport ... I think there's like three a day." 
These excerpts illustrate several explanations for Monica's car use. As well as saving 
time, driving her own car avoided the "hassle" (or inconvenience) of organising hire 
cars for trips during working hours. These benefits, plus the impracticality of commuting 
by bus, "obviously" made driving the most "sensible" (Le. 'rational') commuting mode. 
Georgina (part-time administrator in her 50s) also mentioned journey time repeatedly 
and identified it as her most important reason for commuting by car in the ranking task, 
where she associated a temporally-short journey with convenience. 
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R: Is it possible to put them in order of importance? 
I: Yes. ((pause» Time first. ((pause» And convenience, as that's almost linked with time. 
She also noted the car's flexibility and reliability. 
I: I like the independence that the car gives you. Being able to go exactly where you want to go 
on most occasions. And when you want to go. 
R: Yeah. 
I: Um, ((pause» without being delayed. To be sure you'll be on time. 
Moreover, Georgina, like Monica, was negative about bus travel. 
I: Um, ((pause» it used to take me about an hour to get home as well, when I came by bus, 'cos 
you've got to walk to the centre of Leicester, then wait for a bus. And that used to be, again, 
affected by the schools. They got put out of their sequence and didn't arrive when they should. 
Through these evaluations she built a case for commuting by car based largely on its 
instrumental benefits and the disbenefits of buses. She actually claimed to enjoy bus 
travel because she could "relax totally", but suggested that this affective advantage 
was less important than speed, convenience, reliability and flexibility. Hence she drove. 
Furthermore, although she stated that her health would benefit from taking a bus and 
walking some of the way to DMU, her negative evaluations of bus travel provided a 
rationale for driving despite the need for exercise. 
Positive views of the convenience, flexibility, reliability and speed of car commuting 
formed a core set of evaluations, at least one of which was expressed by 14 
participants. These terms were central to the practical vocabulary with which many 
people explained their driving to DMU. Denise (full-time academic in her 40s), for 
example, said the following. 
I: I guess what's all kind of linked together is those ... 'cos they're what makes me drive a car ... 
things to do with how practical, convenient, time, that sort of thing. 
She ranked "Convenience", "Practicality" and "Time" as equal first when listing 
influences on her commuting behaviour. "Environmental concerns", which were also a 
recurrent theme in her account, were fourth. Although Denise expressed guilt over 
driving because of such concerns, she also stressed the car's instrumental benefits. 
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I: Y'know, the fact that it saves me fifteen minutes at either end of the day, I think that's 
important. Whether I should is another matter. But I do. 
Despite the self-critical "Whether I should is another matter", her stance was that 
driving's practical advantages outweighed any reservations about it. 
Denise's ranking task was echoed by Beryl (full-time administrator in her 40s), who 
identified "Flexibility", "Time" and "Convenience" as her three most important reasons 
for commuting by car. Several other participants spoke positively about the flexibility of 
car use. Tina (part-time administrator in her 60s), for example, said the following. 
I: I can go exactly where I want to. If I want to stop off at a shop on the way or something ... the 
thinking that you go from A to B and that's your joumey is not really how I live ... I do sort of a 
bunch of things at the same time. I wouldn't just go from A to B necessarily ... I'd do all sorts of 
other things. Making little sorts of detours and things, which I couldn't do on a bus. 
Like several others, she compared driving with bus use; negative evaluations of which 
were often used to justify car commuting. Ian (full-time academic in his 60s) compared 
his journey time of an hour by car with a two-hour bus trip that was "just unacceptable". 
Ian also spoke very positively about his car's reliability. 
I: Um, my car is extremely reliable and I can only recall one occasion in thirty-two years working 
at DMU when I haven't had a car available to come in. 
Similarly, Jacky (full-time administrator in her 30s) said "I know I can rely on my car" 
and, in keeping with the comparative aspect of this discourse, "if people knew public 
transport was good and they could rely on it, it would be used so much more." 
While the most common positive evaluations of driving referred to convenience, 
flexibility, reliability and speed, some people did cite other instrumental benefits. Harry 
(full-time administrator in his 50s) and Nigel (full-time administrator in his 20s), for 
example, mentioned comfort, but this was not central to the car-as-practical discourse; 
it was not one of the main pillars of this stance. 
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To summarise, many people who talked about the car's instrumental functions 
represented it as the most practical means to an end. Fourteen of the 24 participants 
used positive evaluations of driving's convenience, flexibility, reliability and/or speed to 
explain their use of cars for commuting. Many compared driving favourably with public 
transport in these terms. Beyond these four evaluations, people also spoke of the 
comfort of driving but unlike, say, convenience, this was not central to any accounts. 
6.5.1.2 The car as impractical: '/t's just much easier to walk or cycle' 
Although many instrumental evaluations of driving were positive, there was an 
opposing discourse in which the car was represented as impractical. Various reasons 
were given for this view, but they are unified insofar as they all cast driving as 
somehow instrumentally inferior to other modes. 
Perhaps the strongest proponent of this position was Frances (full-time academic in her 
30s), who reported that she used to drive to work in the car of a friend with whom she 
car shared. However, she said the following about car ownership. 
I: I can drive a car. I've never wanted to buy a car. I've never wanted to get to the position of 
actually having to rely on a car. Having to go to work to pay for my car. I don't particularly think I 
could afford to run a car without sacrificing other things I like. 
Far from bringing instrumental benefits, Frances claimed that driving entailed sacrifice. 
She reinforced this by saying "I don't think having a car is as convenient as people who 
use them regularly make out, because I don't think they get the whole thing of how 
many days a week you have to work to pay for it." Again, she implied that car 
ownership is a financial trap. 
Alun (full-time postgraduate in his 20s) also gave the cost of car commuting as a 
reason for avoiding it, although rather than the expense of car ownership, he talked 
about the cost of parking at DMU. The excerpt below is from a section of his interview 
in which he explained his views on various commuting mode options. 
I: Um, well public transport I don't consider because it's such a short distance now. 
R: Yeah. 
I: Um «pause» car, I wouldn't, it costs too much to park. Too much hassle trying to park. Um 
«pause» I dunno. It's just money and unnecessary expenditure. Um «pause» it's just much 
174 
easier to walk or cycle ... From the point of view of «chuckles)) dealing with the car at the end of 
the journey. 
As well as the financial disadvantage of driving when free modes like walking and 
cycling were practicable, Alun asserted that parking was "too much hassle". His 
position was that commuting by non-car modes was more convenient than driving. 
For slightly different reasons again, Sue (part-time administrator in her 30s) also 
explained that she saw driving as less convenient than cycling to work. In her case this 
was because cycling was "quicker by miles" than driving in rush hour. She said that "at 
another time of day this journey would take you twenty minutes and it's now taking 
forty-five" by car, while her bicycle commute was "twenty-five minutes tops". 
Motorcyclists stressed this mode's ability to reduce journey time by cutting through 
traffic. Ernie (full-time member of non-administrative staff in his 40s) said that while 
comfort was an advantage of driving, this was relatively unimportant compared to 
commuting quickly. Motorcycling apparently outperformed the car in this regard. 
I: Urn, «pause)) right, the bike tends to be quicker than the car ... simply the fact you can get 
through traffic [quickeL] 
Rick (full-time administrator in his 40s), another motorcyclist, made similar comments, 
as did Patricia (full-time postgraduate in her 20s). the third and final motorcyclist among 
the 24 partiCipants. She reportedly alternated this mode with driving and cycling to 
DMU. Her position was that the car was only practical when "I'm lugging my laptop 
around and I can't take my laptop and all my other bits and pieces on my bike." When 
she did not have too much baggage, she preferred to cycle because "it saves me 
money on petrol" and because "You know it's gonna take you however long to get in 
and unless you have a puncture or anything you're not gonna be caught up in traffic." 
These excerpts illustrate how some people characterised cars as less instrumentally 
beneficial than other commuting modes on the basis of journey time and financial cost. 
One further instrumental benefit associated with a non-car mode is slightly different. All 
six people who said that they cycled to DMU mentioned exercise as a reason for doing 
so (although this seemed more important to some cyclists than to others). While the 
benefits of exercise accrue over a longer period than the immediate advantage of a 
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quick journey on a given day, they are still personal, material gains and so can be seen 
as part of the discourse that cast non-car modes as more functional than driving. 
By way of example, Patricia said "my bicycle, I use that for fitness. It's a good way of 
keeping fit" and Alun asserted that "it always feels like really good exercise when you're 
cycling even if it is just a short journey." These participants presented exercise as a 
relatively important reason for cycling. Patricia listed it as the third (of six) influences on 
her modal choice in the ranking task, while for Alun it was equal second of seven. 
Others identified exercise as a welcome side-effect of cycling rather than a primary 
motivation. Sue, for example, said that exercise was "sort of nice, but just the added 
bonus really." Nonetheless, it is notable that everyone who reported commuting by 
bicycle alluded to its health benefits; benefits that cars do not provide. 
In summary, although not as prevalent as the car-as-practical discourse, there was an 
opposing discourse that characterised driving as less practical than other modes. The 
three bases for this stance were that non-car modes could be cheaper, quicker and 
healthier than driving. 
6.5.1.3 Choice and necessity: '/ have to drive' 
In a recent study, Bickerstaff & Walker (2002,2175) examined "the reasonings that 
people deploy in explaining and rationalising their behaviour in relation to the collective 
environmental and health-risk problem of urban air quality". They identify a discourse-
used to deny responsibility for pollution - in which the speaker "was the victim of forces 
over which they had little or no control - a lack of personal volition that shielded the 
individual from blameworthiness" (Ibid., 2184). A similar discourse was discernible 
here. In one sense, it can be linked with the TPB's perceived behavioural control (PBC) 
construct, in that people asserted a lack of control in explaining how they commuted. 
(Invariably this was presented as necessitating car use.) 
However, one can also make an association with the positive instrumental evaluations 
of driving described in section 6.5.1.1. Statements like lan's - that "the only realistic 
option is the car" - call to mind Handy et. a/.'s (2005) discussion of choice and 
necessity in relation to travel (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2). When somebody says that 
they have to drive, this could mean 'driving is more convenient than alternatives', rather 
than 'no alternatives exist'. Describing driving to work as a necessity may be another 
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way of saying that it is more practical than using any non-car mode. Practicality and 
control may not be separate issues, but different ways of presenting the same issue. 
Be that as it may, several participants spoke of choice and necessity in explaining how 
they commuted and a driving-as-necessary discourse was evident. 
Ursula's (full-time academic in her 40s) assertion that "I hate driving, but it's a 
necessity" provides an example. This statement - and others including "I have to drive. 
If I want to go anywhere, I have to drive" - left little room for debate about the 
requirement for car use. Why would Ursula voluntarily do something that she hated? 
On the continuum along which participants positioned themselves in terms of level of 
choice over commuting mode, Ursula was at the zero-choice extreme. 
No other participant was quite so categorical, but many said that their modal choice 
was constrained. Jacky and Zoe (part-time postgraduate in her 40s) illustrate this. 
Jacky lived six miles from campus, Zoe almost 30 miles away. Both said that they had 
to commute by car for similar reasons, illustrated by their ranking tasks (Table 6.5). 
Jacky Zoe 
1= children 1 Children! 
1 = time constraints 
3 know I can rely on my car to work 
4 safe in my car 
2 No viable public transport alternative (within reason) 
3 Time constraints 
4 Need car for other journeys - means car is already 
available (pay twice) 
Table 6.5 Jacky and Zoe's ranking task results 
The need t~ take children to school or childcare en route to DMU was presented as a 
major limitation on modal choice. Jacky explained as follows. 
I: Yep, the reason I come by car is I've got to run to a very tight schedule. 
R:Mmm 
I: Got to be here for half past eight. Urn, childcare facilities don't open until eight o'clock.= 
R: =Right. 
I: So, I've got half an hour to get from Oadby in here. 
Although both women listed "children" as their primary reason for driving to work, this 
can be interpreted as an expression of inability to use non-car modes. Reference to 
children invoked Jacky and Zoe's role as mothers; a role that society values. While 
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some people might see driving as socially undesirable (see section 6.5.1.7), it seems 
unlikely that many would think it worse than a mother neglecting her children's needs. 
Thus, reference to children can be seen as a device for justifying car use. 
Other people claimed to have no control over modal choice for different reasons. Harry 
shifted responsibility for his car use onto his employer. He seems to illustrate how 
people actively try to understand a situation through talk (Antaki, 1988). When asked 
why he drove to work, he made seemingly contradictory statements. He began by 
discussing his employer's position on car use. 
I: When I first got the job, I work in ISAS and staff in ISAS are expected to travel round the 
various sites of the University ... and in order to retain hold of certain quality parking spaces, if 
you like, they said you must have a parking space ... I happen to have lodgings within a 
reasonable distance of the University, but I have to use the car to travel to work because that's 
what they ask me to do. 
However, Harry then said that he rarely visited other sites and when he did, he did not 
take his car because "they make me take a hire car." He also remarked that "basically, 
I don't need to use the car" except to "go via a slight L-shaped route" to buy milk for the 
office en route to DMU. He also recalled that when his car had been unavailable he 
had walked to work, which "wasn't too difficult. .. it's just a matter of go and do it." 
Thus, unlike Jacky and Zoe, Harry did not suggest that commuting by non-car modes 
was so impractical as to be impossible. He claimed that driving was necessary 
because of his employer's requirements. However, this stance was contradicted by his 
answer when asked whether there were other influences on his commuting behaviour. 
I: My doctor's told me I need to lose some weight, so I shall be getting a bicycle soon and be 
cycling ... So er, that will change my way, er, how I travel... it's just purely my choice ... I am not 
forced by anybody else to [change] what I do. 
Here he asserted that his commuting mode was under his control and, given that he 
planned to cycle, driving seemed not to be necessary after all. While he initially 
positioned himself as subject to uncontrollable forces, this stance was later revised. 
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Kath (full-time academic in her 50s) also made some seemingly contradictory 
statements. She began with the following justification for commuting by car. 
I: The bus service is, the alternative would be bus, urn, if I came on Tuesdays and Saturdays. 
R:Ah. 
I: That would be possible. Mondays, Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays, there's no bus 
service. 
Stating that "the alternative would be bus" (emphasis added) implied that her options 
were driving and this single non-car mode. As buses were rarely available, this led to 
the conclusion that she had to drive. Nonetheless, she then rejected cycling because 
"it's uphill" and car sharing because she "may want to finish a job and the other person, 
they've got to go home". These statements hinted that despite identifying bus as the 
only alternative to driving, she still felt the need to address other possibilities. This is 
congruent with the idea that she did have a choice over how to commute, but the 
impracticality of non-car modes led her to present this as a no-choice situation. 
Kath also noted the flexibility and especially the convenience of driving, ranking this as 
the second most important influence on her commuting mode (after "Lack of public 
transport"). Indeed, convenience apparently outweighed some drawbacks of 
commuting by car. 
I,: [Parking charges?] I don't mind, because of the convenience for me. 
Again, Kath's stance that she had little choice over commuting mode can be interpreted 
as characterisation of the car as the most practical mode for this purpose. 
Besides Kath, several others explained their car use for commuting by citing the 
absence of alternatives. For example, Owen (part-time academic in his 60s) dismissed 
the possibility of using buses because he lived "outside of a regular route" and 
lamented the lack of park and ride service. 
I: And another factor innuencing it, yes I am, I hope, reasonably environmentally friendly. And it 
seemed to me if there was a park and ride, or had there been a park and ride, I certainly would 
have used that. 
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Owen hinted that context prevented him from acting on environmental concern. He also 
remarked that "I'm not a very good cyclist. Um, and I don't necessarily run eleven miles 
a day." Thus, he asserted that despite his reservations, he had to commute by car. Or, 
in keeping with the alternative interpretation, that driving was so much more practical 
than other modes that this was tantamount to having no option. 
lan, too, claimed that the absence of public transport left him no choice but to drive to 
DMU, saying "I have no alternative", "the bus is impossible" and "If there was a rail 
service, that's what I would use." Each of these statements supported his assertion that 
"the only realistic option is the car". 
Carl (full-time administrator in his 30s) also used the driving-as-necessary discourse in 
citing barriers to switching commuting modes. Like Ursula, he voiced displeasure at 
commuting by car. 
I: So, er, ((laughs)) the AS is an absolute nightmare with people tailgating ... So if I could get 
away with getting on the train every day, I certainly would. 
He provided two reasons for driving to DMU despite this sentiment. Firstly, trains were 
characterised as unreliable. Carl wondered "Whether they're gonna actually turn up." 
Secondly, commuting by train was said to be a waste of money. 
I: You've still gotta pay the road [tax.) OK, you're saving on petrol, you've still gotta pay the 
insurance, still gotta pay the road tax. Now if you could get kind of a refund, like the government 
could ... y'know, offset your road tax via your ... season ticket on the train. It would be, I would 
definitely choose the train. 
Carl did not claim that there were no alternatives to driving, but that they were 
instrumentally deficient. He illustrates the blurred boundary between being unable "to 
get away with" using non-car modes (Le. having no choice but to use his car) and 
driving because it is much more practical than alternatives. 
In considering choice and necessity, one must acknowledge the role of (perceived) 
context. Participants' arguments that driving was necessary always referred to some 
contextual condition. (Even when personal capabilities were invoked - as when Owen 
said that he could not run long distances - there was a contextual aspect.) Carl spoke 
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about unreliable trains, Kath about infrequent buses, Ian and Ursula about the 
complete lack of public transport near their homes, and so on. 
It is interesting to note the possible links between context, necessity (or choice), and 
the reported changes in some people's commuting behaviour between studies 1 and 2. 
As explained in section 6.4.1, half of the 24 participants had previously expressed 
intentions to reduce their commuter car use. Alun was one of these 'reducers' and he 
reported switching from driving to cycling or walking. He was quoted in section 6.5.1.2 
as saying that his journey was "such a short distance now" (emphasis added). We 
might hypothesise that Alun's reduced commuting distance removed the (perceived) 
need to drive and opened up a choice of modes that were previously unavailable (or 
impractical). While the interviews did not address this issue directly, some participants' 
accounts suggested that changes in context (especially in commuting distance) may 
have increased perceived choice of commuting modes. 
Rick, for example, stated in study 1 that he usually drove to work at one of two sites in 
different towns. He subsequently relocated to the campus closer to his home, 
describing this change as follows. 
I: Yeah, so when I worked at Milton Keynes I drove 'cos it was quite a long way. ((pause» Over 
20 miles. 
R: Right. 
I: But here I cycle quite a lot 'cos it's nearer 10 [miles.] Not all the time 'cos if I've got stuff to 
carry then I'll drive or if I reckon the traffic's gonna be really bad I'll use the motorbike, but I 
cycle when I can. Just obviously 'cos I enjoy riding my push bike. 
Thus, like Alun, Rick apparently found himself with a choice of (practicable) commuting 
modes when previously the car had seemed necessary. He seemingly took the 
opportunity afforded by a contextual change to act on his enjoyment of cycling. Similar 
observations apply to Wendy (part-time academic in her 30s), who switched from 
driving to cycling or walking between the two studies. 
To summarise, 10 participants asserted that their commuting mode choice was in some 
way restricted and they all presented this as justification for driving. They used phrases 
including "I've got to", "the only way is to drive", "there isn't really any alternative" and 
"it's a necessity". Some people cited lack of public transport as necessitating car use, 
181 
others public transport's cost or slowness, the inflexibility of car sharing, or the need to 
meet non-work commitments alongside work travel. However, as Handy et. a/. (Ibid.) 
point out, what is presented as necessity depends on how much effort people are 
willing to go to. Some or all of the participants who invoked the driving-as-necessary 
discourse may have been able to commute by non-car modes, but this would have 
resulted in reduced personal utility (e.g. longer journeys, less reliability, less flexibility). 
Thus, although there was a distinct discourse expressing a lack of choice, it is arguable 
that the underlying issue was just the same as in the discourse characterising driving 
as the most practical commuting mode. 
It is also notable that three participants who had driven to DMU at the time of study 1 
reported greater choice over their commuting mode by the time of study 2 because 
their commuting distances had been reduced. They, of course, did not invoke the 
driving-as-necessarY discourse, but their accounts point to interesting links between 
(perceived) context and (perceived) choice and necessity. 
6.5.1.4 Affective motives: '/ just enjoy it' 
As noted in Chapter 3, affect in the context of travel refers to "feelings evoked by 
travelling, such as stress, excitement, pleasure, boredom and control" (Anable & 
Gatersleben, 2005, 164). Reference to such feelings was common in the interviews. 
Bryan (full-time academic in his 50s), for example, gave the following explanation for 
bicycle commuting. 
I: I just enjoy it. Fun, y'know? Riding my bike. That's really why I do it. Don't do it as much as I'd 
like really. «pause)) It's a nice way to start the day. ((pause)) And to end the day. Urn, y'know, if 
you're a bit stressed or whatever [it's nice] to get out in the open air and do a bit of exercise and 
just blast it out. 
Alun was similarly enthusiastic about cycling, saying that the fact that he considered it 
to be fun "absolutely, definitely" played a part in his choosing to commute by this mode. 
Several others referred to "fun". For Ernie, it was attached to motorcycling: "a car's just 
a means of getting from A to B ... Bike's much more fun." Rick made the same point, 
remarking that motorbikes are "great fun", but cars are "just a mode of transport" and 
Patricia said "motorbike's much more fun 'cos you're more involved with the actual ride. 
Um, whereas in a car it's like you're detached from the world." 
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These were the only participants who commuted by motorbike and it is interesting that 
they all talked about the "fun" of this mode. It is also notable that nobody described car 
commuting as 'fun'. This particular affective evaluation was only given by cyclists and 
motorcyclists and constitutes a discourse shared among users of these modes alone. 
Drivers did, however, give other positive affective evaluations of their mode. Jacky, for 
example, made the following comments about her journey to work. 
I: I've got no one, another thing I find enjoyable while driving is there is nobody in the car with 
me. ((laughing» Nobody asking me questions. Nobody arguing. It's quiet. .. That's probably the 
only time of the day when nobody can ask [me] questions or bother me. I like that. It's nicer than 
being on a bus with loads of other people around. 
This seems distinct from arousal, or simple 'fun'. It suggests less visceral, more 
contemplative pleasure, provided by quiet time alone. 
Other drivers offered different reasons for enjoying privacy in their cars, but the 
common theme was "personal space". Kath, Nigel and Monica all used this term. 
Notably, of six drivers who identified privacy as an enjoyable aspect of car commuting, 
only two listed it as an influence on their modal choice in the ranking task. Beryl and 
Kath each identified six influences and placed privacy fourth and fifth in order of 
importance, respectively. Thus, although mentioned, privacy was not central to 
anyone's explanation of their driving. It was a discourse unique to drivers, however. 
Nobody who used a non-car mode gave privacy as a reason for doing so. 
People also reported enjoyment from exerCising a skill. Beryl said that she liked the 
"precision" of driving and the "feeling that you're doing it well" by being "in the right 
lane, stopping at the lights, indicating", while Ernie made similar comments about 
motorcycling. 
I: You go round a bend and you go 'Yeah, that was right.' That feels good ... You missed the 
drain, you've coped with that, it's been smooth, it's been steady. 
Although it was a minority concern, these two participants clearly referenced similar 
themes in constructing accounts of commuting. Pleasure in exercising a skill can, 
therefore, be identified as another shared affective discourse. 
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An affective issue that received more attention was stress. Nigel said that after 
commuting by bus he "arrived at work in a lot less stressed state" than after driving. 
Carl commented that "I find driving to work an absolute nightmare. I don't enjoy it all. 
The road is full of nutters". Alun - explaining why he preferred not to drive to DMU-
made the following statement. 
I: Urban traffic is always awful... I don't like people's «pause» attitude [in their cars,] the 
individuation and the hostility [that sort] of arises. Don't like that. That stresses me, to be honest. 
All three participants characterised driving as stressful, yet two of them (Carl and Nigel) 
commuted by car most days. Carl explained this by claiming that he could not often 
commute by train because it was expensive and unreliable (Le. driving was necessary 
because alternatives were impractical). Nigel attributed his driving to habit; an issue 
explored in section 6.5.1.8. 
Not everybody represented commuting as stressful, however. Ernie spoke of "little back 
roads that you can take the motorbike and unwind", suggesting that motorcycling was a 
way to relax after "a stressful day". This echoes Bryan's remarks about cycling enabling 
him to "blast it out" when "a bit stressed". 
These evaluations of travel as stressful or relaxing differ from 'fun', referring to less 
direct emotional responses. Pleasantness or unpleasantness results from stress or 
relaxation, rather than being direct, visceral experience. It is notable that those who 
characterised commuting as stressful were all drivers, while those who characterised it 
as relaxing all used non-car modes. 
One further affective issue differs from those already described because it is linked to 
the moral motives described in section 6.5.1.5, below. Guilt over driving can be 
characterised as an emotion arising from moral beliefs; an emotion overtly expressed 
or implied by several participants. 
Some actually used the word "guilt". Owen remarked that "I, to some extent, feel that 
sort of guilt that I've, you know, still used the motor", while Sue (part-time administrator 
in her 30s) said that driving to work gave her "the feeling of guilt that I'm the only one in 
the car." Others suggested guilt without using the term itself. For example, Tina said 
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"I'm very aware that I'm not a good person, ecologically", while Denise claimed to feel 
"a bit uncomfortable about" commuting by car and also stated the following. 
I: I think the fact I think about it and I'm worried about it and feel bad about it does say 
something about me as a person or sort of my belief systems. Um, 'cos it does stem out of 
concern for the environment. .. although I don't always do as many things as I might to help. 
Similarly, Alun's use of "I must admit" before explaining that he sometimes got a lift to 
DMU suggested discomfort over commuting by car, even when he was taking 
advantage of a journey that was being made anyway. With 10 participants referring to 
similar feelings, driving-inspired guilt was the most common affective discourse. 
In sum, participants often spoke of emotional aspects of commuting. The most common 
affective terms were "fun", "personal space", "stress" and "guilt". The first three of these 
(along with less common references to pleasure in exercising a skill) can be seen as 
solely affective evaluations, while "guilt" also has a moral aspect. These five types of 
evaluation can be seen as five affective discourses; stances based on emotional 
aspects of travel. 
Drivers frequently identified "personal space" as a pleasurable aspect of car use. "Fun", 
by contrast, was associated with cycling and motorcycling rather than driving, perhaps 
because driving was often associated with "stress". Pleasure in exercising a skill was 
reported by a driver and a motorcyclist, while "guilt" was expressed only by drivers. 
Although more than half the participants talked about affective aspects of commuting, 
these were rarely central in accounts. Affect usually played a supporting role, providing 
additional justification for travel mode choices that were attributed more to practical or 
moral motives. 
6.5.1.5 Driving as morally problematic: 'We're all responsible' 
One moral aspect of travel - guilt over car use - has already been introduced, but two 
further moral concepts were evident in the interviews: obligation and responsibility. 
These echo NAT's personal norm (PN) and ascription of responsibility (AR) constructs. 
Unlike Schwartz (1977), however, participants did not distinguish obligation from 
responsibility. These concepts seemed to be interchangeable. Patricia, for example, 
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responded as follows when asked whether she felt responsible for environmental 
protection. 
I: Yeah, urn, yes I do ... I sometimes think about why I care about, you know, if we have negative 
consequences on the environment and say, if I wasn't gonna have any children that have to 
face the consequences, why do I feel, why do I feel morally obliged to, to sort of, urn, hold my 
actions in check? And I don't know. I, ((pause» you just think it's the right thing to do. 
She answered the question about responsibility by referring to obligation, suggesting 
that she did not need to differentiate these concepts to articulate her moral position. 
The central idea of this discourse - that car use is morally problematic - required 
participants to acknowledge a moral dimension to travel, but they apparently did not 
concern themselves with any more specific philosophical notion. 
In formulating NAT, however, Schwartz (Ibid.) was concerned with precise definitions. 
He proposed "self-expectations for specific action in particular situations ... experienced 
as feelings of moral obligation" as a component of PN (Ibid., 227). Patricia was actually 
the only participant to use the word "obligation", but others implied such feelings. Sue, 
for example, remarked that she "shouldn't really" drive to work. 
It was often hard to say whether participants were talking about obligation or 
responsibility, but several identified a moral aspect to their travel behaviour. Alun 
provides an example. 
I: I would hope that my action sort of contributes to a broader, better whole. 
R: In what sense? 
I: Urn, I suppose cycling, or walking, reducing your car use, there's always a carbon dioxide 
reductions which has widespread implications= 
R: =Yeah, yeah. 
I: Which I'm quite pleased about... If I can do my part to reduce it. 
He seemed to assert a moral duty to contribute "to a broader, better whole". Perhaps 
the "hope that my action contributes" is best characterised as self-expectation (PN), but 
the desire to "do my part" could constitute ascription of responsibility to oneself (AR). 
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It was more common for participants to use the terms "responsibility" or "responsible" 
than to mention 'obligation'. For example, Jacky's interview contained the following 
exchange. 
R: Do you think that you actually should try and cut down your driving? 
I: Yeah, because we're all responsible for the condition of the atmosphere at the moment. Yeah. 
Um, and the thing is if we don't try and fix it, what's going to happen for the future? 
Notably, the question asked about Jacky's behaviour while her answer referred to "we", 
not '1'. This was not a complete shift of responsibility onto a 'they', but served to share 
the responsibility. Carl used the same rhetorical device when answering this question. 
Others did not attempt to spread the burden of responsibility, seeming to accept it fully. 
Sue, for example, said the following when asked how driving made her feel. 
I: It makes me feel very responsible for the environment actually, because what type of world 
are we leaving to our grandchildren? This is, «pause)) this will affect their world. 
The moral discourse also referred to "environmental beliefs" or "environmental 
concern"; terms apparently encompassing the range of motives captured by NAT 
(personal responsibility, obligation and awareness of behaviour'S consequences) 
without differentiating between them. Denise spoke of "environmental concern" and 
Frances remarked that commuting by bicycle and train "matches a lot of the kind of ... 
environmental kind of beliefs I have." The implication of such language was that 
speakers valued the environment and saw it as deserving protection, even though they 
did not identify particular obligations or responsibilities. Nonetheless, they appeared to 
suggest that their commuting mode choices had some moral basis, invoking the same 
discourse as more specific moral terminology. 
Frances' "environmental kind of beliefs" warrant further comment in connection to the 
earlier treatment of choice, necessity and context (section 6.5.1.3). It has already been 
proposed that some partiCipants' choice of commuting modes may have been widened 
by reductions in their journey distance. Contextual change also seemed to influence 
Frances' commuting behaviour, but in a different way. 
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She stated in study 1 that her forthcoming campus move prompted an intention to 
reduce car use. (At that time she reportedly drove to work in a car share.) In her 
interview, however, she explained that this intention had been based on driving less 
far, rather than less frequently. 
R: You didn't actually intend to stop driving and change to another mode of transport when you 
left Scraptoft? 
I: No. Not at that stage. I just knew I wasn't gonna be driving as far to [get to] the city. 
Thus, Frances' intention to reduce car use apparently rested on anticipating a shorter 
drive to her new campus ("the city"). After the campus change occurred, however, her 
context changed again when her car share partner moved away. 
I: She lived in Loughborough and I lived in Loughborough. Um, she's now moved to Leicester. I 
then had to make a decision about what I was going to do in relation to getting to work ... Um, a 
few years ago my father retired and gave me his Brompton fold-away bike.= 
R: =Oh right. 
I: So, um, ((pause» I thought fine, I've got a little bike that I can get on and off the train quite 
[easily.] Um, it matches a lot of the kind of ((pause)) environmental, um, ((pause)) 
environmental kind of beliefs I have. 
Unlike Alun, Rick and Wendy, whose cases were described in section 6.5.1.3, Frances' 
contextual change did not seem to widen her choice of commuting modes. In fact an 
option disappeared when her colleague moved. But despite her decreased choice, 
Frances reported that a contextual change prompted her to reassess her travel to work 
and this led her to switch to a combination of modes that was consistent with her 
environmental stance. This calls to mind the idea that changes in travel behaviour -
especially routine behaviours like commuting - may require contextual stimuli that 
prompt people to consider their actions (Fujii et. a/., 2001; Matthies et. a/., 2002). 
In sum, 11 participants used moral vocabulary when discussing commuting. This 
vocabulary gave rise to the guilt discourse detailed in section 6.5.1.4 and also formed 
the basis for the driving-as-morally-problematic discourse that referenced obligation, 
responsibility and environmental concerns. Terms used to indicate responsibility and 
obligation included "should" and "shouldn't", as well as "responsible" and 
"responsibility", but only Patricia used the word "obliged". "Guilt" was mentioned more 
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frequently and was also suggested by assertions of feeling "bad" about driving and 
having to "admit" to it. 
Some participants shifted responsibility for reducing car use from 'I' to 'we', spreading 
the burden more widely without actually denying responsibility for addressing transport-
related problems. It was also notable that participants often did not differentiate 
between NAT constructs, using 'responsibility' and 'obligation' interchangeably, or 
referring to general environmental concern. 
6.5.1.6 Car use consequences: CO2 as 'Long-term problem' or 'Most innocent of 
substances' 
Although it was difficult to distinguish talk about responsibility from talk about 
obligation, participants clearly used a separate vocabulary when discussing driving's 
consequences, echoing NAT's awareness of consequences (AC) construct. People 
were asked for their views on the consequences of car use and several mentioned 
environmental damage. Emissions were a common theme, illustrated by Sue's stated 
concern over "the CO2 that it puts out" and Zoe's expression of anxiety that despite 
local air-quality improvements, "there's still CO2 and that's the long-term problem." 
Jacky was less specific about the nature of emissions, saying that "there's an awful lot 
of toxins and whatever else goes into the air because of cars ... it's bad", but still 
identified pollution as a negative consequence of driving. 
These participants expressed concern over emissions, but this was not true of 
everybody who spoke about pollution. There was some scepticism over whether cars 
damage the environment. Ian asserted that "carbon dioxide is the most innocent of 
substances that has been given an awfully bad press". He was a chemist and argued 
that "the way in which some people pursue scientific careers, they latch on to a concept 
and develop it, urn, as they create their reputation. And I believe carbon dioxide is a 
victim of that kind of idea." He illustrates how a vocabulary can be used for multiple 
ends. While some people referred to emissions to explain their guilt over car use, Ian 
used similar language to justify driving and to argue that "there isn't necessarily a need 
for people to reduce the amount that they drive". 
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Les, who was also a chemist, expressed a different kind of scepticism. Rather than 
denying that CO2 is harmful, he argued that emissions are falling and so there is no 
cause for concern. 
I: Because certainly, there's a downward trend in motor fuel. Now motor fuel's hydrocarbon ... It 
gets burned more and more efficiently these days. Um, there is less and less pollution. 
Therefore when you look at the automotive contribution to carbon dioxide, it is decreasing. We 
are using, gently, less ... And yet, they say that the automotive contribution is increasing from 
cars. I think that possibly people are making different assumptions and coming at different kind 
of, um «pause)) because one thing that is happening is that the efficiency of motor vehicles is 
increasing. 
The apparent confusion over emissions levels was attributed to an anonymous "they" 
who would have people believe that driving is more harmful than it actually is. 
Kath emphasised a different aspect of the debate, expressing doubts over the 
seriousness of anthropogenic emissions compared to those from non-anthropogenic 
sources. 
I: I suppose one of the other things that I think about in terms of cars and fumes and so on ... I 
feel that environmental effects of cars is not as great as, say, one eruption of a volcano. 
R: Hmm, sure. 
I: And so when you just, when you look at, compare that, I think ((pause)) I suppose small steps 
are important, but in the other hand, are they that important? 
Whilst acknowledging that cars produce emissions, she argued that these are 
insignificant compared to those from natural sources. This served to justify her 
assertion that "the convenience of going places" warranted driving, even though she 
occasionally got "a conscience about it". 
Emissions were the most commonly-cited consequence of driving, discussed by 13 
participants. Another consequence raised by several people was the UK's increaSing 
traffic volume and resultant congestion. Unlike pollution, however, participants 
characterised congestion as a problem for themselves rather than for society or the 
environment. Rick provides an example. 
190 
I: I hate being stuck in traffic.= 
R: =Mmm 
I: I used to work at Milton Keynes. You could get in and out of Milton Keynes really easily. 
R: Right. 
I: I used to be able to get from my house to my office in 35 minutes ... Here, because it takes so 
much longer, when I get into work, I'm usually not in the best mood. 
Often when people spoke of congestion, they suggested resignation to it. Jacky 
commented that "everybody needs to get to work. What can you do? We're all in the 
same boat." Harry said that "competition for road space from other people gets up your 
nose" but then asserted that if he asked others to drive less "it would be like calling, the 
pot calling the kettle black ... I use th~ car because I like it and so does everybody 
else." Thus, congestion was usually represented as an unavoidable consequence of-
in Tina's words - "the lives we lead". 
Other consequences of car use that were identified as negatives included the need to 
build roads and the resource use necessitated by a car-oriented society. Beryl, for 
example, mentioned "waste of energy resources" and "the need for petroleum and 
digging for it". Driving was not always associated with negative consequences, 
however. A few participants suggested beneficial effects. Harry argued that "road 
transport keeps the country going, keeps the economy going" and Alun stated that 
"roads may be necessary ... to make sure that everyone is included". Social inclusion 
was the most commonly-cited positive consequence of car use. Ursula said that driving 
"opens up so much to you. You know, I can get to places that I just couldn't without a 
car. .. that's a positive" and Jacky remarked that "it's freedom for people if they've got 
access to cars." 
To summarise participants' talk about car use consequences, more than half spoke of 
emissions - many specifying C02 - and most of these said that such emissions were a 
negative. A few people, however, expressed scepticism about whether vehicle 
emissions really do cause environmental damage and/or whether this damage is 
accurately reported. Thus, the most common car use consequences discourse cast 
driving as environmentally harmful, but there was an opposing position. 
Congestion was identified as a problem by several participants but they tended to 
accept this as inevitable, suggesting that nothing that could be done because 
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everybody needed to travel. Other negative consequences, such as resource use, were 
mentioned by very few people. 
Although most comments on the consequences of car use cited negative impacts, 
some participants identified positives; that driving facilitates economic functioning and 
provides opportunity. These were, however, minority positions. The prevalent stance 
acknowledged few, if any, positive consequences of the current level of UK car use. 
6.5.1.7 Social pressure: 'It's my car and I will drive it' 
The TPB's subjective norm construct (SN) captures "the perception of the individual 
that, in general, other people who are important to him, want him to perform" a 
behaviour (Staats, 2003,173). SN has been implicated in modal choice (e.g. Hunecke 
et. al., 2001), although its influence is not always statistically significant in quantitative 
studies (e.g. KI6ckner & Matthies, 2004). Thus, it has been suggested that researchers 
should expand conceptions of social influence to capture issues like status and "self-
ascribed social role" (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003, 280) (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1.3). 
Relatively few participants acknowledged social pressure surrounding commuting, 
even when pressed. For example, Georgina's interview included the following 
exchange. 
R: Can you tell me if there are any ways in which other people influence how you travel? 
I: Um, there's just myself and my husband at home ... so no. For a while he was working in 
Leicester and I used to give him a lift in. 
R: Right. 
I: So that was useful... Urn, «pause» and if he, we have two cars ... So, if one of the cars wasn't 
available, the bus is always an option to me. Whereas it might not be, [it does vary where] he 
travels to. Urn, and if he's in town he will come by bus. Unless I can bring him. Um, «pause» so, 
not really. 
R: [Ah, OK.] 
R: OK ... that's very much kind of responsibilities to other people for transporting them around. 
How about kind of social pressure? 
I: No. 
R: You don't feel that that's an issue? 
I: Hmm, no. 
192 
Fifteen participants responded to this question by reference to transporting others. Only 
nine people mentioned the possibility of social pressure surrounding travel, but did not 
necessarily cite it as an influence on their commuting behaviour. 
Just two people explicitly acknowledged an anti-driving social norm. When Kath was 
asked if her travel behaviour was influenced by others, the following exchange ensued. 
I: I'm sympathetic to people who don't want to use cars. Urn, but I'm not necessarily influenced 
by them. 
R: Can you elaborate? 
I: Well because I, I, I do, I do think about energy saving and urn, and particularly environmental 
aspects.= 
R: =Sure. 
I: You know, I'm sympathetic from that point of view. But not when it stops me, I mean there's 
the convenience of travel and the inconvenience of public travel. Which I, I think that public 
services have got to do a lot more before they, urn, appeal to a large number of people. 
She acknowledged that some people "don't want to use cars", seemingly assuming 
pro-environmental motives. However, despite expressing sympathy for this position, 
she invoked the car's practicality and its necessity due to poor public transport to justify 
her driving. Public transport would have to improve (something beyond her control) 
before it could match the car's instrumental benefits. 
Vic (full-time academic in his 30s) also spoke of a perceived norm and claimed not to 
be influenced by it. 
R: OK, are there any ways in which other people influence how you travel? 
I: No ... There is social pressure to not use the car so much, etcetera. I don't feel affected by it... 
I'm not influenced by what anyone thinks about me driving. It's my car and I will drive it. 
This time, however, there was no recourse to necessity or the car's practicality when 
explaining why the norm was ignored. Vic simply asserted his right to drive. 
Other participants did not mention anti-driving social norms explicitly, but hinted at 
awareness of them. For example, Tina initially described how her travel was influenced 
by others insofar as she would "pick a friend up to go and play bridge", but discussed 
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social pressure when prompted. She said "I know that I'm very, um, what's the word? 
Un-ecological really, because I drive everywhere ... I'm very aware that I'm not a good 
person, ecologically." Her self-criticism suggested a perception that others (possibly 
including the researcher) would also be critical of her driving. 
Denise remarked that "I'm not sure that, that I am particularly influenced ... by other 
people's modes of transport, or what they want to do". She too seemed to acknowledge 
that others may prefer her not to drive, but asserted that this did not influence her 
actions. Interestingly, she was one of only two people (with Kath) who alluded to both 
injunctive and descriptive norms. The latter did not feature in any other accounts. 
As well as six participants who explicitly mentioned or implied social pressure against 
car use, three identified pro-driving pressure. Nigel said "I suppose there's an 
expectation on you to have a car ... and if you've got a car, use it", but did not specify 
who expected this. Sue identified her family as a source of pressure. 
I: I think if I went on the bus, they'd say, 'Why are you going on the bus when you could have 
driven?' ... They wouldn't understand if I'd gone to visit them by bus when I could have driven. 
Nigel and Sue illustrate that social pressure is heterogeneous. There may be different 
norms, from different sources, around any issue. Which norms are salient for an 
individual will depend on the information they attend to, who they mix with and so on. 
The third person to speak of pro-driving social pressure was Harry. It was reported in 
section 6.5.1.3 that he justified commuting by car by saying that his employer required 
it. The employer can be seen as an "important" other (Ajzen, 1991a; Staats, 2003), just 
like relatives or friends. Harry claimed that pressure from his employer to travel by car 
made it necessary, simultaneously invoking two discourses and suggesting that in 
organisational settings, employer pressure may influence commuting mode. 
In summary, social pressure discourses were less prevalent than either necessity or 
practicality discourses, which echo the TPB's other predictive constructs. Most people 
did not indicate any perception of social pressure on how they commuted. Of those 
who did, only around half actually said explicitly that they believed that others had 
preferences in this regard. There was a split in this group, with two participants 
identifying anti-driving norms and three identifying pro-driving norms. 
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A small number of others implied that they perceived social pressure surrounding 
travel, but hardly anybody identified this as an influence on their commuting mode 
choice. The exception was Harry, who claimed to drive because of pressure from his 
employer. Thus, while social pressure discourses were invoked, participants usually 
positioned themselves as observers of this pressure rather than as acting on it. 
Moreover, looking beyond the specific conception of social pressure captured by the 
SN construct, references to status, prestige or beliefs about participants' own roles 
were conspicuous by their absence. 
6.5.1.8 Habit: " made the decision twenty years ago and' just keep doing it' 
Schwartz's (1977) NAT does not account for habit as an influence on future actions. 
Ajzen (1991a), however, seems non-committal on whether habit's inclusion should 
increase the TPB's predictive power. He has argued that habits 
capture the residues of past behavior that have established a habit or tendency to 
perform the behavior on future occasions. Attitudes are, of course, such residues 
of past experience, as are subjective norms and perceived self-efficacy 
(Ibid., 203). 
This suggests that the TPB accounts for habits. However, elsewhere Ajzen (2001, 48) 
notes that "the frequency with which a behavior has been performed in the past tends 
to correlate well with later actions" and "intentions may become largely irrelevant when 
a behaviour ... has become habitual". This suggests that habit can influence future 
actions independently of intention and, by implication, its antecedents. Previous travel 
research shows that this is the case (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.3). 
Two partiCipants explicitly referenced habit in explaining their commuting behaviour. 
Nigel said that despite the stress of car use and convenience of the bus, his driving to 
DMU was "down to laziness and force of habit". Georgina stated "I suppose I've formed 
a habit of coming in the car." 
Others did not use the word 'habit', but nonetheless suggested that their commuting 
behaviour was automatic. Jacky observed that "I have the same routine every day" and 
Tina, asked why she had driven on the day of her interview, said "I made the decision 
twenty years ago and I just keep doing it." 
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In most cases where habit featured in accounts, it was used to justify ignoring factors 
that might encourage behaviour change. Jacky and Nigel both expressed guilt over car 
use and identified negative environmental impacts, but attributed their continued 
driving, at least partially, to habit. Nigel was blunt about this. He compared various 
aspects of commuting by bus and car and the former was usually evaluated more 
favourably (less stressful, more convenient, less environmentally harmful). But despite 
this, he said that he drove to work automatically. When asked why he had first driven to 
DMU, the following exchange ensued. 
I: I've always driven anyway. 
R: Right. 
I: Before I started working here ... So, it's just been normal to drive into work. So, er, I mean I 
have used buses on a couple of occasions ... Which was quite nice. 
R: Right. So, I mean, given that «pause» why do you use the car in preference to the bus 
normally? 
I: Um, «pause» I don't know really. I just «pause» I got the car back and I thought to myself, 
'When I get the car back I might use the bus more'.= 
R: =Hmm 
I: But of course, I didn't. 
The phrase "But of course, I didn't" suggested resignation to habitual driving. It implied 
that despite considering bus use, Nigel could not overcome his 'automatic behavioural 
response' (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). This echoed the driving-as-necessary 
discourse, which expressed low control over commuting behaviour. It could be argued 
that Nigel justified driving by implying that habit overrode his conscious will. He was not 
fully in control of his actions. It is also interesting that he initially explained his habit of 
driving to DMU by referring to having "always driven anyway". There was apparently no 
salient feature of driving by which he could explain his behaviour, perhaps indicating 
the extent to which it had become habitual. 
To summarise, six participants suggested that their commuting behaviour was habitual. 
Habit was often used to justify driving despite imperatives to use other modes (e.g. 
their lesser environmental impact). One participant implied that habit was a force 
beyond his control, which may have prevented his intentions from influencing his 
behaviour. 
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6.5.1.9 Laziness: 'Basically, I'm lazy, so .. .' 
Only two participants cited laziness as an influence on their commuting mode, but it 
warrants comment because it has apparently not been addressed in travel research. 
Nigel, as reported above, attributed his driving to "laziness and force of habit". 
Moreover, when asked whether his modal choice said anything about him as a person, 
he replied as follows. 
I: I don't think driving says anything about me apart from maybe being a bit lazy. «laughs» 
Again, driving was associated with laziness. The fact that Nigel laughed after this 
statement suggested some unease about it. To call somebody - even oneself - "lazy" 
is pejorative. The negative connotation was softened by prefacing with "a bit", but the 
self-criticism remained. 
Vic, by contrast, asserted laziness rather than admitting it. 
R: Can you talk me through the thought process that led to you choosing to drive to work today? 
I: I'm not on a bus route. «pause» I've bought a push bike but it's too big for me so I can't ride it. 
R: «chuckling» Oh right. 
I: And basically, I'm lazy, so, «pause» 
R: Right. 
«laughing from partiCipant's colleagues in background» 
I: It's true! 
Laziness was ranked as the second most important (of five) influences on Vic's 
commuting mode choice, after "No close or easy public transport". One can connect 
these influences and ask whether somebody less (self-professedly) lazy might 
characterise the same public transport as usable. Frances, for example, cycled three 
miles to a station, took a train and then cycled another mile to DMU. She said that cars 
"have their uses", but she had "tried to find other ways" to travel; expressing willingness 
to exert effort to avoid car use. Vic's stance was quite different. He freely admitted that 
"for most short journeys I'll take the car". This echoed his statement that "I'm not 
influenced by what anyone thinks about me driving. It's my car and I will drive it." He 
asserted indifference to others' wishes and his right to travel as he pleased. 
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6.5.1.10 Summary of vocabularies and discourses 
Section 6.5.1 has reported participants' explanations for commuting by particular 
modes, identifying shared vocabularies and discourses. Using King's (1998) template 
analysis method, all 24 interviews were coded five times and the template of codes was 
refined until all data relevant to commuting mode choice had codes attached to them. 
At the end of this process, eight shared vocabularies were evident. Five echoed 
constructs from Schwartz's (1977) NAT or Ajzen's (1991; 1991a) TPB. Some provided 
the basis for a single discourse, others for multiple discourses. Table 6.6 summarises 
the vocabularies, discourses, how common these were and which commuting modes 
were used by people who invoked them. (The orange colour assigned to 'Driving as a 
source of guilt' is intended to show that this discourse has both affective and moral 
aspects, signified by yellow and red , respectively.) 
Vocabulary 
Travel modes' 
instrumental functions 
Choice and necessity 
Affective aspects of 
travel 
Moral aspects of 
travel 
Car use consequences 
Social pressure 
Habit 
Laziness 
Discourse 
The car as the most practical commuting mode 
The car as impractical compared to other modes 
Driving as necessary because of contextual constraints 
Travel as a source of fun 
The car as a provider of personal space 
Exercising a skill as a source of pleasure 
Driving as stressful and non-car modes as relaxing 
n people 
invoking 
discourse 
14 
8 
10 
5 
6 
2 
9 
Mode(s) used by 
people invoking 
discourse 
Car 
Bicycle, get lift, 
motorbike, train, walk 
Car 
Bicycle, motorbike 
Car 
Car, motorbike 
Bicycle, car, 
motorbike train walk ~~~;n-~ ~~~-~~~-r~- ~~~~i~t-- --- -- ------ ---- ----- ----------- -1-~ - ---- ~~ri~~~~-S~I~~- -----
-D~~~ ~ ~~il~-~~~~~~~~ ------------ --------------- -1-; ------Sicycle;car, ... -- ---
Emissions as problematic 
Scepticism over emissions' seriousness 
Congestion as inevitable 
Acknowledgement of anti-driving social norm 
Acknowledgement of pro-driving social norm 
Drivin throu h habit 
DrivIn thro h laziness 
Table 6.6 Vocabularies and discourses 
9 
4 
6 
6 
3 
6 
2 
motorbike train walk 
Bicycle, car, 
motorbike, train, walk 
Car, motorbike 
Car, motorbike 
Car 
Bicycle, car 
Car 
Car 
Some discourses were especially prevalent. The most common presented the car as 
the most practical travel mode (using 'cold ' instrumental evaluations captured by the 
ATT construct), particularly because of its convenience, flexibility, reliability and speed. 
These evaluations were often given as reasons for car commuting. Negative views of 
public transport were also common and were part of this same discourse. 
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A smaller number of participants used the same instrumental vocabulary to argue that 
driving was actually less practical than commuting by non-car modes. The three 
reasons provided for this were financial cost, journey time and the health benefits of 
self-powered modes (especially cycling). 
Several people argued that their context in some way necessitated commuting by car. 
Links can be drawn between this discourse and the PBC construct (capturing perceived 
control over a behaviour), although statements of necessity or low control can also be 
interpreted as expressing the practicality of driving relative to other commuting modes. 
The vocabulary of choice and necessity was only used to argue that car use was 
unavoidable. There was no opposing discourse by which people expressed their choice 
of commuting modes. Perhaps those who enjoyed such choice saw no need to assert 
it, whereas others used lack of choice as a central premise in explaining their driving. 
Almost half the participants used a moral vocabulary to characterise travel as moral 
behaviour and driving as morally problematic. Despite Schwartz's (1977) distinction 
between responsibilities (AR) and obligations (PN), people who invoked this discourse 
used these concepts interchangeably. This discourse also referred to guilt, with several 
people saying that driving inspired such feelings. 
As well as its moral basis, guilt has an affective component and was one of five 
affective aspects of travel that were used to explain modal choice for commuting. The 
others were travel as a source of fun, the car as a provider of personal space, one's 
own skill as a source of pleasure and driving as more stressful than alternatives. 
Several participants identified emissions as a negative consequence of driving (echoing 
NAT's AC construct), with a particular emphasis on CO2• Not all of these people said 
that concern over emissions actually influenced their behaviour, however. Moreover, 
some people expressed scepticism about whether vehicle emissions actually harm the 
environment. Various other negative consequences of driving were identified, but 
congestion was the only one that was raised by multiple participants. This was 
characterised as an inevitable consequence of car use. 
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Most participants did not mention social pressure (SN) surrounding car use. Of those 
who did, most identified the pressure as being anti-driving, although nobody admitted to 
being influenced by it. 
A quarter of participants indicated that their commuting behaviour was habitual. Some 
used the words "habit" or "habitual", while others spoke of "routine" or "automatically" 
using a particular mode. Habit was often used to justify driving despite acknowledged 
imperatives for avoiding car use. In one case, there was an implication that habit was a 
force which the participant could not control. 
Two participants explicitly attributed their car use for commuting to their own laziness. 
One seemed apologetic for this; the other asserted his right to travel as he pleased. 
As explained in section 6.4.1, study 2 participants were chosen based on study 1 
standardised regression residuals. People were assigned to groups according to 
whether NAT, the TPB, both or neither was a 'good fit' for their study 1 data (Table 6.1). 
The aim was to include people with a variety of motives for their commuting behaviour. 
Study 2 did not seek to (dis)confirm study 1's findings, so analysis did not explicitly ask 
whether people used particular discourses that might be expected on the basis of their 
'good fit' categorisations. (For example, people stating intentions to reduce their car 
use who had relatively small standardised residuals from the NAT regression might be 
expected to express moral motives for not driving.) Rather, study 2's open-ended 
questions were designed to provide much more diverse data than those from study 1 
and to complement that study by taking a quite different analytical approach to the 
same general question of why people commute by particular modes. A narrow 
confirmatory focus would not have made good use of the rich interview data, which 
showed that each participant used several discourses to explain their modal choice and 
that people did not fall easily into pre-defined categories. Combinations of discourses 
are explored in section 6.5.2, below. 
In summary, participants often cited influences captured by NAT and the TPB in 
explaining their commuting behaviour. Although some interview questions were 
designed to tap these constructs, prompting people to talk in these terms, influences 
captured by NAT and TPB were often raised in response to questions that did not 
specifically reference them, suggesting that these ideas were salient for participants 
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and provided shared means of discussing commuting. There were also discourses 
relating to influences beyond these theories' purview. These were used in talking about 
affective aspects of travel, habitual driving and laziness. 
6.5.2 Constructing positions using multiple discourses 
While section 6.5.1 described vocabularies and discourses evident in people's 
accounts of commuting, it did not focus on participants as individuals. Each discourse 
expressed one broad idea about travel to work, but each person combined these ideas 
in different ways to present their own overall stance on commuting. 
As might be expected when people talk freely and at length about a subject, each 
stance was unique. It was notable, however, that some combinations of discourses 
recurred. The most common are reported below. The following sub-sections do not 
cover all 24 participants, but selected individuals illustrate various ways in which people 
used multiple discourses to explain their commuting behaviour. Interestingly, these 
combinations of discourses are cross-theoretical; they show people invoking ideas from 
both NAT and the TPB, or combining concepts captured by one of the theories with 
other concepts, such as habit, that are not included in either model. Table 6.7 shows 
what combination of discourses each participant used to explain their commuting mode 
choice. It also shows whether they moved campus, how far they commuted before and 
afterwards and what mode(s) they used during study 2. (Everyone commuted by car at 
least four days a week during study 1.) 
6.5.2.1 Morality and self-interest as mutually-reinforcing 
One reason for using both NAT and the TPB in this research was that neither explicitly 
captures the possibility of people having moral and self-interested reasons for one 
action. While talk may not reveal 'inner realities', six people at least spoke of having 
mutually-reinforcing moral and non-moral motives for commuting by particular modes. 
Ernie, for example, said that reducing his car use for commuting between studies 1 and 
2 had benefited him and others. He reportedly gained financially from cutting his car 
use in favour of motorcycling because "bike's more economical". He also stated a 
desire to avoid "sitting in jams and churning out fumes and not going anywhere", which 
can be characterised as a pro-environmental (moral) position. 
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Participant Campus Study 1 Study 2 Mode(s) Combination of discourses invoked to explain 
move commute commute during commuting mode choice 
(miles} (miles} stud:l2 
Les No 4.0 4.0 Drive Car as practical and doubts over environmental impacts 
Alun Yes 6.4 1.5 Cycle/walk! Car as impractical , driving as morally problematic, affective 
get lift motives for cycling and concern over environmental 
impacts all supporting use of non-car modes 
Patricia No 4.1 4.1 Cycle/drivel Car as impractical, driving as morally problematic and 
motorcycle concern over environmental impacts all supporting use of 
non-car modes 
Frances Yes 22.7 15.1 Cycle and Car as impractical , driving as morally problematic and 
train concern over environmental impacts all supporting use of 
non-car modes 
Ernie No 26.7 26.7 Drive/ Car as impractical, driving as morally problematic, affective 
motorcycle motives for motorcycling and concern over environmental 
impacts all supporting use of non-car modes 
Rick Yes 23.4 12.5 Cycle/drive/ Car as impractical and affective motives for cycling both 
motorcycle supporting use of non-car modes 
Owen No 5.6 5.6 Drive Driving as morally problematic, concem over 
environmental impacts, but driving as necessary 
Sue Yes 5.0 2.0 Drive/cycle Car as impractical , driving as morally problematic and 
concern over environmental impacts all supporting use of 
non-car modes 
Denise No 2.2 2.2 Drive Driving as morally problematic, but car as practical 
Monica No 25.2 25.2 Drive Car as practical and affective motives for driving 
Wendy Yes 6.3 1.2 Cycle/walk! Car as impractical, driving as morally problematic and 
drive affective motives for cycling all supporting use of non-car 
modes 
Nigel No 7.9 7.9 Drive Driving as morally problematic, affective motives for bus 
use and car as impractical, but laziness and habit as 
reasons for driving 
Vic No 2.1 2.1 Drive Anti-driving social norm and negative environmental 
impacts acknowledged, but habit, laziness and car's 
practicality as reasons for driving 
Beryl No 1.8 1.8 Drive Car as practical and affective motives for driving 
Harry No 2.1 2.1 Drive Driving as necessary and social pressure (from employer) 
as reasons for driving 
Zoe Yes 33.6 28.5 Drive Driving as necessary despite being morally problematic 
and having negative environmental impacts 
Georgina No 5.0 5.0 Drive Car as practical and habit as reasons for driving 
Jacky Yes 7.1 4.2 Drive Driving as necessary, practical and affectively beneficial 
despite being morally problematic 
Ursula No 15.2 15.2 Drive Driving as necessary despite negative affect 
Ian No 18.9 18.9 Drive Car as practical and doubts over environmental impacts 
Kath No 8.3 8.3 Drive Driving as morally problematiC, but doubts over 
environmental impacts as well as practical and affective 
motives for car use 
Tina No 6.3 6.3 Drive Driving as morally problematic, but necessary, practical 
and habitual 
Bryan No 4.0 4.0 Drive/cycle/ Driving sometimes necessary, but affective and practical 
get lift benefits from cycling 
Carl No 10.9 10.9 Drive/train Car as practical and necessary despite affective and moral 
motives for using non-car modes 
Table 6.7 Participants' commuting distances, modes and use of combinations of discourses 
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Patricia also said that she had reduced the amount that she drove to DMU, reporting a 
switch to more cycling. She too stated moral and self-interested motives. She 
expressed obligation to avoid commuting by car with her assertion that "I certainly feel 
like I should use my bike if I can" and guilt over driving by saying "I used my car 
today ... I wish I didn't, but I did." But she also identified instrumental benefits from 
cycling, saying that "it saves money", "you're not gonna be caught up in traffic" and "it's 
a good way of keeping fit." Her position, like Ernie's, was that using a non-car mode for 
commuting made both moral and practical sense. 
Alun, Wendy and Sue's accounts echoed Ernie and Patricia's insofar as they reported 
having acted on the intentions stated in study 1 because they believed that commuting 
by non-car modes (at least sometimes) was both practical and morally right. But Ernie 
and Patricia were alone in saying that they switched modes when not subject to 
contextual change. Alun, Wendy and Sue all relocated between the two studies and 
this shortened their commutes. (As reported in section 6.5.1.2, Frances also expressed 
mutually-reinforcing moral and practical motives for switching from driving to 
commuting by bicycle and train. These motives were not, however, given in explanation 
for the intention to reduce car use that she stated in study 1. That was apparently 
based solely on anticipating a shorter commute.) 
Ernie and Patricia's commuting distances did not change and it is notable that both 
expressed a combination of moral and personal-instrumental motives for switching to 
non-car modes for some journeys. There is an interesting comparison with Denise and 
Nigel. Neither moved campuses and both stated intentions to reduce their car use 
which were reportedly not enacted. They each expressed only one type of motive for 
avoiding driving (moral for Denise and instrumental for Nigel), while Ernie and Patricia 
expressed two types. Of those who moved between studies, people who invoked 
multiple discourses expressing different types of motive for reducing car use were more 
likely to report actually having done so than people expressing only one type of motive. 
6.5.2.2 Morality and self-interest in opposition 
Moral and non-moral motives did not always sit comfortably together in people's 
accounts. Six participants' used the driving-as-morally-problematic discourse whilst 
also saying that commuting by car was either practical or necessary for them. This 
tension was best illustrated in Denise's account and suggests a possible explanation 
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for her reported failure to reduce her car use, despite having stated an intention to do 
so in study 1. 
Denise repeatedly expressed guilt over driving, saying, for example, "it's something I 
feel kind of a bit uncomfortable about" and "I don't feel totally comfortable with the car 
driving ... for environmental and sort of ecological reasons." She also expressed 
obligation not to drive with her assertion that "I think I probably shouldn't be using a 
car" (her emphasis). However, she explained that "I choose to drive for practical 
considerations", arguing that commuting by car saved time and was convenient. 
Whatever she intended during study 1, the stance taken in study 2 was that self-
interest had prevailed over environmental concern. When asked how she usually 
commuted, Denise replied "I have been seriously considering giving up my car ... But I 
haven't quite got there ... so it's always the car." 
Denise's positive evaluations of driving's practical benefits were not the only aspect of 
her account that conflicted with the moral concerns she reported. She also invoked the 
car-as-practical discourse when characterising non-car modes negatively. 
I: I do not like cycling. I'm frankly scared of traffic ... Wouldn't do that. Buses ... by the time you've 
walked to the bus stop and waited for the bus, it's no better ... So I see the choice as between 
having a car or walking. 
Notably, the choice was between having a car and walking; not using a car and 
walking. This implied that simply owning a car was a barrier to switching commuting 
modes. Indeed, Denise proposed this (echoing Carl's comments in section 6.5.1.3). 
I: I don't live that far from DMU ... So, I mean, «sighs)) I don't sort of feel terribly comfortable 
that I drive that distance. Partly, well the main reason I do it is because lawn a car [and I] pay, 
y'know, the money that you payout on your insurance and everything about owning car ... So 
because I have got a car, I think I might as well use the car.= 
The tension between Denise's moral stance and her (financial) self-interest was 
apparent again. While she expressed environmental concern and said that this made 
her feel guilty about driving and even to have considered getting rid of her car, her final 
position was that driving's practical benefits outweighed these considerations. 
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6.5.2.3 Affective and instrumental motives as mutually-reinforcing 
Section 6.5.2.1 showed how evaluations of a travel mode's personal benefits could be 
consistent with a moral preference for that mode. Two mutually-reinforcing types of 
motive were expressed for the same behaviour. In a similar vein, eight participants 
presented their chosen commuting mode as bringing two types of personal benefit: 
instrumental and affective. 
Monica, for example, identified practical and emotional benefits from driving. It was 
reported in section 6.5.1.1 that she gave several practical reasons to support her 
conclusion that "obviously the car is the most sensible option for me" (e.g. needing to 
drive during working hours, the infrequency of buses). But these instrumental 
evaluations do not constitute Monica's whole explanation for her car use. When asked 
whether she enjoyed driving, she made the following comments. 
I: I do. I love it. [I have to] say ... It's being able to be in my own environment and have the 
music on how I want the music on, um, «pause» I dunno, I just feel like you can enjoy, I like the 
journey ... So, I just find, I do enjoy «pause» I, I can't quite put my finger on it. I think it's having 
your own personal space, really. 
As well as being the most practical way of commuting, driving was characterised as an 
enjoyable experience because of the privacy it afforded. Two discourses that referred 
to different types of personal benefit were invoked to explain car use for commuting. 
Other participants gave practical and affective reasons for commuting by different 
modes; particularly cycling. Alun said that enjoyment "absolutely, definitely" was a 
reason why he commuted this way and, as reported in section 6.5.1.2, stated that it was 
"just much easier to walk or cycle" to DMU than it was to drive and to park. Wendy's 
stated reasons for reducing her commuter car use in favour of cycling were similar, as 
were Rick's. He expressed considerable enthusiasm for cycling with statements 
including "I will try and favour my push bike whenever I can ... That's just obviously 
because I enjoy riding my push bike" and "I really do like push bikes ... I had a go on my 
wife's and just thought, 'Yeah, this is really good.'" But Rick also stressed that cycling 
was not just "a form of transport that's gonna get you from A to B. It's also gonna give 
you a physical workout." This is a practical benefit, although physical fitness (or the 
belief that one is physically fit) may also have secondary emotional benefits (e.g. 
Brehm, 2003; Edwards, Edwards and Basson, 2004). Thus, a number of participants 
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explained their commuting behaviour by saying that their preferred mode gave them 
both material and affective benefits. 
6.5.2.4 Necessity overrides all else 
Another common stance - taken by seven participants - was that whatever they may 
have liked to do, they actually had to drive to work. The necessity for car use was often 
presented as a factor that negated any other concerns; moral, instrumental or affective. 
Owen provides one example. As reported in section 6.5.1.3, he remarked that he 
thought of himself as being "reasonably environmentally friendly" and said that he 
would have preferred to use a park and ride service than to commute by car had such 
a service existed. He also said the following about his pro-environmental stance. 
I: I try to save the planet by whatever means I can. I mean I've always tried to bring my children 
up to be environmentally friendly ... I've done some environmental work, in terms of working with 
young people to raise awareness ... So I feel I should, in some ways, be that classical youth 
worker who's still a role model. 
This stated desire to be a role model apparently led Owen to "feel that sort of guilt that 
I've, you know, still used the motor" when he drove to work. However, he went on to 
assert that he had no alternative. When asked whether he always commuted by car, he 
replied as follows. 
I: Yes. But if you look at, if you plot my feet, for me to get here by any other means, I've no idea 
how long it would [take.] But it would be, it would be pretty horrendous times. Just because I 
live outside of a regular route for buses and there's just no other way to get here. 
Owen's position was that in spite of the guilt he felt because of driving and his concern 
for the environment, necessity overrode these motives and led him to commute by car 
anyway. 
In contrast to Owen, Ursula expressed no pro-environmental beliefs or moral motives 
for avoiding car use, but still claimed that she would have preferred not to drive to 
work. Her explanation for this was affective. When asked whether she enjoyed driving, 
she replied "No ... I don't like driving ... I hate driving. It gets me really worked up ... I 
hate it... I hate sitting in traffic jams. I hate driving. But it's a necessity." She could 
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hardly have stated her negative emotional response to car commuting more forcefully, 
but argued that she had no choice because of contextual conditions (e.g. lack of public 
transport alternatives). According to Ursula, she had to drive whether she liked it or not; 
and she did not. 
Harry claimed that he had to drive because his employer required him to retain a 
departmental parking space. What is particularly interesting about his account is that it 
illustrates the blurry distinction between choice and necessity and the way in which a 
behaviour can be presented as necessary or negotiable depending on the stance a 
person is trying to construct. 
As reported in section 6.5.1.3, Harry initially claimed to have no control over how he 
commuted. Later, however, he stated that he intended to start cycling to work. 
R: Is there anything else that influences how you travel, specifically for your work journey? 
I: My doctor's told me I need to lose some weight, so I shall be getting a bicycle soon and be 
cycling ... So er, that will change my way, er, how I travel... Because the doctor told me I've got 
diabetes, and I need to lose a stone in weight, so I shall be getting a bicycle and I shall be using 
that to get to work. 
Harry clearly asserted modal choice, contradicting his previous assertion that "I have to 
use the car to travel to work because that's what they ask me to do." Thus, the 
necessity for driving disappeared from his stance. As such, it is arguable that although 
Harry said "I have to", we can interpret his expressions of employer pressure as a 
social norm that he apparently conformed to rather than a non-negotiable requirement. 
In his account, necessity did not override all else, despite his initial claim to this effect. 
6.5.2.5 Habit overrides all else 
As noted in section 6.5.1.8, six participants suggested that their commuting behaviour 
was habitual. Some were explicit about this, while others implied habits by using terms 
such as "routine". What is most interesting as regards combinations of discourses is 
that some people talked of imperatives for using non-car modes but suggested that 
driving habits prevented these concerns from actually influencing their modal choice. 
Nigel provides the best example. He spoke positively about his occasional experience 
of commuting by bus, characterising it as "quite relaxing", "convenient" and "less 
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stressful" than driving. In other words, he expressed practical and affective evaluations 
of bus use that were congruent with switching to this mode. However, he also said that 
each time he had commuted by bus because his car was unavailable, he had 
considered continuing to use the bus once his car was returned but had never actually 
done so: "But of course, I didn't." Habit was presented as a force acting against 
behaviour change even when - based on Nigel's own evaluations of bus travel - one 
might conclude that change would benefit him. 
Tina's position is notable because she repeatedly expressed guilt - for example by 
saying that she was "not a good person, ecologically" and was "afraid" that she 
commuted by car - yet these evaluations of her behaviour as morally problematic did 
not lead to the conclusion that she should use another mode. When asked whether she 
consciously thought about how to get to work each day, she replied "No, I just get in 
the car" and, as reported in section 6.5.1.8, she said that she had decided to commute 
by car twenty years previously and just continued. She presented habit as a force that 
prevented her from considering alternatives to driving, whereas Nigel presented it as a 
force that prevented their use. Nonetheless, there is a similarity insofar as both of them 
characterised their driving habits as blocking behaviour change in some way. 
6.5.2.6 Summary of positions based on multiple discourses 
The five preceding sub-sections describe some ways in which participants used 
multiple discourses to construct their overall pOSitions on commuting. Although not 
exhaustive, they cover the most frequently-used combinations of discourses and 
illustrate how people dealt with apparently conflicting motives (e.g. the tension between 
morality and practicality in Denise's account) or provided several mutually-reinforcing 
motives for using a given commuting mode (e.g. Alun's argument that cycling was both 
more enjoyable and more practical than commuting by car and also that it accorded 
with his moral stance on driving). The theoretical implications of these findings are 
taken up in the discussion in section 6.6. 
6.5.3 Additional analysis: the transtheoretical model of behaviour change 
Much of the above analysis refers to NAT and the TPB, but neither of these theories 
was designed to explain behaviour change over time (Huguenin, 2005). This is an 
interesting aspect of the present research; with seven participants reportedly switching 
commuting modes for at least some journeys to work between studies 1 and 2. One 
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framework with an explicit temporal dimension is Prochaska's (Prochaska & Norcross, 
2001) transtheoretical model (TIM). This was developed to explain health behaviour 
changes like stopping smoking (Prochaska & DiClemente, 1982) and starting exercise 
(Nigg, Burbank, Padula, Dufrense, Rossi, Velicer, Laforge and Prochaska, 1999). It has 
been described as "a general explanatory model of intentional behavior change" (Ibid., 
473). Despite this generality, the TIM has rarely been applied to environmentally-
significant behaviour (ESB). A literature search revealed only one ESB study to use the 
theory; Gatersleben's (2003) investigation of cycle commuting. 
According to the TIM, "people move through five stages when attempting to change a 
behaviour": precontemplation, contemplation, preparation, action and maintenance 
(Nigg et. al., 1999,473). They are summarised in Table 6.8, based on Prochaska & 
Norcross (2001). Although a simple interpretation of the TIM suggests that change is 
linear, practitioners note that people often cycle through stages and may never reach 
action or maintenance (Ibid.). 
Stage of change 
Precontemplation 
Contemplation 
Preparation 
Action 
Maintenance 
Theoretical definition 
There is "no intention to change the behavior in the 
foreseeable future". Indeed, the individual may not 
feel that their behaviour needs changing. 
The individual is "aware that a problem exists and 
is seriously thinking about overcoming it but has 
not yet made a commitment to take action." 
"Individuals in this stage are intending to take 
action in the next month". They may have begun to 
make small changes, "but have not yet reached a 
criterion for effective action, such as abstinence 
from smoking'. 
"Individuals modify their behavior, experiences and 
environment to overcome their problems. Action 
requires considerable commitment of time and 
energy: 
The individual "works to consolidate the gains 
attained during action." 
Table 6.8 TIM stages of change 
Operational definition 
The individual is not intending to 
change the target behaviour in the 
next six months. 
The individual is seriously 
considering changing the target 
behaviour in the next six months. 
The individual expresses a definite 
intention to change the target 
behaviour in the next month. 
Individuals are in this stage "if they 
have successfully altered the 
dysfunctional behavior for a period 
from 1 day to 6 months.· 
The individual is "able to remain 
free of the problem behavior and to 
consistently engage in a new 
behavior for more than 6 months.· 
The operational definitions in Table 6.B were used as decision rules to classify 
participants by stages of change. Each transcript was examined for references to 
switching commuting modes; either since study 1 or planned in the six months 
following the interview. Some suggested no previous modal switch or intention to 
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switch in future. For example, Ian simply replied "No, no" when asked whether he had 
considered reducing his car use. Expanding rather more, Les answered as follows. 
I: Er, yes ... But, er, actually we've tended to use the car more because at the time we were 
thinking about reducing the use of the car, urn, some years back, the family started dispersing. 
R: Right. 
I: So we ended up with a, er, son in Wensleydale, North Yorkshire and daughter in urn, in 
Norfolk ... So, urn, either way it was a hundred and fifty, hundred and seventy miles ... plus my 
mother's now 90 and I go and see her once a week. And urn, even if you get stuck on the M25 
it's still quicker to drive than go by train. 
This indicated precontemplation (although perhaps 'noncontemplation' would be better, 
as 'pre' implies that contemplation will occur later). Les said that he had considered 
reducing his car use "some years back", but there was no indication that he was 
contemplating doing so in the next six months, or that he had ever thought about 
reducing his commuter car use (despite the intention expressed in study 1). 
Frances, by contrast, was apparently in the action stage. Having car shared "up 'til two 
weeks" before her interview, she reported having just started commuting by train and 
bicycle. Alun appeared to be in the maintenance stage. He said that he always drove to 
work at the time of study 1, but switched to cycling, walking or getting a lift after moving 
campuses nine months before study 2. He had therefore maintained his new 
commuting behaviour for more than the six months required to pass through the action 
stage. Harry, who said that he would "be getting a bicycle soon" and "using that to get 
to work" was classified as being in the contemplation stage. He suggested that he was 
seriously considering changing his commuting behaviour in the next six months. Each 
participant's TTM classification is shown in Table 6.9, along with the basis for it, and 
the intention stated in study 1. (It is stressed that classifications relied on self-reports.) 
The TTM was applied to see whether participants at different stages invoked particular 
discourses in explaining their commuting behaviour. This was not an attempt to find 
discourses of precontemplation, preparation and so on. Rather, the aim was to see 
whether participants' use of discourses identified in section 6.5.1 was associated with 
their stage of change. 
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Intention Partici~ant TIM stage Ex~lanation of TIM classification 
Reduce car Les Precontemplation No talk of intention to switch commuting modes despite study 1 data 
use Alun Maintenance Reported switch from driving to mix of non-car modes between 
studies 
Patricia Maintenance Reported switch to cycling more between studies 
Frances Action Reported switch to cycling and train two weeks before study 2 
Emie Maintenance Reported switched to motorcycling more between studies 
Rick Maintenance Reported switch to cycling more between studies 
Owen Precontemplation Reported reducing car use by commuting less often due to semi-
retirement, but talked of impossibility of modal switch 
Sue Maintenance Reported switch to cycling more between studies 
Denise Contemplation Reportedly continued driving despite intention stated in study 1 
Monica Precontemplation Reportedly reduced car use by commuting less far after house move 
between studies, but no talk of modal switch 
Wendy Maintenance Reported switch from driving to mix of non-car modes between 
studies 
Nigel Precontemplation Reported Only used bus occasionally and temporarily despite 
intention stated in stud~ 1 
Maintain car Vic Precontemplation Stated intention to continue driving due to laziness 
use Beryl Precontemplation Stated intention to continue driving for convenience and enjoyment 
Harry Preparation Said he intended to start cycling "soon" for health reasons 
Zoe Precontemplation Said that she was unable to switch modes due to time constraints 
Georgina Precontemplation Stated intention to continue driving due to lack of altematives 
Jacky Precontemplation Said that she was unable to switch modes due to time constraints 
Ursula Precontemplation Said that she was unable to switch modes despite dislike of driving 
Ian Precontemplation Said that he had never considered reducing his car use 
Kath Precontemplation Said that she was unable to switch modes due to lack of alternatives 
Tina Precontemplation Stated intention to continue driving due to lack of alternatives 
Bryan Precontemplation Said that he could not alter current mix of modes 
Can Contem~lation Stated that he was considering commuting b~ train more often 
Table 6.9 Participants' TIM classifications 
In fact, few such patterns emerged. Moreover, precontemplators did not commute 
much further than others. Average commute distance for precontemplators was 9.8 
miles, compared to 9.1 miles for all participants (calculated using home and work 
postcodes at www.multimap.com).This contrasts with Gatersleben's (2003) finding that 
precontemplators commuted significantly further than others. However she only 
investigated switching from driving to cycling. Distance may be more salient when 
people think about switching to cycling than to bus, for example. 
Three observations regarding the TTM are noteworthy. Firstly, nobody in the 
maintenance or action stages (seven people who switched commuting modes between 
studies 1 and 2) used the driving-as-necessary discourse. This suggests the 
importance of perceived control to behaviour change. 
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Secondly, the driving-as-necessary discourse was central in the accounts of eight of 
the 14 precontemplators. Again, this hints at the importance of perceived control to 
(even considering) behavioural change. 
Thirdly, of six people who invoked the driving-as-morally-problematic discourse to 
express obligation to avoid car use for commuting, five (Alun, Denise, Frances, Patricia 
and Sue) were apparently beyond precontemplation. (The exception was Zoe, who 
apparently could not act on her personal norm because driving to work was necessary 
due to other commitments.) Of course, reports of reduced car use were not always 
associated with expression of normative self-expectations. Rick, for example, had 
seemingly reached maintenance and did not take any moral position on driving. In fact, 
he said "some people just like cars. Is there a problem with that? I don't think it's to be 
frowned upon. If someone wants to buy a car that only does eight miles to the gallon 
and they can afford it then that's their choice." The point remains, however, that where 
personal norms were expressed, they seemed to be associated with movement 
through the TIM. 
6.6 Discussion 
This study set out to answer one broad question: how do participants explain their 
commuting behaviour? This question was addressed in two stages. Firstly, a number of 
discourses were identified in section 6.5.1. Secondly, ways in which participants 
combined these discourses to construct positions on commuting were reported in 
section 6.5.2. 
In response to data concerning changes in some participants' commuting behaviour, 
Prochaska's (Prochaska & Norcross, 2001) transtheoretical model (TIM) was applied 
as a possible means of understanding the process of switching travel modes. Thus, as 
well as answering the original question, the study included some additional analysis. 
6.6.1 Vocabularies and discourses 
Section 6.5.1 examined explanations of commuting behaviour and treated discourses, 
rather than participants, as units of analysis. People gave a range of explanations for 
commuting by particular travel modes, from which eight shared vocabularies and 16 
shared discourses were identified. Some echoed constructs from norm-activation 
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theory (NAT) and the theory of planned behaviour (TPS). Others referred to motives 
not captured by these theories. 
Separate discourses echoed the TPS constructs of attitude (A TT), subjective norm 
(SN) and perceived behavioural control (PSC). Several people invoked the driving-as-
necessary discourse (Le. low PSC), absolving themselves of responsibility for their car 
use. Why should they do this? Perhaps they believed that driving would be 
disapproved of. Indeed, some participants alluded to an anti-driving social norm. 
Moreover, people may have perceived the researcher as being anti-driving. Although 
care was taken to remain neutral, participants knew that the researcher was from 
DMU's Institute of Energy and Sustainable Development. They may have assumed that 
such a person, investigating travel behaviour, would frown upon car use. 
Whatever the reason, several drivers stressed that they had to commute by car, raising 
questions about choice and necessity. It was argued in section 6.5.1.3 that while 
participants used separate vocabularies to characterise driving as necessary or as 
more practical than alternatives, these were different ways of talking about the same 
issue. Some people said that they had a choice of commuting modes and chose the 
most instrumentally beneficial, while others pOSitioned themselves as being unable to 
choose because non-car modes were so impractical. One might say that the former 
group explained their car use in instrumental terms, while the latter group justified it. 
Kath, for example, said that she had to drive because there were no buses, her route 
was unsuitable for cycling and car sharing was inflexible. Tina gave similar reasons. 
Soth also acknowledged anti-driving social norms and stated guilt over driving. Thus, 
while they expressed motives that would be consistent with avoiding car use, they 
justified driving by saying that it was necessary. These could be examples of self-
serving bias, with people streSSing the influence of external factors on behaviour that 
they feel is somehow deficient (for example, because it conflicts with a social norm) 
rather than admitting to internal motives (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002). Indeed, Steg (2005, 
148f) suggests that "people might not be willing to admit that using a car fulfills many 
symbolic and affective functions" and that "car drivers are inclined to justify and 
rationalise their behaviour". 
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Kath, Tina and others highlight a point about contextual influences. The necessity of 
driving was attributed to numerous factors, which are divisible into two broad types: 
personal (or dispositional) and contextual (or situational). These categories have 
existed in social psychology for many years (e.g. Heider, 1958), but have been 
questioned. For example, Langdridge and Butt (2004, 360) argue that "this distinction is 
problematic because what we have traditionally defined as situational ... may very 
easily be re-cast as dispositional and vice-versa". 
The personal/contextual distinction does seem simplistic. Vic, for example, identified 
laziness as a reason for driving to DMU, but also claimed that there was "No close or 
easy public transport". The first reason referred to a personal characteristic, the second 
to context. But they must interact. Somebody else in the same situation may have said 
that public transport was usable (see Salomon & Mokhtarian, 1997). It is useful to recall 
Handyet. al.'s (2005) assertion that it may be impossible to differentiate actions taken 
through choice from those performed out of necessity because individuals have 
different perceptions of the effort that is acceptable (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2). 
Previous UK research shows that people often assert inability to drive less (DEFRA, 
2002), or, put another way, that all their driving is necessary. The present study echoes 
this. Citing constraints such as having to combine commuting with family commitments 
(see Dowling, 2000; Root & Schintler, 1999) and the cost, quality or lack of public 
transport (see Exley & Christie, 2002), participants often used the driving-as-necessary 
discourse to justify car use despite imperatives to use other modes. It was invoked 
alongside statements of responsibility or obligation for avoiding driving, guilt over 
driving, or driving's environmental impacts. This echoes study 1 's finding that PBC 
moderated ARlPN's influence on intentions. The different methods used in the two 
studies provide complementary results. 
The driving-as-morally-problematic discourse provided another echo of study 1, in that 
partiCipants seemed not to distinguish responsibility from obligation. This is congruent 
with the study 1 principal components analysis (PCA) where AR and PN loaded highly 
on one factor. There are other examples from travel psychology studies of 
responsibility and obligation being characterised as essentially the same. Bickerstaff & 
Walker (2002) offer qualitative evidence to this effect, while Hunecke et. al. (2001) 
provide quantitative evidence (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1.4 and Chapter 4, section 
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4.5.3.2). These findings suggest that Schwartz's (1977) theoretical distinction between 
responsibility and obligation may not reflect how people talk about travel. Certainly the 
present study indicates that although some people describe modal choice as having a 
moral component, this component is undifferentiated. 
In other ways, however, participants' accounts reflected Schwartz's (1977) formulation 
of NAT. He stated that failure to act on normative self-expectations (PN) causes "guilt, 
self-deprecation, loss of self-esteem or other negative self-evaluations" (Ibid., 231). 
Ten people expressed guilt over their car use. Whether they really felt this cannot be 
revealed by their accounts, but we should recognise the possibility that drivers did not 
want to seem 'uncaring' in light of anti-driving social norms. The fact that only seven of 
10 people who expressed guilt over driving also expressed responsibility or obligation 
for avoiding it suggests that some of them may have asserted guilt for self-
presentational reasons. Alternatively, expressions of guilt over driving could be seen as 
consistent with a lack of obligation to avoid car use when people also argue that driving 
is necessary (e.g. Kath and Tina). This is an issue for future research. 
So far discussion has focused on NAT and TPB constructs that were each echoed by 
one discourse. People only referred to behavioural control when arguing that car use 
was necessary and, when discussing moral issues, participants invariably cast avoiding 
car use as 'right', whether they did so or not. Awareness of consequences (AC) was 
more contentious. There were two discourses that - although drawing on the same 
vocabulary of emissions, pollution and CO2 - asserted opposing positions. 
The more common discourse characterised vehicle emissions as environmentally 
harmful. Such statements were often used to explain feelings of responsibility and 
obligation, mirroring Schwartz's (Ibid.) proposal that PN is (partly) activated by AC. 
But not everyone characterised pollution as a reason not to drive. Four participants 
expressed scepticism over the environmental harm caused by cars. Rick's stance was 
one of 'technological optimism' (Costanza, 2000). He argued that while cars do pollute, 
"emissions problems are going to be met by more efficient engines". Les expressed 
similar views. These shifts of responsibility for cutting automotive pollution onto industry 
reflect an almost identical discourse identified by Bickerstaff & Walker (2002). Ian 
asserted that emissions had never been a serious a problem and that the threat of 
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CO2-induced climate change was exaggerated. It is notable that he prefaced these 
remarks by saying "For the record, I am a chemist." This asserted his authority on the 
issue. Kath's stance differed slightly. She acknowledged that vehicle emissions could 
be damaging, but argued that anthropogenic emissions are insignificant compared to 
those from non-human sources, leading her to question the importance of human 
actions. While there were differences between these participants' positions, the 
common feature is that they all used scepticism about automotive-induced 
environmental problems to justify driving. (Although divided by whether they expressed 
concern or scepticism, it is notable that over half the participants talked about cars' 
environmental impacts. Whether this is representative of the UK population is doubtful. 
It may be a function of this sample's generally high education levels.) 
In considering the opposing discourses on automotive pollution, it is useful to recall 
Hagman's (2003) proposal that people experience their cars' instrumental benefits, but 
only know about environmental damage through external sources. This knowledge is 
"negotiable, and open to interpretation" (Ibid., 8). Hence, Hagman argues, people feel 
able to justify driving on the basis of its personal benefits in the face of alleged 
environmental threats. The present study offers some support for this proposal. The 
benefits of commuting by car were always couched in terms of verifiable experience 
(using the car-as-practical discourse), while disbenefits were often cast in terms of 
less-perceptible environmental problems. (There was, of course, a car-as-impractical 
discourse as well, but this was less prevalent than the opposing position). The 
scepticism discourse illustrates that knowledge of such problems is negotiable and that 
at least some people feel able to challenge it when defending their driving. 
As well as pollution, six participants alluded to another negative consequence of car 
use: congestion. Some cited this as a reason for commuting by bicycle or motorbike; 
modes that cut through traffic. Others indicated that congestion actually encouraged 
them to drive. Georgina explained as follows. 
I: Er, and there are buses, which I could use. But when they stop «pause» [the traffic stops.] 
Urn, because the road isn't wide enough. Urn, «pause» it used to take me about an hour to get 
home as well, when I came on the bus, 'cos you've got to wait for a bus. And that used to be 
affected by congestion. They didn't arrive when they should've done. At least in the car I can nip 
off the main road and get around any spots where it's just not moving. 
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Thus, despite the paradox, there was a position which identified congestion as a 
reason for driving. This calls to mind the idea of travel as a social dilemma (see 
Chapter 3, section 3.5). Individuals might benefit from driving, but society suffers. Vic 
described this situation succinctly. His answer to whether he thought that problems 
caused by car use were important is reproduced below. 
I: They're certainly important. But because they don't affect people in their day to day travel, or 
behaviour, «pause» um, people don't take them seriously or appreciate their consequences or 
really do anything to address them. I mean, I feel like why should I stop driving when nobody 
else is going to? Why should I put myself out? 
Vic alluded to driving's negative consequences, but indicated that he felt no obligation 
to drive less because "nobody else is going to". The social dilemma highlighted by Vic 
reminds us that, as Schwartz (1977) proposed, awareness of consequences alone is 
unlikely to be sufficient motivation for altruistic behaviour. 
A final note on car use consequences concems the few statements of driving's 
economic and social benefits. Such views may help in understanding the UK's general 
car-dependence (see Chapter 7, section 7.3), but there was no clear, direct link with 
participants' commuting behaviour. These views may be related more to car ownership 
than to modal choice for specific joumeys. Of course, some people cited car ownership 
to justify commuting by car, saying that it would be wasteful to pay for non-car modes 
while paying fixed costs associated with driving (see Salomon & Mokhtarian, 1997). 
However, nobody suggested a direct relationship between the car's general socio-
economic benefits and their car commuting specifically. 
As in Hagman's (2003) study, several partiCipants explained their car use by reference 
to personal, practical benefits. Four of driving's instrumental advantages -
convenience, flexibility, reliability and speed - constituted the prevalent practicality 
discourse. The comparative aspect of this discourse was important. People often gave 
negative evaluations of public transport alongside positive evaluations of driving. 
Participants may have given these negative evaluations to pre-emptively defend 
themselves against the charge that other modes could confer the same benefits as the 
car. Kath, for example, asserted (referring to driving) that "there's the convenience of 
travel and the inconvenience of public travel." Such perceptions are common in travel 
psychology research, leading Exley & Christie (2002, 19) to conclude that if "more 
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people are to switch to bus and train travel, major efforts will be needed both to 
improve services and to change the perception of public transport as inconvenient" 
(see also Chapter 3, section 3.3.1). 
Although the most common practicality discourse supported driving, the car-as-
impractical discourse referred to instrumental benefits to explain use of non-car modes. 
Cyclists and motorcyclists positively evaluated these modes' speed and ability to 
bypass congestion. Cyclists also referred to exercise. Despite conferring longer-term 
benefits than the convenience or flexibility of a given mode on a particular day, 
exercise can still be seen as instrumental. All six participants who cycled to work spoke 
positively about the health benefits provided by this mode, suggesting that - as 
Gatersleben (2003,180) proposes - "those who cycle simply ... like the exercise". 
As discussed in Chapter 3, recent travel psychology studies have moved beyond the 
assumption that people only "make reasoned choices and behave rationally" (Steg, 
Vlek & Siotegraaf, 2001, 151), examining affective motives. The present study adds to 
this work. Although some people's explanations of their commuting behaviour were 
staunchly practical, more than half the participants gave non-instrumental reasons for 
using particular modes. Notably, however, these reasons were usually cast as 
supplementary; supporting morally- or practically-motivated choices. 
There is some evidence of this finding being echoed in quantitative studies of modal 
choice (Anable & Gatersleben, 2005; Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; see Chapter 3, 
section 3.3.1.2), but instrumental motives do not always appear to outweigh affective 
ones in this domain. Steg, Vlek & Siotegraaf (2001) found that motives' relative 
importance depended on the measurement method, while Steg (2005, 159) found that 
commuter "car use was especially related to symbolic and affective motives ... not to 
instrumental ones" and that commuting mode was "not significantly related to the 
evaluation of the instrumental function of commuter car use." 
Steg, Vlek & Siotegraaf (2001) also argue that people may not admit to enjoying driving 
if they believe it is socially undesirable. In the present study, no drivers described their 
mode as 'fun', whilst most cyclists and all motorcyclists did. This may be another 
example of self-serving bias and further research could examine whether social 
desirability might influence people's willingness to characterise driving as 'fun'. 
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Despite not mentioning 'fun', drivers provided other affective reasons for their modal 
choice. One that was unique to car users was pleasure from privacy. Based on a PCA 
of 33 evaluations of car use, Steg (2005) actually identified this as an instrumental 
benefit, but the way in which the present participants discussed it suggested that it was 
- as Ellaway et. al. (2003) argue - an affective evaluation. Jacky provides an example. 
I: Yeah, and I've got no one, another thing I find enjoyable while driving is there is nobody in the 
car with me. ((laughing» Nobody asking me questions. Nobody arguing. It's quiet. 
R: A little moment of peace. 
I: Yeah ... I can gather my thoughts and urn, «pause» ... That's probably the only time of the day 
when nobody can ask [me] questions or bother me. I like that. It's nicer than being on a bus with 
loads of other people around. 
This implied a less visceral form of pleasure than 'fun'; pleasure from peace rather than 
excitement. Although commuting by car seemed unable to match other modes in terms 
of 'fun', participants suggested that it outperformed alternatives in providing 'personal 
space' (see also Hagman, 2003; Handy et. al., 2005). 
Ernie cited another aspect of affect, speaking of "little back roads that you can take the 
motorbike and unwind". Commuting offered time to relax after "a stressful day". This 
raises the idea of commuting as a buffer between work and home life (Salomon & 
Mokhtarian, 1997; Schwanen and Dijst, 2002). While rational-choice models assume 
that travel modes' attractiveness is "a function of travel time and cost" (Rodriguez & 
Joo, 2004,152), people may not wish to minimise this time if theyuse it to "unwind". 
There was a clear pattern whereby drivers represented commuting as stressful while 
others - espeCially cyclists and motorcyclists - represented it as relaxing. This echoes 
Evans, Wener and Phillips' (2002) idea that commuter stress results from journeys' 
unpredictability. Given that bicycles and motorbikes enable users to bypass 
congestion, they may increase predictability. As Patricia said, "You know it's gonna 
take you however long to get in by bike ... you're not gonna be caught up in traffic." 
Two people reported enjoyment of exercising skill when commuting (Beryl concerning 
driving and Ernie concerning motorcycling); something that has apparently not been 
investigated in previous studies. Pleasure in one's abilities calls to mind Bandura's 
(1994, 71) concept of self-efficacy: "people's beliefs about their capabilities to produce 
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designated levels of performance". As well as referring to normative self-expectations 
(PN), some participants explained their commuting mode choices on the basis of ability 
to meet other self-set standards. 
In total, participants gave five types of affective evaluation. Apart from privacy and guilt, 
which only drivers alluded to, they were all raised by users of different modes, 
supporting the common-sense notion that different people enjoy different activities for 
different reasons. In a sense, this does not help policy-makers. There appears to be no 
one mode that people could be convinced is more enjoyable than others. Nonetheless, 
it reminds us that people do not choose travel modes for instrumental reasons alone. 
As well as those concerning affective aspects of travel, partiCipants used two other 
shared discourses that did not echo NAT or TPB constructs; driving through laziness 
and through habit. Laziness is another socially-undesirable motive whose expression 
may be influenced by self-serving bias. Accordingly, Nigel seemed uncomfortable when 
offering it as a reason for driving. But Vic was more self-assured. Perhaps this was a 
rhetorical challenge to the interviewer. By asserting that he saw laziness as a valid 
reason for driving, Vic defended his stance from possible criticism. 
Although few participants explicitly mentioned laziness, some who did not still indicated 
that they preferred to minimise the effort expended on commuting. Beryl, for example, 
said that although she would have liked to, she often felt too tired to walk home, so she 
commuted by car. Whether this is laziness in the same sense as that expressed by 
Nigel and Vic is debatable. Perhaps the difference is in how the desire to minimise 
effort is presented. While Nigel and Vic used a socially-undesirable term, others 
preferred to rationalise their attempts to make commuting less demanding by talking 
about the car's convenience rather than any characteristic of their own. Just as driving-
as-necessary may be another way of saying that driving is far more practical than other 
modes, perhaps laziness can be seen as another way of saying that one prefers to 
minimise effort. 
Nigel and Vic's use of both habit and laziness discourses echoes observations made 
by psychologists in the attitude-behaviour tradition. Driving habits may develop more 
easily and be harder to break when drivers are unwilling to try other modes; when 
doing so is perceived as too much effort (Matthies et. al., 2002). Nigel also illustrated 
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the idea that the intention-action relationship is weak when the intention is to change a 
habitual behaviour (Ajzen, 2001; Staats, 2003). He stated an intention to reduce his car 
use for commuting in study 1, but in study 2 he presented his driving habit as the 
reason why he had not acted on it. This supports other travel research suggesting that 
the intention-behaviour link is stronger when there is no habitual past behaviour (e.g. 
ear commuting) that conflicts with intended future behaviour (e.g. commuting by non-
car modes) (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; BergstrOm & Magnusson, 2003). 
Tina also said that she habitually drove to work. She did not cast habit as a barrier to 
acting on intentions, but rather as an influence that stopped other motives from 
directing her commuting behaviour. She repeatedly expressed guilt over ear use, but 
said that she had not considered driving less. Habit's role as a moderator of moral 
motives' influence on travel behaviour was discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.3.3, and 
Tina's account called to mind this effect. 
To summarise, there were eight shared vocabularies on which participants drew to 
explain their commuting behaviour. Five echoed constructs from NAT or the TPB 
(moral aspects of travel, ear use consequences, choice and necessity, travel modes' 
instrumental functions and social pressure), while three were beyond these theories' 
scope (affective aspects of travel, habit and laziness). 
Some vocabularies gave rise to one discourse. When people spoke of choice and 
necessity, they invariably positioned themselves as having to drive. When speaking of 
moral issues, they always characterised driving as morally problematic. Only drivers 
described their commuting behaviour as habitual, or referred to laziness in explaining 
their modal choice. 
Other vocabularies gave rise to multiple discourses, some of which were directly 
opposed to each other. These referred to anti-driving versus pro-driving social norms, 
concern versus sceptiCism about cars' environmental impacts and the practicality of 
driving versus alternatives. The final vocabulary - concerning affect - was the basis of 
multiple discourses referencing different aspects of travel, but these were not 
oppositiona\. Rather, they cited different types of non-instrumental evaluation (e.g. 
privacy, stress) as reasons for choosing particular modes. 
221 
Although other explanations for modal choice were offered, these were not shared 
amongst participants like the vocabularies and associated discourses described above. 
These were the most common stances on commuting in this study and can be seen as 
the prevalent ideas surrounding travel to work among participants. 
6.6.2 The transtheoretical model of behaviour change 
Prochaska's TIM (Prochaska & Norcross, 2001) was applied to see whether different 
stages of change were associated with particular discourses. Gatersleben (2003), who 
applied the TIM to car and bicycle commuters, found that attitudes to cycling became 
more favourable and perceptions of personal barriers (e.g. fitness) became less 
apparent as people moved from precontemplation towards maintenance. She found no 
significant differences in perceptions of external barriers to cycling (e.g. weather) 
between people at different stages. 
In the present study it was harder to see differences between people at different 
stages. Without statistical tests, there was no way to 'objectively' identify similarities 
and differences between participants. Furthermore, while Gatersleben (Ibid.) examined 
differences on three variables (attitudes, personal barriers and external barriers), 
participants in this study cited 67 separate influences on modal choice for commuting 
(see Appendix 5). So many 'variables' made it difficult to identify patterns. 
Nonetheless, three points can be made. Firstly, nobody in the maintenance or action 
stages said that they had no choice over how to commute and, secondly, those who 
said that they were not considering switching modes spoke of more barriers than other 
participants. Both of these observations highlight the relationship between perceived 
control and switching (or even considering switching) commuting modes in participants' 
accounts. 
Gatersleben (Ibid.) found that precontemplators did not differ significantly from actors 
or maintainers in their perception of external barriers to cycling, while they did differ in 
perceptions of personal barriers (e.g. needing a car for work). Beliefs about what 
cycling would be like seemed less off-putting to non-cyclists than beliefs about how it 
might constrain other activities. It is difficult to draw comparisons with the present study 
because drivers were not asked specifically what stopped them from cycling. However, 
it is notable that precontemplators identified numerous barriers to switching modes; 
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some personal and some external (using Gatersleben's distinction). These included 
weather, poor cycle lanes (external), needing the car for work, baggage and needing to 
combine commuting with other trips (personal) (see also Chapter 3, section 3.3.2.1 ). 
Such concerns were widely reported by drivers and there was no one barrier that stood 
out as especially common. As Gatersleben (Ibid.) suggests, efforts to reduce car use 
may need to be personalised. Addressing what is a barrier for one person may make 
no difference to others, although as discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.6, targeted 
interventions may have little impact on overall traffic levels. 
The third observation regarding the TIM is that use of the driving-as-morally-
problematic discourse was closely associated with talk of behaviour change. The 
relationship did not always hold (Zoe expressed moral concerns over driving but 
reportedly saw no alternative), but there was a general pattern. Where people 
apparently do see a moral dimension to travel, encouraging feelings of responsibility 
and obligation may prompt them to move towards switching modes. Unfortunately, the 
TIM does not reveal why some people characterise travel as moral behaviour when 
others do not. This remains a key question for future studies. 
Use of the TIM in this study raises issues relevant to its wider application to ESB. 
Firstly, the theory was designed to illuminate changes in behaviours like smoking. 
Although people smoke different amounts, there is a clear line between smoking and 
not smoking. Travel behaviour seems less clear-cut. PartiCipants reported commuting 
by different modes on different days. As Ernie said, "it's not an all or nothing deaL" 
Changes in commuting behaviour may be incremental. Indeed, only Alun reported 
stopping driving to work altogether between studies 1 and 2. This seems to contrast 
with behaviours like smoking, where people generally stop instantaneously and are 
only 'successful' if they avoid relapsing (Prochaska & Norcross, 2001). 
Secondly, the TIM does not account for past events. The operational definition of 
precontemplation (Ibid.), for example, refers only to what people may do in the next six 
months. This may be appropriate in contexts for which the TIM was designed, but past 
experience seems relevant to travel behaviour, as Nigel illustrates. He reported that he 
had commuted by bus and although he enjoyed it and found it convenient, he always 
resumed his car use. His classification as a precontemplator draws no distinction 
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between him and others without experience of alternative modes and it is this 
experience that makes his talk of habitual driving especially interesting. 
Thirdly, the TIM was developed for situations where behaviour change could be seen 
as unambiguously desirable. For example, smokers probably accept this behaviour's 
detrimental health effects. Such behaviours are "dysfunctional" (Ibid., 444), but travel 
seems different. Vic, for example, said that driving is "just something that happens ... a 
practical means to an end." Furthermore, the TIM was designed to explain "intentional 
behavior change" (Nigg et. a/., 1999,473). In the present study, people often spoke of 
contextual changes that were beyond their control. Although they also reported 
personal motives for reducing their car use, opportunities to act on these motives were 
often said to arise externally (from, for example, DMU's campus reorganisation) and 
reduced car use sometimes seemed to require less effort than its maintenance (e.g. 
Alun and Wendy). In such situations, people apparently did not have to work "to 
consolidate the gains attained during action" (Prochaska & Norcross, 2001, 444). 
How these issues might affect the TIM's applicability to travel or other ESBs is unclear. 
It is difficult to draw general conclusions when so few studies have used the model. It is 
potentially useful to identify issues that are salient at different stages of behaviour 
change, but more work is needed to see whether the TIM provides a suitable means of 
achieving this in behavioural domains outside that for which it was developed. 
6.7 Conclusions 
This study's most important conclusions concern choice, necessity and the extent to 
which people said that they had to drive to work. Such claims reflect widespread views 
about travel in the UK (e.g. DEFRA, 2002). Of course, people react differently to the 
same contextual conditions, meaning that what necessitates car use in one person's 
eyes may not in another's. Moreover, people may attribute their driving to necessity 
rather than preference for self-presentational reasons. Nonetheless, policies making 
non-car modes more practical (Le. convenient, flexible, etc.) may discourage people 
from arguing that they must drive if they make these arguments less convincing. 
Improving non-car modes' practicality might also encourage people to act on anti-
driving social norms. While some participants acknowledged such norms, they 
seemingly felt justified in citing cars' superior practicality and the difficulty of using 
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alternatives as reasons for ignoring them. SN's reported lack of influence on 
commuting behaviour may also be related to contradictory social signals. While some 
people acknowledged anti-driving norms, others identified pro-driving norms. Old and 
new ideas about the propriety of driving may be vying for acceptance, meaning that 
there is no dominant norm surrounding car use in this research setting (see Castro and 
Lima, 2001). 
Similarly, participants did not express universal acceptance of environmental 
imperatives for avoiding car use. While there was some agreement that car use causes 
environmental damage - making driving a behaviour with moral implications - there 
was also an opposing position; that cars' negative environmental impacts have been 
exaggerated and that there is actually no need for behavioural change. 
Indeed, there seemed to be two types of commuter; those who characterised travel as 
moral behaviour and those who did not. When efforts are made to encourage drivers to 
switch modes, appeals to responsibility and obligation may not engage the latter group. 
Moreover, while there was an association between presenting travel as a moral issue 
and talking about reducing one's driving, some participants maintained that car use 
was necessary regardless of moral concerns. This further underlines the apparent 
importance of perceived control, or choice. 
People expressed low control for several reasons, but the most important seemed to 
be journey distance and lack of public transport when journeys were perceived as too 
long to walk or cycle. Because of DMU's campus reorganisation, some people had 
shorter commutes during study 2 than study 1. Some said that this increased their 
choice over how to commute, enabling them to act on their motives for reducing car 
use. In attitude-behaviour terms, perceived control seemed to moderate the influence 
of moral, instrumental and affective motives on modal choice. 
These theoretical insights resulted from studying NAT and the TPB together and these 
theories captured many reasons that participants gave for their travel mode choices. 
This is notable, given that the interviews allowed people to discuss any influences. But 
people also offered explanations for choosing particular modes that are beyond NAT 
and the TPB's purview; most notably, affect and habit. 
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Analysis showed that affect is not indivisible. People offered various non-instrumental 
reasons for choosing particular travel modes. These ranged from 'fun' to enjoyment of 
exercising a skill. Notably, drivers did not characterise commuting as 'fun' (perhaps 
related to the view that it is stressful), while users of other modes did use this term to 
describe their journeys. Although what people enjoy is a matter of personal preference, 
it may be possible for policy-makers to use the 'fun' of non-car modes as a lever to 
encourage people out of their cars. On the other hand, they may struggle to convince 
drivers to relinquish their privacy. This study suggests that this is one non-instrumental 
evaluation on which alternative modes have difficulty competing. 
Some participants spoke of habitual driving. In their accounts, attitudes to car use, 
beliefs about its impacts and so on seemed to underpin habits rather being presented 
as direct influences on commuting behaviour. If this interpretation reflects the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying travel behaviour, there are policy implications. Addressing 
attitudes and beliefs may be insufficient to change habitual driving. Additional 
measures may be required to encourage people to consider their travel on a daily basis 
rather than automatically using their cars (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.3). 
Considering policy, it is interesting to recall Labour Deputy Prime Minister John 
Prescott's words when his party took power in 1997: "I will have failed in five years time 
if there are not many more people using public transport and far fewer journeys by car" 
(Wainwright, 2004, 14). UK car use actually rose, bus use fell and train use remained 
static in between 1997 and 2002 (Exley & Christie, 2002). Policy makers have much to 
do to persuade drivers to switch modes. 
What policies does the study suggest? Firstly, even people who expressed anti-driving 
personal norms said that the fixed costs of car ownership incentivised driving. These 
costs are payable whether the car is used or not, implying that reported plans for 'pay-
as-you-drive' taxation (Tempest, 2005) could help to cut car use. 
Secondly, in contrast to Steg's (2005) Dutch study, participants identified instrumental 
motives for commuting by car. This may reflect the state of UK public transport 
compared to that in The Netherlands. Indeed, Exley & Christie (2002, 1) claim that the 
UK is "among the worst off countries in Europe for the quality of public transport." This 
implies a need for improvements in many aspects of non-car modes. Participants 
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suggested that they must be more accessible, quicker, cheaper, more reliable, more 
flexible and safer. There is nothing new here and many arms of UK government claim 
to be addressing such issues (e.g. LCC, 2005). However, the study also highlighted 
motives for car use that may be more difficult to influence. Some participants claimed 
to drive simply out of laziness. It is unclear what policies could change this. 
Some drivers identified the need to carry baggage as a reason for car use and, again, it 
is hard to see how government could address this. Perhaps employers have a role. 
They may not be able to change the perception that baggage necessitates driving, but 
could perhaps reduce the carrying that people need to do for their jobs. Organisations 
could also consider reducing the need to drive during working hours, or, if this is 
impossible, providing car pools so that employees would not need their own vehicles. 
There could even be benefits from more relaxed dress codes, so that people would not 
be put off cycling by the need to wear smart clothes. These are issues of organisational 
culture, rather than transport policy per se. 
Finally, the study revealed some scepticism about the harm caused by vehicle 
emissions. It is not clear from a small sample how widespread these views are, but the 
issue deserves attention. If many people are doubtful about the environmental harm 
resulting from car use, ways must be found to change this perception. Of course, care 
needs to be taken that educational efforts do not cause reactance. As Exley & Christie 
(2002) suggest, UK drivers seem to need few extra incentives to maintain their car use. 
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Chapter 7 
General discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters have reviewed research on travel and other environmentally-
significant behaviours (ESBs) and reported empirical work undertaken for this thesis. 
This chapter combines these strands, discussing issues arising from the thesis as a 
whole. It begins with a reminder of the rationale for the project and its epistemology in 
section 7.2. Section 7.3 discusses the project's implications for the type of 'synthetic 
theory of ESB' that Stem (2000) has called for; at least insofar as such a theory might 
be applied to travel behaviour. Following this, section 7.4 considers how travel 
psychology based on attitude-behaviour theories might benefit from incorporating ideas 
from other areas of psychology and the social sciences. Finally, section 7.5 discusses 
the thesis' relevance for travel and transport policy. 
7.2 Rationale for the research 
This research was conducted in response to the negative impacts of people's travel 
behaviour. As outlined in Chapters 1 and 3, reliance on cars contributes to - among 
other problems - climate change, air pollution, ill health, congestion and accidents. It 
was argued that where technological solutions to these problems are possible, they 
remain distant. Behaviour change - people switching from car use to other modes 
and/or avoiding some travel altogether - may be more effective, more quickly. 
The thesis focused on commuting because it offers considerable scope for positive 
change. If some of the 71.2% of UK workers who commute by car (ONS, 2002) 
switched to other modes, emissions, congestion and accidents might all be cut. 
People's health would benefit from walking or cycling and this could have knock-on 
effects; raising economic productivity and easing pressure on health services. 
The thesis aimed to propose psychological and contextual influences on travel mode 
choice for commuting, focusing on drivers' reasons for maintaining or reducing their car 
use. Two theories were applied; Schwartz's (1977) norm-activation theory (NAT) and 
Ajzen's (1991; 1991a) theory of planned behaviour (TPB). Study 1 used inferential 
statistics to compare the theories' ability to explain drivers' car use intentions. 
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Explanation was improved by a model that used constructs from both theories and 
improved again by adding contextual variables to this model. Study 2 investigated the 
extent to which interviewees used discourses echoing NAT and the TPB when 
explaining their commuting behaviour and identified additional discourses relating to 
other motives. Thus, the two studies used different methods to examine people's stated 
reasons for their commuting intentions and behaviour, but it is argued that these 
methods are complementary. Both studies assumed that while behaviour may 
systematically relate to enduring psychological states (Breakwell, 1993), we cannot 
directly access these and so cannot be certain of their existence. Nonetheless, the 
psychological constructs that comprise attitude-behaviour theories do seem to be 
associated with people's actions. They are a useful device and their measurement at a 
given point in time may illuminate enduring mental features that direct behaviour. Given 
the inherent uncertainty in trying to discover why people do what they do, this seems to 
be the best available approach. 
7.3 Towards a synthetic theory 
7.3.1 Applicability of NAT and the TPB to commuting mode choice 
Chapter 4 reviewed ESB research using NAT and/or the TPB. Despite problems 
directly comparing studies, it was concluded that both theories are useful in this 
domain. Each captures different motives and together they account for various altruistic 
and self-interested concerns. In published studies, models using constructs from both 
theories tend to explain more variance in ESB than either theory alone (see Chapter 4, 
section 4.6.1.1). Study 1 of this thesis provides further evidence of this. 
The psychological model comprising a responsibility/obligation construct (ARlPN) from 
NAT and perceived behavioural control (PBC) from the TPB explained 37.7% of 
variance in drivers' car use intentions (based on Ff and compared to 25.9% for the 
TPB and 34.1 % for NAT). The information criteria statistics showed that this model also 
struck a better balance between parsimony and goodness-of-fit than either individual 
theory's model. As Harland et. a/. (1999) note, the TPB does not capture all moral 
motives for ESB and equally, one can say that NAT does not capture all non-moral 
motives. Their combination exemplifies a step towards the empirically-founded 
'synthetic theory' for which Stem (2000) calls. 
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Study 2 also provided support for a theory based on components of NAT and the TPB. 
Some participants gave mutually-reinforcing moral and practical reasons for choosing 
particular travel modes. Furthermore, some people expressed moral motives for 
avoiding car use, but used the driving-as-necessary discourse to state inability to do 
so. This echoes study 1, where PBC partially moderated ARlPN's influence on car use 
intentions (i.e. the strength of the ARlPN-intention relationship was related to people's 
level of PBC). This is a key finding. Two studies using different methods suggest that 
whether moral motives are actually manifest in the mode a person uses for commuting 
is to some extent governed by perceived ability to act on those motives. 
Based on the above, it is argued that a model of travel mode choice should draw on 
both NAT and the TPB for its component parts. Sections 7.3.2 to 7.3.6 examine those 
components in greater detail, suggesting which should be included and why. Section 
7.3.7 then describes the proposed model. 
7.3.2 Responsibility and obligation 
Both studies undertaken for this thesis raise questions about Schwartz's (1977) 
theoretical distinction between feelings of personal responsibility and obligation (see 
Chapter 4, section 4.4). Although some ESB studies have empirically differentiated 
these constructs, others have been unable to do so (see Chapter 5, section 5.7.1). The 
present research encountered this difficulty. AR and PN items loaded high on the same 
factor in the study 1 principal components analysis. It was acknowledged in Chapter 5 
that the low number of AR and PN items may have contributed to this result, but it is 
notable that study 2 participants seemed to use responsibility and obligation 
interchangeably. In this second study, number of items was not a confounding factor, 
so overall these findings indicate that people involved in this research saw no 
substantive difference between the constructs. 
The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Blackbum, 1996) defines 'responsibilities' as 
"those things for which ... [people] are accountable; failure to discharge a responsibility 
renders one liable to some censure or penalty". 'Obligation' is defined as "an action that 
is required of one". It is easy to see why people may have difficulty distinguishing 
between these ideas. Failure to perform a 'required' action could lead to 'censure or 
penalty' and one may be 'accountable' for such actions. There is conceptual overlap 
here and on the evidence ofthis and other research (e.g. Hunecke at. a/., 2001; 
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Matthies et. al., 2002), it is arguable that Schwartz's (1977) separation of responsibility 
and obligation does not always reflect people's own expressions of moral motives. The 
extent to which people use these concepts interchangeably or characterise them as 
distinct is a question for future research. 
7.3.3 Personal and social norms 
Schwartz (1977) proposed that personal norms (PN) often capture social norms. He 
defined social norms as what people "perceive others expect of them" (Ibid., 270), 
mirroring Ajzen's (1991a) subjective norm (SN) construct. This implies that there is no 
need for SN in psychological models containing PN. Indeed, Schwartz (1977, 271) 
presents results showing that "perceived social norms failed to add significantly to the 
variance" in altruistic behaviour explained by PN. 
However, Schwartz (Ibid.) also notes that sometimes there are conflicting social norms 
around an issue (as in study 2, where participants spoke of both anti- and pro-driving 
pressure). In such situations, people may perceive social norms that conflict with their 
PN and these social norms might add to explained variance in behaviour. Hence, 
Schwartz called for studies "in which both types of norm are measured" (Ibid., 272). 
Study 1 did this. Perceived expectations of friends had a statistically significant 
influence on car use intentions in a regression testing the TPB (see Chapter 5, section 
5.5.2), but this variable was non-significant when included alongside ARlPN, echoing 
Schwartz's (1977) findings. Although the two SN items did not form a reliable scale, 
perceptions of one referent group's wishes (friends) did not improve explanation of 
intentions above and beyond normative self-expectations, while these perceptions 
were significant before self-expectations were taken in to account. 
Some study 2 participants alluded to social norms surrounding travel, but rarely 
presented these as influences on their commuting behaviour (see Chapter 6, section 
6.5.1.4). Moral motives, however, were central in several accounts. 
One could argue that these findings show that SN is not required in a 'synthetic theory' 
of commuting mode choice. However, previous research suggests otherwise. Harland 
et. al. (1999) showed that PN and SN can simultaneously exert Significant effects on 
car use intentions (see Chapter 4, section 4.5.2.4) and Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) 
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found that SN had a significant influence on self-reported modal choice while PN did 
not. PN does not always entirely mediate SN's effect on intentions and/or behaviour. 
Therefore, it is proposed that both variables should be retained when NAT and the TPB 
are combined to explain commuting intentions and/or behaviour. 
7.3.4 Attitude towards a behaviour and awareness of its consequences 
Oom Do Valle et. al. (2005,389) used a model based on NAT and the TPB to explain 
recycling behaviour, stating that the "idea of combining these theories resulted from 
both sharing similar constructs." In particular, they suggest that awareness of 
consequences (AC) and attitude towards the behaviour (A TT) have "similar meaning" 
(Ibid., 370). They measured ATT and assumed that it captured identical beliefs to AC. 
Oom Do Valle et. al. took a narrow conception of ATT and their items only elicited 
evaluations of recycling's environmental outcomes. If A TT is defined in this way, it does 
indeed capture the same beliefs as AC. However, this is not Ajzen's (1991a) 
conception of ATT; an overall evaluation of performing an act. While treating AC and 
ATT as analogous reduces the number of variables in a combined NATITPB model, it 
also reduces that model's ability to capture potentially-salient motives. Oom Do Valle 
et. al. (2005) combined NAT and the TPS on a questionable premise. It is useful to 
integrate them not because of their similarity, but because of their difference. They are 
different partly because ATT - on Ajzen's (1991a) definition - captures self-interested 
motives. Although neither A TT nor AC was a significant predictor of car use intentions 
when used in the same regression in study 1, study 2 participants expressed 
instrumental motives of the type captured by An and characterised these as distinct 
from beliefs about behavioural consequences. It is therefore argued that both A TT and 
AC should be parts of a 'synthetiC theory' and that A TT should be operationalised to 
capture overall evaluations of performing an act. 
7.3.5 The importance of context 
While the psychological model comprising ARIPN and PSC explained more variance in 
drivers' car use intentions than either individual theory in study 1, it explained less 
variance (and had higher information criteria values) than a model that also included 
contextual variables (Fi- = .481). 
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In many ways, study 2 reinforced study 1 's results. For example, some people (e.g. 
Alun and Carl) said that their commuting behaviour was influenced by contextual 
variables such as the cost of driving. But study 2 also provided additional insights, 
because it enabled participants to give reasons for their behaviour that were not 
allowed by the response options in the study 1 questionnaire. 
The driving-as-necessary discourse was often invoked to explain why motives for 
avoiding car use were not acted upon. As well as feelings of responsibility and 
obligation, these included affective evaluations of particular modes (e.g. Ursula). This is 
another key finding; (perceived) context and low behavioural control were given as 
reasons why affective as well as moral motives failed to manifest themselves in 
people's commuting behaviour. Whether this generalises to other settings and other 
behaviours is a question for future studies. It could be explored both qualitatively and 
by statistical tests for a possible moderating effect of PBC on affect-intention or affect-
behaviour relationships. 
Similar interactions were suggested by some study 2 participants' references to context 
when explaining changes in their commuting behaviour. Rick's account was examined 
in Chapter 6, section 6.5.1.3 and it was reported that he had reduced his car use in 
favour of more cycling. This partial switch of modes was attributed not only to his 
enjoyment of cycling and its health benefits, but also to the fact that his commuting 
distance had been halved by moving campus, making cycling a practicable option. Rick 
- and Alun and Wendy, who also implicated contextual changes in their modal switch-
presented journey distance as a determinant of whether psychological motives were 
actually brought to bear on commuting behaviour. Rick explained that when his context 
had been prohibitive of bicycle use (because his commute was over 20 miles) he had 
driven to work, but when this barrier was removed, he had been able to act on his 
enjoyment of cycling and his appreciation of the exercise it provided. Like Ursula's, 
Rick's account suggests that it would be interesting to statistically analyse the 
possibility of PBC moderating the relationship between affect and behaviour. Moreover, 
since he identified (instrumental) health benefits to cycling, we might also ask whether 
PBC moderates the A IT -behaviour relationship. 
Another important point is that personal characteristics often mediate contextual 
influences on behaviour (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2). It can, therefore, be difficult to 
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distinguish choice from necessity (Handy et. a/., 2005). Indeed, as proposed in Chapter 
6, one person might describe driving as necessary while another person in a 
comparable situation would describe it as much more practical than the alternatives. 
They might characterise the same situation in different ways. Thus, it is useful to 
measure both PSC and 'objective' context. Study 1 showed that these variables can 
have independent effects on car use intentions. Moreover, asking participants how 
context affects their perceived behavioural control reveals individual differences in this 
regard, helping to explain why people act differently in similar situations. 
As well as physical context, the research examined how socio-demographics relate to 
car use intentions and commuting behaviour. Study 1 found that age, income and full-
or part-time status had significant effects on intentions. Older, higher earning and full-
time respondents were more likely to express intentions to maintain their car use for 
commuting. Explanations for these findings were suggested in Chapter 5, section 
5.7.3.2, but are necessarily speculative. It should also be remembered that socio-
demographics should sometimes be seen as proxies for other influences on intentions 
and behaviour (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2.2). If researchers could identify these 
influences, it may be better to measure them than age, income and so on. 
Study 2 showed no clear patterns of participants with certain socio-demographic 
characteristics invoking particular discourses. Patterns may be hard to identify in such 
a small sample (n = 24), but on the available evidence, socio-demographics added little 
to the understanding of commuting mode choice provided by study 2. 
In summary, the studies reported in Chapters 5 and 6 illustrate various ways in which 
context may directly influence commuting behaviour, or interact with personal 
characteristics to do so. As such, there are several reasons for ensuring that contextual 
variables (both 'objective' and perceived) are included in models designed to explain 
such behaviour. 
7.3.6 Psychological motives not captured by NA T or the TPB 
The review of travel psychology studies presented in Chapter 3 found some influences 
on modal choice that are not accounted for by NAT or the TPB; most notably, affective 
evaluations, social-symbolic motives and habits. 
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Research into affective motives for travel is in its infancy (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.1). 
While there is mounting evidence that affect plays some role in directing how and if 
people travel, it remains unclear how affect should be defined and measured in this 
domain (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1.2). Nonetheless, "subjectively experienced 
feeling" (Colman, 2001,16) can be distinguished from the altruistic motives captured by 
NAT, is not necessarily captured by the TPB and can, therefore. be identified as a 
distinct influence on modal choice. 
Although study 1 did not include affect measures, study 2 participants discussed 
affective motives for their commuting behaviour, suggesting that any theory of modal 
choice should include such motives. As Steg, Vlek & Siotegraaf (2001) point out, 
caution is needed when examining affective influences on travel because the 
importance attached to them seems to be (at least partly) contingent on how they are 
measured. Some authors suggest that this applies to drivers more than users of other 
modes (Ibid.; Steg, 2005), although study 2 participants tended to cast affect as a 
relatively unimportant consideration regardless of which mode(s) they used (see 
Chapter 6, sections 6.5.1.3 and 6.6). 
The potential for social-desirability bias in data on affect highlights an issue for future 
research: the development of methods that minimise this bias. Other interesting 
questions concern which affective experiences (e.g. fun, stress, pleasure in exercising 
skill, pleasure from privacy) influence modal choice for different journey types (e.g. 
commuting and leisure). There are also unresolved issues of what constitutes affective 
experience and if and how this should be distinguished from its causes. But what 
already seems certain is that travel has affective benefits and can be more than a 
means to an end (e.g. Anable & Gatersleben, 2005). 
Chapter 3 revealed some overlap between affective and social-symbolic motives and 
reported attempts to broaden ideas of social influence on travel beyond the perceptions 
captured by SN. There is some evidence that modal choice is associated with status 
(Ellaway et. a/., 2003) and is used to present a particular image (Steg, 2005). Notably, 
however, these themes were absent from study 2. No participant presented status as a 
reason for their modal choice, or said that their decisions about how to commute were 
influenced by image concerns. It seems unlikely that this was because of the questions 
that were asked, one of which was "Do your feel that your decisions about how to travel 
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say anything about you as a person?" (see Appendix 2). It may have been because 
people were wary of appearing concerned with status or image if this was perceived as 
socially undesirable. Or these influences on travel behaviour may not operate at the 
level of modal choice for particular journeys (at least in this research setting). Perhaps 
they influence whether people own cars and, if they do, what cars they choose. (Beryl, 
for example, said that she drove a Volkswagen Golf and "wouldn't have just any car".) 
Thus, while it may be true that "the vehicle you drive has long been seen as a symbol 
of your wealth, taste, style and - some would say - virility" (Wilson, 2004), this 
research found no evidence that such symbolism influenced participants' daily travel 
mode decisions. 
Habit, on the other hand, was presented as an influence operating at this level. 
Previous research shows that travel behaviour can follow automatically from situational 
cues (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.3) and some study 2 participants' accounts accord 
with this. Tina presented her driving habit as a barrier to acting on an anti-driving 
personal norm. This is congruent with the interpretation of Klockner & Matthies' (2004) 
findings presented in Chapter 3 and with other ESB research (e.g. Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 
2000; Staats, 2003). Moreover, Nigel invoked the habit discourse to explain why he 
drove to DMU despite instrumental and affective evaluations that favoured bus travel. 
Just as it would be interesting to statistically analyse PBC's role a possible moderator 
of relationships between various psychological motives and commuting behaviour, the 
same can be said of habits. In study 2, people certainly talked about habit in a way that 
implied such effects. 
7.3.7 A new model of travel mode choice for commuting 
Based on material in sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.6, a model of commuting mode choice is 
proposed that takes account of findings from this research and other studies reviewed 
in the thesis (Figure 7.1). This model may not apply to settings outside DMU, or even to 
other samples from DMU's population. Qualitative research like that presented in 
Chapter 6 is concerned with individual idiosyncrasies as much as generalisable 
patterns. The claim is that this model is "a simplified ... idealized ... representation" 
(Colman, 2001, 739) of influences on commuting mode choice among partiCipants in 
this research. It is also acknowledged that every aspect of the model will not apply to 
every participant. Doubtless some of the 312 partiCipants in study 1 had motivations for 
commuting by particular modes that are not shown here. Even in study 2, some stated 
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motives were unique to one individual. Figure 7.1 represents influences on commuting 
mode choice that were statistically significant in study 1 and/or were the subjects of 
shared discourses in study 2, but for most people only some of these influences 
seemed salient. Furthermore, there may be relationships between components of the 
model that are not shown in Figure 7.1. For example, study 2 suggested that habits can 
prevent intentions from influencing behaviour (arrow '3'). However, the study did not 
provide data on the possibility of habit influencing motivations' relationships with 
intentions. Nor does other travel research typically address this question . 
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Figure 7.1 A model of commuting mode choice 
Habit 
Figure 7.1 is explained in the following points. 
• Solid arrows represent direct relationships and assumed causal directions. 
• Each separate 'motivation' is expected to have a direct effect on intentions, but 
these effects are all represented by horizontal arrow 'a' . 
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• The colours assigned to each type of influence echo Figure 3.1, which 
illustrates Stern's (2000) categorisation of influences on ESB. 'Psychological 
factors' are in yellow, 'contextual factors' green and habits blue. 
• There is no significance to influences' vertical position. For example, the fact 
that subjective norms are above affective motives (e.g. stress, enjoyment of 
exercising skill) is not intended to convey anything about their relative 
importance or relationship to one another. 
• Overlapping bubbles, however, do show relationships. They signify conceptual 
overlaps. For example, perceived behavioural control is partly based on 
perceived context (e.g. job requirements, journey distance), while moral motives 
(which include both normative self-expectations and feelings of responsibility) 
partly account for subjective norms. 
• Acceptable effort is based on the idea (proposed in Chapter 6, section 6.6.1) 
that laziness is another way of talking about the amount of effort someone is 
willing to exert on a behaviour. Since asking whether people consider 
themselves lazy may elicit socially-desirable responses, it may be better to ask 
how much effort they are willing to exert on commuting, which is arguably a less 
loaded question. 
• Although acceptable effort and PBC would be called 'psychological factors' on 
Stern's (Ibid.) categorisation, they differ from those grouped on the left of the 
model. These can be seen as 'motivations', while effort and PBC may 
determine how much influence motivations have on intentions and/or behaviour. 
• Perceived context is assumed to influence intentions and behaviour via PBC. 
'Objective context' (e.g. not possessing a car) may also have direct effects. 
• Arrow '1' represents the idea that PBC can partially determine the influence of 
motivations on intentions. 
• Arrow '2' represents the idea that acceptable effort can partially determine the 
influence of motivations on intentions. 
• Arrow '3' represents the idea that habit can partially determine the influence of 
intentions on behaviour. 
• Arrow '4' represents the idea that intentions can be overridden by conflicting 
motivations (e.g. an intention based on moral motives may later be overridden 
by self-interest). 
This model departs from Schwartz's (1977) NAT in several ways. 
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• It includes non-moral motivations (e.g. evaluations of travel modes' practical 
and affective functions) alongside moral ones (obligation and responsibility). 
• It includes subjective norms alongside personal norms, on the assumption that 
PN does not always capture SN. 
• It combines feelings of responsibility and obligation into a single construct 
capturing moral motivations, rather than separating them. 
• It includes contextual influences on behaviour. 
• It includes intentions. Schwartz (Ibid.) did not specify this construct in NAT but 
subsequent research - including study 1 of this thesis - shows that PN can 
influence intentions as well as behaviour (e.g. Harland et. a/., 1999). 
• It includes PBC on the basis that this variable moderated the ARlPN-intention 
effect in study 1. 
• It includes habit and acceptable effort, both of which may intervene in the 
relationships between motivations and intentions/behaviour. 
The model also departs from Ajzen's (1991; 1991 a) TPB in several ways. 
• It includes moral motivations. These may be captured by An, but this depends 
on how it is operationalised. 
• It includes affective motivations. Again, An may capture these but it is argued 
that affect should be included as a distinct construct to differentiate emotional 
from instrumental evaluations. 
• It includes 'objective' contextual factors. Efforts should be made to measure 
these where possible as they can influence intentions and behaviour 
independent of PBC and it is interesting to compare people's perceptions with 
actual conditions (e.g. how far is 'too far from a bus stop'?). 
• It includes habit and acceptable effort, both of which may intervene in the 
relationships between motivations and intentions/behaviour. 
The proposed model bears some similarity to Triandis' (1977) theory of interpersonal 
behaviour (TIB). This comprises PN, affect, behavioural, control and normative beliefs 
(of the type underlying An, PBC and SN), role beliefs, habit and intentions. The only 
components of the model proposed here that are not shared with the TIB are AC, 
acceptable effort, role beliefs and some measure of 'objective' context. Time 
constraints on this research meant that the TIB could not be tested in a second 
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quantitative study of commuting mode choice at DMU, but this would be an interesting 
project. It may be that in focusing on the more popular NAT and TPB, a model well-
suited to the research setting was overlooked. 
In fact, the TIB has been shown to be a good predictor of (self-reported) modal choice. 
Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) compared it to NAT and the TPB and, using the same 
sample, it explained 51 % of variance in behaviour and 68% of variance in intentions. 
NAT explained 14% of variance in behaviour (intention was not included) and the TPB 
explained 45% and 60% of variance in behaviour and intentions, respectively. 
Bamberg & Schmidt also tested a model integrating NAT, the TPB and the TIB. Its 
overall performance was very similar to the TIB's; explaining 52% of variance in 
behaviour and 68% of variance in intentions. There were differences in individual 
constructs' effects, however. In the TIB, only behavioural beliefs, control beliefs and 
role beliefs were significant (p < .05) predictors of intentions and only intentions and 
habit were significant predictors of behaviour. In the combined NATITPBITIB model 
An, PBC, SN and role beliefs significantly predicted intentions and, again, intentions 
and habit significantly predicted behaviour. 
What is most notable when comparing these findings with study 1 's is the relative 
importance of motivations captured by NAT in the research undertaken for this thesis. 
As Bamberg & Schmidt (Ibid., 281) note, their young, student sample apparently did 
not "perceive car use as a behavior with moral implications." They suggest that SN was 
much more influential than PN because students are more susceptible to peer pressure 
than older people in other settings. Certainly the older, more diverse sample in studies 
1 and 2 identified a moral aspect to commuting. The TIB would account for this, 
reinforcing the idea that it may explain commuting behaviour at DMU. 
As discussed in section 7.3.4, Oom Do Valle et. a/. (2005) have also tested an 
integrated NATITPB model (of recycling behaviour in Portugal). This included An, 
PBC and SN from the TPB (intention was not measured), along with PN from NAT (AC 
was considered analogous with An and AR was not measured). Also included were 
various antecedents of these constructs: values, general (as opposed to behaviour-
specific) environmental attitudes and specific beliefs such as knowledge of how to 
recycle that were assumed to influence PBC. The model explained 71.8% of variance 
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in self-reported recycling. Despite this impressive level of explanation, this model may 
not generalise to other behaviours. Some of its variables (e.g. knowledge of recycling 
gained from government campaigns) are specific to the research setting, although it 
may be possible to devise similar variables relating to other behaviours elsewhere. In 
any case, Oom Do Valle et. a/. (Ibid.) set out to explain recycling behaviour in Portugal 
under that country's particular circumstances, so they cannot be criticised for producing 
a model appropriate for that purpose. 
Much the same could be said of the model put forward here. As stated, it was 
developed from DMU participants' data and is intended as an explanation of 
commuting mode choice in this setting, although it would be interesting to see how well 
it generalises. It is proposed that this model - which integrates NAT and the TPB on 
the basis that they capture different motives - should explain more variance in 
commuting mode choice at DMU than either individual theory or a model including only 
NAT and TPB variables. Some evidence for this has been provided by studies 1 and 2, 
but further tests would be useful both within and beyond DMU. 
7.4 This thesis in the bigger social-scientific picture 
This thesis has examined a specific type of behaviour (commuting) using common 
theories in quantitative environmental psychology research. In terms of both social 
psychology and travel and transport studies, it occupies small corners of large fields. 
Because of its specific focus, the thesis necessarily ignores some aspects of travel 
psychology and behaviour. However, although these have not been examined 
empirically, they should not go unacknowledged. Section 7.4.1 outlines some theories 
and ideas that are not common in ESB research and suggests ways in which they may 
help to progress it. Section 7.4.2 then has some comments on methodology. 
7.4.1 Complementary theoretical approaches 
While the thesis has attempted to develop the attitude-behaviour approach by 
borrowing from discourse analysis, it has still focused on individuals' motivations. Many 
social scientists and even psychologists take different approaches. For example, 
Moscovici's (2000) social representations theory (SRT) is not particularly concerned 
with individuals' attitudes or behaviour. Rather, it focuses on shared ideas -
representations - and treats these as units of analysis. SRT was first developed as an 
attempt to understand "the transformation of scientific knowledge into common 
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knowledge" (Ibid., 228) and seeks to explain the mechanisms underlying ideas' origins, 
development and communication. 
SRT reminds us that the immediate antecedents of individuals' travel behaviour are 
part of a larger causal process. Taking an SRT perspective, we might ask where 
people's attitudes originate and how they relate to shared representations of travel. 
There is a connection here with the discourse analytic techniques applied in study 2, 
which focused on shared ways of explaining and justifying commuting behaviour. One 
difference between this and an SRT approach is that SRT is concerned not so much 
with what ideas are shared and how they are employed rhetorically, but with those 
ideas' genesis and transformation over time (Castro & Lima, 2001). Nonetheless, SRT 
might help us to understand where discourses such as those evident in study 2 come 
from and how they become prevalent. 
The potential for applying SRT to travel can be illustrated by a real-world example. On 
July th 2005, bombs exploded on three underground trains and a bus in London; killing 
56 people. Such events receive enormous media coverage, which may be a source of 
shared representations. 
A BBC news report on Londoners' reactions to the bombings (Geoghegan, 2005) 
included the following quotation from Professor John Maule of Leeds University's 
Centre for Decision Research. 
Without the availability of statistics for us to work out the exact likelihood of being 
involved in an explosion, people do their own mental short-cuts. One factor is the 
availability of images in our mind, which dictates how soon the event could happen 
again. Pictures of the blast aftermath are so powerful and so omnipresent they stick 
in the memory, so people overestimate the likelihood of these events happening 
again. How readily can you bring to mind the image of a cyclist being knocked 
down? Not easily, because the media isn't interested and that's the lens through 
which we learn about the world. 
Professor Maule was discussing the reported 30% increase in commuter cycling (Ibid.) 
immediately after the bombings. Many Londoners apparently reacted by switching to a 
travel mode that they perceived as safer than public transport. This perception, 
Professor Maule argued, was based on media coverage rather than experience. One 
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might hypothesise that a media representation rapidly became a social representation, 
which was accepted by individuals with an immediate effect on many people's 
commuting behaviour. Unlike attitude-behaviour research, this perspective does not 
illuminate the mechanisms by which psychological states influence actions, but it is 
complementary. It asks how those states arise in the first place; a no less important 
question. 
Representations of risk are not the only pervasive idea that may influence travel. 
Another is personal freedom; seemingly a core value in contemporary UK society. To 
illustrate, consider how politicians frequently refer to freedom of choice when 
promoting unpopular policies. The following text is from the UK government 
Department of Health website (DoH, 2005) and refers to reforms allowing private 
companies to provide services on behalf of the National Health Service (NHS). 
System reform represents a group of interconnected policies that aim to support 
the transformation of the NHS to a system that is truly patient-led. They will give 
patients more choice, more personalised care and real control to improve their own 
health. 
Similarly, the following excerpt is from a speech by David Miliband, UK School 
Standards Minister (Miliband, 2005). 
Aneurin Bevan [a politician instrumental in establishing the UK welfare state] used 
to say that the freedom to choose was worthless without the power to choose. This 
is the power of personalised learning. Not a false dichotomy between choice and 
voice but an acceptance that if we are to truly revolutionise public services then 
people need to have both. 
Now consider this statement from an interviewee (an account manager for a computer 
supplier, not a transport speCialist or social scientist) on the BBC's Car Nation 
programme, which aired on July 3rd 2005 and took "a novel look at 21st century 
society, exploring the lives we lead and the people we are by asseSSing motoring 
behaviours and obsessions" (BBC, 2005). 
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Whenever we feel trapped or ground down by life, our cars tempt us with the 
promise of freedom. 
This remark suggests that the prized asset of freedom has become associated with 
cars. (This seems to have happened outside the UK as well, as suggested by 
Hagman's (2003) identification of a discourse of freedom through car use in Sweden. 
See Chapter 2, section 2.3.) Perhaps this explains UK government's reluctance to 
discourage driving (e.g. by raising petrol tax; a move which was repeatedly deferred 
between 2003 and 2005). Although study 2 participants did not invoke personal 
freedom to explain their commuting mode choice, some talked of attaining freedom 
through car ownership. As with representations of risk, it would be interesting to study 
representations of freedom and their relationship to travel behaviour. Again, this type 
of work would take a more macro-level approach than the research presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6, but could help to elucidate broader social processes. 
Like SRT, Breakwell's (1993) identity process theory (IPT) could provide new insights 
in travel psychology, but is yet to be applied. IPT was mentioned in Chapter 3, section 
3.3.2.2, where it was painted out that the theory emphasises feelings of 'competence 
and control' as contributors to a positive self-identity. (lPT's other central propositions 
are that: 1) people strive for self-esteem, 2) people strive for continuity of identity, and 
3) people like to be distinctive, but not too distinctive.) 
It is interesting that several study 2 participants claimed not to have control over their 
commuting mode; that driving was necessary. Similarly, in study 1, a mean PBC score 
below the scale mid-point scale indicated that people generally expressed inability to 
reduce their car use. These findings might seem counter to IPT's assertions, but we 
should note Breakwell's (1986,102) explanation of what control means in IPT: "Inner 
self-esteem derives directly from the experience of oneself as an agent who can make 
things happen in the world and of effectively realising one's intentions". If one's 
intention is not to avoid driving, but to get to work, a car may be ideal. Although the 
research reported here used far too unrepresentative a sample for generalisations to 
the UK population, sources like Car Nation suggest that most people's intention is 
simply to get to work. Whether cars provide control in this sense and whether this 
contributes to self-esteem are questions that IPT could help to answer. 
One might also speculate on the utility of the distinctiveness proposition in travel 
psychology. Does choosing a car from the alternatives marketed at different groups 
with supposedly different aspirations and images (Wilson, 2004) express 
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distinctiveness whilst also identifying with one's group, or with the majority of Britons 
who drive and who - on the basis that they are in a majority - presumably see driving 
as the norm (e.g. Sue's family in study 2)? Such questions are beyond NAT and the 
TPB's behaviour-specific focus but are still relevant to travel behaviour. 
As well as the theories outlined here, others have been mentioned at various points in 
the thesis. Prochaska's (Prochaska & Norcross, 2001) transtheoretical model was 
applied in study 2 and its potential for illuminating the process of switching travel 
modes evaluated (see Chapter 6, sections 6.5.3 and 6.6.3). Steg's (2005) use of 
Dittmar's (1992) theory of material possessions and its similarity to Csikszentmihalyi & 
Rochberg-Halton's (1981) work were noted in the discussion of social motives in 
Chapter 3, section 3.3.1.3. Also in Chapter 3 (section 3.5), Giddens' (1990) ideas on 
trust were raised in relation to social dilemmas. There may well be other theories and 
methods from other areas of psychology and from other social sciences and 
humanities that could deepen our understanding of travel psychology and behaviour. 
Tapping these resources will take time, but may bring truly 'synthetic theory'. 
The model of commuting mode choice proposed in section 7.3.7 is a small part of this 
larger enterprise; hence the claim that it is only a move 'Towards a synthetic theory'. 
The research questions asked and methods used to answer them in this thesis permit 
a limited set of conclusions that are embodied in the model. As such, this research and 
other travel studies using attitude-behaviour theories should be seen as 
complementary to work (apparently yet to be done) using different theories and 
approaches. Models like that proposed here may explain the latter stages of processes 
underlying behaviour, but should be situated within a project that also examines 
broader socio-cultural forces (Huguenin, 2005). 
7.4.2 Appropriate methods 
The project alluded to above should utilise a range of methods that are appropriate to 
the range of theories at our disposal. This thesis has attempted to show that even in 
attitude-behaviour research, we can go beyond questionnaire data and statistical 
analysis. As has been stressed throughout, data gathered by survey items and by 
interviews are not so different, in that neither can be taken to reveal people's 'inner 
realities'. As several authors note, combining quantitative and qualitative methods has 
advantages (e.g. Robson, 2002); enabling the study of population trends and individual 
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differences. "One can conduct traditional quantitative research, and if the results 
suggest something intriguing that warrants further consideration then it can be followed 
up with in-depth qualitative analysis" (Manzo, 2004a). Furthermore, we should 
recognise that qualitative methods are not restricted to analysis of talk. Study 2, for 
example, used a ranking task to illuminate participants' perceptions of the relative 
importance of different influences on their commuting behaviour. 
Combining different methods also helps researchers to avoid 'inappropriate certainty' 
(see Chapter 6, section 6.2), making results more robust. It is, therefore, suggested 
that mixed-method research offers good prospects for developing our understanding of 
travel psychology. If we expand the portfolio of theories used in the domain to include 
those such as SRT and IPT, this will necessarily require a range of methods which, it is 
argued, can be beneficial. The risk of too much theoretical and methodological 
diversity in studies purportedly applying the same theories was highlighted in Chapter 
4, but in the 'bigger picture', diversity is required. We cannot properly examine 
individuals' attitudes and large-scale social forces using just one method. 
7.5 Policy suggestions 
Commenting on the goals of attitude-behaviour research, Moscovici (2000, 234) 
asserts that those working in the field wish to 
study a kind of substitute for behaviour, one could say a pre-behaviour, which 
would permit them to predict behaviour ... There is also an underlying idea that if 
we can predict behaviour, we can change it. 
This thesis - although largely concemed with theory development - subscribes to the 
aim of changing travel behaviour. The theory development's ultimate goal is to inform 
policies that might reduce car use. What policies can be suggested based on the work 
presented here? 
Firstly, some policy measures can be ruled out. As Tertoolen et. al. (1998) show, 
people may react against being told not to drive (see Chapter 3, section 3.6). Given 
Breakwell's (1993) argument that feelings of control over one's actions contribute to a 
positive self-identity, this is unsurprising. Similarly, Schwartz (1977,269) argues that 
exhortations to act in particular ways 
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may block the activation of personal norms or lead the actor to feel deprived of 
freedom of choice and hence responsibility and self-satisfaction. Social articulation 
of a norm may create a perception of social' pressure to act which elicits reactance, 
especially in the absence of attention to those elements in the situation which lead 
to the spontaneous activation of personal norms. 
According to NAT, one of these elements is awareness of behaviour's consequences. 
Might information on the environmental benefits of reducing car use, rather than just 
telling people to drive less, be effective? Encouragingly, Steg (2003a) and Steg & Vlek 
(1997) found that AC was positively related to acceptance of policies that would 
increase the cost of car use (see Chapter 3, section 3.6). However, they also found 
that measures evaluated as being acceptable were evaluated as being potentially 
ineffective in changing behaviour. People may simply pay whatever they have to for 
their car use if - as this and other research (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1.6) suggests -
it is perceived as necessary. (As Ursula said in study 2, "The cost of driving? I don't 
really think about it because I've got to do it. I just pay what I pay.") 
Furthermore, Chapter 6 showed that some people who expressed concern over the 
environmental impacts of their car use still commuted by car every day. Chapter 4 
showed that where AC's direct effect on ESB has been measured, the relationship is 
unreliable (see section 4.5.3.3). 
Indeed, policy studies show that information-only measures are largely unsuccessful. 
Evaluation of the UK government's Are you doing your bit? campaign (Collins et. a/., 
2003, 46), which ran from 1998 to 2000 and spent over £28 million on advertiSing that 
promoted pro-environmental behaviours (e.g. boiling only as much water as required) 
concluded that 
information does not necessarily lead to increased awareness, and increased 
awareness does not necessarily lead to action. Information provision ... must be 
backed up by other approaches. 
What might these approaches be? Collins et. a/. (Ibid., 31) suggest that Are you doing 
your bit? failed because "it did not address issues of price and convenience". 
Convenience certainly seems to be crucial. Although the TPB associates convenience 
with the An construct and ease/difficulty with PBC, people may link these notions. In 
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research conducted for this thesis, participants reported that driving is convenient and 
other modes generally less so and this may be re-stated as an inability to reduce car 
use; driving-as-necessary. It seems that non-car modes must be made more 
convenient, reliable, flexible, accessible and so on. In other words, they should be 
made easier to use and, importantly, be perceived as such. As several authors point 
out, people will only change their behaviour if they see a viable alternative (e.g. Ibid.; 
Steg, 2003a). The success of Aalborg's cycling scheme, where bicycles were provided 
as an alternative to driving, illustrates that behaviour change can be achieved when 
this condition is met (see Chapter 3, section 3.6). 
Based on the above, the effectiveness of car-use reduction poliCies should be 
maximised when they: 
• engender feelings of personal responsibility and obligation rather than simply 
asserting social norms, and 
• provide information on the positive impacts of switching modes, and 
• demonstrate that switching modes is easy, and 
• demonstrate that switching modes is worthwhile in terms of its outcomes. 
This last point may be essential in overcoming the social dilemma of travel (see 
Chapter 3, section 3.5). Even if people believe that avoiding car use is morally right 
and environmentally beneficial, they may not do so if they see their actions as 
insignificant. Steg (2003a) and Steg & Vlek (1997) report that such beliefs were related 
to acceptance of car-use reduction measures, although they did not examine links to 
actual behaviour. 
The social dilemma reminds us of the importance of trust to pro-environmental 
behaviour change. If people are to believe that their behaviour will impact upon 
problems about which they are concerned, they must feel that others are acting 
towards the same ends (Collins et. al., 2003; Gatersleben & Uzzell, 2001). 
Engendering such feelings may be difficult. As reported in Chapter 3, Giddens (1990) 
has proposed that modern society undermines trust (Le. general confidence in others, 
rather than beliefs that they will keep explicit promises). This position is echoed by 
Onora O'Neill (2002), Professor of Philosophy at Newham College, Cambridge. In a 
lecture broadcast on BBC Radio 4, she remarked that 
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mistrust, it seems, is now directed not just at those clearly in breach of law and 
accepted standards, not just at crooks and wide boys. Mistrust and suspicion have 
spread across all areas of life. 
There may, however, be ways around the lack of confidence that people have in one 
another. Although it might be hard to believe that a sizeable proportion of the whole 
population will switch from car use to other modes, it is easier to imagine that 
significant sections of smaller groups might do so. This may partially explain the 
success of some of the local car-use reduction initiatives detailed in Chapter 3, section 
3.6. For example, Aalborg's cycle scheme (Marshall & Banister, 2000) involved nine 
local organisations; a well-defined target group. Members of this group could see 
relatively easily who else was involved and may, therefore, have found it easier to 
believe that their peers would switch travel modes than if the group had been bigger 
and its members largely unknown to each other. Of course, the disadvantage of 
speCifically-targeted measures is that they influence the behaviour of relatively few 
people. Nonetheless, given the failure of national campaigns such as Are you doing 
your bit?, perhaps multiple local schemes offer better prospects. 
This is the idea behind McKenzie-Mohr's (2005) community-based social marketing 
(CBSM) approach. Rather than relying on large-scale information campaigns, CBSM 
operates locally and involves four steps: 1) identify barriers and benefits to an activity, 
2) develop a strategy using tools that have been empirically shown to be effective in 
changing behaviour, 3) pilot the strategy, 4) evaluate the strategy after implementation 
across the community. CBSM might promote changes in travel behaviour more 
effectively than information-only initiatives, but obviously requires more resources. It is 
not clear who would pay for these resources in the UK. It is probably fanciful to hope 
that some of the £37 billion to be spent by the Department for Transport between 2005 
and 2008 could be directed towards CBSM. 
Local government, however, has a role to play in reducing car use within its smaller 
jurisdictions. Even if approaches like CBSM are too resource-intensive, the context 
from which this thesis arose demonstrates at least one way in which Leicester City 
Council has influenced commuting behaviour in the city. By requiring DMU to 
implement a Green Travel Plan as part of its campus redevelopment, the Council 
contributed to a 5% reduction in the number staff and students driving to DMU 
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between 2003 and 2004; a target which was actually achieved a year earlier than 
planned (DMU, 2005). The Council is also legally required to produce a Local 
Transport Plan, the latest version of which was subject to public consultation when this 
thesis was submitted and was due for final publication in February 2006. This Plan has 
diverse objectives including tackling congestion, increasing accessibility and improving 
road safety and local air quality, but reduced reliance on cars and greater use of other 
modes, especially buses, are central to each of these aims (LCC, 2005). 
The studies presented in Chapters 5 and 6 offer some insights with regard to targeting 
of measures, at least in the context of DMU. Study 1 showed that people who owned 
bicycles, lived relatively far from DMU and travelled to work alone were more likely to 
express intentions to reduce their car use for commuting. Younger, part-time and 
lower-earning members of the University were also more likely to express this 
intention. Most if not all of this information would be available to staff designing car-use 
reduction measures and could be used to target those most likely to respond 
positively. Study 1 also showed that people who stated that driving to work was 
expensive were more likely to express intentions to reduce their commuter car use. 
Cost perceptions could be elicited using a simple questionnaire item. 
Study 2's small sample did not really enable conclusions about targeting, but did 
suggest that reducing the fixed costs of car use (tax, insurance, etc.) and replacing 
these with pay-as-you-drive charging may encourage car owners to use other modes. 
Study 2 also suggested that reducing the need for people to carry baggage, drive 
during working hours and dress smartly may remove barriers to use of non-car modes 
for commuting. It seems reasonable to assume that these issues may be relevant in 
many organisations. 
In conclusion, the research undertaken for this thesis suggests various strategies for 
reducing commuter car use: 
• encouraging people to feel personal responsibility and obligation over travel, 
• providing information on the positive impacts of switching modes, 
• demonstrating that switching modes is easy and worthwhile, 
• targeting relatively small, bounded groups, 
• charging for driving rather than for simply owning a car. 
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It must be remembered, however, that these suggestions are based on attitude-
behaviour studies that largely ignored broader social issues such as representations of 
the car as a means of achieving control and personal freedom. These notions may be 
deeply ingrained in UK society and, as such, could hinder any attempt to reduce car 
use and promote alternatives. 
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ChapterS 
Conclusions 
Based on the premise that while attitudes may not be directly accessible, the notion of 
attitudes as enduring psychological states remains a useful device for understanding 
why people behave as they do, this thesis permits the following conclusions. 
8.1 Theory development 
Environmentally-significant behaviour (ESB), including reducing one's car use, can be 
motivated by altruistic and/or non-altruistic concerns. Study 1 showed that moral 
motives' influence on car use intentions was moderated by perceived behavioural 
control (PBC) and by aspects of perceived and 'objective' context. Study 2 participants' 
accounts of commuting reinforced these findings and also showed that some people 
gave both altruistic and self-interested reasons for using non-car modes. Therefore, 
Schwartz's (1977) norm-activation theory (NAT) and Ajzen's (1991; 1991a) theory of 
planned behaviour (TPB) are both useful in our attempts to understand travel 
psychology and behaviour. Models applied to modal choice should use constructs from 
both theories, as they are complementary. Affective motives for travel, habits and 
'objective' and perceived context should also be included. 
The studies presented in Chapters 5 and 6 raised questions about the distinction 
between feelings of personal responsibility and obligation among members of DMU 
who partiCipated in the research. More work is needed to understand how these 
constructs relate to each other, especially as relatively few ESB studies that claim to 
apply NAT actually measure responsibility. 
Study 2, in particular, highlighted the role of perceived context (e.g. how reductions in 
commuting distance were implicated in providing people with greater choice over their 
travel mode and thus in modal switch) in directing travel behaviour. This is a key finding 
of the present research, but it would be useful to replicate it in a more stable setting 
(Le. where commuting distances did not change) to assess contextual influences on 
intention-behaviour relationships there. 
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8.2 Practical applications 
Based on the theoretical findings of the thesis, a number of suggestions have been 
made regarding measures designed to reduce car use. 
• Interventions should not simply tell people not to drive. 
• Nor should they only provide information on driving's negative impacts. 
• The potential benefits of reducing car use should be pointed out, including the 
worth of the individual's contribution to tackling traffic-related problems. 
• Interventions should engender internal motivations such as feelings of personal 
responsibility and obligation, rather than just asserting anti-driving social norms. 
• Interventions should demonstrate that switching modes is possible or, better 
still, easy. 
• Multiple small-scale, targeted interventions may be more effective in reducing 
car use than large-scale, non-targeted campaigns. 
Even if these suggestions are followed, we should perhaps not be too hopeful of 
achieving behaviour change. This may sound pessimistic, but the studies undertaken 
for this research indicate that reduced car use was in some cases contingent on DMU's 
campus reorganisation; an event that is unlikely to be replicated in other settings. 
Moreover, in addressing individuals' attitudes, we seem to be swimming against a 
strong pro-driving tide at a societal level. Attitude-behaviour research only illuminates 
one part of a much bigger picture. There is hope that we can understand more of this 
picture by applying insights from other areas, however. Moscovici's (2000) social 
representations theory, Breakwell's (1993) identity process theory, Prochaska's 
(Prochaska & Norcross 2001) transtheoretical model and Giddens' (1990) work on trust 
have all been suggested as being potentially useful. Through use of such approaches 
by travel psychologists, we may achieve a 'synthetic theory' that can underpin more 
successful efforts to reduce car use than we have seen in the past. 
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Study 1 questionnaire 
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De Montfort University Travel Survey 
WOULD YOU LIKE TO 
IMPROVE DMU'S 
I 
VE 
AND 
FACILITIE 
ELP 
? 
• 
Yes? Then complete the survey and enter the prize draw. 
DMU is surveying staff and students about travel patterns - how we currently get to 
campus, how long it takes, the problems we find and what improvements are 
needed. The university recognises that the increasing levels of traffic on the roads 
are causing problems. Accidents, pollution, congestion and delays can damage 
people's health and the environment, and make commuting more stressful, difficult 
and time consuming. The university is therefore committed to improving facilities for 
- and access to - a variety of forms of transport including buses, trains, bicycles and 
walking, wherever possible. Completing this survey will help us to decide what 
facilities we should be offering. 
This questionnaire has been prepared by DMU's Estates Department, with help from 
the Institute of Energy and Sustainable Development and the Department of 
Transport. It should take no more than fifteen minutes to complete and has been 
structured so that all questions should be relevant to you as a car user. 
All responses will be treated as strictly anony~ous and confidential. 
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Section 1. Your journey to DMU 
1 On which campus are you usually based? (Please tick two if split 50/50.) 
o Leicester City 0 Bedford Lansdowne 
o Leicester Charles Frears 0 Bedford A.S.H. 
o Leicester Scraptoft 0 Milton Keynes 
o Bedford Polhill 
2 How far is your home from your campus? (Please refer to your longest journey if 
your time is split 50/50 between two DMU sites.) 
Do - 2 miles 010.1 - 20 miles 
02.1 - 5 miles 0 Over 20 miles 
05.1 - 10 miles 0 Unsure 
3 How long does it usually take you to get: (please refer to your longest journey if 
your time is split 50/50 between two DMU sites) 
a) from home to your campus? 
Do -10 minutes 
o 11 - 20 minutes 
021 - 40 minutes 
041 - 60 minutes 
DOver 1 hour 
4 What time do you: 
a) normally arrive? 
o midnight - 8 am 
D8:01 am - 10 am 
o 10:01am -1 pm 
01:01 pm-4 pm 
04:01 pm - midnight 
o variable 
b) home from your campus? 
00- 10 minutes 
o 11 - 20 minutes 
021 - 40 minutes 
041 - 60 minutes 
DOver 1 hour 
b) normally depart? 
o midnight - 9 am 
D9:01 am -1 pm 
01:01 pm-4 pm 
04:01 pm - 6 pm 
06:01 pm - 8 pm 
08:01 pm - midnight 
o variable 
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5 How often do you make a trip from your campus, for any purpose, during the 
working day? (If you never do, please go to question 8.) 
D More than once a day 0 About once a month 
D Once a day 0 Less than once a month 
02 or 3 times a week 0 Never 
o About once a week 
6 Where do you go? (Please tick all answers that apply.) 
o Home 0 Elsewhere for work 
D Shopping 0 To eat (e.g. lunch) 
OTo another DMU campus 0 Other 
7 How do you usually travel on your trips from DMU during the day? 
D Car as driver 0 Bicycle 
o Car as passenger 0 Walk or run 
o Bus 0 Motorcycle 
D Train Other (please specify) .. 1-____ -1] 
8 What form of transport do you usually use for the main part of your journeys 
- in terms of distance - to and from university? 
o Car as driver o Car as passenger 
9 How do you actually arrive on campus each day? (Please tick only one.) 
o Car as driver 0 Walk or run 
o Car as passenger 0 Motorcycle 
D Bus Other (please specify) _I _____ .... ] 
o Bicycle 
274 
10 Do you use another form of transport for the main part of your journey - in terms 
of distance - at least once a week? If so, what? 
D Car as driver D Walk or run 
D Motorcycle D Car as passenger 
DBUS Other (please specify)L-1 ______ ....1 
DTrain D No other form 
D Bicycle 
11 Ideally, how would you most like to travel to the university? 
o Car as driver D Bicycle 
D Car as passenger D Walk or run 
D Bus D Motorcycle 
D Train Other (please specify) .... I______ ..... 
12 What are the advantages and disadvantages of your usual transport mode? Please 
tick one box on each row to say how much you agree or disagree. 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Agree Unsure 
strongly agree strongly 
nor 
disaQree 
I nearly always arrive on time 
I get held up by traffic 
congestion 
I contribute to pollution 
Travelling to DMU is expensive 
I can get to work quickly 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Agree Unsure 
My usual form of transport is ... strongly agree strongly 
nor 
disagree 
Pleasant 
Uncomfortable 
Convenient 
Flexible 
Safe 
13 I have been a victim of crime because of my travel arrangements. 
14 I have been involved in an accident travelling to or from DMU. 
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15 What are your attitudes to transport issues? Please tick one box on each row to say 
how much you agree or disagree with the statements. 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Agree Unsure 
strongly agree nor strongly 
disagree 
My transport choices can have 
an impact upon the environment 
Avoiding car use will help to 
solve wider environmental 
problems like global warming 
Most people I know at university 
don't care how I travel to DMU 
I feel that I can contribute 
towards making my town / city a 
better place to live 
I think that most people who 
drive to DMU are , in principle, 
willing to reduce their car use 
I feel personal responsibility for 
helping to solve my town / city's 
traffic problems 
There should be limits on 
people 's right to choose car 
travel to get to the university 
I can help to solve my town / 
city's environmental problems by 
avoiding car use 
My family and I are affected by 
pollution from cars 
My friends at DMU think that I 
shouldn 't drive to get to university 
I feel morally obliged to avoid -
using the car to get to university 
Everyone should have the right 
to a free car park space at DMU 
I don't believe that environmental 
problems like global warming are 
caused by car use 
I believe that the university is 
sincere in trying to solve traffic 
problems 
Traffic problems can only be 
solved if everybody co-operates 
I feel a sense of moral obligation 
to minimise harm to the 
environment 
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16 What are your views about particular transport measures? Please tick one box on 
each row to indicate whether you think each is good idea. (Car pooling involves a 
group of people having shared ownership of one or more vehicles. Car sharing 
involves people using their own vehicles to provide planned lifts for others.) 
DMU ... 
Encouraging car pooling 
Introducing a car sharing scheme 
Introducing car park charges 
Introducing discounted public 
transport season tickets 
Introducing interest free loans for 
public transport season tickets 
Introducing more secure cycle 
sheds on campus 
Introducing more showers and 
changing facilities on campus 
Very bad Bad idea 
idea 
Neither Good 
good nor idea 
bad 
Very 
good 
idea 
Unsure 
El 
El 
17 Finally in this section, what are your views about the environment? Please tick one 
box on each row to indicate how much you agree or disagree. 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Agree Unsure 
strongly agree nor strongly 
disagree 
The so called 'ecological crisis' 
facing humankind has been 
Qreatly exaggerated 
The earth is like a spaceship with 
limited room and resources 
If things continue as they are, we 
will soon experience a major 
ecological catastrophe 
Nature is robust enough to cope 
with the impacts of modern 
industrialised nations 
Humans are severely abusing 
the environment 
I would describe myself as a 
'green' person 
Thank you. Now please continue to section 2. 
Please note that the question numbers in some subsequent sections do not follow on in 
sequence. This is because sections not relating to car users have been removed from 
this version of the questionnaire. 
277 
Section 2. Questions specifically for car users 
18 How many other people normally travel in your car on the way to DMU? 
D None D 2 others 
D 1 other D More than 2 others 
19 Do you combine your journey with other trips, such as shopping, 
or dropping off children? 
20 How much do you spend on fuel each week? 
OLess than £10 0 £30 - £39.99 
D£10 - £19.99 0 £40 or more 
O£20 - £29.99 0 Unsure 
21 Where do you park? 
Dear park on campus 
o Private car park nearby 
o Street nearby 
o Park and ride scheme 
D I am a passenger 
o Other arrangements 
22 How easy is it to find a parking space? 
Very Hard Neither 
hard easy nor 
hard 
Finding a parking space is usually ... 
Easy Very 
easy 
23 Do you usually park in the same space each time you arrive at DMU? DV ON 
24 Is another mode of transport practical for you? 
25 Are you considering switching to another transport mode? 
26 What facilities would encourage you to switch? (Please tick no more than two.) 
o Discounted public transport season tickets 
o Spread payment scheme for public transport season tickets 
o Secure cycle sheds on campus 
o More convenient bus routes 
D Bus between railway station and campus 
o More showers and changing facilities on campus 
D More cycle routes and footpaths 
Other (please specify)r-I -- ----------. 
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27 Would you take part in a car share scheme? Oy ON Ounsure 
28 What are the main issues affecting your willingness to take part in a car share 
scheme? (Please tick all that are important to you.) 
D Security D Awkward working hours 
D Car already full Other (please specify) 1...--------, 
D Need for flexibility 
29 What incentives would encourage you to car share? (Please tick two at most.) 
D Guaranteed parking space 0 Car park in good location 
D Cheaper parking Other (please specify) P-I ------, 
D Potentially less congestion D None of the above 
30 Would you take part in a car pooling scheme? Oy ON Dunsure 
31 Please tick a box to indicate what you think about parking provision at your 
campus . 
Very bad Bad Neither Good 
good 
nor bad 
Current car parking facilities are ... 
32 Please tick one box on each row to indicate how you feel about each of the 
following statements about your travel habits. 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Agree 
strongly agree nor strongly 
disagree 
It would be difficult for me to 
reduce my car use when 
getting to the university_ 
I am able to use forms of 
transport other than the car to 
get to the university 
I don't feel any personal 
responsibility for causing my 
town / city's traffic problems 
Other means of travelling to the 
university are available to me 
There are obstacles to me 
using any means other than the 
car when travelling to DMU 
Very 
good 
Unsure 
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33 Do you intend to change the amount that you use your car to travel to DMU during 
the next twelve months? Please tick one box to indicate your intentions. 
D Increase 0 Stay the same D Reduce 
If you ticked 'Stay the same', please go to question 36. 
34 If you intend to change your level of car use when travelling to DMU in the next 
twelve months, please indicate why. (Please tick all that apply. ) 
o Flexibility concerns 
o Reliability concerns 
D Environmental concerns 
DPrice / cost concerns 
DChange of DMU site D Personal safety concerns 
D Health or fitness Other (please specify)t...I _____ ---.1 
D Personal circumstances 
35 If you intend to change your level of car use when travelling to DMU during the 
next twelve months, please tick one box to indicate how much. 
DStop using my car altogether 
D Use another mode of transport 3 or 4 days each week 
D Use another mode of transport 1 or 2 days each week 
o Use another mode of transport 1 or 2 days each month 
D Use another mode of transport less than once a month 
D Increase use of the car 
36 Below are some measures that DMU could encourage or introduce. How would 
each affect your willingness to reduce car use when travelling to the university? 
Is likely to put Would have no Is likely to -
The university ... me off reducing impact on my encourage me to my car use car use reduce my car 
use 
Encouraging car pooling 
Introducing a car sharing scheme 
Introducing car park charges 
Introducing discounted public transport season 
tickets 
Introducing interest free loans for public 
transport season tickets 
-
Introducing more secure cycle sheds on 
campus 
Introducing more showers and changing 
facilities on campus 
-
Thank you. Now please continue to section 3. 
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Section 3. Business trips and study placements 
61 How often do you make trips from your campus as part of your work or study? 
(If your answer is 'Never', please go to section 4.) 
D More than once a day D About once a month 
D Once a day 0 Less than once a month 
D 2 or 3 times a week D Never 
o About once a week 
62 Where do you go? (Please tick all that apply.) 
D Other DMU sites in the same town or city 
o Other DMU sites in another town or city 
o Other organisations in the same town or city 
D Other organisations in another town or city 
63 What distance is the most common journey that you make from your campus as 
part of your work or study? 
00-2 miles 
02.1 - 5 miles 
05.1 - 10 miles 
o Over 10 miles 
o Unsure 
64 Do any colleagues make the same trip on the same occasions? 
(If no, please go to question 66.) 
65 Do you travel together? 
66 What form of transport do you usually use for the main part of journeys from your 
campus as part of your work or study? (Please tick only one.) 
o Hire car as driver 0 Train 
D Hire car as passenger 0 Bicycle 
o Private car as driver D Walk or run 
D Private car as passenger D Motorcycle 
o Taxi DOther 
DBus 
Thank you. Please continue to section 4. 
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Section 4. Your travel options 
67 Do you own a car? 
68 Do you have use of a car? 
69 Do you have a driver's licence? 
70 Do you own a bicycle? 
71 Do you know how to ride a bicycle? 
72 Is the area that you live in served by buses? 
73 Does the area you live in have a train service? 
74 Are you in any way disabled? (If no, please go to question 76.) 
75 Does your disability affect how you travel to and from DMU? 
76 Have you changed your usual form of transport to and from DMU 
during the last three years? (If no, please go to section 5.) 
77 How did you travel previously? (Please tick one box only.) 
Dear as driver DBicycle 
Dear as passenger DWaik I Run 
DBus DMotorcycle 
DvDN 
DvDN 
DvDN 
DvDN 
DvDN 
DvDN 
DvDN 
DvDN 
DvDN 
DTrain Other (please specify) .... 1 -------.1 
78 Why did you change travel mode? (Please tick up to three.) 
D Greater flexibility 0 Personal circumstances 
DGreater reliability DEnvironmental concern 
o Greater personal safety 0 Price I cost 
o Health or fitness Other (please specify) I 
"------_--J 
Thank you. Please continue to section 5. 
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Section 5. The way forward 
79 The university has, until now, met the full costs of running its car parks. In future, 
what do you think it should do? (Please tick one box only.) 
OContinue to provide subsidised (free) car parking spaces 
OOnly subsidise sustainable forms of transport 
OProvide no transport subsidies at all 
OSubsidise all forms of transport equally 
OUnsure 
Section 6. About you 
This survey is anonymous and all responses will be treated as strictly confidential. 
This section is optional, but we would like to ask some questions about you, as the 
answers will help us to understand your opinions. We would be very grateful if you 
would provide the following details. 
80 What is your home postcode? .... 1______ ..... 
81 Are you? 
DFemale 
82 How old are you? 
OUnder20 
0 20-29 
0 30-39 
83 Are you? 
DAcademic staff 
DAdmin support staff 
DOther support staff 
84 Are you? 
o Full-time 
85 What is your income (gross per year)? 
DUnder £10,000 
D£10,000 - £19,999 
D£20,ooO - £29,999 
o Male 
0 40-49 
0 50-59 
060 or over 
o Undergraduate student 
o Postgraduate student 
DPart-time 
o £30,000 - £39,999 
o £40,000 or over 
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Thank you very much for taking the time to help with this 
survey. Your answers will help to ensure that DMU can 
provide the facilities that staff and students need. 
If you would like to enter the free prize draw open to all survey respondents, please 
provide your details below. 
Namel Phone~I================~I~E~--m-ai~II~==================~ 
DMU is also seeking volunteers to keep a travel diary for a week, or to attend focus 
group sessions to explore possible travel policies. If you would like to take part, 
please tick the box and provide a contact phone number or e-mail address. 
o I would like to take part in further research. You can contact me at 
Name I Phone~1 ==========:::rJ-=E:--m-a':i1i=1 ==========~ 
If you would like any more information about this initiative, please contact: 
Sarah Wells 
DMU Transport Co-ordinator 
Bedford Tel 01234793 121 E-mail swells01@dmu.ac.uk 
Leicester Tel 01162577653 
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Appendix 2 
Study 2 interview schedule 
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Interview number I Location Date 
Group LI ______ ...J Interviewee 
Section 1. Introduction 
• Thank interviewee for attending. 
• Introduce RW. 
• Topic of research is travel behaviour. Current focus on travel to and from DMU. 
• Part of PhD and also to assist Estates Department in developing DMU travel 
policies. 
• Formalities: 
o Ask permission to tape interview 
o Assure confidentiality and no passing of information to other parties 
o Interviewee free to pull out at any time and without explanation 
• Stress no right or wrong answers. 
• Not many specific questions - more of an open-ended chat. Please follow train 
of thought wherever it takes you and expand on ideas as much as you can . 
• Interviewee is expert - RW is trying to learn. 
• Interview should take 30-40 mins. 
• Interrupt at any time if questions seem irrelevant or unclear. 
• Is there anything interviewee wants to ask before we go on? 
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Section 2. Exploring motivations for travel mode choices 
1. I'd like to start by asking about your journey to university this morning. What mode 
of transport did you use today? 
2. Can you talk me through the decisions that led to you choosing [ ... ] for today's 
journey? 
Probe - context issues such as weather. time. need to combine trips 
Is the decision over mode ever conscious. or always habitual? 
3. What mode of transport do you usually use to get to DMU? 
4 . And why do you usually travel by [ .. . ]? Please tell me about anything at all that 
influences your choice. 
If predominantly contextual. probe personal issues - attitudes, SN, PBC. PN. AR. AC. 
affect, habit, status, role, environmental concem, etc. 
If predominantly personal, probe contextual issues - time, cost, flexibility, traffic 
If predominantly NAT, probe TPB and vice versa. 
5. Can you tell me about any ways in which other people influence how you travel? 
If predominantly contextual, probe SN (injunctive and descriptive). . 
If predominantly psychological, probe context - responsibilities to colleagues, children 
6. Do your feel that your decisions about how to travel say anything about you as a 
person? 
Probe - role. status, values. priorities (time. cost) 
7. I'd like to concentrate on driving now. First of all, can you tell me if there's anything 
that you particularly like or dislike about it? 
Probe - comfort, flexibility. privacy, speed, convenience. enjoyment, congestion, pollution. 
safety, comparison with other transport modes 
8. Have you ever thought about reducing the amount that you use your car? 
9 . Can you tell me more about... why you considered reducing your car use / why 
reducing your car use isn't something that you've considered? 
If predominantly contextual. probe personal issues - attitudes, SN, PBC, PN, AR, AC, 
affect, habit, status. role, environmental concern 
If predominantly personal, probe contextual issues - time, cost. flexibility, traffic 
If predominantly NAT, probe TPB and vice versa. 
10. According to Government figures, 61 % of all journeys in the UK are made by car. 
Cars are obviously a very popular way of getting around. What do you think are 
the consequences of that - good or bad? 
Probe - safety, pollution, congestion, ease of access to facilities. AC local vs. AC global 
11. With so many journeys being made by car, do you think that people should to try 
to cut down on driving? 
Probe - social dilemma. obstacles to reducing, personal choice, AC, institutional vs. 
individual responsibility 
12. Finally in this part of the interview, what do you think could be done to make it 
easier for people to use other modes of transport instead of their cars? 
Probe - public transport, cycling / walking facilities, employer initiatives. planning 
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Obligation to Responsibility AC own driving AC driving in Attitude to own Attitude to PBCfor 
reduce for reducing general driving reducing own reducing 
driving 
SN injunctive SN descriptive Habit Affect Status Role beliefs Env. concem 
Social dilemma Access to other Responsibility Need for Change of TIme Financial 
modes to other people flexibility circumstances constraints constraints 
Thank you. I'd like to move on to something slightly different now - a short activity to 
help us to summarise the ideas that we've been talking about. 
Section 3. Prioritising influences on transport choices 
I've got some blank post-it notes here. On each one, I'd like you to write down one 
thing that influences how you travel to DMU. 
For example, you mentioned [use example from previous section of interview]. 
Just try to summarise each influence in a key word or phrase, don't worry about 
writing sentences. 
Could you spend a couple of minutes doing that? Feel free to talk me through what 
you're writing as you do it. 
When you're done, I'll just run through the things that you've mentioned so far in the 
interview to make sure that we haven't missed anything. But don't feel that you must 
include anything just because I mention it. These should be your ideas. 
Now I'd like you to just put them in order of importance. Things that have a big 
influence on how you travel to DMU should go at the top, with less important 
influences at the bottom. 
STRESS: Remember, there are no right or wrong answers, so please don't feel any 
pressure. We're just trying to summarise the ideas that we've already talked about. 
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Section 4. Knowledge of DMU travel initiatives 
Now I just have some quick questions to finish with. 
1. Firstly, have you ever heard of DMU's Green Travel Group? 
[If yes, ask questions 2 and 3. If no, go straight to question 4] 
2. How did you hear about the Group? 
3. From what you know about the Group, what do you think of it? 
4. Are you aware of any measures that DMU has taken to encourage people to use 
their cars less for getting to university? 
[If yes, ask question 5. If no, move to next section] 
5. What do you think of these measures? 
Section 5. Close 
That's the end of the interview. Thank you very much for your help. 
Before I say goodbye, is there anything else that you'd like to add? Anything that you 
feel is relevant but that we haven't covered? 
I'd like to ask if you'd be willing to fill in a very short questionnaire about the interview. 
It's just so that you can give your impressions of how it went, whether you felt able to 
say everything that you wanted to and so on. It should take ten minutes at most and I'll 
give you a stamped addressed envelope to send it back to me. Would that be OK? 
[Ask the following question of each participant until eight have agreed to it.] 
One last request. As I said at the start, I'll be writing a report on the research and I'd 
like to ask if you'd be willing to check a section of it before it's finalised, to ensure that 
it really reflects what participants have said. This is likely to happen towards the end of 
this year [2004] . Could you help with this? 
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Appendix 3 
Study 2 post-interview questionnaire 
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Interview number D Date I L..__ -=---__ ..J 
DMU Travel Study post-interview questionnaire 
Thank you very much for participati ng in a research interview. This questionna ire is part of the 
research quality control process. Your answers will help the researcher to ensure that the 
conclusions are justified by the information provided by participants. 
1. How did you feel about participating in the interview before it took place? 
2. How did you feel about having participated in the interview after it took place? 
3. The researcher stressed that there were no right or wrong answers in the interview 
and asked you to talk freely. To what extent do you feel that you could do th is? 
4. Did anything in particular influence (enhance or constra in) the extent to which you 
felt able to talk freely? 
5. Did you ever feel that you should answer questions in a particular way? If yes , 
please try to explain why. 
6. What do you think the researcher was trying to achieve in the research? 
7. Did your perceptions of the research aims influence the answers that you gave? If 
yes, please try to explain why. 
8. Finally, is there anything that you would like to add, including anything about your 
travel to DMU that you may have forgotten to say during your interview? 
Thank you. Please return this questionnaire in the pre-paid envelope provided 
or by DMU internal mail if you are a member of staff. 
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Appendix 4 
Study 2 initial template 
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N 
<.0 
""" 
A priori themes are shown in black. New themes added during coding are shown in blue. 
Flrst-order Theoretical definition Second-order theme Theoretical definition 
theme 
Personal norm "[S]elf-expectations for specific action in Personal obligation(PN) "[F]eelings of moral obligation" not to 
for not driving particular situations ... experienced as drive (Schwartz, 1977, 227). 
(PN) feelings of moral obligation" (Schwartz, 
1977,227). 
Guilt(PN) "[T]he uncomfortable feeling of having 
done wrong" by driving (Oxford 
Dictionary of Philosophy) . 
Personal ·Socially, peoples' responsibilities are 
responsibility those things for which they are 
for not driving accountable" (Oxford Dictionary of 
(AR) Philosophy). 
Awareness of A "tendency to become aware of the Congestion(ACo"M1) Any reference to congestion caused by 
consequences consequences of one's behavior for participant's own driving. 
of own driving others" (Schwartz, 1977, 229). 
(ACown) 
Poliution(AcO"M1) Any reference to pollution caused by 
I participant's own driving. 
Awareness of Awareness of the consequences of car Congestion(ACgen) Any reference to congestion caused by 
consequences use in general, rather than the car use in general. 
of driving participant talking about the 
generally consequences of their own car use Poliution(ACgen) Any reference to pollution caused by 
(ACgen) specifically. car use in general. 
Population Any reference to impacts of car use on 
health(Acgen) people's health in general. NB. Not the 
participant's own health . This is covered 
by Personal health(AIT)' 
Example operational 
definitions (Interview, 
I page paragraph) 
"I feel morally obliged to, 
to sort of, um, hold my 
actions in check." (17, 6, 
9) 
"I used my car today ... I 
wish I hadn't, but I did." 
(17,1,2-4) 
"It's down to the 
individual car owner, the 
responsibility ." [For 
cutting down the amount 
ofcaruse1(3718) 
"I'm very aware that I 
cause congestion as 
much as the next driver." 
(19 , 2, 15} 
"It's, um, mostly the CO2 
it puts out. " (18 2,18) 
"Well obviously there's 
things like congestion ." 
(20 , 5 5) 
"That's an awful lot of 
toxins and whatever else 
goes into the air because 
of cars ."J10 8 18) 
"And with the levels of ... 
children's health that are 
driven everywhere. They 
don't walk anywhere ." 
(10, 9, 15) 
I 
N 
<D 
01 
Attitude toward 
one's own car 
use (An) 
"The degree to which a person has a 
favourable or unfavourable evaluation 
or appraisal of the behavior in question" 
(Ajzen, 1991a, 188). NB. Refers to the 
outcomes of the behaviour as 
performed by the participant; not by 
others. 
Participants may also mention their 
attitudes towards alternative modes. 
Inferences about their attitudes towards 
car use can often be drawn from such 
statements. 
Comfort(ATT) 
FlexibilitY(ATT) 
Convenience(ATT) 
Speed(ATT) 
Personal safetY(ATT) 
ReliabilitY(ATT) 
Any reference to comfort of travelling by 
car or any reference to comfort of 
alternative modes that allows for 
inference about comfort of car. 
Any reference to flexibility of travelling 
by car or any reference to flexibility of 
alternative modes that allows for 
inference about flexibility of car. 
References to car allowing 
"independence" (in the sense that it 
enables people to do what they want, 
when they want) should be coded as 
Freedom. 
Any reference to convenience of 
travelling by car or any reference to 
convenience of other modes that allows 
for inference about convenience of car. 
Also references to "practicality". 
Any reference to speed of travelling by 
car or any reference to speed of other 
modes that allows for inference about 
speed of car. 
Any reference to safety of travelling by 
car or any reference to safety of other 
modes that allows for inference about 
safety of car. 
Any reference to reliability of car or to 
reliability of other modes that allows for 
inference about reliability of car. 
'The last time I used a 
train ... It was dirty. It was 
smelly. It was horrible." 
[The inference being that 
car is more comfortable] 
(20, 7,7) 
''I'd do all sorts of other 
things. Making little sorts 
of detours and things, 
which I couldn't do on a 
bus. I mean if you get on 
a bus, you go from A to B 
and that's it." (19, 8, 14) 
"It's an absolute 
convenience. Y'know, 
you get out of your office 
into your car and go 
home." (3, 5, 1) 
"I don't want to waste half 
an hour of my time sitting 
at the bus stop." [The 
inference being that 
driving does not waste 
time] (20, 6, 4) 
"I do not like cycling. I'm 
frankly scared of traffic. 
Wouldn't cycle, don't like 
it." [The inference being 
that driving is safer than 
cycling] (4, 3, 4) 
"You know, it's ... totally 
because you can't rely on 
the public transport 
system." (10, 11, 8) 
I\) 
~ Personal health(ATT) Any reference to health benefits or "Um, and my bicycle, I'd disbenefits of travelling by car or by use that probably more 
other modes. for fitness." (17, 8, 10) 
Perceived An overall evaluation of the perceived Ease/difficultY(PBc) Any reference to how easy or difficult a "[T]here are issues 
control over "ease or difficulty of performing" a behaviour is or to factors that cause around the facilities on 
reducing own behaviour (Ajzen, 1991a, 183). ease or difficulty. the campus, which are, I 
car use (PBq feel are a barrier [to 
cycling] for me." (16, 1, 
10) 
Volitional control(pBC) "The extent to which people consider "I have to drive. If I want 
the performance of a behaviour to be to go anywhere, I have to 
under their voluntary control" (Trimafow drive." (20, 3, 15) 
et. al., 2002, 101). Distinct from 
ease/difficulty because a behaviour may 
be under voluntary control, but still very 
difficult for social/cultural reasons. 
Subjective "Perceived social pressure to perform or Descriptive(sN) Inferring "generally accepted standards "I'd like to think that being 
norm (SN) not to perform the behavior" (Ajzen, of behaviour within a society, around, the more people 
1991a,188). community, or group' from observing see people like me 
others' behaviour, not from considering cycling or walking, I think 
their wishes regarding one's own people are more likely to 
behaviour (Oxford Dictionary of do it themselves." [An 
Psychology). example of participant 
exerting SN, rather than 
perceiving itl (1, 6, 15) 
Injunctive(sN) "Perceived social pressure to perform or "The point I made about, 
not to perform" an act (Ajzen, 1991a, you know, I don't have to 
188). Perceptions of what others want work in Leicester, has 
one to do. been made to me by 
friends who are in the 
Green Party." (4, 4, 12) 
Affect "Emotion or subjectively experienced PriVaCY(Alleet) Any reference to enjoying (or not "I think it's having your 
feeling, such as happiness, sadness, enjoying) driving because the driver has own personal space, 
fear, or anger" (Oxford Dictionary of their own personal space. really." [When asked why 
Psychology). she enjoyed driving] (15, 
--------
4,12) __ 
I\) 
(0 
-...j 
Right to drive 
Wil lingness to 
endure 
inconvenience 
Confidence 
Status 
Enjoymen~A1fect) 
Skill(Affect) 
Stress(Affect) 
Control(Affect) 
The idea that people see driving as a 
right: "a moral or legal entitlement to 
have or do something" (Oxford Concise 
Dictionary). 
Acceptance of some loss of personal 
utility on the basis of beliefs held by the 
individual. A willingness to sacrifice on 
the basis of one's values. 
"A belief and a self-assurance in one's Mode(Confidence) 
own abilities" (Oxford Concise 
Dictionary). 
Route(confidence) 
"A person's subjective evaluation of his 
or her position in the status hierarchy" 
(Oxford Dictionary of Sociology). 
Any reference to enjoyment that does "It's just a lovely, happy 
not rest on one of the other components car to be in." (15,6,15) 
of Affect. 
Any reference to enjoying driving (or "And in a way, if I 
other modes) because of the skill stopped driving, I would 
involved. feel that I'd kind of given 
up a skill." (4, 6, 7) 
Any reference to stress or anxiety "I hate driving. It gets me 
caused by any mode of transport really worked up." (20, 3, 
(including stress caused by other road 3) 
users). 
Any reference to enjoyment of a mode "I've got control over the 
of transport on the basis of being in car. I can go fast. I can 
control of the vehicle. Igo slow." (19, 4,18) 
"I mean, don't get me 
started on parking 
spaces, but having a car 
is seen as like a human 
right." (6, 10, 4) 
"There are times when ... 
to have a car would be 
fantastic [but] I've tried to 
find other ways round it. .. 
I've bought a bike trailer 
and stuff." (6, 8, 5-7) 
Confidence in one's ability to use a "No problems. I used to 
particular transport mode. cycle everywhere when I 
lived in London." [Reply 
when participant was 
asked how he felt about 
cycling] (8, 3, 11) 
Confidence in travelling only on familiar "I like driving .. . routes I 
routes. know." (10, 4, 10-12) 
"I mean, I wouldn't drive 
a Ferrari to show off, or 
whatever." (19, 4, 16) 
'" <0 <Xl 
Self-image 
Habit 
Environmental 
values 
Cynicism 
"The idea or conception that one has of 
oneself in general" (Oxford Dicfionary of 
Psychology). 
"A sequence of learned behaviour 
occurring in a particular context... They 
are often the result of conditioning. are 
performed automatically and 
unconsciously" (Oxford Medical 
Dictionary). 
An "assessment of something as good 
or bad in terms of one's standards or 
priorities" regarding the environment 
(Oxford Concise Dictionary). This theme 
captures any reference to 
environmental concerns that is not 
covered by AC, AR or PN. 
The belief that "people [or Government policy(cyn) 
organisations] are motivated purely by 
self-interest" (Oxford Concise 
Dictionary). 
Alternatively. scepticism about the truth 
of claims about environmental 
problems. NB. This is distinct from AC. 
It is not a lack of awareness of the DMU policy(cyn) 
consequences of car use. Rather. it is a 
view that these consequences are not 
as often claimed. 
"It's everybody's ambition 
to be able to own a car 
and run it, for their 
personal convenience." 
i(8,10,1} 
"I think you just wouldn't 
see me driving anything 
like that. Because it just 
says the wrong thing 
about how I feel I am." 
(15,7,11) 
'''Cos I always do." 
[Immediate answer to 
question of why 
participant drove to DMU 
on day of interview] (13, 
1,4) 
"I guess the way that I've 
been brought up is to try 
and be as 
environmentally-friendly 
as I can." (17, 3, 3) 
"I try to save the planet 
by whatever means I 
can." (14, 3 8) 
Scepticism about the sincerity of "I personally think they're 
government efforts to tackle transport quite happy for 
problems. everybody to use their 
cars 'cos they're 
generating quite a lot of 
money in tax out of it. " (3, 
8 2) 
Scepticism about the sincerity of DMU "When you think of the 
efforts to tackle transport problems. University. it's all kind of 
framework and little 
substance." (12, 25. 7) 
N 
<0 
<0 
Freedom 
Knowledge of 
alternative 
modes 
Cost 
The belief that cars have improved 
quality of life by allowing people the 
freedom and opportunity to travel much 
more widely. 
Knowledge of bus and/or train services 
or cycle/pedestrian routes that could be 
used instead of the car. 
Any reference to the financial cost of 
travel, regardless of the mode of 
transport used. (Modes are 
differentiated by the second-order 
themes.) 
Impacts of car use(Cyn) Scepticism about the truth of cla ims that 
car use harms the environment. 
Cost of driving(cost) Specific reference to the cost of driving. 
Paying twice(cost) Reference to travel mode choice being 
influenced by the fact that there are 
fixed costs for owning a car (e.g. tax, 
insurance) and so paying for public 
transport is viewed as a waste of 
money. 
Cost of Specific reference to the cost of 
alternatives(Cost) alternatives to driving. 
"I think carbon dioxide is 
the most innocent of 
substances that has 
been given an awfully 
bad press." (9, 15, 14) 
"The other thing, of 
course, is it opens up so 
much to you. You know, I 
can get to places that I 
just couldn't without a 
car." (19, 5, 11) 
"I had thought, 'Oh, I 
could get the bus.' But 
I've forgotten. Completely 
forgotten where it goes." 
1(11 , 20, 4) 
"It's just part of my 
expenditure." [Response 
when asked whether she 
was worried by the cost 
of driving] (20, 6, 20) 
'The main reason I do it i 
is because I own a car 
and I pay ... insurance 
and everything ... So 
because I have got a car, 
I think I might as well use 
the car. " (4, 1,6) 
'To .. . catch a train from 
either Nottingham or 
Derby to London, that's 
forty-five pounds. Or 
about eighty pounds if 
you don't book in 
advance and just turn up 
on the day." (5,11 , 4) 
w 
o 
o Bicycle 
ownership 
Journey time 
Facilities for 
commuters 
Journey 
distance 
Combining 
trips 
Weather 
Baggage 
Carriage of 
others in car 
Whether participant owns a bicycle and 
whether this affects how they travel . 
Whether journey time is mentioned as 
an influence on how participant travels. 
Any reference to facilities for those Vehicle securitY(FaCUlties) 
commuting to DMU, regardless of the 
mode of transport used. 
Changing(Facilities) 
Reference to journey distance as an 
influence on how participant travels . 
Reference to participant combining their 
commute with other journeys (e.g. 
shopping, visiting family). 
Reference to participant's travel mode 
choice being influenced by weather. 
Reference to need to carry baggage or 
equipment as an influence on how 
participant travels. 
Whether participant gives lifts to others 
en route to and from DMU. 
"I mean I'll walk, but I 
won 't cycle. So, um, I'm 
not going to go awfully 
far really." (19, 5, 8) 
"I suppose it is time 
actually. Because, um, it 
means I get to University 
quicker." -(1, 2, 11) 
Concerns over the security of 'There is sort of semi-
car/bike/motorbike while parked at security, but it's not, not 
DMU. really what you want for a 
fifteen-hundred pound 
bike." (16, 2, 6) 
Availability of changing rooms/showers "I would never have [run 
for those who cycle or run to DMU. to work] ... had there not 
been a shower." (14, 24, 
8) 
"Well it's great if you can 
do it... but I could not 
cycle fourteen miles a 
day." (20,9, 14-1 6) 
"My mother lives in 
Leicester. I have to do 
her shopping once a 
week [on the way home 
from DMU] , so we need 
the car for that. " (3, 6 3) 
"I'd still cycle in the rain if 
it was light." (1 13, 1) 
"I can't take my laptop 
and all my other bits and 
pieces on my bike." (17, 
1, 10) 
"I give a chap in our 
office a lift home." (3, 3, 
18) 
Appendix 5 
Study 2 final template 
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w 
~ A priori themes are shown in black. New themes added during coding are shown in blue. 
Flrst-order Theoretical definition Second-order theme Theoretical definition Example operational 
theme definitions (Interview, 
page paragraph) 
Personal norm "[S]elf-expectations for specific action in Personal obligation(PN) "[F]eelings of moral obligation" not to "I feel morally obliged 
for minimising particular situations ... experienced as drive (Schwartz, 1977,227). to, to sort of, um, hold 
car use (PN) feelings of moral obligation" (Schwartz, my actions in check." 
1977,227). (17,6,9) 
Guil~PN) "[T]he uncomfortable feeling of "I used my car today ... I 
having done wrong" by driving wish I hadn't, but I did." 
(Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy). (17,1,2-4) 
Personal "Socially, peoples' responsibilities are "It's down to the 
responsibility those things for which they are individual car owner, 
for minimising accountable" (Oxford Dictionary of the responsibility. " [For 
car use (AR) Philosophy) . cutting down the 
amount of car use] (3, 
7,18) 
Awareness of A "tendency to become aware of the Congestion(Acown) Any reference to congestion caused "I'm very aware that I 
consequences consequences of one's behavior for by participant's own travel. cause congestion as 
of own others" (Schwartz, 1977, 229). much as the next 
transport driver." (19, 2, 15) 
choices 
(ACown) Poliution(ACown) Any reference to pollution caused by "It's, um, mostly the 
participant's own travel. CO2 it puts out." (18, 2, 
18) 
Resource use(ACown) Reference to resources consumed "I'm afraid we use an 
by own travel (as opposed to awful lot of petrol." (19, 
I pollution generated). 3, 1) 
Road building(ACown) Need to build/widen roads caused "The amount of, green 
by own travel. belt, that's taken up by 
road building: (6 , 8, 13) 
(.,) 
o (.,) 
Awareness of 
consequences 
of transport 
choices 
generally 
(ACgen) 
Attitude 
towards one's 
own car use for 
DMU commute 
(ATT) 
Awareness of the consequences of Congestion(ACgen) 
transport choices in general, rather than 
the participant talking about the 
consequences of their own travel Poliution(ACgen) 
specifically. 
Road building(ACgen) 
Resource use(ACgen) 
Accidents(ACgen) 
"The degree to which a person has a Comfort(ATI) 
favourable or unfavourable evaluation or 
appraisal of the behavior in question" 
(Ajzen, 1991a, 188). NB. Refers to the 
outcomes of the behaviour as performed 
by the participant, not by others. 
FlexibilitY(ATI) 
Any reference to congestion caused "Well obviously there's 
by travel in general. things like congestion." 
(20,5,5) 
Any reference to pollution caused by "That's an awful lot of 
travel in general. toxins and whatever 
else goes into the air 
because of cars." (10, 
8,18) 
Need to build/widen roads caused "The fact that we widen 
by travel in general. roads, create more 
roads." (4, 7,12) 
Reference to resources consumed "Presumably at some 
by travel (as opposed to pollution point there will be a limit 
generated). to, you know, how 
much fuel there is 
available." (7,16,15) 
Reference to accidents caused by "[T]here's road deaths." 
car use. (1,9,17) 
Any reference to comfort of "The last time I used a 
travelling by car. train ... It was dirty. It 
was smelly. It was 
horrible." [The inference 
being that car is more 
comfortable] (20, 7, 7) I 
Any reference to flexibility of "I'd do all sorts of other 
travelling by car for specific things. Making little 
joumeys. References to car allowing sorts of detours and 
"independence" more generally (in things, which I COUldn't 
the sense that it enables people to do on a bus. I mean if 
do what they want, when they want) you get on a bus, you 
should be coded as Freedom. go from A to Band 
that's it." (19, 8, 14) 
_L ____ 
- -- - ---------- --
w 
o 
~ 
Attitude to 
using other 
modes for 
DMU commute 
(ATT-OM) 
"The degree to which a person has a 
favourable or unfavourable evaluation or 
appraisal of the behavior in question" 
(Ajzen, 1991 a, 188). NB. Refers to the 
outcomes of the behaviour as performed 
by the participant, not by others. 
Convenience(ATT) 
Speed(ATT) 
Personal safetY(ATT) 
ReliabilitY(ATT) 
ControllabilitY(ATT) 
Comfort(ATT_OM) 
FlexibilitYcATT.oM) 
Any reference to convenience of 
travelling by car. Also references to 
"practicality" . 
Any reference to speed of travelling 
by car. 
Any reference to safety of travelling 
by car. 
Any reference to reliability of car. 
Any reference to being in control of 
one's journey. This is distinct from 
flexibility, which is a matter of being 
able to travel when one wants to. 
Any reference to comfort of 
travelling by modes other than car. 
Any reference to flexibility of 
travelling by modes other than car. 
References to "independence" 
should be coded as Flexibility. 
"It's an absolute 
convenience. Y'know, 
you get out of your 
office into your car and 
I go home." (3, 5, 1) 
"I don't want to waste 
half an hour of my time 
sitting at the bus stop." 
1(20,6,4) 
"I do not like cycling. I'm 
frankly scared of traffic. 
Wouldn't cycle, don't 
like it." [Inference being 
that driving is safer than 
cycling] (4, 3, 4) 
"You know, it's ... totally 
because you can't rely 
on the public transport 
svstem." (10, 11, 8) 
"To be in control of 
time. Because 
alternatives are 
uncertain." (14, 22, 1) 
"The last time I used a 
train .. . It was dirty. It 
was smelly. It was 
horrible." (20 7 7) 
"I'd do all sorts of other 
things. Making little 
sorts of detours and 
things, which I couldn't 
do on a bus. I mean if 
you get on a bus, you 
go from A to Band 
that's it. " (19, 8L 14) _ 
w 
o 
CJ1 
iPerceived 
control over 
: reducing own 
I commuter car 
use (PBC) 
An overall evaluation of the perceived 
"ease or difficulty of performing" a 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1991a, 183). 
Convenience(ATT-OM) 
Speed(ATT -OM) 
Personal safetY(ATT-OM) 
ReliabilitY(ATT_OM) 
Personal health(ATT-OM) 
ControliabilitY(ATT -OM) 
DifficultY(PBc) 
Any reference to convenience of 
travell ing by modes other than car. 
Also references to "practicality". 
Any reference to speed of travelling 
by modes other than car. 
Any reference to safety of travelling 
by modes other than car. 
Any reference to reliability of modes 
other than car. 
Any reference to health benefits or 
disbenefits of travelling by modes 
other than car. 
Any reference to being in control of 
one's journey. This is distinct from 
flexibility, which is more a matter of 
being able to travel when one wants 
to. 
Any reference to how easy or 
difficult a behaviour is or to factors 
that cause ease or difficulty. 
"[T]he bus just picks me 
up from the end of my 
road , literally .. . So 
that's quite convenient." 
(13, 2, 6-10) 
"I don't want to waste 
half an hour of my time 
sitting at the bus stop." 
1(20, 6, 4) 
"The safety issue is an 
important aspect. For 
women in particular .. . 
that would apply on 
public transport, on a 
train late at night." (7, 
17,7) 
"You know, it's .. . totally 
because you can 't rely 
on the public transport 
system." (10, 11, 8) 
"Urn, and my bicYcle, I'd 
use that probably more 
for fitness." (17,8, 10) I 
"You know it's gonna 
take you however long 
to get in and unless you 
have a puncture or 
anything you're not 
gonna get caught up in 
traffic." (17, 2, 1O) 
"[T]here are issues 
around the facilities on 
the campus, which .. . 
are a barrier [to CYcling] 
for me" (16, 1, 10) 
w 
o 
Ol 
Affect 
Confidence 
"Emotion or subjectively experienced 
feeling , such as happiness, sadness, 
fear, or anger" (Oxford Dictionary of 
Psychology). 
"A belief and a self-assurance in one's 
own abilities" (Oxford Concise 
Dictionary). 
Volitional control(pBc) 
PrivacY(Affect) 
Enjoyment(Affect) 
Skill(Affect) 
Stress(Affect) 
Control(Aft'ect) 
Mode(Confldence) 
"The extent to which people 
consider the performance of a 
behaviour to be under their voluntary 
control" (Trimafow et. a/., 2002, 
101). Distinct from ease/difficulty 
because behaviour may be under 
voluntary control, but still very 
difficult for social/cultural reasons. 
Any reference to enjoying (or 
disliking) driving because the driver 
has their own personal space. 
Any reference to enjoyment that 
does not rest on one of the other 
components of Affect. 
Any reference to enjoying driving (or 
other modes) because of the skill 
involved. 
Any reference to stress or anxiety 
caused by travel (including stress 
caused by other road users). 
Any reference to enjoyment of a 
mode of transport on basis of being 
in control. 
Confidence in one's ability to use a 
particular transport mode. 
"I have to drive. If I want I 
to go anywhere, I have 
to drive." (20, 3, 15) I 
"I think it's having your 
own personal space, 
really." [When asked 
why she liked driving] 
(15,4,12) 
"It's just a lovely, happy 
car to be in." (15, 6, 15) 
"And in a way, if I 
stopped driving , I would 
feel that I'd kind of 
given up a skill." (4, 6, 
7) 
"I hate driving. It gets 
me really worked up." 
1(20,3,3) 
"I've got control over 
the car. I can go fast. I 
can go slow." (19, 4, 
18) 
"No problems. I used to 
cycle everywhere when 
I lived in London." 
[Reply when participant 
was asked how he felt 
about cycling] (8, 3, 11) 
w 
o 
....., 
Habit 
Laziness 
Environmental 
va lues 
Social values 
Tiredness 
Cynicism 
"A sequence of learned behaviour 
occurring in a particular context ... They 
are often the result of conditioning, are 
performed automatically and 
unconsciously" (Oxford Medical 
Dictionary). 
Whether modal choice is influenced by 
laziness. 
An "assessment of something as good or 
bad in terms of one's standards or 
priorities" regarding the environment 
(Oxford Concise Dictionary). This theme 
captures any reference to environmental 
concerns that is not covered by AC, AR 
or PN. 
In accordance with the above definition: 
the view that societal well-being is good. 
Whether tiredness affects the 
participants' choice of travel mode 
The belief that "people [or organisations] 
are motivated purely by self-interest" 
(Oxford Concise Dictionary). 
Alternatively, scepticism about the truth 
of claims about environmental problems. 
NB. This is distinct from AC. It is not a 
lack of awareness of the consequences 
of car use. Rather, it is a view that these 
consequences are not as often claimed. 
"'Cos I always do." 
[Immediate answer to 
question of why 
participant drove to 
DMU on day of 
interview] (13,1 , 4) 
[Car use] "expends less 
energy on your part as 
well. " (13, 7,9) 
"I guess the way that 
I've been brought up is 
to try and be as 
environmentally friendly 
as I can." (17, 3, 3) 
"I try to save the planet 
by whatever means I 
can." (14, 3, 8) 
"I would hope that my 
action sort of 
contributes to a 
broader, better whole." 
(1 , 6,7) 
"That's depending on 
how tired I am as well. 
That's a key factor." 
(16, 4, 2) 
Cynicism(DMU) Scepticism about the sincerity of "When you think of the 
DMU efforts to tackle transport University, it's all kind of 
problems. framework and little 
substance." (12, 25, 7) 
Cyn icism(Env) Scepticism about the truth of claims "I think carbon dioxide 
that car use harms the environment. is the most innocent of 
substances that has 
been given an awfully 
bad press." (9 , 15, 14) 
w 
o (» Cost 
Bicycle 
ownership 
Any reference to the financial cost of Cost of driving(cost) 
travel, regard less of the mode of 
transport used. (Modes are differentiated 
by the second-order themes.) 
Paying twice(cost) 
Cost of alternatives(cost) 
Fixed costs(Cost) 
Whether participant owns a bicycle and 
whether this affects how they travel. 
Specific reference to the cost of 
driving. 
Reference to travel mode choice 
being influenced by the fact that 
there are fixed costs for owning a 
car, so paying for public transport is 
a waste of money. 
Specific reference to the cost of 
alternatives to driving. 
Reference to travel mode choice 
being influenced by the fact that 
there are fixed costs for owning a 
car, but without reference to having 
to pay additional fares for public 
transport. 
"It's just part of my 
expenditure." 
[Response when asked 
whether she's worried 
by the cost of driving] 
1(20,6,20) 
"And two of us buying 
the season rail ticket, 
but you've still gotta 
have the car anyway ... 
you've still gotta pay the 
road tax." (3, 2, 15) 
''To ... catch a train from 
either Nottingham or 
Derby to London, that's 
forty-five pounds. Or 
about eighty pounds if 
you don't book in 
advance and just turn 
up on the day." (5, 11 , 
4) 
"The main reason I do It 
is because lawn a car 
and I pay ... Insurance 
and everythlng ... So 
because I have got a 
car, I think I might as 
well use the car: (4 , 1, 
6) 
"I mean I'll walk, but I 
won 't cycle. So, um, I'm · 
not going to go awfully 
far rea lly: (19, 5, 8) 
(.0) 
o 
CD 
Journey time 
Car ownership 
Train 
availability 
Bus availability 
Car availability 
Facilities 
--
Whether journey time is mentioned as an 
influence on how participant travels. 
Whether participant owns a car and 
whether this affects how they travel. NB. 
Participant may own a car because they 
need it for non-DMU journeys but fact 
that they own it leads them to use it for 
DMU travel too. 
Participant's perception of whether there 
is a train service suitable for commute. 
Participant's perception of whether there 
is a bus service suitable for commute. 
If participant has a car but it is 
temporarily unavailable, forcing change 
of mode. 
Any reference to facilities for those SecuritY(FacilitieS) 
commuting to DMU, regardless of the 
mode of transport used. 
Changing(FacilitieS) 
--------_._--------- - - ---
"I suppose it is time 
actually. Because, um, 
it means I get to 
University quicker." (1, 
2, 11) 
''There's certain things 
that I do ... that I think 
would be difficult 
without my car. . . so I 
choose to have a car 
for that sort of 
convenience." (4, 2,3) 
"There is a train stop, 
but it either gets me to 
work late or gets me to 
work, er, y'know, two 
hours early." (3, 1, 6) 
''There is no bus service 
from the village where I 
live." (3, 1, 6) 
"I have used buses on a 
couple of occasions. 
When I've not had the 
car for various reasons. 
When it's been for MOT 
. or whatever."113, 1, 18) 
Concerns over the security of ''There is sort of semi-
car/bike/motorbike while parked at security, but it's not, not 
DMU. really what you want for 
a fifteen-hundred pound 
bike." (16, 2, 6) 
Availabi lity of changing rooms/ "I would never have 
showers for those who cycle or run [run to work] ... had 
to DMU. there not been a 
shower." (14, 24, 8) 
-_ .- ---
(.oJ 
..... 
o Parking(FaCilitieS) Availability of parking space at DMU "I used to travel in by 
as an influence on modal choice. bus 'cos I didn't have a 
car parking space." (7, 
1, 5) 
Park and ride(Facililies) Availability (or lack of) park and ride "Or a park and ride ... 
as an influence on modal choice. so you could [park there 
and] choose whether 
you got the bus or 
walked." (7,7,17) 
Journey Reference to journey distance as an . "Well it's great if you 
distance influence on how participant travels. can do it... but I could 
not cycle fourteen miles 
a day." (20, 9,14-16) 
Combining trips Reference to participant combining their "My mother lives in 
commute with other journeys (e.g. Leicester. I have to do 
shopping, visiting family). her shopping once a 
week [on the way home 
from DMU], so we need 
the car for that." (3 , 6, 
3) 
Socialising Reference to participant not travell ing by "Oh, I was going to the 
car because they are going straight to a theatre. That was why I 
social event after work. didn't bring the other 
one rcarl in." (7 9 14) 
Weather Reference to participant's travel mode "I'd stili cycle in the rain 
choice being influenced by weather. if it was IIght."J1 13 1) 
Baggage Reference to need to carry baggage or "I can't take my laptop 
equipment as an influence on how and all my other bits 
participant travels. and pieces on my bike ." 
'(171. 1 .. 10) _ 
Novelty If participant switches modes 'just for a "I'm sure I've done it on 
change'. a few occasions, when 
I've just got the bus for 
a change." (13, 10,7) I 
- -------
.. . I 
Lift availability Whether participant has the option of "[I]f she goes home in 
getting a lift to and from DMU and the evening or 
whether this influences modal choice. something, then I can ... 
get a lift. That would 
influence what I do." (6, 
3,17) 
Job Whether participant has job JOb(Dross) Requirement to wear a particular "Sometimes I need 
requirements (e.g. needing smart style of dress during the working day smart dress for 
clothes) that influence modal choice. as an influence on modal choice. meetings during the 
day, so I can't really 
cycle." (22, 1, ~ 
JOb(DrivO) Requirement to drive for work during "This morning I chose 
the working day. the car for a couple of 
reasons. I had to bring 
some stuff in and I 
might be moving some 
stuff around during the 
dc!y:" 15, 1, 61 
Job(parking) Requirement to drive because "Er, and in order to 
employer demands retention of retain hold of certain 
parking spaces. quality parking spaces, 
if you like, they said you 
must have a parking 
space." (8, 1, 6) 
Season Whether the season of the year affects "Over winter I walk ... 
travel mode choice. but in the summer, I 
have started to think 
'Oh, it's light enough to 
cycle'." (1, 1,2) 
w 
